

SPICILEGIUM SACRUM LOVANIENSE
ÉTUDES ET DOCUMENTS
FASCICULE 47

JOHN PHILOPONUS
AND THE CONTROVERSIES
OVER CHALCEDON
IN THE SIXTH CENTURY

A STUDY AND TRANSLATION OF THE *ARBITER*

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LEUVEN
SPICILEGIUM SACRUM LOVANIENSE
RAVENSTRAAT 98

PEETERS
2001

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ISBN 90-429-1024-0

D. 2001/0602/46

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is my pleasure to express my gratitude to all those who contributed in many ways to the completion of this book, which originated as a doctoral thesis at the University of Oxford. First I would like to thank Dr Mark Edwards, who initiated me into the study of Patristics and supervised the growth of my thesis with his gentle guidance and generous encouragement. Dr Sebastian Brock gave me indispensable support in matters of Syriac language and literature. I greatly profited from the discussions with Professor Michael Frede, who showed considerable interest in my work and provided stimulating criticism, in particular regarding my treatment of ancient philosophy. I am indebted to Fr Joseph Munitiz, S.J., for his help with the manuscript research on which my edition of the Philoponus-fragments in Nicetas is based. Mr George Karamanolis kindly permitted me to draw on the results of his research on Porphyry in chapter seven. I would like to thank Dr Lionel Wickham and Fr Brian Daley, S.J., for examining my thesis in August 1999 and for providing valuable suggestions for its improvement. My translation of Philoponus' *Arbiter* owes much to Lionel Wickham, who carefully checked my rendering of the Syriac.

I am happy to acknowledge my debt to all those who read parts of this book and offered their criticism regarding its contents and style, Fr Thomas Weinandy, O.F.M.Cap., Fr Gabriel Flynn, Dr Johannes Zachhuber, Dr Nicholas Healy, Dr Daniel Keating, and, most of all, Mr Richard Dobbins. They helped to improve the diction of the author, who encountered the difficulties of writing in a language other than his native tongue. I also profited much from discussing matters of Patristic theology with them.

I am grateful to those institutions without which this project could not have been undertaken, above all the *alma mater Oxoniensis*, and in particular Saint John's College. Thanks are due to the *Stiftung Maximilianum* and its former *Vorstand*, Mr Hans Angerer, the *Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes*, the British Academy, and the *Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst* for their financial support over the years. The Bodleian Library in Oxford, the British Library in London, the Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris and the Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana in Florence furnished me with micro-

films and photocopies of the manuscripts I needed. I am grateful to Fr Peter Willi, F.S.O., Rector of the Seminary *Collegium Paulinum* in Rome, for his generous hospitality, which enabled me to explore the treasures of the Vatican Library.

Finally, kind thanks are due to my brethren in the Oratory of St Philip Neri who generously provide me with the opportunity for further study and research. This book is dedicated to Tante Marie *piae memoriae*.

Vienna, Candlemas 2001

ABBREVIATIONS

ACO	<i>Acta Conciliorum Œcumenicorum</i> , ed. E. Schwartz, Berlin 1914-40 – J. Straub, Berlin 1971-84 – R. Riedinger, Berlin 1984-95
CCG	<i>Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca</i> , Turnhout 1977ff.
CCL	<i>Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina</i> , Turnhout 1953ff.
CPG	<i>Clavis Patrum Graecorum</i> , ed. M. Geerard, Turnhout 1974ff.
CSEL	<i>Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum</i> , Wien 1866ff.
CSCO	<i>Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, Romae et al.</i> 1903ff.
GCS	<i>Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte</i> , Leipzig – Berlin 1898ff.
LCL	<i>Loeb Classical Library</i> , Cambridge, Mass. – London 1912ff.
PG	<i>Patrologiae Cursus Completus</i> , accurate J.-P. Migne, <i>Series Graeca</i> Paris 1857ff.
PL	<i>Patrologiae Cursus Completus</i> , accurate J.-P. Migne, <i>Series Latina</i> , Paris 1841ff.
PO	<i>Patrologia Orientalis</i> , Paris 1907ff.
SC	<i>Sources Chrétiennes</i> , Paris 1941ff.
SVF	<i>Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta</i> , collegit Ioannes ab Arnim, 4 vol., Leipzig 1903-24

ET English translation

Greek and Latin texts are usually quoted in the original language. An English translation is provided when it seems expedient to illustrate a specific point of the passage in question. Syriac texts are generally cited in English translation. Unless otherwise noted, the translations are my own.

In the case of primary sources references are usually made to the texts in the original language or in an ancient translation (Latin, Greek, Syriac); square brackets [] indicate translations of Syriac texts into Latin and modern languages.

I

THE CHRISTOLOGY OF JOHN PHILOPONUS

1 Introduction

The Alexandrian polymath John Philoponus (c. 490–575 AD) is best known to scholars as the outstanding philosopher from the Neoplatonic school of Ammonius Hermeiou (435/445–517/526 AD) and prolific commentator on Aristotle who launched an overall attack on the dominant Aristotelian scientific world-view of his day. Among historians of ancient thought his reputation as one of the most original thinkers of late antiquity has been established for some time. Philoponus the Christian theologian, however, has not attracted such scholarly enthusiasm. Patristic research often concentrated on the intricacies of the Trinitarian and Christological debates of the fourth and fifth centuries, and was inclined to underestimate the gravity of the controversies in the aftermath of the Council of Chalcedon in 451. This has changed in recent years, and considerable attention is now given to post-Chalcedonian Christology. It is one of the major achievements of the monumental work by the late A. Grillmeier to have gathered together the highly specialised research undertaken in various departments of academia. Still, only a few, far from comprehensive studies have been devoted to the specifically Christian doctrines of the Alexandrian philosopher and lay-theologian Philoponus.

1.1 *John Philoponus: Philosopher and Christian Theologian*

There are two plausible explanations for the sobriquet “Philoponus”. Φιλόπωνος was a name given to studious scholars in antiquity because of its literal meaning “lover of work”. Damascius praised the φιλοπονία of various Neoplatonists in his *Life of Isidore* (written around 500 AD)¹. Athanasius quoted approvingly from the “labour-loving (φιλοπόνου) Origen”; it is likely that this had already been a well-known epithet of Origen, whom Epiphanius of Salamis branded with the hostile version ματαιόπωνος, “he who strives in vain”². In the same way our author’s name was changed in the long catalogue of heretics

¹ See Zintzen’s word index in his edition of Damascius, *Vitae Isidori Reliquiae*, s. v. φιλοπονία, φιλόπωνος.

² Athanasius, *De Decretis* 27,1: 23.19 Opitz; Epiphanius, *Panarion*, haer. 64,63,8: GCS 31,501.8.

compiled by Sophronius of Jerusalem in his *Synodical Letter* to Sergius of Constantinople. Here we read the entry Φιλόπονος, μᾶλλον δὲ Ματαιόπονος³. Alternatively, Philoponus might have belonged to a community of very committed Christian lay workers who lived together in a sort of guild called the *Philoponeion*. They engaged in various activities for the Alexandrian church, among them works of charity and anti-pagan apologetics⁴. Since John's membership of the *philoponoi* is not documented in any extant source, this suggestion remains unproven. As for which of these two reasons Philoponus received his name, no scholarly consensus has been reached⁵. Another student of Ammonius, Simplicius, tells us that John himself used the name "Grammarian" – which Simplicius then exploits in his polemics against him⁶.

As for Philoponus' Christian faith, there was no necessity that this should conflict with his philosophical profession. The exposition of pagan philosophers by Christians was at least as old as the fourth century, as the Emperor Julian's edict against this practice indicates. The Alexandrian Neoplatonists were by no means as fiercely opposed to Christianity as the Athenian school under Proclus (c. 411–485 AD) and his successors, until they ceased teaching there in 529 AD⁷. That the Alexandrian rapprochement of Christianity and philosophy was not appreciated in Athenian Neoplatonist circles is reflected by Damascius' critique of Ammonius, who himself had attended Proclus' lectures in Athens. Damascius accuses Ammonius of being so avaricious as to come to agreements with the Christian authorities for the sake of making money⁸. We do not know, however, what exactly provoked the wrath of Damascius. Had Ammonius arranged to teach philosophy courses to ec-

³ Sophronius of Jerusalem, *Ep. Syn.*: ACO ser II, II.1,480.14-5. This letter was included in the acts of the Third Council of Constantinople in 680/1.

⁴ Cf. Wipszycka (1970), Trombley II (1994), 1-51. The main source for this is Zachariah's *Vita* of Severus of Antioch, who, as a student in Alexandria, belonged to the *philoponoi*, while himself still being a catechumen.

⁵ The issue is discussed by Sorabji (1987), 5-6, and Hainthaler. in Grillmeier (1990b), 111-2.

⁶ Simplicius, *In De Caelo*: 119.7.

⁷ The precise circumstances surrounding the last days of the school at Athens in the reign of Justinian are far from clear. The often-restated view that the academy was closed and the professors had to leave the city as the result of an anti-pagan edict issued by the zealous Emperor has been challenged with compelling arguments by Af Hällström (1994). Such doubts, however, are not new and were expressed as early as 1889 by Gregorovius.

⁸ Damascius, *Vita Isidori*, in Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 242, 292: VI,53 Henry (= fr. 316 Zintzen). Cf. Sorabji (1987), 1-2.

clesiastics or, as H. Chadwick suggested, had he “simply shown his face in the cathedral”⁹?

It is still debated whether Philoponus was born and reared a Christian or whether he converted at some point during his life. The name “John” certainly suggests the former. There was a tendency in scholarship to distinguish the “pagan” from the “Christian” Philoponus, mainly under the impact of A. Gudeman’s and W. Kroll’s article in *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie* of 1916¹⁰. Those who argued for distinct pagan and Christian periods in Philoponus’ life divided his writings into two groups: the earlier ones which are concerned with problems of pagan philosophy and the later ones which deal with questions of Christian theology. In a magisterial article of 1953, however, É. Evrard made a strong case that such a division is contrary to what we know from Philoponus’ literary career¹¹. The Alexandrian’s attack on the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world containing the distinctively Christian view that matter itself had a beginning is already found in his commentary on Aristotle’s *Physics* which dates from the year 517. In addition to that, Philoponus mentions in this commentary that he has produced these arguments (θεωρήματα) before¹². Evrard concluded from this fact that there must have been a lost work with the title *Symmikta Theôrêmata*. Moreover, we know that at least one of Philoponus’ “purely” philosophical writings, his commentary on Aristotle’s *Meteorology*, was composed after the major Christian treatise *On the Eternity of the World against Proclus*. This work aimed at a refutation of Proclus’ arguments that the world had no beginning in time. Philoponus saw in them an assault on the Christian faith and felt obliged to encounter them.

Those who attacked Philoponus’ “tritheistic” doctrine of the Trinity, which he adopted later in his literary career – while they usually saw in tritheism an intrusion of pagan thought into Christian theology – never questioned the sincerity of his supposed conversion nor accused him of falling back into the paganism to which he might once have adhered. The latter would have been a convenient point to be scored in polemics¹³. Significantly, an anti-tritheist treatise in Syriac which contains extracts from Philoponus’ writings on the Trinity is entitled:

⁹ Cited by Blumenthal (1986a), 323.

¹⁰ Gudeman–Kroll (1916), 1769–72.

¹¹ Evrard (1953).

¹² Philoponus, *In Phys.*: 55.26.

¹³ This was noted by Martin (1959), 34; cf. Hainthaler, in Grillmeier (1990b), 110–1.

*Solution of questions which have slanderously been composed by one of those who have fallen into the heresy which confesses in the holy and consubstantial Trinity a plurality of substances and of natures; this is a product of pagan polytheism*¹⁴.

This title could be read as saying that Philoponus had lapsed into paganism. However, the charge against Philoponus does not seem to be *apostasy* from the Christian faith, but rather *heresy*. It could certainly be objected that such a neat distinction is not always drawn in polemics. At any rate, it is not clear whether or not the author of this treatise insinuates that Philoponus relapsed into former pagan beliefs.

While the crude schematisation of earlier scholarship has been superseded, the debate has been complicated since K. Verrycken presented a modified version of the thesis that there were distinct pagan and Christian periods in Philoponus' life¹⁵. Verrycken's starting-point is the observation that there are three passages in the *Physics Commentary* where Philoponus refers to the eighth book of this work in which he refutes the doctrine that motion, and thus the world, are eternal¹⁶. These references do not agree with the content of the extant fragments from the eighth book of the *Physics Commentary*¹⁷. Moreover, there are a few passages in the text of this commentary where he affirms the eternity of the world. Verrycken takes this as evidence that there was a second redaction of the *Physics Commentary* which indicates a shift in Philoponus' thought. According to Verrycken's complex hypothesis, the young Christian Philoponus was attracted by the philosophical school in Alexandria which he entered in around 510, and converted to Neoplatonism. The first redaction of the *Physics Commentary* falls in this period of his life. In 529 there occurred "a return (on the level of doctrine) to Christianity"¹⁸, yet for opportunistic reasons, since the authorities of the Church exerted pressure upon him under the impact of Justinian's anti-pagan policy. Philoponus did not want to abandon his philosophical career and demonstrated his orthodoxy by composing *On*

¹⁴ Van Roey (1980), 145.

¹⁵ Verrycken (1990) attempts to reconstruct two different metaphysical systems in the writings of Philoponus, the Neoplatonist one of "Philoponus I" (before 529) – which is that of his teacher Ammonius – and the Christian one of "Philoponus II". For a comprehensive presentation of Verrycken's argument see his projected two-volume study in Flemish, the first part of which has already been published (1994).

¹⁶ Philoponus, *In Phys.*: 458.30-1, 639.7-9, 762.7-9.

¹⁷ They are part of the *Excerpta Veneta*, *In Phys.*: 882-7.

¹⁸ Verrycken (1990), 240.

the Eternity of the World against Proclus. This reconstruction rests upon an anecdote which obtained currency among Arabic philosophers and can be found in as-Sijistani and al-Farabi; its origin is obscure. According to one version of this piece of anti-Christian polemics, Philoponus engaged in his refutations of Aristotle and Proclus "in order to pacify the wrath of his fellow Christians, aroused by his preoccupation with the exegesis of Aristotle's works, and to protect himself against their threats of diverse forms of duress"¹⁹; according to another version, Philoponus received financial reward from the Christians for writing the two works²⁰.

There are many problems with Verrycken's reconstruction²¹. He attempts to explain the genesis of Philoponus' thought with biographical motives which are drawn from an anecdote. Such anecdotes were current in the Arabic tradition and had obviously been provoked by the illustrious personality of the Alexandrian philosopher and Christian theologian. The stories told about Philoponus are certainly picturesque; their historical value, however, is more than doubtful²². The polemical drift of the Arabic anecdote adduced by Verrycken is obvious. It is meant to discredit Philoponus' turn against the contemporary Aristotelian scientific world view as insincere, prompted by external pressure or even bribery. Verrycken would like to avoid this conclusion and is obliged to overturn the point of the anecdote. He concedes some genuine aspiration in Philoponus to present "his new theories as part of a larger

¹⁹ Kraemer (1965), 322.

²⁰ See Verrycken (1990), 258-63.

²¹ Many of Verrycken's arguments have been refuted convincingly, as I think, by Scholten (1996), 118-43. Curiously, Scholten misjudges the point of MacCoull (1995a), who also rejects Verrycken's hypothesis. My criticism of Verrycken is indebted to an unpublished paper by C. Wildberg, "Hermeneutics of Science in Simplicius and Philoponus".

²² According to the charming legend recorded by Meyerhof (1930), 398, Philoponus was a poor ferryman who used to transport the professors of the Alexandrian school to the island where the "house of science" stood. While listening to their discussions, he received an invincible inclination towards the study of philosophy. He was taught perseverance while observing an ant trying the whole day long to drag a date pit up a hill in vain but only succeeding in the evening. Thus John sold his boat and took up his studies. According to another anecdote which is set after the capture of Alexandria by the Arabs, Philoponus directed the attention of the new rulers to the famous library of the city. The Caliph Omar decided that the books should be destroyed, for "if what is written in them agrees with the Book of God, they are not required: if it disagrees, they are not desired". Thus the treasures of the Alexandrian library were burnt as fuel for heating in the baths of the city. If this anecdote were true, Philoponus would have lived to see the Arab invasion of Egypt in 642. See Butler (1978), 401-26.

programme” and to establish “Christian philosophical *teaching*” in Alexandria²³.

As noted by C. Scholten, Verrycken’s method suffers from a crucial deficiency. Reading Philoponus’ commentaries on Aristotle, it is indispensable to distinguish between where he is simply elaborating on the argument of the author and where he is stating his own views. Evrard put it aptly:

Un exégète est inévitablement amené à répéter certaines thèses de l’auteur qu’il explique, sans pouvoir les critiquer chaque fois qu’il les rencontre²⁴.

All the passages which Verrycken singles out as indicators of different strata of redaction are more easily read as expositions of Aristotle’s thought²⁵. It is not justifiable to apply the tools of literary criticism before having undertaken a complete analysis which distinguishes between Philoponus’ exegesis of Aristotle and his own argument²⁶.

My principal objection to Verrycken’s hypothetical reconstruction is his assumption that Philoponus’ literary activity as a Christian theologian was only prompted by an opportunistic attempt to present himself as an apologist for Christianity. If one studies Philoponus’ doctrinal writings on the Trinity, on Christology and on the resurrection, one cannot but notice the sincerity and commitment with which he applied himself to these theological subjects. In fact, he was willing to break away from the miaphysite²⁷ communion and endure the anathema for the sake of his rather abstruse Trinitarian doctrine. It is extremely difficult to see in all this just a clever camouflage to conform to the militantly anti-pagan climate of Justinian’s reign. There is, then, reasonable evidence to say that Philoponus, also known to the Latin Middle Ages as *Johannes Christianus*²⁸, had always been a Christian.

Still, it seems that there was a transition in Philoponus’ life from being a philosopher to being a theologian, since he apparently began to

²³ Verrycken (1990), 263.

²⁴ Evrard (1953), 355.

²⁵ Scholten (1996), 139.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 142.

²⁷ A note on terminology. It is a historical anachronism to summarise the different anti-Chalcedonian factions as “monophysites”, thus using a derogatory term which seems to have been coined in the seventh century in analogy to the older “diphysite”. Chalcedonian orthodoxy had a variety of collective names for its adversaries like “Eutychians”, “Dioscorians”, “Severians”, or διακρινόμενοι; cf. Schwartz (1934), 171. I shall follow the use of Grillmeier (1989), 162-3, who speaks of “miaphysites” when referring to the post-Chalcedonian defenders of a μία-φύσις Christology.

²⁸ See Grabmann (1929), 7.

write theological works only in his later years. That the picture is not quite so clear-cut has been made plausible by C. Wildberg. He has shown that already the earlier *Against Aristotle*, composed soon after the *Against Proclus* between 530 and 533/4, contained significant elements of Christian doctrine. Wildberg concludes that there is only a gradual "transition of emphasis" in Philoponus' *œuvre* from philosophy to theology and suggests that the Alexandrian "cherished his dual interest throughout his intellectual development"²⁹.

One might detect a transition of some degree in Philoponus' literary career to writings which engage in theological controversies, most notably over the Christology of Chalcedon and over the doctrine of the Trinity. But this theological engagement does not exclude the "dual interest" claimed by Wildberg. In fact, Philoponus' doctrinal treatises have a philosophical character (at least to some extent), which reflects his firm conviction that in contemporary debates much clarification can be achieved by terminological precision and rational argument. The subject of the *Treatise to Sergius*, written between 557/8 and 560/1³⁰, is not explicitly theological. However, its Christological application would have been obvious for readers who were familiar with the *Arbiter*, Philoponus' major miaphysite work.

An interesting hypothesis has been presented by E. Booth. He sees a "conversion" in Philoponus from the commonly accepted Neoplatonic metaphysics to a "radical Aristotelianism". Regarding the ontological status of universals, Philoponus endorsed an interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* after the pattern of Alexander of Aphrodisias. According to Booth, this adoption of "nominalism" then led to Philoponus' "virtual tritheism"³¹. Intriguingly, it had already been suggested by J. M. Schönfelder that in this respect Philoponus anticipated Roscelin of Compiègne, whose teaching on the Trinity was strongly attacked for dissolving the divine unity by Anselm of Canterbury³². Not even in the case of

²⁹ Wildberg (1987), 209. Cf. also his comprehensive study on Philoponus' criticism of Aristotle's theory of aether (1988).

³⁰ My reasons for this dating are given in chapter three, below pp. 32f. Verrycken (1990), 243₅₃, sees in the first sentence of this treatise ("The request and the recollection of your God-fearing chastity, O presbyter Sergius, excites us again to rational contests, in that you are asking how we conceive of parts being in a whole". 81.6-8 Šanda) an indication of Philoponus' retirement from his teaching activities at the Alexandrian Neoplatonic school in 529. Such an inference is by no means compelling.

³¹ Booth (1982) and (1983), 56-61.

³² Schönfelder (1862), 288 and 295-6; also Grabmann I (1909), 293-306.

Roscelin, however, is it wholly evident that the problems with his Trinitarian theology originated from a "nominalist" understanding of universals. For the late eleventh century, to speak of "nominalism" seems anachronistic, and it certainly is for the sixth century³³. Generally speaking, it is questionable whether one's views on the ontological status of universals affect one's theology of the Trinity in such a way. On the one hand, nominalism does not necessarily entail tritheism. On the other hand, the unity of the Trinity is by no means satisfactorily accounted for by a Platonic realism. Moreover, the force of Booth's argument is seriously impaired by the fact that his case for Philoponus' "radical Aristotelianism" is mainly based on the *Scholia on Metaphysics*, which have been shown to be spurious. S. Ebbesen has argued that they must have been composed after Michael of Ephesus and thus after 1100³⁴.

1.2 Literature on Philoponus' Christology

Only fragments from the original Greek text of Philoponus' Christological treatises have come down to us. Our apprehension of his thought is therefore largely based on an extant ancient Syriac version (see my chapter on the manuscript evidence below pp. 15ff.). It appears that this text was not studied in depth before the twentieth century. J. M. Schönfelder's essay "Die Tritheiten" of 1862³⁵ provided a good account of the Greek extracts in John Damascene, but made no use of the Syriac material. In the 1920s G. Furlani dedicated a number of pieces to Philoponus' minor treatises, some of which he edited and translated on the basis of the Syriac manuscripts³⁶. Furlani's comments are often very useful, and I shall resort to them time and again in the course of this monograph.

In spite of all these valuable efforts, scholarship was in need of a complete edition of Philoponus' Christological treatises. This was eventually achieved in 1930, when A. Šanda published the Syriac text of the *Opuscula Monophysitica Ioannis Philoponi*, together with an introduc-

³³ On Roscelin see now Mews (1992); cf. Lloyd (1990), 68-75 on "The myth of a Neoplatonic nominalism" and "The Aristotelianism of Byzantine Neoplatonism".

³⁴ Ebbesen (1981), III, 86-7.

³⁵ Appended to his German translation of John of Ephesus, Schönfelder (1862), 267-311.

³⁶ Furlani (1920), (1921-2), (1922), (1923). These articles are published in Italian journals which are not easily accessible. As this was apparently the case even in his lifetime, Furlani himself gave a useful overview of his studies of Syriac philosophical writings, in an article in 1926.

tion, a synopsis of their content, and a Latin translation. Šanda's pioneering work is in general reliable (I shall mention the few points where the text has to be emended) and a constant point of reference for any study of our subject³⁷. Even before that book was published, however, T. Hermann had undertaken a study of Philoponus' Christology on the basis of his own manuscript research. Hermann's paper, which was published in the same year as Šanda's edition, still remains the most extensive treatment of the topic. The main part of his erudite article consists in a terminological analysis of the key concepts in Philoponus' Christology (such as φύσις, οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, ἔνωσις) in abstraction from the argumentative context where they appear. It is one of Hermann's merits that he indicates how Philoponus employed arguments from his commentaries on Aristotle in his defence of miaphysite Christology. Regarding his theological method, Philoponus could be compared with Leontius of Byzantium, the protagonist of the "scholastic" theology which emerged in the sixth century. Hermann's judgment of this *théologie savante*, however, is thoroughly negative³⁸.

In 1967, W. Böhm published a book with selections from Philoponus' philosophical and theological writings in a German translation. In his introduction, Böhm gives an appreciation of Philoponus' achievements in reconciling Christian theology and science.

M. Lutz-Bachmann's unpublished doctoral thesis of 1983 on the theological works of Boethius (known as *Opuscula sacra*) contains a chapter on Philoponus³⁹. His treatment is to a large extent indebted to Hermann and does not offer much new insight into the Christology of the Alexandrian philosopher. A concise presentation of Philoponus' theological works is given in a short essay by H. Chadwick, which is part of the important collection edited by R. Sorabji in 1987. Chadwick follows the development of Philoponus' thought on Christ in its historical setting. A. Grillmeier's monumental study of Patristic Christology includes a chapter dedicated to Philoponus, written by T. Hainthaler⁴⁰. Hainthaler

³⁷ Šanda's edition was printed in Beyrouth, apparently in a very small number, so that it is quite difficult to obtain a copy today.

³⁸ Hermann (1930), 258: "Es ist ein kühles Dokument, das mit Syllogismen für den eigenen Glauben zu werben sucht. ... Der Philosoph führt überall die Feder, d. h. der Interpret des Aristoteles. ... der Verstand steht am Anfang und Ende, die Bibelworte sind an den Fingern abzuzählen und die Sprache ist streng und kalt. Abhandlungen im wahren Sinne des Wortes hat er seiner Kirche dargeboten"; cf. *ibid.*, 264.

³⁹ Lutz-Bachmann (1983), 116-55.

⁴⁰ Hainthaler, in Grillmeier (1990b), 109-49.

provides an excellent survey of the present state of research on this topic. In a way similar to Hermann, she concentrates on the key terms in Philoponus' Christology and also adduces material from his commentaries on Aristotle.

Several interesting contributions to the debate have been made recently by the American papyrologist L. S. B. MacCoull. While much scholarship has been concerned with a terminological and conceptual analysis of Philoponus' writings, MacCoull looks at the work of the Alexandrian philosopher and theologian in the context of the social and cultural history of Byzantine Egypt, as it is known to us mainly from papyrological sources. She argues that Philoponus chose particular philosophical texts and problems as objects of his work in order to provide the nascent Coptic Church with arguments against the supporters of Chalcedonian Christology. Thus MacCoull perceives in Philoponus' commentaries on Aristotle a polemical Christological context, for instance, when he discusses the soul-body relationship in his *De Anima Commentary*:

No sixth-century Egyptian audience could have followed an exposition of these states of involvement without being aware of what the discussion was in the deepest sense about⁴¹.

This new approach can bear fruit for our understanding of Philoponus' thought. There are, however, problems in the underlying assumptions. MacCoull presupposes that Philoponus was "bilingual" and was a fluent Coptic speaker – which cannot be sustained by any evidence⁴². It is also highly doubtful whether there was anything like a "Monophysite logic apparatus"⁴³.

In another article, where MacCoull attempts to substantiate her thesis by an analysis of Philoponus' commentaries on Aristotle's *De Anima* and *De Generatione et Corruptione*, one can distinguish between two claims she makes. The stronger claim says (a) that it "would have been obvious to every Christian Egyptian reader of this text what the discussion really was about, and who the subject of the 'mixture' really was". The weaker claim says (b) that this "seemingly traditional, in fact radically original analysis lends itself aptly to Christology"⁴⁴. While (a)

⁴¹ MacCoull (1995a), 51.

⁴² Note her careful statements a few years earlier: "Whether they [sc. the *Opuscula Monophysitica*] were ever translated into Coptic, and whether Philoponus himself was bilingual, are questions we cannot answer for lack of evidence", MacCoull (1987), 164.

⁴³ MacCoull (1995a), 58.

⁴⁴ MacCoull (1995b), 199 and 200.

seems more than implausible – and far from being verifiable – (b) is possible. This does not mean, however, that this philosophical account of mixture was already written with a Christological “application” in mind. What we can say at best is that Philoponus, when faced with dogmatic issues, found certain points he had developed in his commentaries on Aristotle helpful for his argument. MacCoull makes much of the allegedly Coptic background to Philoponus’ mixture-terminology. Since I am not familiar with this language, I cannot judge the validity of her argument, but it seems that in her observations there is nothing which could not be explained more easily with contemporary Greek usage⁴⁵.

1.3 *Scope and Method of This Study*

The last part of this introductory chapter will be devoted to a few points of methodology, which will guide my treatment of the subject-matter. I shall also set out in brief the sequence of chapters in this monograph.

The primary sources for Philoponus’ Christology are the treatises which were edited by Šanda under the title *Opuscula Monophysitica*. We know of another major work by Philoponus on Christology, his polemical *Four Tmēmata against Chalcedon*, which have come down to us only in excerpts contained in Michael the Syrian’s *Chronicle*. The compiler of this summary version states that he put Philoponus’ arguments “in order” and left out those parts of the treatise which he considered unimportant⁴⁶. From what we have in Michael the Syrian, it seems that the *Tmēmata* were largely concerned with canonical and ecclesio-political questions. This is obvious, for example, from Philoponus’ criticism of the proceedings at Chalcedon and from his invectives against the primacy of the Bishop of Rome. His polemics against Chalcedon are centred around the issue known as the “Three Chapters”. On a more specifically doctrinal level, Philoponus attempts to demonstrate that the anathemas of the Second Council of Constantinople in 553 (which are

⁴⁵ Ibid., 201-3; cf. the criticism by Scholten (1996), 143, and (1997), I,21-2. MacCoull (1995c), 393, clearly overstates her case: “Philoponus had composed his commentaries on Aristotle’s *Gen. et Corr.* and *Cat.* specifically to give Egyptian Monophysites an adequate set of tools for analysing these notions more correctly than either the Chalcedonians or the Aphthartodocetists were doing”.

⁴⁶ *Tmēmata*: IV,238 [II,121] Chabot.

quoted extensively) really overturned Chalcedon itself. It is difficult to say whether the concentration on issues of that kind is a faithful representation of Philoponus' treatise, or whether the compiler singled these parts out for his own purposes. It is obvious, however, that the doctrinal argument in these extracts is much less subtle and differentiated than the one in the *Opuscula Monophysitica*⁴⁷, and I am inclined to see in this the hand of the compiler rather than Philoponus himself being carried away by his undeniable relish for polemics.

Hence my interpretation of Philoponus' Christology in this monograph will be based on the *Opuscula Monophysitica*. The *Tmēmata* will be adduced only as subsidiary evidence. Regarding the question of method, I shall not proceed in the manner of a terminological analysis of *physis*, *ousia*, *hypostasis* and the like in abstraction from the argumentative context (as Hermann and Hainthaler did). Instead, I suggest that we follow Philoponus' argument in his major treatise, the *Arbiter*. Moreover, I shall discern the development of some of Philoponus' positions in the course of the controversy, as is evident from his minor treatises which were written after the *Arbiter*.

The following chapters will largely be concerned with philological and historical issues. In chapter two, I shall examine the manuscript evidence for Philoponus' Christological treatises, both for the ancient Syriac version and for the Greek extracts from the *Arbiter* which have been transmitted in various sources. Chapter three will deal with the chronology and historical context of Philoponus' Christological works. Questions of dating will give me the starting-point for locating these writings in the course of events surrounding the Second Council of Constantinople in 553. My fourth chapter will consist in an analysis of the *Arbiter*. I shall follow Philoponus' complex argument and elucidate it mainly from two groups of sources. On the one hand, it will be set in the context of the Christological debates of the fifth and sixth centuries. This will include both the Alexandrian tradition, shaped by Cyril and appropriated by Severus of Antioch, and the Antiochene tradition, as represented by Theodore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret of Cyrus. Moreover, I shall refer to the positions of contemporary theologians, such as Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem, who played an important role in the controversies over the Christology of Chal-

⁴⁷ This is so esp. with his statements about nature and hypostasis, see chapter four, below pp. 60ff.

cedon. On the other hand, it will be seen to what extent Philoponus is indebted to the tradition of Neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle, notably his own, but also those of his contemporaries, insofar as they can shed light on the problems discussed. This analysis will present a fairly comprehensive picture of Philoponus' Christological argument. In the fifth chapter, this picture will be supplemented by an account of Philoponus' defence of the doctrine put forward in the *Arbiter*. At certain points he felt obliged to correct, or at least to clarify, his previous statements, and it will be instructive to examine the reasons for this revision.

Philoponus' defence of miaphysitism largely rests on the paradigm of the soul-body relationship for the divine-human union in Christ. The sixth chapter will be dedicated to a wider-ranging enquiry as to how this paradigm was used in Christology before and after Chalcedon. This will lead to a re-appraisal of Philoponus' thought in chapter seven, where I shall discuss his treatment of the soul-body relationship in his philosophical commentaries and its significance for Christology. In the eighth chapter, the results of the preceding analyses will help to portray Philoponus as one of the protagonists of the *théologie savante* of his age. The question will be raised whether his specific way of using philosophical argument in theology is profitable. Finally, I shall reflect upon the relationship between his Christology and the Council of Chalcedon.

The second part of this book contains a translation of Philoponus' *Arbiter* from the extant Greek fragments and from the ancient Syriac version, and a critical edition of new fragments from the original text which I have identified in the Byzantine author Nicetas Choniates.

2 The Textual Evidence for Philoponus' Christological Treatises

2.1 *The Manuscripts of the Ancient Syriac Version*

The Christological works of John Philoponus (*Arbiter*, *Epitome of the Arbiter*, *Two Apologies on behalf of the Arbiter*, *Treatise on the Whole and its Parts to the Presbyter Sergius*, *Treatise on Difference, Number and Division*⁴⁸, *Letter to Justinian*), originally written in Greek, have come

⁴⁸ The authenticity of this treatise is disputed, see the discussion in chapter three below pp. 33ff.

down to us *in toto* only in an ancient Syriac version. Šanda's edition of the Syriac text under the title *Opuscula Monophysitica Ioannis Philoponi* is based on the manuscripts Vaticanus Syriacus 144 and British Library Add. 12,171 (plus Add. 14,532 for the *Treatise to Sergius*).

Vaticanus Syriacus 144

The only complete codex of Philoponus' Christological works is Vat. Syr. 144⁴⁹. The age of this beautifully written manuscript has been disputed, though it is obvious that it must be of an early date. Šanda suggested the eighth century, while J.-B. Chabot argued for a date in the early tenth century and claimed that the manuscript was one of those which Moses of Nisibis had brought from Mesopotamia to a monastery in Scetis (in the Wâdi'n Natrûn). Chabot concluded this from the hardly legible note on fol. 90^v of the manuscript⁵⁰. This note, however, does not say anything about Moses of Nisibis at all. What is legible is something about not removing books from the library. Vat. Syr. 144 is not mentioned as part of Moses' collection in H. G. Evelyn White's book on the monasteries of the Wâdi'n Natrûn⁵¹. Even if this note did once mention Moses, it is presumably later than the original hand of the codex, and thus cannot tell us anything about its date⁵². While no absolute certainty on the age of the manuscript can be attained, Šanda's proposal, that it was written in the eighth century, seems plausible⁵³.

The first two pages of Vat. Syr. 144 are damaged, most likely by water, as Šanda notes⁵⁴. None the less parts of fol. 1^v – 2^v are still legible. There is also some damage, probably caused by water, on fol. 3^{rb}. Parts of the manuscript contain scholia on the margins, especially on the *Arbiter*, the *Treatise to Sergius*, and the *Treatise on Difference, Number and Division*. On fol. 49^v, the scholiast is identified as Rabban Daniel, presumably the same author who composed the note on Probus, John (Barbur) and the Patriarch Peter (i.e. Peter of Callinicus, Patriarch of Antioch) concerning the distinctions of properties in Christ after the union (fol. 88^v). These scholia

⁴⁹ For a description see Assemani (1759), III, 250-3.

⁵⁰ Chabot, in CSCO 84, III

⁵¹ Evelyn White (1926-33).

⁵² I owe this information to the kindness of Dr S.P. Brock, who, at my request, had a look at the hardly legible fol. 90^v of Vat. Syr. 144.

⁵³ Baumstark (1900), 169, puts it into the ninth century, together with the manuscripts in the British Library. It seems, however, that the Vatican manuscript is older than the other ones.

⁵⁴ Šanda (1930), [3].

seem quite ancient and, as A. Baumstark proposed, might well go back to the eighth century⁵⁵.

Vat. Syr. 144 has the following works by Philoponus:

- 1^{va} ***Arbiter***, with many scholia on the margins.
- 30^{rb} ***Epitome of the Arbiter***, with some scholia on the margins. On fol. 38^{ra} there is the subscription “*The book which is called Arbiter has ended, which is the examiner of the words of the two sides that contend against each other on the Incarnation of God the Logos*”.
- 38^{ra} ***Two Apologies on behalf of the Arbiter***; no scholia on the margins, only a few corrections by the scribe himself, obviously where he made mistakes. “*Again a solution of things in the Arbiter that are doubtful on the part of some*” (fol. 38^{ra}), and “*Again about the fact that some have thought erroneously and have judged that the Arbiter has permitted that Our Lord Christ may be said to be in two natures. Against that I have prepared my whole treatise*” (fol. 45^{va})⁵⁶. At the end of the second apology we read “*The defence concerning some doubts in the Arbiter has ended*”, and, subsequently, “*The book which is called Arbiter, i.e. examiner, has ended*” (fol. 49^{va}).
- 49^{va} ***Treatise on the Whole and its Parts; to the Presbyter Sergius***, with many scholia on the margins⁵⁷.
- 58^{ra} ***Treatise on Difference, Number and Division***, with abundant scholia on the margins.
- 75^{vb} ***Letter to Justinian***; only two marginal comments, apparently by the scribe.
- 80^{rb} Extract from the *Treatise on Difference, Number and Division* (sections 3-14: 97.12–105.12), falsely noted by Assemani as “*Eiusdem ad eundem Justinianum Imperatorem, de divisione, differentia, & numero*”⁵⁸. The heading on 80^{rb} reads: “*Again of the same John Philoponus*”. On 85^{rb} there is a rubric: “*The book of John the Grammarian of Alexandria, who is also called Philoponus, i.e. Lover of Work, ends.*”

⁵⁵ Baumstark (1900), 136.

⁵⁶ Assemani (1759), III, 251, treats the second apology as a separate treatise.

⁵⁷ Curiously, this is not counted as a separate treatise by Assemani (1759), III, 252.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

Brit. Libr. Add. 12,171

This manuscript⁵⁹ was written in 815 AD (1126 *anno Graecorum*), as the note on fol. 64^{vb} says. Unfortunately, parts of this subscription have been erased, so that the name of the scribe and other information are lost. The manuscript contains the following works by Philoponus:

- 1^{va} *Arbiter*, with some scholia on the margins⁶⁰.
- 32^{rb} *Epitome of the Arbiter*, with a few scholia on the margins⁶¹.
- 39^{vb} *Treatise on Difference, Number and Division*.
- 56^{rb} *Treatise on the Whole and its Parts; to the Presbyter Sergius*,
with a few scholia on the margins.

In addition to these two codices, there are a few manuscripts which testify to individual treatises, either as a whole or fragmentarily:

British Library Add. 14,532

This eighth-century manuscript⁶² contains the *Treatise to Sergius* under the title “*Again of the same John Philoponus a treatise: what the difference is between parts and elements and how whole and parts are related to each other*”, without the dedication to Sergius (fol. 166^{rb-va}). There is no subscription (cf. fol. 175^{rb}). The words “*again of the same Philoponus*” apparently refer back to the immediately preceding folios 164^{rb} – 166^{rb}, which have fragments from Philoponus’ treatise *Against Andrew*⁶³.

British Library Add. 14,670

Fol. 2^v – 7^v of this ninth-century codex⁶⁴ contain parts of the *Treatise on Difference*. The title reads “*A treatise on the difference that is acknowledged to be preserved after the union, showing that along with a difference of such kind, number or division is not conceived of, except for the things that subsist on their own and in a proper way*” (2^v). This title is same as in Vat. Syr. 144, fol. 58^{ra}, except that the ascription to Philoponus

⁵⁹ For a description see Wright (1871), II, 587-8.

⁶⁰ The greater part of fol. 8 has been torn away, except for the first eight or nine lines.

⁶¹ Wright (1871), II, 588, is wrong in describing “a short excerpt” on fol. 39^r separately. The section fol. 39^r is still part of the *Epitome*. This had already been noted by Hermann (1930), 212.

⁶² For a description see Wright (1871), II, 955-67.

⁶³ Edited by Van Roey (1979).

⁶⁴ For a description see Wright (1871), II, 588-9.

is lacking⁶⁵. The text is not continuous; there are two gaps, where folios are obviously missing (2^v/3^r and 6^v/7^r). In addition to that, there are a few lacunae. There are many departures from the text established by Šanda on the basis of Vat. Syr. 144, Brit. Libr. 12,171, and Brit. Libr. 14,532. The manuscript breaks off at ܐܘܪܝܬܐ (13: 104.15 Šanda).

Vaticanus Syriacus 145

This codex⁶⁶ contains on fol. 21^r – 22^v the last few sections of the *Treatise on Difference*, starting from ܐܬܠܝܬܐ (34: 119.25 Šanda) and ending ܥܠܡܐ (37: 122.2 Šanda). There is no subscription.

Harvard Syriacus 22

This very badly damaged codex, with the folios in disorder⁶⁷, contains the beginning of the *Letter to Justinian* on fol. 31^{vb} under the title: “*Letter of John the Grammarian, Philoponus of Alexandria, which was written to the Emperor Justinian who had urged him to come up [sc. to Constantinople] on behalf of the unity of the holy churches of God*”. The text following on the last seven lines of this column is, with some variants, that of Vat. Syr. 144, fol. 75^{vb}. The last word on the page, ܐܠܡܐ, is a variant reading of ܐܠܡܐ ܐܠܡܐ (1: 123.6 Šanda). Unfortunately, the rest of the letter is missing, since the text does not continue on the following page.

British Library Add. 17,215

In this palimpsest codex⁶⁸ with mainly liturgical texts, written in the tenth or eleventh century, the running title of the older text is still visible on fol. 23^r: “*The Arbiter of John the Grammarian*”. According to W. Wright, this hand is from about the ninth century.

British Library Add. 14,684

Finally, there is a twelfth- or thirteenth-century manuscript which belongs to those codices described by Wright under the heading “Punctuation” (“Syriac Masora”)⁶⁹. This school of Masorites, almost exclusively

⁶⁵ What this might indicate for the authorship of this work will be explored in chapter three, below pp. 33ff.

⁶⁶ For a description see Assemani (1759), III, 253–64.

⁶⁷ See Brock (1975), 18 and 21, who has drawn attention to this manuscript.

⁶⁸ For a description see Wright (1870), I, 388.

⁶⁹ For a description see *ibid.*, I, 101–15, esp. 114.

from the Jacobite tradition, did not only work on the punctuation of the biblical text, but also of widely read Greek writers, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus, ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite, Severus of Antioch – and indeed John Philoponus. Thus on fol. 92^v words from the *Arbiter* are found, for example, ܐܠܗܐ ܡܠܝܚܐ, ܡܠܝܚܐ ܝܬܐ, ܠܠܝܬܐ ܡܠܝܚܐ. This testifies to the esteem in which Philoponus was held in the Syriac miaphysite communities. He must certainly have been studied until about the ninth century⁷⁰. The fact that most of our manuscripts are not younger than this period suggests that later he was not read and copied any longer. The reason may have been the decline of the knowledge of Greek among Syriac speakers. The Syriac translations of biblical and Patristic texts emerged from a bilingual culture where the source language was strongly privileged⁷¹. When the Greek language dwindled in the Near East, it must have become extremely difficult to make sense of Philoponus in Syriac without recourse to the original text. However, that Philoponus was still occasionally read even in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries seems to be clear from this masoretic manuscript.

Šanda's reputation as an editor of Patristic texts suffered from his inadequate editions of Severus of Antioch⁷². In the case of his pioneering work on Philoponus' Christological treatises, however, the established text is in general reliable, as the study of the Syriac manuscript tradition shows. Occasional corrections will be noted in my translation of the *Arbiter* (see below chapter 9).

2.2 The Greek Fragments

2.2.1 Doctrina Patrum and John of Damascus

Two groups of fragments from the original Greek text of Philoponus' *Arbiter* have come down to us. Excerpts from chapters four and seven are preserved in the late seventh-century florilegium edited by F. Diekamp, *Doctrina Patrum* (chapter 36), under the title: Περὶ φύσεως καὶ ὑποστάσεως, ὅπως οἱ ἐκ Σευήρου δοξάζουσι καὶ ὅπως τὰ μερικά

⁷⁰ Cf. Baumstark (1900), 169, and (1922), 162.

⁷¹ Cf. Brock (1979), 74.

⁷² Šanda edited the *Philalethes* and the anti-Julianist writings of Severus in 1928 and 1931. Hespel, who edited both works again in 1952 and 1964-71, observed that Šanda had taken into consideration only part of the manuscripts, that he had not edited the complete text, and that his conjectures, showing the marks of a superficial recognition of the textual evidence, were often useless.

δογματίζουσιν οὐσίας. These excerpts have found their way into several manuscripts of John Damascene's *Liber de Haeresibus*, as an addition to the 83rd heresy⁷³. Diekamp has convincingly argued that the passages from the *Arbiter*, together with chapters 34 and 35 of the *Doctrina Patrum*, were added to Damascene's original list of 100 heresies. This extended list of 103 heresies formed part of a canonistic collection and was later included in M. Lequien's edition of John of Damascus⁷⁴. In the *Doctrina Patrum*, there are scholia on the passages from Philoponus, but they are not found in the manuscripts of Damascene⁷⁵. The *Ecclesiastical History* of the Byzantine author Nicephorus Callistus (written around 1320) contains a few lines from the *Arbiter* which were most likely extracted from the *Doctrina Patrum* or John of Damascus⁷⁶.

2.2.2 Nicetas Choniates

It has been observed that the chapters 45 to 49 in the eighteenth book of Nicephorus Callistus' *Ecclesiastical History* are based on the *Panoplia Dogmatica* of the late twelfth-century Byzantine theologian, Nicetas Choniates⁷⁷. Nicetas' work, usually known as *Thesaurus Orthodoxiae*, a title given to it by Theodore Scutariotes, is a re-edition of the *Panoplia* of Euthymius Zigabenus who lived in the reign of the Emperor Alexius I (1081–1118). In it Nicetas included further source material in order to give a more comprehensive account of earlier heresies which had only been treated cursorily by Euthymius⁷⁸. Although the text of the *Thesaurus* is still not edited completely, the passage in the ninth book where Nicetas presents various groups opposing the Council of Chalcedon is accessible in A. Mai's *Spicilegium Romanum*. The "exposition of some main points brought forth by the monophysites", which is included in Mai, is not ex-

⁷³ *Doctrina Patrum*: 272-83 Diekamp; John Damascene, *De Haeres*. 83: IV,50-5 Kotter.

⁷⁴ Diekamp (1981), LXXII-LXXIV.

⁷⁵ Curiously, however, they are announced in the two "Editionshandschriften" U (Paris. Gr. 1320) and W (Vindob. Hist. Gr. 56): Ὡς διαλαβεῖν (διαβῆναι W) ἐν ἐπιτομῇ τὴν ἀσέβειαν ἐλογισάμεθα δεῖν παρενθέντες καὶ μικρὰ σχόλια πρὸς ἐλεγμὸν ἀθέου αὐτῶν καὶ παμμιάρου αἰρέσεως (+ αὐτὰ δηλοποιῆσαι W). Τοῦ προασπιστοῦ δὲ (δὲ om. W) αὐτῶν Ἰωάννου, ἐν οἷς μάλιστα ἐναβρόνονται, τὰ δόγματα, μᾶλλον δὲ ληρήματα, παραθήσομαι, IV,50 Kotter, *apparatus*.

⁷⁶ Nicephorus Callistus, *Eccl. Hist.* 18,47 (PG 147,425B-427A). This is a fairly close rendering of the *Arbiter* VII,22-3: 52.59-53.92 Kotter with less than twenty departures from the established text of the *Doctrina Patrum* and of John Damascene. On Nicephorus cf. Beck (1959), 705-7.

⁷⁷ Winkelmann (1994), 443; on Nicetas cf. Beck (1959) 663-4.

⁷⁸ See van Dieten (1970), 43-8.

plicitly said to be a citation from Philoponus' *Arbiter*. However, a close comparison with the text of Šanda's edition (and, in one case, with the Greek preserved in John Damascene) shows that Nicetas has combined quotations from Philoponus to form a continuous argument⁷⁹. Since these extracts are not contained in Euthymius, it can reasonably be assumed that the *Arbiter* in its original language was still available to Nicetas, when in the late twelfth century he added further source material to his history of the anti-Chalcedonian party. It remains for us to speculate why and when the original Greek text of the *Arbiter* ceased to be known. As G. Dorival remarked in his presentation of new Greek fragments from writings of Severus of Antioch, the survival and disappearance of Patristic works in the Byzantine Middle Ages is clothed in great obscurity. Indeed he made a good case that Severus was still known and read in Byzantium until the tenth century⁸⁰. Nicetas' carefully selected extracts are a very valuable source for the original Greek text of the *Arbiter* and confirm the reliability of Šanda's edition.

3 The Chronology and Historical Context of Philoponus' Christological Works

If one attempts to establish a chronology of Philoponus' Christological works, one has to take into account the difficulty that we do not have any external evidence for their date of composition. The content of the treatises provides a few indications that will serve to build up a relative chronology. References to decisive events in the contemporary Christological controversies, the publication of Justinian's *Edict on the Right Faith* in July 551⁸¹ and the Second Council of Constantinople in

⁷⁹ Mai (1840), 440-6 = PG 140,56A-61B. These extracts have first been presented in Lang (1997).

⁸⁰ See Dorival (1984), esp. 120-1. Did Nicephorus Callistus in the first half of the fourteenth century have access to the integral text? Though he shows himself informed about Philoponus' subtle defence of miaphysitism (*Hist. Eccl.* 18,46: PG 147,424B), this need not be the case. He could have obtained his information from Nicetas, on whom he is dependent in his account of the anti-Chalcedonians, and the quotation from the *Arbiter* inserted in the *Ecclesiastical History* might have been taken from the extracts in the *Doctrina Patrum* and John Damascene. It is perhaps interesting to note here that fragments from Theodore of Mopsuestia's *Contra Eunomium* could be identified in Nicetas Choniates by Vaggione (1980). Nicetas, who has until now not been studied extensively, seems to be a storehouse for extracts from Patristic writings which have not come down to us otherwise.

⁸¹ On the date of this edict see Schwartz (1939), 116, and Schieffer (1971), 286-9. A comprehensive account of Justinian's ecclesio-political and theological activities is given by Grillmeier (1989), 329-498 (with ample bibliography); cf. also Uthemann (1999). Still

553, mark *termini post quem* for the composition of some of Philoponus' works. Following the observations made by Šanda in his edition of the *Opuscula Monophysitica*, Chadwick proposed the following chronology⁸²:

c. 552	<i>Arbiter</i>
after 553	<i>Apology for the Arbiter</i>
	<i>On the Whole and its Parts</i>
c. 553-5	<i>Four Tmēmata against Chalcedon</i>
after 556-7	<i>On Difference, Number and Division</i>
c. 560	<i>Letter to Justinian</i>

In this chapter I shall argue for a modest revision of this chronology on the grounds of the information given in the texts themselves. As for the special case of the *Letter to Justinian*, I shall suggest that it was written even before the *Arbiter*.

3.1 *The Letter to Justinian*

At face value the arguments in favour of a date for Philoponus' *Letter to Justinian* towards the end of the Emperor's reign (c. 560) seem cogent. Philoponus was called by Justinian himself to Constantinople in order to discuss the controversial issues in Christology with him, but he declined and excused himself with his old age and his physical frailty which would not allow him to undertake such a troublesome journey, all the more in winter (*Letter to Justinian* 1: 123.8-10). Instead, Philoponus presented his well-argued position in a letter of response which he concluded with the wish that Christ may grant Justinian "the heavenly *vitatica* ... after the good old age, for your departure to God" (*Letter* 7: 129.22-3). Šanda and Chadwick concluded that this letter was likely to have been written not long before Justinian's death in 565, when Philoponus himself was already in his seventies. However, these points are far from being decisive, as has been remarked recently by C. Schol-

indispensable are the narratives of Schwartz (1940) and Stein (1949), 623-90. Chrysos (1969) has to be read with caution; cf. the review by Weiß (1971). The predicament of Justinian's efforts to define orthodoxy and unite Christendom, as reflected in Eustratius' *Vita* of the Patriarch Eutychius of Constantinople, is studied by Cameron (1988) and (1990).

⁸² Chadwick (1987), 55; Šanda (1930), [5-7]; cf. the chronology of Philoponus' philosophical and theological works in Sorabji (1987), 40.

ten⁸³. Philoponus' claim of being too old and too frail to travel to Constantinople, if it was not just an excuse anyway, does not necessarily point towards a date around 560. In 550, Philoponus was already about 60 years old and might have found the journey to the imperial city too tiresome. Additionally, his wish that the heavenly viatica may be preserved for Justinian – who was born in c. 482 – need not be indicative of the later date. Scholten has followed a suggestion already put forward by G. Furlani who recognised a number of parallels between the *Letter* and Justinian's dogmatic writings, especially the *Edict on the Right Faith* which was published in July 551⁸⁴. This would provide a *terminus post quem* for the *Letter*. If indeed, as Furlani thought, it was written before the *Arbiter*, the *Letter* could be dated between July 551 and early 553 (granting that the *Arbiter* preceded the Council which assembled on 5th May 553). I shall attempt to show that this date is more likely than the late one supported by Šanda and Chadwick. Though no absolute certainty can be obtained on this point, there are several arguments in favour of it.

As Šanda already observed, the *Letter* is silent on the Council of 553⁸⁵. In addition to that, Philoponus exhorted Justinian

to cast out of the Church of Christ the expression 'two natures', which has been the cause of stumbling and of division for the Church of God, and the phrase 'in two', which goes no less than the other with the implication of division, as *they are dear both to the advocates of Nestorius and to the enemies of Christ* (*Letter* 7: 129.23-130.2).

This might suggest that, in the light of Justinian's *Edict* of July 551 which had given a clear indication of what was to be expected from the forthcoming Council, Philoponus attempted to influence its outcome. Notably, according to the summary version of the *Four Tmê-mata against Chalcedon*, preserved by Michael the Syrian, Philoponus interpreted the decrees of the Council as overturning Chalcedon. This is particularly evident in his reading of the ninth canon of Constantinople II:

If anyone says that Christ is to be worshipped in two natures, and that by this two adorations are introduced, a separate one for God the Logos and a separate one for the man ...: let him be anathema⁸⁶.

⁸³ Scholten (1996), 58₂₁₂.

⁸⁴ Furlani (1920), 1259-65.

⁸⁵ Šanda (1930), [6].

⁸⁶ ACO IV.1,242.24-9 (Greek), 217.31-218.3 (Latin).

Philoponus argued that here the formula "in two natures" as such was condemned:

those who say that Our Lord is in two natures say that each [sc. nature] exists on its own and worship it [sc. separately], and fall under the aforementioned anathema⁸⁷.

If we take this statement as representing Philoponus' interpretation of the Christological decisions of the Council – and there is no indication in his other works that we should not do so – then it would be difficult to explain why he should want to exhort the Emperor again to condemn the formulae "two natures" and "in two natures", which apparently divided the Church, since this request had already been fulfilled – at least in Philoponus' own view.

Admittedly, these indications would also allow for an alternative explanation. Philoponus' interpretation of the canons of 553, as put forward in the *Tmēmata*, was arguably one-sided, and he might have realised later that the Council had not made substantial concessions to the miaphysite cause, but strongly backed the Cyrilline-Chalcedonian orthodoxy favoured by the Emperor⁸⁸. It is unlikely, however, that he would have made another attempt after the Council to influence Justinian's ecclesiastical policy, for the later years of the Emperor's reign saw a hardening of the Christological fronts, especially in Egypt. Although the brutal measures adopted by the "soldier-patriarch" of Alexandria, Apollinarius (551-569/70)⁸⁹, made the majority of the people in the city conform to Chalcedonian orthodoxy, it was too obvious that the Chalcedonian Church was only an enclave and the "Melkite" Patriarch a servant of the Emperor without any moral authority. Egypt remained staunchly miaphysite, and so the antagonism between the Imperial Church of the Greek-speaking city and the Coptic Church was hardened and coloured by strong patriotic sentiments⁹⁰. Justinian himself remained faithful to the Christology of Chalcedon in a moderately "Neo-Cyrilline" interpretation. This is evident from his edict of December 562, where he affirmed two natures in one hypostasis and condemned those who uphold "one nature or substance of Christ"⁹¹. The Emperor's sup-

⁸⁷ *Tmēmata*: IV,230 [II,109.36-110.1], cf. IV,237 [II,119.22-31] Chabot.

⁸⁸ Grillmeier (1989), 478-84, would not characterise the Christology of the Council of 553 as "Neo-Chalcedonian" in the proper sense, but only in a moderated form.

⁸⁹ Depicted by Maspéro (1923), 162-4, cf. also 264-5.

⁹⁰ See Stein (1949), 628-32.

⁹¹ A fragment from this edict has been transmitted in the *Doctrina Patrum*: 134.5-9 Diekamp. On Justinian's disputation with Persian theologians in 562 or 563 see Guillaumont (1969-70).

point in the same technical terminology which has already been used by Justinian (τὸ ἀόριστον – ܡܠܟܐ ܕܥܡ, ἀνυπόστατον – ܡܠܟܐ ܡܡܝܬܐ, συντεθῆναι – ܕܝܕܐ).

- IV. But perhaps someone ... might say that to speak of 'two natures of Christ' very clearly implicates a division, the phrase 'in two natures', however, not so, since among the ancients a whole too is usually said [sc. to be] in parts (*Letter* 6: 128.5-7).

While this is not explicitly said to be taught by Justinian, the conception of Christ's being "in two natures" as parts in a whole is familiar from the *Edict*:

καὶ ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ δὲ φύσει, τουτέστιν ἐν θεότητι καὶ ἀνθρωπότητι, τὸν ἓνα κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον σαρκωθέντα καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα γινώσκοντες διαίρεσιν μὲν τὴν ἀνὰ μέρος ἢ τομὴν οὐκ ἐπιφέρομεν τῇ μιᾷ αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσει, τὴν δὲ διαφορὰν τῶν φύσεων, ἐξ ὧν καὶ συνετέθη, σημαίνομεν, οὐκ ἀνηρημένην διὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν, ἐπειδὴ ἑκατέρα φύσις ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ. συνθέσεως γὰρ ὁμολογουμένης καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν γινώσκεται⁹⁶.

To sum up, (I) and (II) refer to the formulae into which Justinian had cast his Christology in the *Edict* of 551; they would later be endorsed at the Council of 553. (III) bears immediately on a particular passage in the *Edict*. (IV) does not correspond explicitly to the *Edict*, but is equivalent to the teaching formulated in the latter. For these reasons it is most likely to see in Philoponus' *Letter* a response to this document issued in 551.

A further indication of the date when the *Letter* was written is given by Philoponus' praising remarks on the Emperor's military success:

For these reasons God has crowned your head with victory over all the barbarians (*Letter* 4: 124.14-5).

But to him who has restored the whole magnificent Empire of the Romans ... (*Letter* 7: 130.3).

If we do not dismiss these as pure rhetorical eulogies, we might attempt to relate them to Justinian's campaigns which aimed at reconquering the lost territories of the Western Empire. At first, their success was spectacular. The expedition against Vandal Africa in 533 marked the starting-point of a campaign that achieved a settlement with the Pragmatic Sanction of 13th August 554. Thus, after Narses' victories

⁹⁶ Ibid.: 74.16-21 Schwartz

over the Ostrogoths and the Franks (along with their Alaman subjects), Italy was brought again under Roman rule and peace was established there, although the sieges of the northern towns went on for some years and it was not before 561 that Verona and Brixia fell. In the same years when Narses was campaigning in Italy, the attempted reconquest of Spain brought parts of the peninsula under Roman rule. Africa enjoyed peace after the crushing of the Moors' revolt in 546/7⁹⁷. On the other hand, the later years of Justinian's reigns were marked by new barbarian threats. Therefore I should like to suggest a date for the letter in the early 550s, at the summit of the success of the Italian campaign.

To conclude, then, it seems likely that the *Letter to Justinian* was composed shortly after the *Edict on the Right Faith* had been issued in July 551, and at any rate before the Council of Constantinople assembled in May 553, rather than in the last years of Justinian's reign. The winter to which Philoponus alluded might have been that of 551/2. As for its relation to the *Arbiter*, it is conceivable that the short *Letter*, which was composed at the request of the Emperor, was Philoponus' first written exposition of his Christology. Subsequently, Philoponus' partisans in Alexandria urged him to provide them with a full-length defence of miaphysitism, according to his own report in the prologue to the *Arbiter* (prol. 3: 5.1-2).

3.2 *The Arbiter, the Epitome of the Arbiter, and the Two Apologies on Behalf of the Arbiter*

The editor Šanda thought that the *Arbiter* had been written shortly after the Council of 553⁹⁸. At this ecclesial assembly, Severan miaphysitism was not condemned explicitly, but only the extremist position represented by Eutyches, which was also rejected by Philoponus (cf. *First Apology* 5: 65-6). This would explain Philoponus' irenic attitude towards the Chalcedonian party and the compromise he recommended, with certain qualifications, namely to use both "in two natures" and "out of two natures" simultaneously (*Arbiter* X,45-6). Both formulae were approved by the Council. Others, however, argued that the internal content of the treatise suggested a date shortly before the Council⁹⁹. A

⁹⁷ This account is based on Jones (1964), I, 287-94, and Cameron (1993), 104-27.

⁹⁸ Šanda (1930), [5-6].

⁹⁹ Martin (1959), 43, and Chadwick (1987), 46.

comparison between the *Arbiter* and the *Epitome of the Arbiter* on the one hand, and the *Two Apologies* on the other hand, shows indeed that Šanda's reasons for placing the *Arbiter* in the wake of the Council of 553 are not compelling. In the *Arbiter* (and in the *Epitome*) Philoponus conceded to the Chalcedonians that the formula "in two natures" would be acceptable as a valid expression of Christological dogma in the sense of a whole seen in its parts (even if this is not a proper usage of the preposition "in"). This was granted, however, *only* under the condition that they would acknowledge that there is "one composite nature" of Christ (*Arbiter* X,45: 45.14-8 – PG 140,61B; also *Epitome* 22: 61-2). It appears that the endorsement of the strongly Cyrilline formulae ἐκ δύο φύσεων and μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη, and Justinian's own use of Χριστὸς σύνθετος made Philoponus hope that the Council of 553 would also approve of μία φύσις σύνθετος. However, its Christology turned out to be a strong affirmation of Chalcedon, which is evident from its seventh and eighth canons. The Chalcedonian ἐν δύο φύσεσιν was made the interpretative principle of the Cyrilline ἐκ δύο φύσεων and μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένη, and vice versa. Confessing that Christ is "in two natures" implies a "difference (διαφορά) of natures from of which the ineffable union without confusion has resulted", yet not a numerical division which would lead to a separation of natures and introduce two hypostases. This difference is only conceptual (τῇ θεωρίᾳ μόνῃ) so that Christ can be said to be εἷς ἐξ ἁμφοῖν καὶ δι' ἑνὸς ἁμφοτέρᾳ¹⁰⁰. Complementary to the affirmation of the Chalcedonian formula, canon eight defines the conditions under which "out of two natures" and "one incarnate nature of God the Logos" can be accepted as valid expressions of orthodox Christology. As a result of the hypostatic union of divinity and humanity one Christ has been effected, but not one nature or substance of the Godhead and the flesh (according to Apollinarius and Eutyches, as the corresponding canon of the *Edict* adds)¹⁰¹. It is a central feature of Justinian's development of Chalcedonian doctrine that a distinction is drawn between the sphere of hypostasis in which union is effected, and the sphere of natures in which duality is preserved, for the two natures remain as they are, while the Logos is united to the flesh hypostatically¹⁰². It is only the

¹⁰⁰ Canon 7: ACO IV.1,242.1-11 (Greek), 217.6-16 (Latin).

¹⁰¹ Canon 8: ACO IV.1,242.12-23 (Greek), 217.17-29 (Latin); cf. *Edictum*: 92.19-21 Schwartz.

¹⁰² Canon 7: ACO IV.1,242.4-5 (Greek), 217.10-1 (Latin); canon 8: 242.18-9 (Greek), 217.24-5 (Latin).

Latin, not the Greek text of canon four which has “one *composite* hypostasis” of Christ¹⁰³, and the anathema against those who worship Christ in such a manner as to introduce *μίαν φύσιν ἡγουν οὐσίαν τῶν συνελθόντων* in canon nine¹⁰⁴ is indeed close to a condemnation of “one composite nature”.

What made Philoponus retract his proposal to resolve the controversy between Chalcedonians and miaphysites and adopt a rather intransigent attitude instead, was not only the external pressure from some of his more radical partisans¹⁰⁵. That he was indeed the object of criticism is clear from the opening paragraph of his *First Apology*:

Previously someone from the imperial city asked us through a letter, showing himself indignant about two passages written by us in the *Arbiter*, and commanded us to present a solution and defence of them. I immediately brought forth a brief defence for him who was asking such. Now, however, that I have a little leisure, I shall take on these things more at length (*First Apology* 1: 63.4-8).

At the same time, however, Philoponus was realising that the anticipated approval of miaphysitism at the Council of 553 had not taken place. Pressure from his community as well as his own thwarted hopes made him categorically reject the use of the formula “in two natures” in his *Two Apologies* and in his *Treatise to Sergius*. The latter was written in order to prove that the locution “in two natures”, indicating a whole in parts, cannot be used of a composite.

Hence it appears most likely that the *Arbiter* and the *Epitome of the Arbiter* were composed before the Council of Constantinople (5th May to 2nd June 553) with the intention of having an impact on its decisions. They display a conciliatory attitude towards the burning Christological controversies and are remarkably free from the harsh polemic against Chalcedon which pervades the *Tmémata*. The *Epitome*, which is indeed nothing more than a condensed replication of the longer treatise, would seem to be the “brief defence” mentioned in the opening paragraph of the *First Apology*. Apparently, the *Epitome* was written for Philoponus’ radical partisan who had criticised him for making intolerable concessions to the Chalcedonian party. The *Two Apologies on Behalf of the Arbiter* were composed after the Council.

¹⁰³ ACO IV.1,216.7: *unam eius subsistentiam compositam*, while the Greek (241.7) only has *μίαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ὑπόστασιν*.

¹⁰⁴ Canon 9: ACO IV.1,242.25-7 (Greek), 217.32-218.1 (Latin).

¹⁰⁵ According to Chadwick (1987), 47-8.

Given the development of events which I have sketched, my dating of the *Letter to Justinian* may appear less cogent, since in it Philoponus clearly rejected the use of “in two natures” in any sense, including that of a whole in its parts, and asked Justinian to condemn the formula explicitly. Is it plausible that within the short time which I propose lies between the *Letter* and the *Arbiter*, Philoponus should have changed his mind so significantly on the highly controversial Chalcedonian formula and should then have returned to his original intransigence not long afterwards? In fact, Philoponus did not have to change his attitude at all, for in the *Arbiter* he was as censorious of the formula as in the *Letter* and in the *Two Apologies*. The only condition under which he would tolerate its usage was a simultaneous endorsement of the doctrine that there is one composite nature of Christ. Philoponus clearly made the point that a true confession of the unity of Christ implied not only that his hypostasis is one, but also that his nature is one. Even more, the former necessarily implies the latter:

we will neither, because Christ is one, deny the constituents of this ‘one’ (τὸ ἓν τοῦτο), nor, on the other hand, because we recognise two natures which have concurred into the union, will we not confess that ‘one’ which resulted from them; whether someone prefers to call it one nature or hypostasis or one Christ, makes no difference to us. For the rest will necessarily be implied by each of these (*Arbiter* X,47: 47.16-20 – PG 140,61B).

Thus I think Philoponus is consistent (though the tone he sets now is considerably sharper), when he emphasises in the *Second Apology*:

If certain of our contemporaries confess one composite nature in the same way as [sc. they confess one composite] hypostasis but none the less do not refrain from speaking of him as ‘in’ his ‘two’ constituent elements, they should first reject the synod of Chalcedon, which dared to anathematise those who in any way speak of ‘one nature’ of Christ, as blasphemous and in contradiction with themselves. ... But if any of their associates, intending a right view, confesses ‘one’ along with us, why must he then also use a phrase indicating, as we have proved, a division of the underlying realities, and also providing Nestorians with many arguments? (*Second Apology* 26: 80.7-10. 18-21).

3.3 *The Four Tmēmata* against Chalcedon

Evidently, the *Tmēmata* were written after the *Arbiter*, to which Philoponus alludes three times¹⁰⁶, and not long after the Council of 553,

¹⁰⁶ *Tmēmata*: IV,221 [II,97.27], IV,230 [II,110.14], IV,235 [II,117.12-3] Chabot.

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¹⁰⁶ *Tmêmata*: IV,221 [II,97.27], IV,230 [II,110.14], IV,235 [II,117.12-3] Chabot.

“the Synod which assembled in our time”¹⁰⁷. Its canons are subjected to scrutiny¹⁰⁸. The treatise is characterised by strong polemics against the Council of Chalcedon and attempts to show that its Christological decisions have been reversed at Constantinople. The aggressive tone of this work is similar to that of the *Two Apologies* and is in contrast with the irenic attitude Philoponus displays in the *Arbiter*¹⁰⁹.

3.4 *The Treatise on the Whole and its Parts; to the Presbyter Sergius*

Although the *Treatise to Sergius* has been included in the *Opuscula Monophysitica*, its subject-matter is philosophical. Philoponus aims at a demonstration why it is inappropriate to speak of parts “in” a whole. Despite the lack of an expressly theological context, however, it is clear that the import of this argument is directed against a particular interpretation of Chalcedonian Christology. It is meant to sustain the point already made in the *Arbiter*, that “two natures in Christ” cannot be understood as “parts in a whole”. Hence it seems reasonable to assume that this treatise was written some time after 553.

The dedication of this work “to the presbyter Sergius”¹¹⁰ presumably refers to Sergius of Tella, who was consecrated Jacobite Patriarch of Antioch in 557/8, yet resided in Constantinople, and died in 560/1¹¹¹. I should like to argue that Philoponus wrote this treatise at the request of Sergius before 557/8, when the latter was (only) in priestly orders. The last two words of the subscription, which identify Sergius as the “Patriarch of Antioch” (94.6-7), are contained only in Vat. Syr. 144, but neither in Add. 12,171 nor in Add. 14,532. They could be a later addition, perhaps by a scribe to whom Sergius was known as the Patriarch of Antioch¹¹². That Philoponus stood in a close relationship with Sergius of

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.: IV,221 [II,97.35], cf. IV,225 [II,102.8-10].

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.: IV,235-8 [II,117.14-121.29].

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Hainthaler, in Grillmeier (1990b), 120-1.

¹¹⁰ *ⲙⲉⲓⲱ ⲉⲣⲉⲃⲟ*, *Ad Sergium* 1: 81.6. *ⲉⲣⲉⲃⲟ* is the word used in the Peshitta for translating ἐπίσκοπος (Phil. 1:1, 1 Tim. 3:2, Titus 1:7). Later, however, its regular meaning seems to be “presbyter, priest”, while “bishop” is regularly rendered *ⲉⲡⲓⲥⲕⲟⲡⲟⲥ*. See Payne-Smith (1901) and Brockelmann (1928), s. v.

¹¹¹ These dates were established by Brooks (1929/30), 469; cf. Honigsmann (1951), 192-5, and Van Roey (1975/6), 216.

¹¹² As proposed by Furlani (1921-2), 102. Šanda (1930), [6] rejects this final appellation as a “mere fiction” which is rightly omitted in Add. 12,171; his reasons, however, are unsatisfactory.

Tella is evident from his address in the *De Opificio Mundi*, which is often thought to have been written during Sergius' patriarchate in 557/8–560/1¹¹³, and from a note in Nicephorus Callistus¹¹⁴.

3.5 *The Treatise on Difference, Number and Division*

It has been doubted whether this extremely difficult and indeed obscure treatise was composed by Philoponus, though it is contained among his Christological works in the two codices Vat. Syr. 144 and Add. 12,171. The ascription to Philoponus, however, is not unanimous in the manuscript evidence. Vat. Syr. 144 has the title:

Again of the same Philoponus a treatise on the difference that is acknowledged to be preserved after the union, showing that along with a difference of such kind number or division is not conceived of, except for the things that subsist on their own and in a proper way (fol. 58^{ra}).

A frame was drawn (perhaps by another hand?) around the words "*Again of the same Philoponus*", which is usually an indication in this manuscript that the words encircled in such a way do not belong to the text (as in fol. 24^{vb} and fol. 35^{ra}; cf. 40.5 and 57.1–2 Šanda). It also seems that these words were deleted manually, yet this is not certain, since the lines are very feeble.

Significantly, the title in Add. 12,171 does not mention Philoponus' name at all. It reads:

¹¹³ *De Opificio Mundi* I: 2.4–8 Reichardt. This date had already been put forward by Gudeman–Kroll (1916), 1776, and was accepted by many scholars, e.g., Evrard (1953), 299–300, and MacCoull (1983), 62, and (1987), 163. It was challenged by Wolska (1962), 163–5, who argued for the years between 546 and 549. This had already been recommended by the editor Reichardt (1897), xi. Wolska's arguments have found the support of Hainthaler, in Grillmeier (1990b), 153–4; cf. now also Schamp (2000). Scholten (1996), 56–72, has pointed out that there are no clear indications in the text as for its date of composition and has suggested that it was written between 546 and 560, more likely, however, towards the end of this period.

¹¹⁴ Nicephorus Callistus, *Eccl. Hist.* 18,47: PG 147,424CD, claims that Sergius, while he was patriarch of Constantinople (this misinformation undoubtedly reflects the fact that Sergius was residing in the imperial city), encouraged Philoponus to give an account of his "heresy". Subsequently, Philoponus composed a λόγον δεινότατον, namely the *Arbiter*, in which he showed forth all his philosophical acumen in order to prove "his loathsome doctrine". It seems obvious to me *pace* Martin (1962), 520, that this refers to Philoponus' miaphysitism, not to his tritheism, though Sergius is known to have espoused the latter heresy as well. Note that Nicephorus sees in Philoponus primarily the clever advocate of miaphysitism (cf. 424B). However, the temporal link he draws between the patriarchate of Sergius and the composition of the *Arbiter* is evidently mistaken.

*Treatise on what is in the difference that is in a natural predicate*¹¹⁵, produced by a certain lover of work, for the profit of those who chance to read it (fol. 39^{vb}).

The ascription “by a certain lover of work” is an obvious and rather awkward allusion to the sobriquet Φιλόπονος, which recurs twice in the treatise in the form “with love of work”¹¹⁶. I do not think that this can be taken as an indication for its authenticity, since nowhere in his undoubtedly genuine Christological treatises does Philoponus indulge in such a play on his name. Moreover, the phrase “with love of work” can be used on its own without such a connotation¹¹⁷.

As for the subscription, Vat. Syr. 144 reads:

The treatise on the difference which is acknowledged to be preserved after the union of John the Grammarian of Alexandria ends (fol. 75^{va}).

The words “of John the Grammarian of Alexandria” are not only framed but also clearly deleted by hand.

The subscription in Add. 12,171 does not mention Philoponus at all. It reads:

The treatise on the difference which is preserved after the ineffable union (fol. 56^{rb}).

Interestingly, the ninth-century codex Brit. Libr. Add. 14,670, which has the beginning of the *Treatise on Difference*, testifies to the same title as Vat. Syr. 144, yet with the significant difference that there is no attribution to Philoponus (fol. 2^v).

In sum, while the *Treatise on Difference* is transmitted to us among the genuine works of Philoponus, it is not attributed to him in Add. 12,171, nor in the manuscript Brit. Libr. Add. 14,670. The ascription in Vat. Syr. 144 was corrected (perhaps by an early reader of the codex), a fact which is not recorded by Šanda. This external evidence suggests that the *Treatise on Difference* is not Philoponean. That it is included among Philoponus’ Christological works indicates that it originated from an intellectual environment close to the Alexandrian miaphysite.

In addition to that, there is internal evidence against the treatise’s authenticity. This argument is pursued by the editor Šanda on the grounds

¹¹⁵ Add. 12,171 does not have the plural here, as Šanda (1930). 95₁, notes, but the singular.

¹¹⁶ فلو in 2: 97.8 and 37: 121.23, which can be retranslated as φιλόπονος, as Šanda (1930), [142] and [170], proposes.

¹¹⁷ Cf. in the eighth or ninth century Elias, *Epistula Apologetica ad Leonem* 3: CSCO 469 [470], 11.20 [8.13-4]. See also my remarks on φιλόπονος/φιλοπονία in chapter one, above p. 3.

of two observations¹¹⁸. First, the author explicitly rejects a plurality of substances in the Trinity (*Treatise on Difference* 1: 95.11-4). This is precisely the form of tritheism known to us from the extant fragments of Philoponus' writings on the Trinity¹¹⁹. Secondly, the author defends the Christological formula "in two natures" (13: 104.8-25). Šanda also observes that the treatise is less coherent than those works which are genuinely Philoponean and that there are obvious *lacunae* in the text (for instance, at the beginning of section 15: 105.13-4). The text, Šanda notes, could have been conflated out of authentic parts that were originally disparate. This could have been done by someone who was more verbose than Philoponus himself and added material of his own. Given that there is a certain similarity in method and content between this treatise and those which are genuinely Philoponean, Šanda considers it possible that some disciple of the master, who did not follow his teaching in every respect, after his death compiled the volume, arguing in a milder spirit against some of his more radical miaphysite co-religionists.

Though I agree with Šanda on the lack of coherence and the obscurity of the treatise, I do not find his two major arguments against its authenticity convincing¹²⁰. As for the first point, Chadwick, who accepts the authenticity of the treatise, has remarked that its subject is Christology, not Trinitarian theology¹²¹. We do not know exactly when Philoponus espoused the tritheist heresy, a fact of which we hear for the first time in 567 when Bishop John of Cellia and the miaphysite clergy of Alexandria condemned Philoponus and his *On the Trinity*¹²², which would indicate that this work was published in the second half of the year 567¹²³. As we know from the extant fragments of Philoponus' polemical work *Against Andrew*¹²⁴, there was a time when he appeared as an outspoken opponent of tritheism. From this point of view the *Treatise on Difference* could have been written some time before 567, when Philoponus still adhered

¹¹⁸ Šanda (1930), [7].

¹¹⁹ See Van Roey (1980).

¹²⁰ Van Roey, who agrees with Šanda that the *Treatise on Difference* was not written by Philoponus and would fit very well in the controversy over Stephen of Alexandria, has also pointed out that Šanda's arguments are deficient; Van Roey (1979), 238₇, followed by Hainthaler, in Grillmeier (1990b), 113₃₀.

¹²¹ Chadwick (1987), 50.

¹²² Chabot (1962 [1965]), 160-1 [111-2].

¹²³ See Martin (1962), 522-5. Honigmann (1951), 183, holds that this anathematization of Philoponus' writings might have happened *before* the actual publication of the treatise.

¹²⁴ Edited by Van Roey (1979), 239-41.

Another proposal by Šanda appears to be more convincing. In a note added to his translation¹²⁷ he points out that a context for the *Treatise on Difference* would be provided by the controversy caused by Stephen Niobes in Alexandria during the reigns of the local miaphysite Patriarch Damian (578–607) and his Antiochene confrère Peter of Callinicus (580/1–591). According to a report in Timothy of Constantinople¹²⁸, the sophist Stephen Niobes led a sect called “Niobites” that had broken away from the miaphysites, the tritheists and the agnoetes (!) on a Christological issue. While the mainstream miaphysites rejected a duality of natures, yet recognised a difference (διαφορά) between the divinity and the humanity of Christ after the union, Stephen taught that it was not possible to speak of such a difference after the union. Šanda identifies this Stephen Niobes with a sophist in Alexandria called Stephen about whom we are told in a fragment from the *Ecclesiastical History* of Dionysius of Tell-Mahre which happens to be preserved in Vat. Syr. 144 (fol. 89^{r-v}) – the only complete manuscript of Philoponus’ Christological works¹²⁹. Dionysius records that the sophist Stephen held that it was “not licit to say that a difference of natural signification (ὁμοκατασκευαστικῶς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν) of the [sc. natures] from which Christ is was preserved after the consideration of the union”¹³⁰. To introduce such a

IV,218-21 [II,93-7] Chabot. There he vehemently attacks the *Tome of Leo*, in particular the phrases (in the Greek translation which I suppose Philoponus would have known) ἐν ὅσῳ τὰ συναμφοτέρα μετ’ ἀλλήλων ἔστιν (ACO II.1.1,13.24-5), εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τῷ δεσπότῃ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν ἑστὶν πρόσωπον (ibid., 16.4-5), and διὰ ταύτην τοίνυν τοῦ προσώπου τὴν ἔνωσησιν τὴν ἐν ἑκατέρῃ φύσει νοεῖσθαι ὀφείλουσαν (ibid., 16.8-9). Philoponus censures Leo especially for the use of *two* articles (ἄρθρα), which in his view indicate a separation of the natures; *Tmēmata* IV,220 [II,95-6] Chabot.

¹²⁷ Šanda (1930), [181].

¹²⁸ *De Iis Qui ad Ecclesiam Accedunt*: PG 86,65A; also 44A, 56B. Cf. the virtually identical report in Nicetas Choniates, *Thesaurus Orthodoxiae* IX: PG 140,53B.

¹²⁹ Edited by Chabot with a Latin translation: CSCO 84 [88], 219-24 [151-4]. R. Abramowski (1940), 138-42, provides a reproduction of the manuscript and a German translation.

¹³⁰ CSCO 84 [88], 219.7-10 [151.5-7]. The phrase κατὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἔνωσησιν appears to mean that Christ is contemplated as the end-product of the union of the two natures; cf. Bettiolo (1979), 18*₃₁ and Uthemann (1985), 382-4. The translations *post supputationem unitatis, postquam unitas exstare putatur* (Payne-Smith I (1879), 1395), “nach der Feststellung der Einheit” (Abramowski (1940), 138), and “na de beschouwing van de vereniging” (Van Roey (1961), 183) capture this point. Cf. Elias, *Ep. Apol.* 3: CSCO 469 [470], 11.11-2 [8.6-7]: *post considerationem unionis. quando terminum Christum considerat*, and ibid. 11: 100.22-102.3 [72.28-73.30]. The underlying Greek seems to be μετὰ τὴν τῆς ἐνώσεως ἔννοιαν, as in Severus of Antioch, in Eustathius, *Ep. de Duabus Naturis* 493-4: CCG 19, 429. Cf. also *C. Imp. Gr.* III,18: CSCO 93 [94], 305.14-5 [214.25-6]; 9: 182.30-183.1 [128.2-3] *et alibi*.

difference would imply a division (ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛ) and number (ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛ), i.e. plurality, of natures¹³¹. The controversy caused by Stephen was in full swing when Peter of Callinicus came to Alexandria to consult Damian about the problems he encountered in Antioch, where a good part of the miaphysite community did not recognise him as the legitimate Patriarch. This visit must have happened in the early years of Peter's reign, that is to say, in 581 or 582. He brought with him two learned and eloquent men, Probus and the archimandrite John Barbur. These two illustrious figures then became followers of Stephen – since their ambitions to become bishops were frustrated, Dionysius insinuates. They later went to Antioch, where they converted to Chalcedonian orthodoxy. Eventually, Probus was appointed Metropolitan-Bishop of Chalcedon.

W. Wolska-Conus has objected to this theory that the two Stephens are not identical¹³². Her main point is that, while there is a strong affinity between their teaching, Stephen of Alexandria expresses himself in a more philosophical manner than his somewhat simple and straightforward contemporary Stephen Niobes. Though this observation is certainly correct as far as our scarce sources are concerned, the brief reports about the doctrine of Stephen – or the two Stephens – do not seem to allow for such a judgment, since the information given by Timothy of Constantinople is very simplified and it is not evident whether it renders justice to Niobes' thought. None the less it is the merit of this objection to have shown that an identification of the two cannot simply be taken for granted. After all, this problem is not relevant to the question of the Philoponean authorship of the *Treatise on Difference*. It is clear that during the early years of the patriarchate of Peter of Callinicus in Antioch a doctrinal controversy was provoked in Alexandria by the teaching of the sophist Stephen (whether or not he was identical with Niobes) that a difference of natural signification between the divinity and the humanity of Christ after the union implies a division and plurality of natures. There is no exact congruency between the terminology used by Dionysius of Tell-Mahre and that used by the author of the *Treatise on Difference*, who speaks of "the substantial difference of the natures (ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛ ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛ ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛ)" which, according to his opponents, leads to a plurality (ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛ) and division (ⲛⲓⲛⲓⲛ) of natures (1: 96.6-8). In spite of that, the author's disagreement with those who say that it is not licit after

¹³¹ CSCO 84 [88], 219.14-6 [151.10-3].

¹³² Wolska-Conus (1989), 64-6, *pace* Šanda (1930), [181], Bettiolo (1979), 19*³⁵, and Declerck (1983), 217-20. Doubts about this identification have already been expressed by Uthemann (1985), 387-8 and 399.

the union to say “in the one and the other”, as expressed in the carefully worded passage quoted above, might indeed refer to Stephen’s contention that the union of divinity and humanity does not allow for a difference of natural signification.

As Wolska-Conus has argued, Stephen of Alexandria was moving in the philosophical milieu of the city that was associated with Philoponus and, as his student, may even have known him personally¹³³. If this is correct, it is conceivable that later another member of Philoponus’ “circle” could have taken up the task against Stephen of defending the mainstream miaphysite teaching that a difference of signification does *not* imply a division and plurality of natures. This could account for the fact that the *Treatise on Difference* was included in the two extant codices of Philoponus’ Christological works. Do we have any further indications regarding its author? A. Van Roey once suggested Probus, who composed a *Liber de Differentia*, as we are told in the seventh tome presented by the miaphysite monks at their disputation with Probus that was held at Antioch in 595/6¹³⁴. Dionysius of Tell-Mahre informs us that, when Probus and John Barbur first heard of Stephen, Probus wrote a refutation of his teaching¹³⁵. In addition to the fragment from the *Ecclesiastical History* of Dionysius of Tell-Mahre, Vat. Syr. 144 also contains two texts on the distinction of properties in Christ after the union (88^v and 90^r) by an otherwise unknown Rabban Daniel and by Rabban Elias of Harran (the eighth- or ninth-century author of the *Epistula Apologetica*, addressed to Leo, the Syncellus of Harran?). These short texts are obviously concerned with the controversy caused by the sophist Stephen¹³⁶. Moreover, Philoponus and Probus are associated with each other in the citations which Elias of Harran has transmitted to us of the *Letter to Christophorus* written by George, Chalcedonian Bishop of Martyropolis. In this letter, written in Syriac probably around the beginning of the eighth century¹³⁷, George responded to attacks on Chalce-

¹³³ Wolska-Conus (1989), 66 and 85-6.

¹³⁴ See Van Roey (1961), 187, and (1978), 351-2. The same convert Probus is most likely the author of a short sixth-century collection of syllogistic arguments in support of the Christology of Chalcedon which has come down to us under the title Πρόβου ὀρθοδόξου ἀπὸ Ἰακωβιτῶν ἐπαπορήματα πρὸς Ἰακωβίτας. This collection was edited by Uthemann (1981b), 110, and, with a French translation, by Declerck (1983), 229-31.

¹³⁵ CSCO 84 [88], 220.3-6 [151.19-23].

¹³⁶ See Van Roey (1961), 189-90.

¹³⁷ See Van Roey (1944), (1972), 125-32, and the preface to his translation of Elias, *Ep. Apol.*: CSCO 470, v-ix, where he refutes the view of Assemani and Baumstark who argued that George lived in the age of Philoponus and Probus and thus dated the letter in the last decades of the sixth century.

donian Christology which he had encountered not only in the *Arbiter* to which he refers explicitly¹³⁸ (and which he must have read in the Syriac translation), but also in works of Probus. Philoponus and Probus are mentioned in one breath as having prepared “questions” against the Chalcedonians (to which George then replied)¹³⁹. Though this does not tell us much about the relations between the two miaphysite polemicists in Alexandria, it seems evident that their works emerged from the same intellectual milieu, and it would be possible to see in Probus the author of the ps.-Philoponean *Treatise on Difference*. Later, however, Van Roey felt obliged to retract the hypothesis of Probus’ authorship on the grounds that the fragment from his *Liber de Differentia* which is cited in the manuscript Brit. Libr. Add. 12,155, fol. 141^{vb} – 142^{ra}, cannot be identified in the treatise allegedly written by Philoponus¹⁴⁰.

To conclude, there is a good case to deny the Philoponean authorship of the *Treatise on Difference*, especially given the textual evidence of the manuscripts Vat. Syr. 144, Brit. Libr. Add. 12,171, and Brit. Libr. Add. 14,670. The treatise would indeed fit very well in the controversy that broke out after his death in Alexandria owing to the teaching of the sophist Stephen. This would point to a date in 581 or 582.

3.6 Chronology

July 551	Justinian’s <i>Edict on the Right Faith</i>
shortly after the <i>Edict</i>	<i>Letter to Justinian</i>
(winter 551/2?)	
after the <i>Letter</i>	<i>Arbiter</i>
shortly after the <i>Arbiter</i>	<i>Epitome of the Arbiter</i>
5 th May – 2 nd June 553	Second Council of Constantinople
shortly after the Council	<i>Two Apologies on behalf of the Arbiter</i>
	<i>Four Tmēmata against Chalcedon</i>

¹³⁸ Elias, *Ep. Apol.* 11: CSCO 469 [470], 97.29-98.5 [70.23-8] = against *Arbiter* I,9-10; 3: 9.5-23 [6.19-7.2] = against *Arbiter* V,19; 4: 13.4-10 [9.8-12] = against *Arbiter* X,36-39; 6: 32.16-8 [23.7-9] = against *Arbiter* X,41.

¹³⁹ Elias, *Ep. Apol.* 3: CSCO 469 [470], 9.1-3 [6.16-8]: *Scriptis itaque in epistula ad Christophorum in qua fecit pseudo-solutionem quaestionum quae a grammatico Iohanne Philopono et Probo praeparatae sunt adversus vos.*

¹⁴⁰ Van Roey (1978), 352_q. Wolska-Conus (1989), 66₂₈, thinks that Stephanus himself “à un certain moment de son évolution religieuse” might have written the treatise, since he was associated with Philoponus and the treatise “concerne aussi en quelque sorte Philoponos”. There is, however, no solid basis for such an attribution.

before 557/8
581/2?

Treatise on Whole and Parts to Sergius
Treatise on Difference, Number and Division, written by some follower of Philoponus against the teaching of the sophist Stephen

4 The Christological Argument in Philoponus' *Arbiter*

In this chapter I shall present an analysis of the *Arbiter*, Philoponus' major Christological work in which he presents his exposition of miaphysitism. My analysis will follow the argument of the treatise, which, as I see it, is divided into five parts:

1. a prologue in which Philoponus determines the purpose and scope of his treatise and proposes to clarify the common ground on which the parties involved in the controversy stand;
2. a series of chapters (I to VI) in which Philoponus gives a defence of miaphysitism, that is, he attempts to show that the doctrine of the one (composite) nature of Christ is the only consistent explication of the oneness of Christ which is demanded by the Incarnation of the Logos;
3. one lengthy and important chapter (VII) and two short ones (VIII and IX) in which Philoponus attacks the Christology of Chalcedon as terminologically confused and unintelligible;
4. the larger part of chapter X where Philoponus deals with a series of objections that might be raised against miaphysite Christology;
5. the last section of chapter X and the conclusion¹⁴¹ where a formula of compromise is offered to the supporters of Chalcedon.

Philoponus' complex argument will be elucidated mainly from two groups of sources: on the one hand, Christological writings of the fifth and sixth centuries both of the miaphysite-Alexandrian tradition to which Philoponus is indebted (especially Cyril of Alexandria and Severus of Antioch), but also of Antiochene theologians like Theodore of

¹⁴¹ At X,47: 47.12, after the phrase "Likewise also of fire and of all composites", the ms. Vat. Syr. 144, has a caesura in rubrics (not in Add. 12,171). Apparently, the tenth chapter ends here, with the rest of the treatise being a conclusion. This is in accordance with the rubric found in the *Epitome* X,22: 61.5: "From that which is after the tenth [sc. chapter]".

Mopsuestia and Theodoret of Cyrus whose positions are contested; on the other hand, the late ancient commentaries on Aristotle, notably Philoponus' own, but also those of his contemporaries, insofar as they can shed light on problems discussed. Note that this is not meant to be an exhaustive commentary on the text of the *Arbiter*, but rather an attempt to follow its argument. Philoponus' train of thought is subtle, and at times obscure. This state of affairs is complicated by the fact that our primary source is a closely literal translation into Syriac of the original Greek text. This makes it even more difficult to understand the precise meaning of the author's argument¹⁴². The reader will find that I have not always succeeded in elucidating Philoponus' thought. None the less I hope that this chapter will serve as a guide to further study of the *Arbiter*.

4.1 *Stating the Common Ground – The Posture of the Arbiter*

In the Christological controversy following the Council of Chalcedon, an intellectual climate heated by fervent polemics on either side, Philoponus adopts the posture of an impartial arbiter:

Truth is self-sufficient for its own advocacy with those who ardently regard it with the eye of the soul (prol. 1: 3.6-7¹⁴³).

He sees his task in removing those impediments which obscure reason and pervert right judgment, especially lack of proper training in logic and lack of skill in reasoning. Proper schooling is required in any discipline, but above all in theology¹⁴⁴. When Philoponus examines the positions of the participants in the controversy, he is convinced that most of them hold very similar opinions and disagree with one another merely on points of terminology. On the one hand, his own partisans confess

¹⁴² Cf. the observations of Ebied, Van Roey and Wickham on the difficulties they encountered during the course of their edition and English translation of Peter of Callinicus, *C. Damianum*: CCG 29, xxxvi-xxxvii.

¹⁴³ References to Šanda's edition of the *Arbiter* will be given in the text. Where the original Greek is extant, it will be noted separately. The English translations from Philoponus' Christological treatises are my own.

¹⁴⁴ The technical character of theology in the post-Chalcedonian age is also accentuated by Leontius of Byzantium, *Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos* 6: PG 86,1296AB. I have used the critical edition of Leontius' works by Daley (1978). Since this edition, which was announced for the CCG, has not been published yet, references will be given to the text available in Migne's PG.

that there is one composite nature of Christ, that is, of the Logos with humanity; on the other hand, the Chalcedonians define that after the union there are two natures and not one. That there is indeed a fundamental consensus between both parties is shown by their common refusal of extremist positions, such as an Eutychian confusion of natures and a Nestorian division of hypostases. Two different poles of interest can be distinguished: the Chalcedonians, being afraid of confusion, say that there are two natures in Christ, and their opponents, fearing that the union may be dissolved, reject the term "duality", while they assert that the properties of each nature are preserved. To reconcile the dissent between these two parties is a "a feature of the piety of lovers of truth" (prol. 2: 4.25).

Philoponus, apparently a prominent figure in the anti-Chalcedonian community of Alexandria, has been asked by his co-religionists to inquire into the possibility and coherence of miaphysite doctrine. He intends to take up this task first by explaining and defending his own position, and secondly by scrutinising the Chalcedonian one. In order to render his defence more familiar to his readers, he will initially consider what has been commonly held on the Incarnation of the Logos and then develop his arguments from these generally accepted opinions. For this purpose he recites a Christological creed:

Thus it is believed in accordance with the Holy Scriptures that the eternal Son, the only-begotten Word of the Father, he who is true God from true God, he who is consubstantial with his begetter, in the last age became truly incarnate from the holy God-bearer Mary, and became perfect man, without suffering from any change or alteration in substance, but uniting with himself hypostatically a human body ensouled with a rational and intelligent soul (prol. 3: 5.8-12).

To Philoponus, the relation of soul and body in man serves as the fundamental analogy for the relation of divinity and humanity in Christ:

And as is the case with man, who is an assembly from two natures (that is, a rational soul and a body which is made up of elements that have been mingled¹⁴⁵ out of which the rational living being man has been effected), thus also with Christ (ibid.: 5.12-5).

¹⁴⁵ The widely accepted philosophical theory of the four elements (earth, water, air, fire), which also constitute the microcosm of the human body, had become a commonplace in Jewish and Christian thought as early as Philo; cf. Possekel (1999), 83-95, and the overview of Lumpe (1959).

The one Christ is made up from (ἐκ) two natures¹⁴⁶, divinity and humanity. This does not mean that the divinity and the humanity of Christ have been united just as God may be said to have been united with a human being, or again a human being with another human being. In these cases their natures remain separate, while there is no single reality effected by them. The *tertium comparationis* between man and Christ is that the relation of our body to the rational soul, governing it and moving its inner impulses, is of the same kind as the relation of the whole humanity of Christ, soul and body, to the divinity. In the God-man all rational movements of the soul are subjected to the divine operations of the Logos in the manner of an instrument. Thus, since the body serves as the proper instrument to the soul, the divinity may be said to use the whole humanity as an instrument. Consequently, there is one operation of the whole,

which is principally moved by the divinity of Christ Our Lord but proceeds instrumentally through the rational soul united to him, and is completed in the movement of the divine body (prol. 3: 5.24-6.1).

A certain ambiguity lies in the idea that the soul uses the body as an artisan uses an instrument. In the Platonic tradition, it is understood as a model which emphasises the distinctness and separability of soul and body. This is developed in the *Alcibiades Maior* and is discussed by Plotinus, who does not decide whether the relationship between soul and body is better conceived of as that of form and matter or as that of user and tool. Philoponus recurs to this notion in his commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* and in his exegesis of the hexaemeron, *De Opificio Mundi*¹⁴⁷. In Christology, the model is applied to the relation of the divinity with the humanity, predominantly in order to affirm the unity of operation in Christ, as in Philoponus. This application had been developed by Apollinarius and was resumed by Cyril and Severus¹⁴⁸. How-

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Cyril of Alexandria, *Ep. I ad Succensum* 7: 76 Wickham; Severus of Antioch, *Hom. XXIII*: PO 37,116 and 122; *Hom. XLII*: PO 36,48; *Ep. XXV*: PO 12,229-30.

¹⁴⁷ (?)Plato, *Alcibiades Maior* 129c-e; Plotinus, *Enn.* I.1.3 and IV.7.1. Philoponus, *In De Anima*: 140.11-7; *De Opificio Mundi* I,9: 22.18-20; I,10: 25.25-26.1; I,16: 36.10-1 Reichardt. These issues will be discussed more extensively in chapter seven.

¹⁴⁸ Apollinarius, *C. Diodorum*, fr. 117: 235-6. Cyril, *C. Nestorium* II,8: ACO I.1.6,46; *De Incarnatione Unigeniti* 692c17-20: SC 97,232. Severus, *C. Imp. Gr.* III,33: CSCO 101 [102], 185 [134-5]; *Ep. I ad Sergium*: CSCO 119 [120], 82-3 [60-1]; *Hom. CIX*: PO 25,758-9. On Severus, cf. Grillmeier (1989), 176-9. Athanasius, *De Incarnatione* 44: 244 Thomson, emphasises that the Logos uses the human body as an instrument for soteriological reasons. Maximus Confessor, *Op. 20*: PG 91,229C-232C, has a few short

ever, it could also be adopted in the Platonic, that is to say, "divisive" interpretation. Significantly, Cyril rejected the idea that the Son uses the humanity as an artisan uses an instrument in his *Epistula ad Monachos*, since it suggested an external relation between the Son and his humanity. Apparently, this point had been raised before by Nestorius¹⁴⁹. Thomas Aquinas apprehended the difference between the two modes of employing the comparison, when he introduced a distinction between *instrumentum unitum* and *instrumentum separatum*¹⁵⁰.

Let me, then, return to Philoponus' exposition. The difference between man and Christ is that there are proper operations of the human body to which the soul does not give the impulse and which it cannot direct according to its will, whereas in Christ the omnipotent divinity moves both soul and body completely¹⁵¹. There is not even one natural movement in Christ, either of his soul or of his body, which is not governed by the divinity, whose will is mediated to the body by the soul. As in man operations of the composite cannot be predicated of the body separately (like speaking, smelling, seeing, hearing), but are initiated by the soul and accomplished in the body, so in Christ the operations cannot be divided, but are predicated of the whole composite, since rational soul and body are under the control of the divinity (prol. 4: 6)¹⁵².

Passions are predicated of the whole human composite because of the union of soul and body. The term "passion" (πάθος) requires some

quotations from Anastasius I of Antioch, *Contra Iohannis Philoponi Diaetetem*, in which the question of Christ's μία ἐνέργεια is discussed. Notably, the Chalcedonian Anastasius agrees with Philoponus on this point. This polemical treatise was most likely written not long after 553, at a time when Anastasius was the apocriary of the Patriarch of Alexandria. Cf. Weiß (1965), 101-3.

¹⁴⁹ Cyril, *Ep. ad Monachos Aegypti* 19-20: ACO I.1.1, 19.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Backes (1931), 214-6 and 270-87.

¹⁵¹ For a similar conception in Apollinarius see, e.g., *Fides Secundum Partem* 30: 178.13-7 Lietzmann.

¹⁵² Likewise Cyril, *Responstones ad Tiberium* 9: 162.17-24 Wickham. In Cyril, the "natural movement" (ἔμφυτον κίνημα) can be neutral, when it is the movement of the soul. It is a mark of the sinful state of humanity, however, that the "movement of the flesh" is in spiritual combat with the higher part in man: καταστρατεύεται μὲν γὰρ τοῦ νοῦ βλέποντος εἰς ἐγκράτειαν διὰ τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ φόβον τὸ κίνημα τῆς σαρκός, *Resp. ad Tib.* 12: 170.3-4 Wickham. That *all* movements of Christ's humanity are subjected to the Logos is thus an indication of his sinlessness. Augustine considers the autonomous movement of the genitalia in sexual arousal indicative of original sin. It is a loss of control of the "will" over the body which marks a loss of the highest form of integration of the personality. This is typical of the fallen, and thus fragmented, state of our personalities, whereas, in the original state, Adam's sexual desire remained under the control of the good will – and one may infer that this is also the case with Christ, the second Adam. This often-maligned side of Augustine's thought is treated in a very balanced way by Rist (1994), 321-7.

clarification. In most general terms, it is understood as an alteration which results from the operation of an external agency. Thus it is, in an ontological sense, a property of the world of “becoming” and is coextensive with (creaturely) mutability and corruptibility. Such is the difference between God, who is ἀπαθής, and human beings, who are passible. In this sense, “passion” cannot be attributed to God. “Passion” can also be understood in an emotive sense: first, as passions of the soul, that is, irrational movements which arise from the apprehension of something good or evil and are directed to this object, thus being either positive (for instance, joy) or negative, and therefore sinful (for instance, envy); secondly, as passions of the body (bodily sensations). The extreme form of such bodily passions is physical death¹⁵³. When Christ takes human sufferings which are natural to soul and body upon himself, as a sign of his true Incarnation, he is not constrained by necessity, but does so in absolute freedom. Thus the ontological impassibility and transcendence of God is in no way impaired¹⁵⁴. Christ’s human passions can rightly be predicated of him as a whole, especially since they do not arise apart from the will of the Logos. In the case of human beings we say, for example, of Peter or Paul that they are sick (passions properly belonging to the body), or that they are weary or anxious (passions properly belonging to the soul). According to this Christological *communicatio idiomatum*, then, it is appropriate to call Christ as a whole “God”, even if this entails that God is said to be weary, to suffer, even to be crucified and to die. But this does not mean that suffering is attributed to the (immutable and impassible) divinity. For neither can the passions that are proper to the human body, such as being sick or weary, be predicated of the soul in the proper sense. Philoponus clearly thinks that the appropriate direction of this *communicatio idiomatum* is from the superior part of the

¹⁵³ For such a notion of “passion” see Nemesius of Emesa, *De Natura Hominis* 16: 74.5-75.6 Morani; Gregory of Nyssa, *Or. Cat.*: 45.22-49.16 Mühlenberg; Cyril of Alexandria, *Ep. ad Mon. Aegypti* 23-4: ACO I.1.1,21-2; cf. Meunier (1997), 243-4. The distinction between “worthy” and “unworthy” affections is presented lucidly by Maximus Confessor, *Op.* 20: PG 91,237BC; cf. Heinzer (1980), 121_g.

¹⁵⁴ Severus, *Ep. I*: PO 12,184-5, quoting from Cyril of Alexandria, says that Christ suffers not “in accordance with compulsory ordinances of nature”, but by a voluntary permission of the Logos. This quotation from Cyril could not be identified by the editor of the letters, Brooks. Cf. also Severus, *C. Additiones Juliani* 26: CSCO 295 [296], 81 [68]. Similarly Leontius of Byzantium, who holds that the humanity of Christ did not suffer by necessity of nature, but for the sake of the divine economy at the Logos’ permission (λόγω οἰκονομίας, τοῦ Λόγου ἐφιέντος τὸ παθεῖν), *C. Aphthartodocetas*: PG 86,1329C and 1321B.

composite to the whole, as when we say of a man that he is prudent or intelligent, and of Christ that he works miracles or that he reigns over all things, while we know that these are operations, respectively, of the soul and of the divinity. Scripture, however, may name human beings also from the inferior part, i.e. "flesh", and so Christ may be called "man". It is conceded by Philoponus that such a way of speaking seems offensive to some. In any case, the principle to be borne in mind with such predication is:

Now, however, just as, on hearing 'God', I understand together with it truly his humanity also, so too with the appellation 'man' I understand that the divine nature is meant together with it (prol. 5: 8.3-5)¹⁵⁵.

Until now, Philoponus claims, he has only professed "what is commonly agreed by those who think in a devout manner about the mystery of Christ" (prol. 6: 8.6-7). The purpose of the subsequent rational enquiry will be to arbitrate whether it is right to speak of one nature of Christ after the union or whether one has to confess two natures, or that Christ appears in two natures. Philoponus is emphatic that the "divine flesh of the Logos" has in no way existed prior to the union with the Logos, who exists from eternity, but that it has assumed existence in the very union. Later in the *Arbiter*, Philoponus will resort to this point (VII, 27 and 29). After the Logos and the flesh have been united, they are distinguished only conceptually (ἐν θεωρίᾳ). So the thesis which Philoponus is about to defend is clear-cut: it is evident to reason and congruent with the belief shared by the Christians of old that there is one nature of Christ after the union, not simple, but composite (ibid.: 8).

4.2 Defending Miaphysite Christology

Philoponus has presented the basic elements of his Christology in the prologue to the *Arbiter*. In chapters I to VI he develops an argument which serves to demonstrate that from a correct understanding of the

¹⁵⁵ By contrast, Theodoret of Cyrus argues that Christ, after his birth, should not be called "God the Logos" only, or "man" only, that is, stripped of his divinity. "Christ" indicates each nature, both that which assumed and that which was assumed: οὐ γὰρ εὐαγὲς μετὰ τὸν τόκον ἢ Θεὸν Λόγον μόνον αὐτὸν προσαγορεύειν, ἢ ἄνθρωπον γεγεννημένον θεότητος, ἀλλὰ Χριστὸν. ὃ ἐκατέραν φύσιν τήν τε λαβοῦσαν καὶ τήν ληφθεῖσαν δηλοῖ, *De Incarnatione Domini* 24: PG 75,1461B.

union between divinity and humanity in Christ the doctrine of the one composite nature of Christ follows necessarily. Thus miaphysitism will be shown to be the only coherent exposition of what is implied in the Incarnation of the Logos.

4.2.1 Christ is one

The predominant emphasis in Philoponus' Christology is laid on the unity of the God-man. If one admits that the divine nature and the human nature of Christ have been united not merely by accident, i.e. in honour, power, operation or likewise, but *qua* natures themselves, the end-product of this union has to be conceived of as a single entity (τι ἓν). "To be united" (ἡνωσθαι) is nothing else than "to become one" (ἐν γεγονέναι). Hence, that the Logos became incarnate means that he was united to the flesh so that one living entity issued out of the pair (I,7: 8-9, also PG 140,56A). The end-product of this union of natures is one not as the homonyms "astral dog" (the dog-star or hound of Orion) and "terrestrial dog", or "a real man" and "a pictured man" are said to be one. As Philoponus explains in his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, homonymous expressions have a name in common, but differ in reality¹⁵⁶. The example of "a real man" and "a pictured man" belongs to a subclass of homonymous predication, the ἀφ' -ἐνός predication¹⁵⁷. Any kind of homonymy falls short of the fact that what has resulted from the union of divinity and humanity is not a mere name, but a reality (οὐκ ἄρα ψιλὸν ὄνομα τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα, PG 140,56B)¹⁵⁸ which is united by substance, not by any accompanying accidents. Philoponus attributes the latter position to Nestorius and his followers. If what results from the union is a substance viz. nature (both terms are used synonymously), it is right to assert one nature of Christ after the union, albeit not simple, but composite (I,8: 10).

Those who reject the formula of a "single nature" might maintain that the oneness of Christ is safeguarded by speaking of a "single Christ", who is the result of the union of the two natures. Surely, Philoponus points out, the name "Christ" refers to the divine Logos who has become incarnate, whereas prophets and kings could be called "Christ",

¹⁵⁶ Philoponus, *In Cat.*: 14.2ff.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*: 17.12-3: ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὁ γεγραμμένος ὠνόμασται.

¹⁵⁸ Similarly Severus of Antioch, *Hom. CXI*: PO 25,794.

i.e. "anointed", in an homonymous sense. This name "Christ" is not indicative of what accompanies a substance, but of substance viz. nature itself, since the divinity and the humanity were united *qua* natures. Could it be argued, then, that the name "Christ" is indicative of two natures¹⁵⁹? "Christ" could be said to signify each of the two natures in itself, either homonymously, as "dog of the sea" and "dog of the dry land" are both called "dog"¹⁶⁰, or univocally, as Peter and Paul are called "man". In the case of the mere homonymy there are two dogs that are one in name, but not in nature, and in the case of the univocal predication there are two numerically different members of the same species. Hence in both cases there would be two numerically different Christs under the same name. But Christ is truly one, i.e. in name and reality, and thus the name "Christ" is not indicative of each of the two natures in itself (I,9: 10-1).

Secondly, "Christ" could be said to be indicative of both natures together (τῶν φύσεων ἀμφοτέρων). However, this is not possible either:

For if there is no single entity which is the end-product of the union of the two natures, the single name 'man' cannot be predicated of soul and body, nor can the name (προσηγορίαν) 'Christ' be predicated of the two – the divinity and the humanity of Christ – since no single entity has resulted from them (I,10: 11.15-8 = PG 140,56C-D).

Alternatively, "house" cannot be said of stones and wood, before the figure and form of a house have been effected by composition. Thus, since the name "Christ" can neither be predicated of each of the two natures in itself (other than homonymously or univocally) nor of the two natures together, it is indicative of one substance viz. nature which is composite and not simple, as "man" is indicative of a composite nature of soul and body (I,10: 11-2)¹⁶¹.

¹⁵⁹ This position is ascribed to the "partisans of Nestorius" in Philoponus, *Four Trîmêmata*: IV,219 [II,94-5] Chabot. It is found, e.g., in Theodoret of Cyrus, *De Incarnatione Domini* 24: PG 75,1461B, which is quoted above in fn. 155 on p. 47.

¹⁶⁰ The Syriac expressions here are ܠܒܝܬܐ ܕܝܡܝܢܐ (*phoca* – φώκη) and ܠܒܝܬܐ ܕܝܡܝܢܐ (*canis domesticus*), 11.3-4. Cf. the Syriac version of Dionysius Thrax, *Grammatica*: 56.20-1 Merx. Merx (1889), 14s., comments: "Imitatur graecum exemplum μῦς θαλάσσιος et μῦς γηγενής". These are the examples used for homonymy by Philoponus, *In Cat.*: 14.32-3. However, the examples of κύων ὑστέρως, κύων χειρσῦτος, and κύων θαλάττιος are also found in the commentators, e.g., Dexippus, *In Cat.*: 19.25-30, Ammonius, *In Porph. Isag.*: 84.8-11, Philoponus, *In De Gen. et Corr.*: 130.28-31, Simplicius, *In Cat.*: 26.24-5. Thus it is most likely that here the Syriac is a literal translation of the Greek.

¹⁶¹ George of Martyropolis takes issue with the argument of *Arbiter* I,9-10 in the first fragment of his (Syriac) refutation of Philoponus, which is transmitted by Elias, *Ep. Apol.*

Some contend that the name “Christ” is not indicative of substance itself, but of something in relation to substance, as in the O.T. prophets or priests have been called “anointed”¹⁶². Philoponus admits that names like “king”, “philosopher”, “grammarian”, “lord” and “servant” indicate a certain activity, learning or possession, but they are used more often otherwise. If we say, for example, “the grammarian walks” or “is sick” or “sleeps”, we do not mean his profession by calling him “grammarian”, but his nature or substance. So Mt. 16:16 reads: “You are the Christ, the Son of the living God”. Whereas previously the signification “anointed” was not indicative of substance, here it is indicative of the one nature of Christ that is effected out of divinity and humanity¹⁶³ (I,11: 12).

4.2.2 Christ is identical with his single nature

To those who contend for a “dyad of natures” (δυὰς τῶν φύσεων), Philoponus poses the question whether Christ is other than his own natures. Thereby nature is understood as the particular nature that is distinguished from universal nature (see below pp. 60ff. on *Arbiter* VII,21-3). Nothing which exists is other than its (particular) nature. “Man”, for instance, cannot be something other than “rational, mortal living being”, which he is *per definitionem*. If Christ existed as other than his own natures or substances, given that “the existence¹⁶⁴ of an individual is according to his nature (or substance)” (II,12: 13.11-2), he would be other

11: CSCO 469 [470], 97.29-98.5 [70.23-8]: *Ergo neque duarum naturarum simpliciter est significativum nomen ‘Christus’, sive simul (sumptarum) sive uniuscuiusque seorsim; sed (nomen ‘Christus’ significativum est) termini et totius quod ex coniunctione earum duarum perfectum est et completum. Hoc autem est hypostasis characteristic et persona.*

¹⁶² This point is made in a fragment of Nestorius in *Exc. Eph.* VI: ACO I.1.2.47.7-14, also quoted by Justinian, *Contra Monophysitas* 35: 13.17-23 Schwartz.

¹⁶³ The difference between the meaning of “anointed” in the O.T. and in Mt. 16:16 and the Christological relevance of this passage is also emphasised by Cyril, *Quod Unus Sit Christus* 726c19-728c21: SC 97,340-8, and Severus, *Hom. CXXIV*: PO 29,216-8.

¹⁶⁴ Šanda (1930), [47] translates τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, where the Greek text in Nicetas (PG 140,57A) has τὸ εἶναι. The Syriac ܡܕܢܐ ܕܡܕܢܐ, ܡ is most easily retranslated into Greek with τὸ εἶναι, since there is no equivalent here to the τί. Dr S.P. Brock was so kind as to look at a photograph he had of the unpublished manuscript Vat. Syr. 158 which contains a Syriac translation of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* from the beginning of the seventh century. In fol. 7^v τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is translated ܡܕܢܐ ܕܡܕܢܐ ܕܡܕܢܐ, ܡ ܕܡܢ. The presence of ܕܡܢ to represent τί suggests that Šanda’s translation is wrong and that Philoponus does not use the Aristotelian technical term here. Cf. also the compilation of scholia on Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, the so-called *Anonymus Vaticanus*, edited by Baumstark (1900), ܕ [245], where ܡܕܢܐ ܕܡܕܢܐ translates τί εἶναι.

than himself. Philoponus derides this as absurd. Hence Christ is not other than his natures. Since the supporters of a diphysite Christology say that the name "Christ" is indicative of the two natures, it is the same to say "Christ" or "his natures". Now if Christ is identical with his natures and if there are two natures of Christ and not one, consequently there will also be two Christs. But since Christ is truly one by name and by reality and since there is no way of asserting two Christs with respect to the Incarnation, Christ is identical with his one (particular) nature or substance (ibid.: 13).

Philoponus illustrates this argument with the example of the sun. Since the sun itself is one, its nature is necessarily one and not two. In it many differences of natural predicates (or faculties: *πλείονες φυσικῶν δυνάμεων διαφοραί*, PG 140,57B)¹⁶⁵ can be seen, such as brightness, heat, three-dimensional extension, spherical form and circular motion. They cannot be said to be many natures, for nothing of such kind by itself makes the nature of the sun¹⁶⁶.

But what is a joint product (*σύγκριμα*) of all that has been mentioned, being one and not more, this is the sun's nature (or substance), which is not to be seen in anything else and makes the one sun and its one nature (II,13: 14.1-4 – PG 140,57C).

Consequently, of the God-man, though different properties of the divinity and the humanity are recognised in him, there are not two natures. For Christ is none of these on its own, neither his divinity nor his humanity, but rather a compounding out of both, and hence he is one and has a single composite nature (ibid.: 14).

4.2.3 "Christ" is indicative of one nature viz. substance

If the name "Christ" is not indicative of the divinity alone or of the humanity alone, but of him who has been effected out of both, it is indicative either of substance or of accidents which inhere in the substance of something¹⁶⁷. The latter would mean nothing else than a (mere) mu-

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Aristotle, *Protrepticus*, fr. 6: 35 Ross (= Iamblichus, *Protr.* 7): εἰ δ' ἔστιν ἐκ πλείονων δυνάμεων συμπεφυκός [ὁ ἄνθρωπος]; i.e. man is not just constituted by discursive reason and intellect.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. the discussion in Leontius of Byzantium, *Solutio Argumentorum Severi* 5: PG 86,1928BD. The miaphysite interlocutor claims that all unique entities (πάντα τὰ μοναδικά), such as sun and moon, have a single nature. In response, Leontius rejects this idea of a φύσις μοναδική and insists that names such as "sun" and "moon" are not indicative of the common nature, but of the hypostases which are marked off by defining properties.

¹⁶⁷ Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.*: 20.11-2, on accidents: ἐκείνων ἐν ἑτέρῳ τὸ εἶναι ἐχόντων, λέγω δὴ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ.

tual relationship of natures (ἡ τῶν φύσεων πρὸς ἀλλήλας σχέσις, 140,60B). In fact, if the name "Christ" is not indicative of that which relates to the substance of something, the two natures will be united only to the degree of a simple relationship, while both of them will persist on their own after the union. In Stoic terminology this case would be called *parathesis* or juxtaposition. Thus "chorus" is indicative of a unity constituted by a mutual relationship, every singer being particular and individual in his hypostasis. The number of individuals will remain the same as it has been prior to their relational union¹⁶⁸. This is similar in the case of the stones and pieces of wood of which a house is built, in that each of the individual entities has its own particular and hypostatical being. There is no union with respect to the natures themselves. In Christ, however, a union of natures *qua* natures has been effected, in the same way as the rational soul is united with the body. Hence the name "Christ" is indicative of substance or nature (III,14: 14-5).

Philoponus argues that every name is predicated of a plurality of entities either univocally or homonymously. In the first case, it is indicative of one and the same class with respect to all the members of this class of which it is predicated. So "horse" is predicated univocally of the individual horses "Chestnut" and "Dapple"¹⁶⁹, and (the genus) "living being" is predicated of (the species) "man" and "horse". The nature of horse is one, but in many individuals, and the nature of living being is one, but in many species. In the second case, of "sea horse" and "land horse", for example, "horse" is predicated homonymously and not univocally, for they differ in substance. If the word "horse" is used to indicate a land horse, it is indicative of one, and only one, nature. This is similar with names that are predicated univocally. For the name "man" is, strictly speaking, not indicative of the individuals that are under a species, but of the species itself, in the same way as "living being" is indicative of the genus and not of the species under the genus. But with the general name often those which fall under the same designation are indicated. So if we say "Paul is a man", "man" is also indicative of Paul's being one individual nature. Otherwise we could not say that there are many or few men in a city. The individual man who is under-

¹⁶⁸ Nemesius of Emesa employs the example of singers in a chorus as an illustration of (Stoic) juxtaposition in his *De Natura Hominis* 3: 38.22-3 Morani.

¹⁶⁹ Ξανθος, a horse of Achilles (*Ilias* 16,149; 17,400-20), and Βαλῖος (or Βαλίας), a horse of Peleus and Achilles, generated by Podarge and Zephyrus (*Ilias* 16,149; 19,401) Ammonius, the teacher of Philoponus, uses Ξανθος and Βαλῖος as exemplary names for horses, *In Porph. Isagogen.* 17.19-21, 32.1, 60.20.

stood by the species “man” is one and not many. Thus Philoponus concludes that “any name predicated of any single subject is indicative of only one nature” (III,15: 16.10-1). He summarises the argument of this chapter that the name “Christ”, whether predicated homonymously or univocally, is necessarily indicative of only one nature that is effected out of the union of divinity and humanity.

4.2.4 Christ admits of no duality

The fourth chapter of the *Arbiter* begins with the following syllogism:

If a dyad is indicative of a first distinction [*lege* διακρίσεως] of a monad, in as much as it is a [certain] division – hence it has its name – and division is opposed to unity, it is therefore impossible that the same should be in the same respect simultaneously united and divided; therefore no dyad *qua* dyad may in this respect be said to be united, but rather to be divided (IV,16: 16.23-17.2 – partly in PG 140,57D).

The Greek fragment in Nicetas presents us with a textual problem, for it reads in all four manuscripts: εἰ ἡ δυὰς τῆς ἐκ μονάδος πρώτης διασκέψεως ἐστὶ δηλωτική. The noun διάσκεψις means “inspection” or “close examination”, and is employed in this sense by Philoponus in his commentary on Aristotle’s *Meteorologica* and in his *De Opificio Mundi*¹⁷⁰. This reading is unintelligible to me and does not seem to make sense here. In fact, the Syriac translation ܠܕܥܝ suggests that the underlying Greek was perhaps διαιρέσεως or διακρίσεως. These are both familiar terms in the philosophy of Proclus, where they denote the principle of distinction or division¹⁷¹, such as in *Elements of Theology* 64:

Every original monad (ἀρχικὴ μονὰς) gives rise to two series, one consisting of substances complete in themselves (αὐτοτελῶν ὑποστάσεων), and one of irradiations which have their substantiality in something other than themselves¹⁷².

He comments on those substances which are complete in themselves that

by their discrimination into a manifold they fall short of their original monad (διὰ τὴν εἰς πλῆθος διάκρισιν ἡλαττωμέναι τῆς ἀρχικῆς αὐτῶν μονάδος)¹⁷³.

¹⁷⁰ See Philoponus, *In Meteor* : 40.6; *De Opificio Mundi* VI,1: 229.20, 230.6 and 23-4 Reichardt.

¹⁷¹ Cf Beierwaltes (1980), 40-4, and (1979), 63-4.

¹⁷² Proclus, *El. Theol.* 64: 60.20-2 Dodds.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*: 60.31-2.

Proclus' idea of substances proceeding from the original monad by a division into a manifold, with διάκρισις as the principle of distinction which introduces numerical plurality¹⁷⁴, provides us with a hermeneutical context for the passage in question. Otherness (ἐτερότης) is the cause of distinction (διάκρισις) of beings and brings forth a dyad (δυάς)¹⁷⁵. Διάκρισις also indicates the procession (πρόοδος) of the many from the original unity¹⁷⁶ and so belongs to the second moment in Proclus' triadic philosophy. This triadic scheme goes back to Iamblichus, who characterises μονάς as ταυτότητος καὶ ἐνώσεως αἰτία, δυάς as προόδων καὶ διακρίσεως χορηγός, and τριάς as τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς τῶν προελθόντων ἀρχηγός¹⁷⁷. We find διάκρισις as the principle of distinction also in the famous sixth-century Christian author who used the pseudonym of Dionysius Areopagita¹⁷⁸. Notably, the notion of a dyad as a first distinction of a monad recurs elsewhere in the *Arbiter* and in the *Epitome of the Arbiter*¹⁷⁹. Therefore I propose to emend the manuscript reading to διακρίσεως¹⁸⁰.

When Philoponus speaks of a dyad as being divided, the additum καθὼς ἐστὶ δυάς is significant. Two individuals, for instance, Paul and

¹⁷⁴ Proclus, *Theol. Plat.* IV,29: IV,88.22-3 Saffrey-Westerink: ὅπου δὲ ἡ διάκρισις, ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁ ἀριθμός, and *El. Theol.* 176: 155 Dodds.

¹⁷⁵ Proclus, *In Plat. Parm.* 7: I184.28-9 Cousin: κατὰ τὴν ἐτερότητα τὴν διακριτικὴν τῶν ὄντων; *Theol. Plat.* III,26: III,89.8: δυαδικὴν διάκρισιν; IV,27: IV,79.25-80.6: ἐναυῖθα δὲ ἡ ἐτερότης διακρίνει μὲν τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ἐν; cf. III,26: III,89-92; IV,27: IV,78-80; IV,30: IV,89-91.

¹⁷⁶ Proclus, *El. Theol.* 35: 38.12 Dodds: ἅμα γὰρ διακρίσει πρόοδος.

¹⁷⁷ Iamblichus, in Proclus, *In Plat. Tim.* II,215.7-10 Diehl.

¹⁷⁸ See Lilla (1982), 542-4 and 549-54.

¹⁷⁹ *Arbiter* IV,17: 18,15-6, X,39: 37.23-4; *Epitome* 4: 51.10; 13: 56.11.

¹⁸⁰ The objection could be raised against my emendation of the Greek text in Nicetas that I follow the *lectio facilior*. Indeed, the Syriac translator might have been as baffled about the meaning of διασκέψεως here as I and thus might have adopted a different reading. If one decides to keep διασκέψεως, the phrase could be translated: "If the term for two [*i.e.* the dyad] is indicative of the first conceptual construct [*sc.* that comes] after or from the term for one [*i.e.* the monad]". This was suggested to me by Fr J.A. Munitiz. Still, the meaning of this phrase is beyond my comprehension. As for my preference of διακρίσεως over διαιρέσεως, the latter can be understood as a *lectio facilior*, since it is the more generic term of the two. This was indicated to me by Professor W. Beierwaltes in a letter. In fact, the more generic term is used in X,36: 33.5 – PG 140,60C, ἡ δὲ δυάς διχάς τις οὐσα διαιρέσεως ἐστὶ δηλωτικὴ. In the passage in question here, the Syriac translator would seem to differentiate between ܕܝܚܝܬܐ for διάκρισις (the more specific "distinction"), and ܕܝܐܝܪܝܬܐ for διαιρέσις (the more generic "division"). Elsewhere, however, he can employ both terms for διαιρέσις, see VII,21: 21.2 (ܕܝܐܝܪܝܬܐ) = 51.38 Kotter, and X,36: 33.5 (ܕܝܚܝܬܐ) = PG 140,60C. Yet this need not surprise us since the translator is largely, but not wholly, consistent in his rendering of Greek terminology.

Peter, are divided *qua* individuals; “in the common intelligible content of nature” (IV,16: 17.4-5)¹⁸¹, however, insofar as they are both a rational mortal living being, i.e. with respect to species, they are said to be united. Here Philoponus draws an important distinction:

ὁ γὰρ κοινὸς καὶ καθόλου τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως λόγος, εἰ καὶ αὐτὸς καθ’ ἑαυτὸν εἰς ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ οὖν ἐν πολλοῖς ὑποκειμένοις γινόμενος πολλὰ γίνεται, ὁλόκληρος ἐν ἑκάστῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους ὑπάρχων (ibid.: 17.8-10 – 50.5-7 Kotter).

For the common and universal intelligible content of human nature, albeit it is in itself one, but when realised in many subjects, becomes many, existing in each completely and partially.

Philoponus’ use of the term “the *logos* of so-and-so” here is indebted to Aristotle who employs it in the locutions λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι and λόγος τῆς οὐσίας¹⁸². There it means “the *logos* that says what it is to be so-and-so”¹⁸³, which is elucidated by Aristotle’s explanation of synonyms:

For if one is to give an account (λόγον) of each [*sc.* man and ox] – what being an animal is for each of them (τί ἔστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῶν εἶναι) – one will give the same account¹⁸⁴.

The term οὐσία in the technical expression λόγος τῆς οὐσίας indicates “being” in general, and is thus not restricted to the first Aristotelian category¹⁸⁵. This is at least Philoponus’ reading in his *Categories Commentary*, where he explains that Aristotle employs οὐσία in a twofold way, first as antithesis to “accident” and so denoting that which subsists on its own (αὐθυπόστατον), and secondly denoting

¹⁸¹ The underlying Greek is most likely ὁ κοινὸς λόγος τῆς φύσεως. Among Christian theologians, the formula ὁ τῆς φύσεως λόγος is found, for instance, in Cyril of Alexandria, *Thesaurus* XI: PG 75,152D.

¹⁸² Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Δ.29: 1024^b29, Z.1: 1028^a35 et al., *Categories* 1: 1^a1, 1^a10-2. In an ancient Syriac translation of the *Categories*, edited by Georr (1948), 253, this phrase is translated as ܠܘܟܠܐ ܠܠܗܐ.

¹⁸³ Kirwan (1993), 179, uses the translation “formula”, which is also endorsed by Frede-Patzig (1988), I, 20. This has a decidedly linguistic connotation, which seems in some contexts of ancient philosophical and theological debate to be misleading. I opt for a translation such as “intelligible content”, which would correspond to Aquinas’ understanding of *ratio*, cf. Wippel (1993), 94-5. Zachhuber (2000), 71-73, sheds light on the conceptual framework of Cappadocian Trinitarian theology against the background of this philosophical discussion.

¹⁸⁴ Aristotle. *Cat.* 1: 1^a10-2.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. Aristotle, *Categories* 5: 2^a14-7. There was some reticence to employing λόγος τῆς οὐσίας for individuals. Porphyry, *Isagoge*: 9.14-6, argues that it comprises only specific differentiae, not individual properties; cf. Zachhuber (2000), 72.

simply that which exists (καθ' ὃ πᾶσαν ἀπλῶς ὑπαρξιν οὐσίαν καλεῖ), thus comprehending "substance" and "accident" as technical categories. It is the second meaning which applies to the phrase λόγος τῆς οὐσίας¹⁸⁶.

Philoponus seems to have this sense in mind, when he adduces a list of examples: the intelligible content of a ship in a ship-builder is multiplied when it inheres in many subjects; the one doctrine in a teacher, when realised in his students, is multiplied in them and becomes inherent in each of them¹⁸⁷; a pattern on a seal is one, but it is as a whole in many impressions, and therefore is said to be many¹⁸⁸. While they are numerically divided *qua* individuals, with respect to their common species the many men are one, just as the many ships are one and the doctrines are one, and the many impressions of the seal are one in the identity of the pattern. So what is many and divided under one aspect is one and united under another aspect (ibid.: 17 – 51.5-52.21 Kotter). This conception of generic and specific unity is essentially derived from Aristotle's *Categories*¹⁸⁹, and is expressed by Porphyry as follows:

τῇ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εἶδους μετουσία οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι εἷς, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ μέρος ὁ εἷς καὶ κοινὸς πλείους· διαιρετικὸν μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, συλληπτικὸν δὲ καὶ ἐνοποιὸν τὸ κοινόν.

The many men are one by participation in the species, but the common man, the species, is made several by its individuals. For the individual is always divisive, but what is common combines and unites¹⁹⁰.

Porphyry's "moderately realist" understanding of form and universal in fact accords with the position of Alexander of Aphrodisias. This agreement could be seen, once the common view of Alexander as a

¹⁸⁶ Philoponus, *In Cat.*: 20.9-14. In the same sense λόγος τοῦ εἶναι is used by Leontius of Byzantium, *C. Nest. et Eut.* 1: PG 86,1280AB. Grillmeier (1989), 200-1, does not recognise this specifically Aristotelian-Porphyrian background to Leontius.

¹⁸⁷ This analysis is reminiscent of Plotinus, *Enn.* IV.9.5, where he discusses how soul can be one-in-many. One of the similes he gives is that of a body of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), which is as a whole in each of its parts.

¹⁸⁸ For the imagery of the seal and its impressions see Philo of Alexandria, *De Ebrietate* XXXIII.133: LCL 247.388, *De Migratione Abrahami* XVIII.103: LCL 261.190-2. With the help of a "seal-ring simile" Ammonius explains the threefold mode of being of universals in his *In Porphyrii Isagogen*: 41.13-42.26. This is echoed in Stephen of Alexandria (found in the Syriac *Dialogues* of Severus bar Šakkū) and in the scholia *Anonymus Vaticanus*, see Baumstark (1900), Δ [206-7] and ΔΔ [230-1].

¹⁸⁹ See the seminal paper on individuals in Aristotle by Frede (1978), 18-9.

¹⁹⁰ Porphyry, *Isagoge*: 6.21-3, ET: Spade (1994), 6.

“nominalist” was revised¹⁹¹. The following passage from one of his *Quaestiones* illustrates this similarity:

For mortal rational animal, if it is taken along with material circumstances and the differences that accompany its concrete reality (ὑπόστασις), which are different for different [sc. men], makes up Socrates and Callias and particular men. But if it is understood apart from them (χωρὶς τούτων), it becomes common (κοινόν), not because it is not in each of the particular men (for with them are found the features peculiar to each particular), but because it is the same in all. Definitions are of what is common in such a sense and in this way because they are the same for many particulars. Therefore, definitions of these sorts of items are also not of any incorporeal nature separated from the particulars. For the definition of man, two-footed pedestrian animal, is common since it is in all the particular men and is complete in each (δλόκληρον ἐν ἑκάστῳ); it is common in virtue of being the same in many, not by each [sc. man] sharing a part of it (κοινὸν τῷ ἐν πλείοσιν εἶναι τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῷ μέρους αὐτοῦ μετέχειν ἑκαστον). For each man is a two-footed pedestrian animal¹⁹².

It seems clear that Philoponus’ point in the *Arbiter* is the same as Porphyry’s and Alexander’s. While the λόγος τῆς οὐσίας (φύσεως) or εἶδος of a thing is one, it is instantiated in the particulars. Thereby, it is complete in each individual and not in part. Philoponus will elaborate on the unity of individuals in the species in the central chapter of the *Arbiter* (VII,21).

This consideration provides Philoponus with the argument that if there are two natures of Christ, and if each dyad, *insofar* as it is a dyad, is divided, then the two natures of Christ, *insofar* as they are natures, are divided as well. And they “would be even more divided than divided individuals which belong to the same species, such as Paul and Peter” (IV,17: 18.4-6), since these are numerically divided, but share a common species, i.e. the λόγος τῆς φύσεως of man, and a common genus. The divine nature and the human nature of Christ, however, unless they have come into the unity of a composite nature, would be divided in all respects, since they are not united with respect to either genus or species. For the divine nature exceeds everything which comes into existence through it, though appellations like “nature” or “substance” are applied to it. But if the two natures of Christ have been united *qua* natures indivisibly, it is necessary that the end-product should be one nature (ibid.: 18).

¹⁹¹ See esp. Tweedale (1984), now also Chiaradonna (1998), 587-9. Cf. the discussion of Lloyd (1981), 49-61.

¹⁹² Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Quaestiones* I,3: 7.32-8.12; ET: Tweedale (1984), 297. See also the commented translation by Sharples (1992).

Another argument why a dyad of natures cannot be predicated of Christ is brought up by Philoponus. Division is fuller than duality, and where the fulness cannot be predicated of something, consequently a part cannot be predicated of it either. For instance, if “colour” cannot be predicated of something, “white” cannot be predicated of it either, and what is not a living being, is not a man either. Hence if a division of natures cannot be predicated of Christ, all the more a dyad of natures cannot be said of him either (IV,18: 18). Of one and the same subject many faculties are said, as of fire heat, brightness and such, none the less they are all united in that they inhere in it. Similarly the many parts of our body effect one whole, when they are united. Unless the two natures of Christ have become one by virtue of their union (like the many parts of the body) and are in one and the same subject which is distinct from them (as the predicates in the corporeal substance of fire perfect it) there will be no union at all, and the divinity and humanity will always be separate (ibid.: 18-9)¹⁹³.

4.2.5 One definition – one nature

That Christ is one in name and reality (ὀνόματί τε καὶ πράγματι) requires that, if one wants to define him or give the intelligible content (λόγος) of what he is, one must give a single definition (ὁρισμός). Here Philoponus recurs to a notion common among the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle, that a thing can be indicated by both its name and intelligible content¹⁹⁴. As the “intelligible content” or “formula of being” is something like a definition¹⁹⁵, the question lies at hand why Aristotle in *Categories* I did not just speak of ὁρισμός. The answer given by the commentators is that neither the supreme genera nor individuals can be defined in a proper sense, that is, by genus and constitutive differentia. The expression “formula of being” is more comprehensive, since

¹⁹³ The short and obscure fifth chapter of the *Arbiter* (V,19: 19) contains syllogistic arguments to show that the composite Christ necessarily has a single composite nature and that the doctrine of two natures is absurd. George of Martyropolis seems to reply to this chapter in one of the fragments transmitted by Elias, *Ep. Apol.* 3: CSCO 469 [470], 9.5-23 [6.19-7.2]. He argues that one has to distinguish between three items which coincide temporally, the two elements which enter into composition, their composition itself, and the single end-product resulting from it. Cf. also Leontius of Byzantium, *Solutio* 4: PG 86,1925C-1928A, where he develops an argument against the doctrine of one composite nature on the basis of a distinction between the nature of the composite (ἡ φύσις τοῦ συνθέτου) and the nature of the composed elements (ἡ τῶν συντεθειμένων φύσις).

¹⁹⁴ See Simplicius, *In Cat.*: 22.15-33.

¹⁹⁵ Porphyry, *In Cat.*: 64.28-65.4.

it includes both definition and circumscription (ὕπογραφή), the latter being a rough outline of an item¹⁹⁶. Porphyry epitomises this interpretation of Aristotle, when he says:

For the definition (ὅρος)¹⁹⁷ is a formula of being inasmuch as it indicates the substance, and the circumscription (ὕπογραφή), inasmuch as it signifies the property which is around the substance (περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν)¹⁹⁸.

Given this background, it is odd that Philoponus would claim that Christ could be “defined” in the strict sense. However, he seems to use “definition” here in a loose sense, so that it is interchangeable with the more generic term “formula”. Thus, when he argues that there a “single formula” should be given for Christ, he says:

For every definition of nature is indicative of the subject reality, and therefore the definition of Christ, or the formula of what he is, is indicative of his nature. But every definition by being one – unless it is homonymous – is indicative of one nature. Thus also the definition of Christ, or the formula indicative of what he is, will be indicative of his single nature (VI,20: 20.3-7 – PG 140.60A).

If, however, according to the Chalcedonians, there are two natures of Christ, they will have two definitions which do not indicate the same. But of every thing that is one, there will also be one definition, hence Christ will not have two definitions, and in this case will not have two natures either. For each definition is indicative of one nature, either simple or composite (VI,20: 19-20 – partly in PG 140,60AB).

The use of such logical reasoning in Christology as in *Arbiter* I-VI might seem surprising, but is not uncommon in the sixth century, when the theological method that was employed in doctrinal controversy became highly technical and formalised, and thus merits the epithet “scholastic”¹⁹⁹. Boethius, in many ways Philoponus’ orthodox Western counterpart, equally maintains that the very name “Christ” denotes a single

¹⁹⁶ Philoponus, *In Cat.*: 19.22-20.3, Simplicius, *In Cat.*: 29.16-24. Zachhuber (2000), 72, argues that the distinction between ὅρος and ὑπογραφή is of Stoic origin.

¹⁹⁷ I take it that Porphyry means the same by ὅρος as the Neoplatonic commentators when they speak of ὁρισμός (Philoponus, *Arbiter*, *In Cat.*; also Ammonius. *In Porph. Isag.*, *In Cat.*; Simplicius, *In Cat.*).

¹⁹⁸ Porphyry, in Simplicius, *In Cat.*: 30.13-4 (= fr. 51F.27-9 Smith), ET: Zachhuber (2000), 72. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.3-4, οἱ γὰρ ὁρισμοί, ὡς πολλάκις εἶπομεν, παριστῶσιν ἡμῖν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων φύσιν.

¹⁹⁹ According to the classic study of Grabmann I (1909), 92-116 and 148-77 (on Boethius), and the more recent survey of Daley (1984), with ample documentation. See below pp. 157ff.

entity (*unum*) by virtue of its singular number²⁰⁰. He argues against Nestorian Christology that

if the substance of God is different from that of man, and the one name of Christ applies to both, and the combination of different substances is not believed to have formed one Person, the name of Christ is equivocal and cannot be comprised in any definition (*aequivocum nomen est Christi et nulla potest definitione concludi*)²⁰¹.

4.3 Examining the Formula of Chalcedon

In chapters VII to IX the logical coherence of the Chalcedonian definition of one hypostasis in two natures is examined. The seventh chapter contains the core of Philoponus' conceptual scheme, the identification of particular nature and hypostasis, which makes him an opponent of the Council's Christology. That this chapter is the central part of the *Arbiter* is acknowledged by the fact that it was included almost entirely in the seventh-century florilegium known as *Doctrina Patrum*, and is thus mostly preserved in the original Greek.

4.3.1 Nature, hypostasis and prosopon

Before entering the controversy over the Christology of Chalcedon, Philoponus regards it as appropriate to define the ecclesiastical terminology of nature, hypostasis and prosopon. The teaching of the Church

holds that nature is the intelligible content of being common to participants in the same substance (τὸν κοινὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον τῶν τῆς αὐτῆς μετεχόντων οὐσίας), as every man is a rational and mortal living being, capable of reason and understanding; for in this respect no one single man is distinguished from another. Substance and nature amount to the same. Hypostasis, however, or prosopon, is indicative of the concrete individual existence of each nature (τὴν ἰδιοσύστατον τῆς ἐκάστου φύσεως ὑπαρξίν) and, so to speak, a circumscription compounded of certain prop-

²⁰⁰ Boethius, *C. Eut. et Nest.* IV.30-1: LCL 74.92.

²⁰¹ Ibid. IV.54-9: LCL 74.94. Cf. Anastasius of Antioch, *Contra Iohannis Philoponi Diaetetem*: 204.14-205.18 Diekamp, where he argues against Philoponus' all-pervading use of the anthropological model that there is not one *nature* of the individual man. The human constitution out of rational soul and body rather means that there is one hypostasis and two natures. Anastasius' response is as technical as Philoponus' argument: εἰ πᾶς ὁρος τῶν ὑποκειμένων φύσεών ἐστι δηλωτικός, λέγεται δὲ καθ' ὅρισμόν ζῶον λογικὸν θνητὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐ ταυτὸν δὲ κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον τὸ λογικὸν τῷ θνητῷ, οὐκ ἄρα μιᾷς εἴης ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσεως κατὰ τὸν τοῦ οἰκείου ὁρισμοῦ κανόνα, *ibid.*: 204.22-6.

erties (περιγραφὴν ἐξ ἰδιοτήτων τινῶν συγκεκριμένην), whereby the participants in the same nature differ, and, to say it in brief, those which the Peripatetics usually call individuals, in which the division into genera and species comes to an end. The doctors of the Church name them hypostases, sometimes also prosopa (VII,21: 20.20-21.3 – 51.31-9 Kotter).

The term “individual (ἄτομον)” is well chosen, since entities cannot be divided beyond this level. If one divided an individual human being, like Peter or Paul, into soul and body, the human being itself would be destroyed²⁰². In ecclesiastical terminology (ὁ ἐκκλησιαστικὸς λόγος)²⁰³ individuals are called hypostases, because in them genera and species assume existence (ὑπαρξίς), and they do not subsist apart from them (χωρὶς τούτων οὐχ ὑφιστάμενα, VII,21: 21 – 51.23-50 Kotter).

Crucial to Philoponus’ understanding of these terms is his distinction between common and particular nature. The common nature, for instance, that of man, is such that *qua* common nature no individual man is distinguished from another. But when it is instantiated in an individual, it is proper to this individual exclusively. Here, Philoponus refers to a distinction between the common and the particular which he has developed in chapter IV of the *Arbiter*. Thus the “rational and mortal being in me (τὸ ἐν ἐμοὶ ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν)” is not common to anyone else (VII,22: 22.17 – 52.55 Kotter). As Ammonius says in a strikingly similar passage of his commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, in the individual the common species is “circumscribed (περιγέγραπται)”, or “fenced off (περιώρισταί)”²⁰⁴. Philoponus illustrates this by a few examples: when a man or an ox or a horse suffers, other individuals of the same species (τὰ ὁμοειδῆ τῶν ἀτόμων) do not suffer; when Paul dies, this does not entail that any other man dies; and when Peter is born and comes into existence, the men to be born after him do not yet exist. So nature is said in a twofold manner:

in one way, when we look at the common intelligible content of each nature on its own, such as the nature of man or of horse which does not exist in any of the individuals; in another way, when we look at the same common nature which exists in the individuals and assumes a particular existence (μερικωτάτην ὑπαρξιν) in each of them, and does not fit with any-

²⁰² Cf. Philoponus, *De Aeternitate Mundi contra Proclum* XI,8: 438.9-11 Rabe: πάλιν δ’ αὖ τὰ μὲν ἄτομα ἀδιαίρετά ἐστιν, ἣ τοιαῦτα ἐστὶν ὁ γὰρ Σωκράτης εἰ διαίρεθῆι, οὐκέτι ἐστὶν Σωκράτης. See also Ammonius, *In Porph. Isag.*: 63.11-21.

²⁰³ Similarly, Boethius speaks of *ecclesiasticus loquendi usus* and *ecclesiastica locutio*, *C. Eut. et Nest.* III.96 and IV.4: LCL 74,90 and 92.

²⁰⁴ Ammonius, *In Porph. Isag.*: 63.19-21.

thing else except with this alone. For the rational and mortal living being in me is not common to any other man (VII,22: 21.23-22.1 – 52.60-6 Kotter)²⁰⁵.

In the same way, Philoponus adds, the “nature of living being which is in this horse is not in any other” (ibid.: 22.1-2 – 52.67 Kotter).

These conceptions of nature and hypostasis are also applied to the doctrine of the Trinity: one nature of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, but three hypostases or *prosopa*, of whom each differs from the other ones by a certain property²⁰⁶:

For what should the one nature of the divinity be if not the common intelligible content of the divine nature seen on its own and separated in the conception (τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ) of the property of each hypostasis? (VII,23: 22.6-7 – 52.72-3 Kotter)

Philoponus is obviously concerned to be consistent in the terminology he uses both for *oikonomia* and for *theologia*²⁰⁷, and in order to achieve this he introduces into the Trinity a “nature” that is conceived of as more particular and distinct from the one common nature of the Godhead. His train of thought is as follows: the common intelligible content of the nature of each individual or hypostasis is proper to it and does not fit with any other member of the same species. This bears significant ramifications, if we consider that in Christ there is a union of two *natures*, the divine and the human. For the common nature of the divinity that is recognised in the Trinity has not become incarnate, otherwise we would predicate the Incarnation also of the Father and the Holy Spirit. Neither has the common intelligible content of human nature been united with God the Logos, otherwise the whole human race before and after the advent of the Logos would have been united to him. In fact, if we say “nature of the divinity” we mean that nature which has become individualised, as distinct (ἐξἰδιασθεῖσαν) from the common nature of the divinity, in the hypostasis of the Logos. It is in this sense that we confess “one incarnate nature of God the Logos”²⁰⁸, distinguishing it

²⁰⁵ For a similar distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις see Severus, *Hom. CXXV*: PO 29,234-6. Severus also remarks that nature is said in two ways, sometimes denoting οὐσία, sometimes ὑπόστασις, *C. Imp. Gr.* II,2: CSCO 111 [112], 69.25-70.6 [55.1-9]; *Ep. VI*: PO 12,196-8; *Ep. LXV*: PO 14,28-9.

²⁰⁶ Similarly Severus, *Hom. CXXV*: PO 29,236-40; cf. also *Hom. CXI*: PO 25,790-1.

²⁰⁷ This has become something like a commonplace by the sixth century, especially in Leontius of Byzantium; cf. Daley (1984), 171.

²⁰⁸ The only occurrence of this formula in the *Arbiter*: VII,23: 22.17-8 – 52.86-53.87 Kotter.

from the Father and the Holy Spirit by the addition "God the Logos". Thus the union of divinity and humanity in Christ is a union of *particular*, not of *common* natures²⁰⁹. We conceive of the common intelligible content of the divine nature as being proper to God the Logos, and by "nature of humanity", which we affirm to be united to the Logos, we understand that particular being which alone the Logos has assumed:

So that in this meaning of 'nature', 'hypostasis' and 'nature' are, as it were, the same, except that the term 'hypostasis' in addition also signifies those properties which, apart from the common nature, belong to each of the individuals, and by which they are separated from each other (VII, 23: 22.21-4 – 53.92-5 Kotter).

This section of chapter VII leads us to the core not only of Philoponus' Christology, but also of his Trinitarian theology. It is his understanding of particular nature and his identification of it with hypostasis which make him an uncompromising enemy to the Chalcedonian definition of faith. Certainly, the argument of the *Arbiter* is more subtle than what has come down to us of Philoponus' *Four Tmēmata against Chalcedon* in the summary account found in the *Chronicle* of Michael the Syrian²¹⁰. There Philoponus is said to have favoured an identification of nature and hypostasis. But this equation, which is usually thought to lie at the heart of Philoponus' miaphysitism and his very peculiar "tritheist" theology of the Trinity²¹¹, is not quite so straightforward.

It was a widely held principle in sixth-century Christological debates that there can be no nature or substance without a hypostasis or prosopon: οὐκ ἔστιν φύσις/οὐσία ἀπρόσωπος/ἀνυπόστατος²¹². We are even told that Severus of Antioch, in a lost treatise, argued for the equivalence of nature and hypostasis, with the aim of showing that the formula of Chalcedon inevitably leads to an affirmation of two hypos-

²⁰⁹ That the union is not a union of universals comprising many hypostases is also stated emphatically by Severus, *Ep. II*: PO 12,186-96, and *C. Imp. Gr.* II,21 and II,28: CSCO 111 [112], 179-84 [139-44] and 218-25 [170-6].

²¹⁰ Philoponus, *Tmēmata*: IV,225, 227, 228 [II,103, 105, 107] Chabot.

²¹¹ See Hermann (1930) and Hainthaler, in Grillmeier (1990b), 109-49.

²¹² Authors who oppose Chalcedon: Severus, *Or. 2 ad Nephaliū*: CSCO 119 [120], 16 [13]; *Hom.* LVIII: PO 8,225, cf. John of Caesarea, *Apol. Conc. Chalc. Excerpta Graeca*: CCG 1, 51.82-4; Philoxenus of Mabbug, *Lettre aux Moines de Senoun*: CSCO 231 [232], 11-2 [9-10]; already Timothy Aelurus, cf. Lebon (1908), 693; Philoponus, *Four Tmēmata*: IV,227 [II,105] Chabot. Authors who defend Chalcedon: Leontius of Byzantium, *C. Nest. et Eut.* 1: PG 86,1277D-1280A; Leontius of Jerusalem, *C. Nestorians* II.13: PG 86,1560A-61D; Anastasius of Antioch, *Adversus Eos Qui in Divinis Dicunt Tres Essentias*: 98-9 Uthemann.

tases²¹³. Philoponus' argument is subtle, for it presupposes a theory of the ontological status of universals which some scholars regard as generally accepted by the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle²¹⁴. According to this theory, in the order of being universal entities are prior to particular entities, but they have no existence separate from their instantiations in concrete individuals. Thus Philoponus says in his commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*:

Universals have their existence (ὑπόστασις) in the particulars, but when they are understood as universals or general terms, they are found in the mind, for their being general consists in their being thought of as general, and thoughts are mental²¹⁵.

In the course of the seventh chapter of the *Arbiter* the relation of nature and hypostasis will again become a matter of discussion. I shall revert to this subject in the course of my analysis (see below pp. 69ff.).

An indication that Philoponus does not straightforwardly identify nature and hypostasis may be found in his concession, which is not wholly free from embarrassment, that many of his partisans speak of a union of natures or of hypostases indiscriminately²¹⁶ in that they often use both terms to denote the individual nature. This use is also found in familiar discourse and among natural scientists. For it is customary to say that "man" is a species of "living being", thus applying the term "man" to the common intelligible content of nature. We also say that "man" is different from "horse", both terms obviously relating to universal natures. On the other hand, we say that Peter is a man, and Paul and John, and that a man is born and dies. The reason why we can do this, though it might look like an equivocation, is the common intelligible content of nature, which is the same for each individual (VII,24: 22-3 – 53.95-106 Kotter).

For the sake of accuracy Philoponus adds that "prosopon" and "hypostasis" are often used as synonyms, as both ξίφος and μάχαιρα de-

²¹³ Cf. Lebon (1909), 247.

²¹⁴ See the seminal, though neglected, paper by Kremer (1961/2), on which Benakis (1982) is wholly dependent in his treatment of the late ancient commentators. The works of Lloyd (1955/6), (1981) and (1990), are essential, but they are not easy reading.

²¹⁵ Philoponus, *In De Anima*: 307.33-308.1, ET: Lloyd (1990), 71; cf. *Four Têmata*: IV,226 [II,104] Chabot.

²¹⁶ Read: "Ἐνθεν τῶν ἡμετέρων πολλοὺς ἀδιαφόρως [not: διαφόρως] εὐρεῖν ἔστι λέγοντας φύσεων ἥγουν ὑποστάσεων ἔνωσιν γεγονέναι, VII,24: 53.95-6 Kotter. The Syriac ܬܠܝܬܐ ܕܡܢܐ ܕܡܢܐ ܕܡܢܐ (22.25), which is also found in VII,25: 23.12 for ἀδιαφόρως (53.109 Kotter), makes this emendation seem defensible.

note the same thing, namely sword²¹⁷. Likewise, when we speak of the Holy Trinity, “hypostasis” and “prosopon” are interchangeable. Often, however, a difference is made between the two terms. “Prosopon” is meant to denote a mutual relationship (σχέσις πρὸς ἄλληλα)²¹⁸; this meaning is not alien to customary usage:

For we say that somebody has taken on my part (τὸ ἐμὸν ἀνειληφέναι πρόσωπον) and that someone states his case to someone (εἰς πρόσωπον τοῦδε τὴν δίκην εἰσαγαγεῖν), and we say that the governor represents the king (πρόσωπον ἔχειν τοῦ βασιλέως) (VII,25: 23.16-7 – 53.113-5 Kotter).

The examples which Philoponus adduces here are taken from the context of juridical or public actions²¹⁹. The origin for this usage of “prosopon” is found in the theatre, namely wearing a mask and thus assuming the role of someone²²⁰. From the age of the early Greek apologists onwards, such language could be used both for the doctrine of the Trinity and for Christology²²¹.

Not surprisingly, Philoponus is cautious about the use of πρόσωπον in Christology. He claims that “those attentive to the doctrines of Nestorius” do not consent to speaking of one hypostasis or one nature of Christ, since they confess neither a union of natures nor a union of hypostases. They prefer to assert that the simple man from Mary contained in himself complete divine illumination and by virtue of this was different from all other inspired men in whom the divine illumination had been only partially²²². What Philoponus takes the Nestorians to mean by

²¹⁷ Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat* : 15.1-2: πολλώνυμον ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ τοῦτο [καὶ ὁμονύμῳ] ἀντικείμενον, τὸ τῷ πράγματι μὲν ταῦτὸν διαφέρον δὲ τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς ἕορ ξίφος σπάθη; also Porphyry, *In Cat.*: 69.1-6, Ammonius, *In Cat.*: 16.4-6, Simplicius, *In Cat* : 38.25-6.

²¹⁸ In the Syriac, σχέσις is translated as “friendship” or “affectionate relationship” (ܫܕܝܩܬܐ, 23.14).

²¹⁹ See Hirzel (1914) and Fuhrmann (1979). In his *Four Tmēmata*: IV.219 [II,95] Chabot, Philoponus alludes to the use of “prosopon” in the public sphere.

²²⁰ As in Lucian, *Nigrinus* 11: 35 MacLeod.

²²¹ Cf. Theophilus of Antioch, *Ad Autolycum* II,22: PG 6.1088A; Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus* X.110,1: GCS 12,78; see also the still valuable study of Schlossmann (1906). On Augustine’s use of *persona*-language in his Christology see Drobner (1986), 87-102.

²²² This is the view of Diodore of Tarsus, according to *Collectio Palatina*, fr. 6 = ACO I.5,178.33-179.9, and a fragment originally quoted by Cyril of Alexandria in his *C Diadochum*, which is found in Severus, *C Imp Gr* III,15: CSCO 93 [94], 254 [178] Theodoret of Cyrus, in his reply to the fifth anathema of Cyril, defends the title “God-bearing man” for Christ, οὐχ ὡς μερικὴν τινα θεῖαν χάριν δεξάμενον, ἀλλ’ ὡς πᾶσαν ἡνωμένην ἔχοντα τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν θεότητα. To corroborate his claim, he quotes Col 2:8-

the one πρόσωπον of Christ is the relationship of God the Logos with the man from Mary, which they call one πρόσωπον since the man has accomplished the whole divine οἰκονομία (ibid.: 54.123 Kotter) in the person of the divinity of the Logos. They are coherent in saying that the ignominy done to the man refers to the God, as the honour and ignominy done by subjects to the legate refer to the emperor. The name “Christ” in its proper sense denotes this relationship, and they call Christ one, because the relationship is one, though there is a plurality of participants²²³. To refute this doctrine, the task in the following section will be to show that prosopon is not, as the Nestorians propose, applied to the mere σχέσις of the Logos of God with the man (whether or not this is a fair reading of Nestorius is not the point here). On the contrary, hypostasis and prosopon are used of Christ in the same way as we speak of one human hypostasis, for example, that of Peter or Paul (ibid.: 23-4 – 53.106-54.135 Kotter).

4.3.2 Union of natures – union of hypostases

At the outset of the next section in chapter VII, Philoponus states two important Christological principles: First, he is emphatic that

there was not even an ever so short moment when the humanity of Christ subsisted apart from its union with the Logos, but from the beginning of its being it assumed union with the Logos (VII,26: 24.10-2 – 54.137-9)²²⁴.

Secondly, we do not say that the human nature exists without hypostasis²²⁵, if it indeed had a proper existence that was distinct from the common nature of all other men by certain properties; for this is the very meaning of the term hypostasis. In other words, the humanity of Christ must be one of the individuals which are under a common nature. Hence

9. ACO I.1.6,126.16-22. In his commentary on the Pauline epistles he says on the passage in question: Οὐ γὰρ μερικὴν τινα χάριν, φησὶ, Μωσῇ παραπλησίως ἐδέξατο· Θεὸς γὰρ ἐστὶν <καὶ> ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τὸ δρώμενον τοῦτο πᾶσαν ἔχει ἡνωμένην τοῦ μονογενοῦς τὴν θεότητα, PG 82,608D-609A; cf. his *Commentary on Isaiah 11:2-3*: 59.22-4 Möhle. For an assessment of these statements in the context of Theodoret's Christology see Parvis (1975), 273-307.

²²³ Theodore of Mopsuestia verges on such a position in his *De Incarnatione* VII: II,295.29-296.9 Swete.

²²⁴ Cf. *Epitome* 7: 53.18: not even “for a twinkling of the eye”. This important Christological principle is affirmed by Theodoret of Cyrus, *Eranistes*, Dial. II: 132-4 Ettlinger; Severus of Antioch, *Hom. XXIII*: PO 37,116, and *Ep. II*: PO 12,190-1; John Damascene, *Expositio fidei* 53.14-7 (III 9): II,128 Kotter.

²²⁵ ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνυπόστατον εἶναι φαμεν τὴν φύσιν ἐκείνην, 54.139-40 Kotter.

sible to say that natures are united “less” and hypostases are united “more”. On the contrary, both are united to the same degree²²⁸. For this reason the definition of Chalcedon is incoherent. It follows that either one has to speak of one nature and hypostasis, or along with two natures one has to commit oneself to the doctrine of two hypostases (VII,27: 24.19-25.4 – partly in 54.148-54 Kotter²²⁹). As we have already seen, this is a commonplace in anti-Chalcedonian polemics.

The Chalcedonians would respond that by saying one hypostasis they preserve the union, and by saying two natures they preserve the unconfusedness²³⁰ of the elements united. Underlying this assertion, however, there is a misconception about the way in which the union affects the elements united. For neither the natures themselves nor the hypostases have remained “without confusion”. Philoponus would certainly not say that the two natures have been “confused” in the union to the effect that they could no longer be distinguished from each other. What has been preserved are the properties of the Logos through which he is distinct from the Father and the Holy Spirit. These divine properties are not confused with the properties of the (particular) human nature through which it is distinct from other men. Since the particular nature and the hypostasis with its accompanying properties have been shown to be equivalent, and since the degree of union is the same with respect to both nature and hypostasis, there is no reason to state that there is one hypostasis but two natures in Christ. Why should one not invert the formula of Chalcedon and say that there is one nature because of the union, but two hypostases because of the unconfusedness? This assertion, though partly false, is at least more plausible than the formula of Chalcedon, Philoponus claims. For one nature may generate a plurality of hypostases, as there is one nature and three hypostases of the Trinity, and one nature of man and an *almost*²³¹ unlimited multitude of hypos-

²²⁸ This point is also made by the miaphysite interlocutor in Leontius of Byzantium, *Solutio* 8: PG 86,1936D.

²²⁹ Note that the section 24.24-26.16 Šanda is not extant in the Greek

²³⁰ ܠܥܠܡܐ ܠܥܠܡܐ ܠܥܠܡܐ (26.6) most likely for τὸ ἀσύγχυτον; at X,36. 33.6-7 – PG 140,60C, ܠܥܠܡܐ ܠܥܠܡܐ ܠܥܠܡܐ corresponds to διὰ τὸ ἀσύγχυτον. On the problem of translating ancient terms (whether Greek or Syriac) for “mixture” into English, cf. Torrance (1988), 37.

²³¹ ܫܚܝܕܘܢ is the crucial word here (VII,28: 55.160 – “as it were” in the Syriac, 26.19). One of Philoponus’ famous arguments against Aristotelian cosmology runs as follows: if time and the universe had had no beginning, an unlimited number of men would have lived until now, and thus an *actual* infinity, that is a more than finite quantity, would have been traversed – which is impossible on the basis of Aristotle’s notion of infinity, *In Phys* : 428.13-430.10.

tases. But two natures which preserve their numerical duality cannot generate one hypostasis, which is evident not only from induction (should there be one hypostasis, i.e. one individual, of stone and wood, or of horse and ox?), but also from rational principles:

For if in the hypostases – which is the same as to say in the individuals – each nature assumes existence, given that there are two natures, there must be at least two hypostases in which the natures have assumed existence. For a nature cannot subsist on its own, without being seen in an individual (VII,28: 26.24-27.3 – 55.165-8 Kotter).

Thus to confess one hypostasis and one nature is logically coherent, to confess one hypostasis and two natures, however, is absurd. Underlying this sharp criticism of Chalcedonian Christology, there is the Neoplatonic understanding of universals. A. C. Lloyd has called this view “conceptualist” and has characterised the thought of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Porphyry as follows:

what they meant was that the universal, in effect the general term or predicate, depended for its existence on that of the particular forms in particular things because thought constructed it by abstraction from them²³².

This position can be found in Philoponus’ commentaries on Aristotle²³³. But for the Neoplatonic commentators this account on its own would not suffice to explain the ontological status of universals. The existence of the universals in the particular things does not exclude their status *ante rem* (τὰ πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν), that is, as ideas in the mind of God. This “multiplication of the universal” has been traced back to the Middle Academy, when a distinction was made between the separate or transcendent form (χωριστὸν εἶδος), the Platonic idea, which is the paradigm of the demiurge, and the inseparable or immanent form (ἔνυλον εἶδος) which could be equated with the Aristotelian λόγος ἔνυλος. As for the doctrine of the Platonic ideas as the thoughts in the mind of an Aristotelian self-thinking intellect, this is attested in Alcinous

²³² Lloyd (1990), 71; cf. 68-75. See already Kremer (1961/2).

²³³ Philoponus, *In De Anima* 307.33-308.1 (quoted above p. 64) and *In Cat* : 58.7-59.2, Ammonius, *In Cat* : 40.19-21, 41.13-5. Boethius, *C Eut et Nest* III.31-3: LCL 74.86, quotes the Greek sentence: αἱ οὐσίαι ἐν μὲν τοῖς καθόλου εἶναι δύνανται ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀτόμοις καὶ κατὰ μέρος μόνοις ὑφίστανται. That substances belong to the class of universals, but subsist only in individuals and particulars, is also his view in his *In Porph Isag II*: CSEL 48.166-7. Chadwick (1981), 193, suggests that Boethius’ source is Alexander of Aphrodisias or another Peripatetic. Lloyd (1981), 53, argues that in *C Eut et Nest* Boethius gives a Platonising interpretation of Alexander’s ambiguous usage

and may go back to Antiochus (or even Xenocrates)²³⁴. It is also held, notoriously, by Philo of Alexandria and so exerted significant influence on Christian theology²³⁵. The Neoplatonic commentators of the sixth century, such as Ammonius, Philoponus and Simplicius, thought that universals can be considered in a threefold way: first, *prior to the many*, that is, as the ideas in the mind of the demiurge; secondly, *in the many*, that is, having their *concrete* existence in the particular things of the sensible world; and thirdly, *posterior to the many*, as concepts which our abstracting intellect applies to the many particulars. A classic exposition of this threefold understanding of universals is given by Simplicius in his commentary on the *Categories*, where he argues for three kinds of common items (τὸ κοινόν). The first is transcendent or separate from the particulars and is the cause (αἷτιον) of the κοινότης in them, for instance, "the first animal" or αὐτοζῶον, which endows all animals with "animality"; *qua* cause, it transcends its effects and is wholly other than they. Thus it is rather a common cause than a common nature. The second is the common item which dwells in the individuals, such as in the individual animal; it is the commonality which constitutes (συμπληροῦν) the individual, and is thus differentiated, so that it is not really the same in different species. The third kind of κοινόν is posterior and exists in our thoughts as a result of the process of abstraction (ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως), which we form by subtracting all differentiae that modify animality in the external world²³⁶.

Philoponus, arguing from these ontological presuppositions which he shared with other members of the Neoplatonic school of Alexandria, found the formula of Chalcedon absurd and unintelligible. How should two natures different in genus and species be instantiated in *one and the same* individual? On the other hand, Philoponus' younger contemporary Leontius of Byzantium could endorse the commentators' doctrine on universals and at the same time develop an original defence of Chalcedonian Christology, as B.E. Daley has shown²³⁷. Hence I should like to suggest that Philoponus' philosophical proficiency was instrumental, in that it served the purpose of providing an exposition of miaphysitism.

²³⁴ See Alcinous, *Didascalicus* IV: 155.13-156.23: 6-8 Whittaker; cf. Lloyd (1955/6), 59-60, and Blumenthal, (1996), 13.

²³⁵ Philo, *De Cherubim* XIV,49: LCL 227,38. *De Opificio Mundi* V,20: LCL 226. 16-8.

²³⁶ Simplicius, *In Cat.* 82.35-83.20; also Philoponus, *In Anal. Post.*: 435.11-2; Ammonius, *In Porph. Isag.*: 41.10-42.26, 68.25-69.11. Cf. Kremer (1961/2), 62-3.

²³⁷ Daley (1993), 248-60. See Leontius, *Solutio* 1-2: PG 86,1916D-1921B.

The comparison with Leontius of Byzantium indicates, however, that there was no necessary link between Christology and the commentators' views on universals and particulars.

Philoponus discerns the following pattern of argument among defenders of Chalcedon:

Because the humanity of Christ acquired subsistence (ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔσχε) in the Logos and did not pre-subsist (οὐ προϋπέστη) its union with the Logos, we therefore say that there is one hypostasis of Christ (VII,29: 27.8-9 – 55.172-5 Kotter)²³⁸.

A similar account is found in Leontius of Byzantium:

Some say that because the Lord's humanity was not formed or did not exist prior [*sc.* to its union with the Logos], and was not assumed already complete, but subsists in the Logos (ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ ὑποστῆναι), therefore they make one hypostasis of both²³⁹.

As already suggested by Daley, Leontius refers here to a view held by other Chalcedonians²⁴⁰. In fact, Leontius would agree with Philoponus that, while it is certainly true that the humanity of Christ did not pre-exist, this cannot be given as the reason why there is only one hypostasis, as it is claimed by some Chalcedonians. Leontius responds by arguing that if it were *impossible* for God to unite himself with a complete humanity, this would imply a restriction to God's omnipotence. Therefore a prior formation (προδιάπλασις) of Christ's humanity cannot be excluded on *logical* grounds, but only for reason of *convenience*. The point is indeed that it is not fitting that the humanity of Christ should ever have existed on its own and prior to its union with the Logos in the Incarnation²⁴¹.

²³⁸ Cf. Philoponus, *Ep. ad Iustinianum* 5: 127.4-6: "But what do they bring up again along with these things? They speak of 'one hypostasis of Christ, because his animate flesh has not subsisted prior to the union with the Logos, for in it it has assumed subsistence'".

²³⁹ Leontius of Byzantium, *Solutio* 8: PG 86,1944C. Such a position is expressed by his contemporaries, Leontius of Jerusalem, *Contra Nestorianos* II,14: PG 86,1568AB, and Justinian, *Edictum de Recta Fide*: 74.24-7 and 86.29-33 Schwartz.

²⁴⁰ Daley (1979), 18-9. According to Hainthaler, in Grillmeier (1990b), 123, this might be a reference to Leontius of Jerusalem, whose thought could have been known to Philoponus. However, this need not be the case, for this position is not peculiar to Leontius of Jerusalem. It was already stated in the fifth century, as in Theodoret of Cyrus, *Eranistes*, Dial. II: 132-4 Ettlinger. Notably, the doctrine that the creation of Christ's humanity coincided in time with its assumption by the Logos was also held by the miaphysite Severus of Antioch, see. for instance, *Philalethes*: CSCO 133 [134], 133 [108].

²⁴¹ οὐ τοίνυν διὰ τὸ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρέπειν ψιλὴν ποτὲ καὶ ἄνευ θεότητος εἶναι τὴν τοῦ Κυρίου ἀνθρωπότητα, τὴν προδιάπλασιν ἐκβάλλομεν,

By contrast, Philoponus responds to this argument by asking whether or not nature and hypostasis denote one and the same thing, with a mere nominal difference, just as μάχαιρα and ξίφος mean the same thing. If they denote the same thing, then one hypostasis necessarily implies one nature, or, if there are two natures, there will also be two hypostases. If, however, nature denotes one thing, hypostasis another, the following conclusion must be drawn: if the reason for the hypostasis of Christ being one is that there was no hypostasis or prosopon of the man before its union with the Logos, then the reason for the duality of natures of Christ is that the nature of the man subsisted prior to its union with the Logos. But if the particular human nature indeed pre-subsisted, then the human hypostasis must have subsisted prior to the union as well. If one of them does not subsist, the other does not subsist either, which means that one cannot speak of the particular nature apart from its proper hypostasis, or of the particular hypostasis apart from its proper nature. Therefore, if neither the hypostasis nor the nature which is united to the Logos existed prior to the union with him, there is one hypostasis of Christ and one nature. For the same reason why it is asserted that there is one hypostasis of Christ, namely that his humanity was not pre-existent before its union with the Logos, for this reason it should be affirmed that there is one nature of Christ. Since there is no difference between nature and hypostasis with regard to the degree of union, they are not different in that respect either (ibid.: 27-8 – 55.172-95 Kotter).

Leontius of Byzantium, *Solutio* 8: PG 86,1944D. This passage from the *Solutio* had already provoked the suspicions of scholars like Loofs (1887), 295-6, and Richard (1947), 60: "C'était jouer avec le feu". It was considered a proof-text by Meyendorff (1969), 45-6, and Evans (1970), *passim*, that Leontius' Christology was essentially "Origenist" or "Evagrian" in disguise. Leontius would thus allow for the pre-existence of Christ's soul and fall under the second and third anathemas of Justinian's *Edictum c. Origenem* of January 543: ACO III,213.17-21. However, Daley (1976), 337-9, has shown that such an interpretation is unfounded. He concedes that Leontius is not so straightforward in his rejection of the pre-existence of Christ's humanity, since he admits it as *logically* possible for almighty God. None the less he unambiguously rejects it as being counterfactual to the actual Incarnation, cf. *Solutio* 7: PG 86,1933A, and *C. Aphthartodocetas*: PG 86,1352D-1353A. This point is indicative of the difference in theological style between Leontius of Byzantium and Philoponus, despite their insistence on consistent terminology and correct language. Cf. Leontius, *Solutio* 8: 1940BC: "Since, then, the mode of union (ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἐνώσεως) rather than the formula of nature (ὁ λόγος τῆς φύσεως) contains the great mystery of religion, we are free from having to investigate the nature of what is united and what is perfect in them Let us, then, investigate the mode of union and the product (ἀποτέλεσμα) of it", ET: Daley (1993), 245₃₀, slightly altered.

4.3.3 One nature – or three natures?

Against those who confess two natures of Christ after the union, the divine and the human, for the reason that the natures are not confused, Philoponus argues that they should rather speak of three natures: of the body, of the soul, and of the divinity²⁴². Even in the single human composite the natures of the soul and of the body have remained without confusion. None the less it is acknowledged that there is one nature after the union. This provides an analogy for Christ (VII,30: 28). Is the objection valid that there is a fundamental difference between man and Christ, for soul and body constitute one nature, since they are both created, while in Christ there are two natures, the one created and the other uncreated²⁴³? In Philoponus' view this is a crude manifestation of ignorance about the principles according to which sameness and otherness are predicated. Every nature or substance in itself has the same name and definition²⁴⁴, and in this respect it is one and not differentiated. "Created" and "uncreated" are not appropriate categories to differentiate one substance from another, since they are not indicative of substance, but of a property which is "around the substance (περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν)". By means of a *reductio ad absurdum* Philoponus argues that from such a point of view there would have to be one nature of all creatures, e.g. an angel and a gnat. The principle of sameness or otherness in a substance or nature is not something which pertains to it accidentally. Otherwise we would say that natures are one which are indeed different and vice versa. A horse and a man are not the same in substance, simply because both of them are white, walk and are created. Similarly we can recognise a number of differences between, say, a Scythian and an Ethiopian, the one being white, the other black, the one being hook-nosed, the other being snub-nosed and so on, but they are not different in substance. In Porphyrian terminology, these are "inseparable accidents" or individual properties. These are not contained in the λόγος τῆς οὐσίας, in contrast to the "differences that belong by themselves (αἱ καθ' αὐτάς)", that is, the specific differences²⁴⁵. The substantial difference (οὐσιώδης δια-

²⁴² Justinian, *Contra Monophysitas* 22-3: 11.30-12.9 Schwartz. takes issue with this argument. See also Eulogius of Alexandria, *Defensiones*: 209-10 Diekamp.

²⁴³ This argument is put forward by Justinian, *Contra Monophysitas* 25-6: 12.15-24; *Edictum de Recta Fide*: 80.37-82.1 Schwartz.

²⁴⁴ This principle was common among the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle, as shown above, see pp. 58f.

²⁴⁵ Porphyry, *Isagoge*: 9.14-6; cf. Philoponus, *In De Anima*: 4.4-32. The question of inseparable accidents is also addressed by Severus, *Ep. 2 ad Sergium*: CSCO 119 [120], 135-6 [102-3], and in a fragment from Damian of Alexandria, *Contra Tritheistas* XIV,

φορά), as Philoponus prefers to say here, between man and horse is that the one is rational and the other irrational, whereas, of course, both the Scythian and the Ethiopian are rational, mortal living beings. "Created" and "uncreated" are thus indicative of an individual property that pertains to substance, not a Porphyrian "difference that belongs by itself". Hence soul and body cannot be said to be one nature simply because both are created. On the contrary, they are diverse in genus, the one being a body, the other incorporeal, and, *qua* being soul and body, they cannot be subsumed under the same λόγος τῆς οὐσίας (VIII,31: 28-9)²⁴⁶.

Even if, hypothetically, "created" and "uncreated" were indicative of a substantial difference which constitutes the underlying natures, it would not be fitting to infer sameness of substance (consubstantiality) from what things have in common, that is, the sameness of genus. Two items cannot be said to be the same in substance, only because they are under the same genus. For instance, a man and a horse are likewise living beings, and in this respect do not at all differ from each other, but the specific difference, "rational" and "irrational" that is, makes their natures different²⁴⁷. Philoponus shows that on the grounds of the common genus, sky and earth might be said to be consubstantial, since both are bodies, not to say

that God too would be consubstantial with the universe, insofar as we usually call the divinity a substance, too, even though the divinity transcends everything that exists (VIII,32: 30.10-2).

which is preserved in Peter of Callinicus, *C. Damianum* III,20,269-81 [248-58]: CCG 35,25 [24]. Christian theologians found a fitting example for inseparable accidents in Jer. 13:23: "Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots?"

²⁴⁶ A similar notion of consubstantiality, which is grounded in the Aristotelian λόγος τῆς οὐσίας, can already be found in the Ps.-Athanasian *Dialogus contra Macedonianum* II: 120-4 Cavalcanti (= PG 28,1336C-1337A). The content of the dialogue suggests a date between 360 and 430. It has been associated with Didymus the Blind; cf. Heron (1973), 101-2.

²⁴⁷ Philoponus here approaches the final definition of *natura* given by Boethius in his *C. Eut. et Nest.*, following Aristotle's *Physics* B.1: 193^a28-31: "Nature is the specific difference that gives form to anything (*natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica differentia*)", I,57-8: LCL 74,80. According to Boethius, this definition provides the ground for affirming two natures in Christ, for the same specific differences cannot belong to God and man. Cf. Schurr (1935), 18. See also the similar argument in John Damascene, *Dialectica. fus.* 42.2-15: I,107 Kotter: Μορφή ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τῶν οὐσιωδῶν διαφορῶν οἷον μορφωθείσα καὶ εἰδοποιηθεῖσα οὐσία. ἥτις σημαίνει τὸ εἰδικώτατον εἶδος ... Ἐτεροοῦσια δὲ καὶ ἑτεροφυῆ καὶ ἑτεροειδῆ καὶ ἑτερογενῆ καὶ ἑτερόμορφα τὰ εἰδικώτατα εἶδη λέγουσιν. Οὐ δυνατόν γὰρ εἶδος ἄλλω εἶδει ἢ φύσιν ἄλλῃ φύσει ἢ οὐσίαν ἄλλῃ οὐσίᾳ μὴ εἶναι ἑτεροοῦσιον καὶ ἑτεροφυῆ καὶ ἑτερόμορφον; cf. *brev.* "Ἐτερον κεφ. 93-104: I,145.

Therefore soul and body, though both created, are not of the same nature, since those under the same genus are not the same in substance because of their specific difference (VIII,32: 29-30).

At the end of this part of the *Arbiter*, Philoponus comments on the difference between "divided" and "divisible". "Divided" indicates what has undergone parting in actuality, "divisible", however, what has not yet been parted, but can undergo parting in actuality. On the other hand, "undivided" indicates what has not yet been divided into parts, "indivisible", however, means what cannot be divided. Hence "divided" is the opposite of "undivided", and "divisible" the opposite of "indivisible". An indivisible union does not admit of any duality (and hence of no separation or division of unity), thus what is produced from it cannot receive either the reality or the name of duality. Since Christ is the end-product of such a union, it is impossible to say that he has two natures, unless one takes the word "union" to signify a difference of those which are united (IX,33: 30-1).

4.4 Refuting Objections

In the first nine chapters of the *Arbiter*, Philoponus has made a case for a miaphysite Christology as the only coherent exposition of what is implied by the Incarnation of the Logos. At the same time he has attacked the Chalcedonian definition of one hypostasis in two natures as logically unsatisfying. He has already dealt with some arguments which were advanced against such a doctrine, but an extensive refutation of objections in question-and-response style (*erôtapokriseis*)²⁴⁸ is reserved for the lengthy tenth chapter. It also contains a proposal that offers a rapprochement with the Chalcedonians. In the following section I shall give a translation of the objections brought forth against Philoponus' Christology and a précis of his responses.

Double consubstantiality – partial consubstantiality

If Christ is consubstantial with the Father *qua* divinity and consubstantial with us *qua* humanity, then there are two natures of Christ and not one. For

²⁴⁸ A similar series of objections and refutations makes up the last part of Leontius of Jerusalem, *Contra Monophysitas*; PG 86,1876C-1902A; for another example of this style see also the third catechetical homily of Severus, *Hom. LXX*: PO 12,5-51. On the characteristic literary genres of theological controversy in the sixth century cf. Daley (1984), 168-72.

how would one be consubstantial with those that are different in substance? (X,34: 31.4-7)²⁴⁹

This objection would impinge on his Christology, Philoponus replies, if he confessed one simple nature. A simple entity cannot be consubstantial with two entities that are different in substance. But this is not the case, since the one nature of Christ is composite. To explain this, an analogy is drawn with the composite human constitution. The single human nature is consubstantial with corporeals by virtue of the body and consubstantial with incorporeals by virtue of the soul. However, since neither the soul on its own nor the body on its own constitutes the human being, we do not say that there are two natures which constitute the human being. Moreover, we also say that water is consubstantial with air through humidity and with earth through coldness. This partial communion of water with either of both does not mean that with regard to its substance, that is, *qua* being water, we would speak of two natures. Hence to say that Christ is consubstantial with the Father with respect to his divinity and with us with respect to his humanity does not entail that there are two natures of him. For neither his divinity alone nor his humanity alone makes up Christ. Consequently, the whole individual we call "one nature" is in his totality consubstantial neither with the Father, since God the Father is not a human being as we are, nor with us, since we are not, insofar as we are human beings, gods *qua* substance. If we consider Christ in his double consubstantiality, we make a conceptual division between divinity and humanity. At this point Philoponus refers to the baptismal profession of faith in the One Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, which he substantiates by quoting 1 Cor. 8:6 – one of the few instances where he cites from Scripture. He points out that this profession explicitly rules out the Nestorian notion of "two sons". Nestorius held that the Son is by nature from God the Father, the one from Mary, however, is a human being and Son of God not by nature, but by honour and "affectionate indwelling". In Philoponus' account, this is what Nestorius meant by a union of *proson* (X,34: 31-2). This point, however, leads to a further query:

If, therefore, Our Lord Jesus Christ is truly one Son, how do we say that one and the same is Son of God the Father *qua* divinity and again the same is son of man *qua* humanity? For if *qua* the former there exists a Son of God, and *qua* the latter a son of man, there must also be two sons here. For

²⁴⁹ This argument is put forward by Justinian, *Edictum*: 82.2-8 Schwartz.

if there be one son, there are the alternatives: either Son of God or son of man; but with both being affirmed, then two sons would necessarily be professed: one of God, the other of man (X,35: 32.10-5).

Philoponus emphasises that it is one and the same Christ, the Son of whom St Paul speaks (Rom. 1:3). *Because* of the composition of divinity and humanity in the same subject, the Son of God incarnate, there is no need to affirm two sons, just as there is no need to affirm two natures. It is the same Christ, Son of God and son of man, who is consubstantial with God the Father and with us (X,35: 32).

Change and confusion

If the natures have remained in the union without confusion and if the property of each of them is preserved, with neither of them suffering from any change or confusion by virtue of the union, why is it not necessary that we should speak of two natures after the union? (X,36: 32.25-7)

In response to this objection Philoponus presents an *aporia*. If we assume that the natures are united *qua* natures, and if things that are united become one (as shown in the first chapter of the *Arbiter*), how should there be two natures of Christ after they have been united? For things that have not become a single entity are necessarily not united. Thus if there are two natures of Christ and if a duality is indicative of a division, they are not united:

Hence if they are minded to speak of two natures of Christ because of their not being confused, none the less they will be obliged to speak of his one nature because of the union (33.6-8 – PG 140,60C)²⁵⁰.

This *aporia* is indeed unavoidable, if one holds that that all things which are united by composition suffer change and variation, which means that their λόγος τῆς φύσεως is altered. In fact, this occurs in the intermingling of the elements of which our bodies are constituted, or in a blending of liquids. In this case, the natures of Christ would either never be united, or they would be contracted into one nature and thus suffer from variation and confusion. Such a theory, Philoponus emphasises,

²⁵⁰ It appears that it is X,36-39 to which George of Martyropolis replies in the fragment transmitted in Elias, *Ep. Apol.* 4: CSCO 469 [470], 13.4-10 [9.8-12]: *Ergo. quando dicimus sine confusione unionem esse servatam, non considerantes terminum unionis hoc dicimus, – hic enim nullo modo dualitatem admittit, – sed (considerantes) partes quae perfecerunt totum ex illis perfectum. Et rursus: Itaque, in alio quodam unum et in alio quodam diversum dicimus Christum.*

displays gross ignorance, which will be demonstrated first by a series of examples (ibid.: 32-3).

The first example is the celebrated paradigm of the union of soul and body in man: two natures that are united without confusion and effect one subsisting thing of which there is one (composite) nature. At this point Philoponus again insists on the essentially *composite* constitution of man out of soul and body, in contrast to the position common among Neoplatonists that the human self is identical with the soul²⁵¹. The second example Philoponus adduces for this ἀσύγχυτος ἔνωσις is that of illuminated air, which

totally mixed with light, and is a single reality from the two, and does not admit of any division either, as long as it is in the light, but is susceptible [*sc.* of division] only conceptually (X,37: 34.1-3).

This is a classical example of a Stoic κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων²⁵², a total interpenetration of material bodies, however, with a significant shift of meaning, which can be traced back to Plotinus. When Plotinus uses this simile to illustrate the relation of soul and body, he insists on the light's incorporeal nature. Light is "present" to all of the air, but is not "mixed" with it; it transcends the air, as the soul transcends the body²⁵³. The transcendence of the soul is emphasised even more by Nemesius who compares it with the sun as the source of light²⁵⁴. Unlike the Stoics, then, Philoponus sees in the "mixture" of light and air an example for an unconfused and reversible union between a material and an immaterial substance. While the light totally pervades the air, the natural properties of both of them are preserved unaltered. The light in its own nature is in no way obscured after its union with the air²⁵⁵, and the air in its λόγος

²⁵¹ The questions of soul and self and of the soul-body relationship will be discussed extensively in chapter seven, see below pp. 135ff.

²⁵² See Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Mixtione*: 218.8-9 (= SVF II, 155.38-9): καὶ τὸ φῶς δὲ τῷ ἄερί ὁ Χρῦσιππος κιννάσθαι λέγει. Cf. also Ps.-Simplicius, *In De Anima* 134.5-20, and Proclus, Περὶ φωτός, in Philoponus, *De Aeternitate Mundi c. Proclum* I,7: 18.16-19.12 Rabe.

²⁵³ οὐδενὶ μίγνυται, *Enneads* IV.3.22.3; also I.1.4; cf. Rist (1988), 403. Thus "it is correctly said that the air is in the light rather than the light is in the air; and this provides a further analogy to the relationship of soul and body, since, while the body is totally penetrated by the soul, soul is not totally penetrated by body", Norris (1963), 71.

²⁵⁴ Nemesius, *De Natura Hominis* 3: 40.22-41.8 Morani; Priscian, *Solutiones ad Chosroem* I: 51.30-52.22 Bywater; cf. also Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima*: 62.5-13. On Philoponus' theory of light, see de Groot (1991).

²⁵⁵ The example of illuminated air as an analogy for the ἀσύγχυτος ἔνωσις in Christ is already found in Theodoret of Cyrus, *Eranistes*, Dial. II: 144.14-29 Ettlinger, and *Ep.* 146: SC 111, 196.15-27.

τῆς οὐσίας does not receive any light. Consequently when the light is separated from it, the air remains unaltered in its nature. Those elements which suffer from change, variation or confusion through union never admit of division in the true sense, since through the union their λόγος τῆς φύσεως is corrupted, as in the mixture of wine with water²⁵⁶. Although after death our body is said to be dissolved into the elements of which it consists, they are the same as those of which it was generated not numerically, but only in species. With light receding from the air, however, this is not different, for this union is not effected by confusion. It is the same, Philoponus adds, with glowing iron, another classical example of a κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων²⁵⁷ which had a remarkable career in Patristic Christology, needless to say. Hence the conclusion is drawn that the human soul and body that are united with the Logos remain as they are, for through the union the intelligible content of their substance has in no way been changed²⁵⁸ (X,37: 34-5).

After having adduced these examples, Philoponus sets out to refute the objection by general principles. Only a certain class of predicates admits of alteration, those which are closest in relation to the same genus, the *genus proximum*, and are contrary to each other, such as whiteness and blackness, whose *genus proximum* is colour²⁵⁹. Contrary predicates are naturally apt to produce mutual corruption through intermingling when they act upon each other²⁶⁰. All those predicates, however, which are not contrary and are not under the same *genus proximum*, even if they come together into one species and are constitutive of one nature, none the less preserve their property unconfused. Philoponus illustrates his point with the analogy of an apple. This example had already been adduced by Porphyry in his argument for the unity of the

²⁵⁶ On τροπή and ἀλλοίωσις, see Philoponus, *In Phys.*: 157.17-9: κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν δὲ γίνεσθαι φησι τὰ κατ' οὐσίαν μεταβάλλοντα, διότι ὅλον τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀλλοιοῦται καὶ μεταβάλλει.

²⁵⁷ Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Mixtione*: 218.1-2 (= SVF II, 155.30-2).

²⁵⁸ Philoponus is not the first theologian to use the mixing of light and air as an illustration of the union in Christ. See, for instance, Philoxenus of Mabbug, *De Trinitate et Incarnatione*: CSCO 9 [10], 40 [36].

²⁵⁹ According to Aristotle, *De Sensu* 3: 439^a6-40^b25, the basic colours are black and white; all other colours are a mixture of these two.

²⁶⁰ This doctrine goes back to Aristotle, *De Generatione et Corruptione* A.7: 323^b25-24^a9; Joachim (1922) comments *ad loc.*: "Only Contraries or Intermediates – i.e. only contrasted forms of the same – can 'act on' one another". Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.*: 82.17-8: τὰ γὰρ δεχόμενα τὰ ἐναντία πάσχει (πάθος γάρ ἐστιν ἢ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία μεταβολή). ἐναντία form a sub-class of ἀντικείμενα; *ibid.*: 168.13-5; cf. 48.12-3, 158.10-1, 191.10-1.

soul. Porphyry rejected a division of the soul into parts, since these parts would be distinct agents which form distinct *genera*. A part differs from another part with regard to underlying subject, form and activities (μέρος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ καὶ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ τῷ εἶδει καὶ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ἄλλου μέρους διαφέρει). Each part has a certain constitution (κατασκευή). With faculties, however, there is no differentiation regarding the underlying subject or form. We can speak of different faculties in the same agent with the same form. Faculties cannot be localised in any of the constitutive parts. A plurality of faculties therefore does not jeopardise the unity of the soul. Thus the faculties of an apple, such as fragrance, sweetness, or shape, cannot be localised or identified with certain parts of the apple, but exist there all at once in all of the parts²⁶¹. Philoponus endorses Porphyry's argument on the faculties of the soul in his *De Anima Commentary*, and makes use of the analogy of the apple as well²⁶². The point he makes here in the *Arbiter* is the following: sweetness, colour, spherical form, fragrance and weight are predicated of an apple. That which is effected out of all these faculties²⁶³, together with the corporeality which is their subject, is the one nature of the apple. It is the apple considered in its totality which is sweet, heavy, spherical, fragrant and of a certain colour. None of these predicates suffers from an alteration because of the mutual intermingling, as if the sweetness affected the colour or vice versa, since these predicates are not contrary to each other and thus are not fit to be acted upon by each other²⁶⁴. If thus only predicates under one *genus proximum* can suffer from confusion, those under different genera can not. Since soul and body or divinity and humanity are neither contrary pairs nor fall under the same *genus proximum*, neither of both can suffer from change or intermingling when they are united (X,38: 35-7).

²⁶¹ Porphyry, Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων, fr. 253F.57-70 Smith; see also the fragments from Iamblichus' treatise under the same title, Stobaeus, *Anthologium* I: 368.17-20 Wachsmuth; I gratefully owe these references to G. Karamanolis.

²⁶² Philoponus, *In De Anima* 196.17-8: τὸ μῆλον ἐν ὃν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν διαφόρους ἔχει δυνάμεις τὸ εὐώδες, τὸ γλυκύ, τὴν εὐχροίαν, τὸ σχῆμα.

²⁶³ The Syriac text here has ܠܬܕܝܥܐ (36.7), i.e. "predicates". In the Syriac version of the correspondence between Severus of Antioch and Sergius the Gramarian ܠܬܕܝܥܐ stands for "sign, signification, sense, mark, token, indication, meaning", and translates the Greek δῆλωσις from Cyril of Alexandria, as pointed out by Torrance (1988), 248. *Arbiter* IV,18: 18.25 and X,41: 40.13-4 read ܠܬܕܝܥܐ ܕܡܥܬܐ ... ܠܬܕܝܥܐ, "faculties, that is predicates". This is most likely a translator's gloss on δυνάμεις.

²⁶⁴ See Philoponus, *In De Generatione et Corruptione*: 190.24-191.12.

A final point is made by Philoponus in response to the objection. If "without confusion" is equated with a duality of natures, then the union in Christ is indicative of a duality of natures. But if the union is undivided, then the undivided must be one and not two. It is not possible that anything should at the same time be indicative of "one" and "two". In other words, if he who is united out of the two natures is a single entity, yet a duality insofar as the two natures have not been confused, as they say, then two are one, which is impossible. The undivided is one and the same, a unity of which no duality can be predicated (X,39: 37).

Does one of the two natures perish?

If he who is from two is one nature, which of those two has perished?
(X,40: 38.2)

From Philoponus' point of view, this question is not relevant to the doctrine of one composite nature in which the simple entities are preserved without confusion. For if one of the united elements had to perish, the end-product would not be a composite, but a simple entity. Not even concerning those things which are united by confusion such a question would make sense, for the natures of the elements are preserved, though not without alteration. With regard to man who is composed of soul and body, neither of the two perishes. Both simple components of the one composite Christ preserve the proper intelligible content of their nature in the composite perfectly (ibid.: 38).

Why are there different properties?

But if, they say, we acknowledge that the properties of the natures are preserved after the union and if we recognise their difference and hence that in God the properties of two or three natures appear, of the body, of the soul, and of the divinity, why then should we not in this way also acknowledge natures of Christ, when we do not negate their properties? Hence if because of the union there was one nature and hypostasis, why did there not also come to be, because of the same union, one property from these many properties? If, however, the union has not contracted the plurality of properties, then it has not contracted the duality of natures either (X,41: 38.21-6).

The problem whether a difference of properties could be allowed for in the one composite nature of Christ provoked much debate among the miaphysite opponents of Chalcedon. The best known of these controver-

sies is that between Severus of Antioch and Sergius the Grammarian²⁶⁵. Sergius understood ἰδιότης as a defining property belonging to an underlying nature, and so maintained that to speak of two properties would oblige us also to speak of two natures. Severus adopted the Cyrilline notion of “property as in natural quality (ἰδιότης ὡς ἐν ποιότητι φυσικῇ)”. He was insistent in the controversy with Sergius that the properties of the Logos and of the flesh are preserved and not confused, but not separated and divided either²⁶⁶.

In his response to this objection, Philoponus follows the path of Severus and attempts to clarify what the term “property” denotes. We usually call “properties of natures” the differences of substances, that is, the distinctive characteristics which pertain to their species. For instance, it is specific to a body to have three-dimensional extension and to be touchable; it is the property of the divinity to be eternal, omnipotent and so on. Thus we say that the properties of the nature of something are such-and-such. Now it is not custom to call each single property which is in something its nature²⁶⁷. Nature is the compound of all the constituents of the subject (τὸ ἐκ πάντων σύγκριμα τῶν συμπληρουμένων τὸ ὑποκείμενον φύσις ἐστί, 140,60D). We say, for instance, that brightness and lightness are properties of fire, but neither of them is the nature of fire²⁶⁸. This plurality of properties is not constitutive of a plurality of natures. Hence in Christ, who consists of divinity and humanity, a plurality of properties is preserved, while there is one composite nature and hypostasis (ibid.: 38-40).

On the right use of the term “composite”

If the divinity is simple and not composite, but Christ is composed of divinity and humanity, then the non-composite and simple has become composite and has not remained in its own simplicity (X,42: 40.22-4).

²⁶⁵ See the study of Torrance (1988). Cf. George of Martyropolis in the fragment Elias, *Ep. Apol.* 6: CSCO 469 [470], 32.16-8 [23.7-9]: *Hypostasim autem unam placet nobis credi et proclamari Christum, quae est seu composita est ex diversis proprietatibus.*

²⁶⁶ Severus, *Ep. 3 ad Sergium*: CSCO 119 [120], 158 [121], *Ep. I*: PO 12,176-7, *Ep. II*: PO 12,194; cf. Lebon (1951), 538-42. Precisely this understanding of difference of property in Christ was seen by Eleusinius of Sasima as implying a Nestorian διαίρεσις and so the teaching of Chalcedon; see Severus' letter to Eleusinius, *Ep. X*: PO 12,201-3. Cf. Honigsmann (1951), 114-5. Leontius of Byzantium argued in defence of Chalcedon that a duality of properties implied a duality of natures, *Triginta Capita* 10: PG 86,1904C. On the controversy provoked by the sophist Stephen in Alexandria, see above chapter three, pp. 37ff.

²⁶⁷ As already shown in II,13.

²⁶⁸ On Philoponus' theory of the elements see Scholten (1996), 191-213.

To Philoponus this objection is based upon a misconception, for in a composition the components do not become composite, but are simple with respect to the end-product of the composition. For instance, our body is composed in itself, none the less with respect to the living being that is composed of soul and body it is said to be simple. Thus entities which are simple in their λόγος τῆς οὐσίας, even if they enter into some sort of combination with each other, remain simple. If every composite were composed from composites, this would lead to an infinite regress, for each component would itself be composite, and there would be no single entities, but even matter (ὑλη) and form (εἶδος), of which bodies are made up, would be composite. For this reason, just as the incorporeality, impassibility, immortality and eternity of the Logos are truly preserved – although he is united to a passible body which has a beginning of its existence in time – so the simplicity of his substance is preserved without diminution in the composed Christ (ibid.: 40-2).

Is thus the divinity incomplete?

If Christ is composed of divinity and humanity, then the divinity is a part of the composite, but if it is a part, it is not complete. Therefore it is less than the composite, since the part is less than the whole and the incomplete less than the complete (X,43: 42.6-9).

Philoponus meets this objection with a clarification of what a “part” is which is obviously taken from his own commentary on Aristotle’s *Categories*²⁶⁹. “Part” falls under the Aristotelian category of the relative (πρός τι). Consequently, a part is always “in relation to something”, which means that nothing is a part on its own, but a part of a whole. Hence, since a part is “in relation to something”, it is incomplete and less in relation to something. This is illustrated by Philoponus with the analogies adduced by Plato for the soul, the steersman of a ship, and the charioteer who directs his equipage²⁷⁰. In relation to the whole, namely the ship or the chariot, the steersman or charioteer is an incomplete part. But it cannot be said that he is simply a part or simply incomplete. Only if the man is seen *as* pilot or charioteer, is he part of something else and thus incomplete. *Qua* man, however, he is neither a part nor incomplete.

²⁶⁹ Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.*: 114.16-21, esp. 16-7: ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς μέρη οὐσιῶν λέγεται εἶναι πρὸς τι (τὸ γὰρ μέρος ὅλου ἐστὶ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῖς μέρεσιν ὅλον). See also his *Ad Sergium* 1: 82.3-4, and 8: 91.

²⁷⁰ Plato, *Phaedrus* 247c and *Critias* 109c; *Phaedrus* 246a.

Likewise, the human soul is a part and is incomplete with respect to its being a component of the whole, that is, the human being. But if seen in itself, it is not part of something, but it is complete and exceeds the composite living entity, for rational and incorporeal life by far exceeds earthly being which is conjoined and related to the body²⁷¹. Philoponus also resorts to the example of the alloy *electrum*, which is constituted of gold and silver. Gold is an incomplete part of the alloy, seen on its own, however, it is complete and indeed far surpasses the alloy²⁷². These analogies are meant to elucidate the fact that in Christ the divinity of the Logos is a part of the composite Christ with respect to the necessity of the divine economy, for our salvation is procured in no other way than by the Incarnation. In this respect each of the two elements united is indeed incomplete, even the divine Logos, who, considered in itself, is of course far above perfection and above comparison with anything that exists (ibid.: 42-3). This position is in fact that already formulated by Apollinarius, who considers the soul and body *qua* constituents of human nature as ἀτελεῖς. He even holds, as put succinctly by R. A. Norris, that in Christ

spiritual and material principles are present as in the constitution of ordinary men, and that, again as with ordinary men, these principles are so related as to compose a single, organic whole, one nature. They are, in fact, complementary principles, neither of which is 'perfect' in and of itself. For the purposes of his incarnate existence, even the divine Word himself can be thought of as 'imperfect' apart from the flesh which he assumes²⁷³.

This view is also endorsed by Severus of Antioch²⁷⁴. But it has to be said that both Severus and Philoponus avoid the devastating conclusion

²⁷¹ For a similar argument, cf. Severus, *Hom. LXX*: PO 12,39-40.

²⁷² The alloy *electrum*, which is constituted of gold and silver (cf. the index of Forbes (1950), s. v.), as an analogy for the divine-human union in Christ is *rejected* already by Tertullian, *Adv. Prax.* 27,8-9: CCL 2,1199, and also by Theodoret of Cyrus, *Eranistes*, Dial. II: 134 Ettlinger. Interestingly, Theodoret uses the analogy of the *electrum* having a μικτὸν τὸ εἶδος for the constitution of the human body ("mixed" out of the four elements) and, more significantly, for the human constitution out of rational soul and mortal body. This is done in his exegesis of Ezekiel's vision of the man sitting on a throne (Ez. 1:26-7 LXX), which Theodore interprets as a vision of the Incarnate Logos. The *electrum* is compared with Christ's human nature which is surrounded (περιέκειτο) by fire, i.e. the divine nature, *Interpretatio in Ezech.*: PG 81,836AC.

²⁷³ Norris (1963), 95-6; cf. 109. See Apollinarius, *Fides Secundum Partem* 18: 173.14-15; *De Unione* 5: 187.5-14; fr. 119: 236.25-6 Lietzmann: οὐκ ἄρα ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη οὐσία θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος. Underlying this idea may be Aristotle's principle that an οὐσία cannot actually (ἐντελεχεία) be composed of a plurality of οὐσίαι, *Metaph.* Z.12: 1039^a3-4.

²⁷⁴ E.g., Severus, *Hom. LXX*: PO 12,40.

of Apollinarius that Christ could then be considered as a symmetrical compound or “middle thing (μεσότης)” out of God and man²⁷⁵. Notably, the same argument involving the notion of parts in relation to the whole could be adduced by Leontius of Byzantium in defence of Chalcedon²⁷⁶.

Philoponus’ argument provokes the following objection:

If the intellectual life of the soul is more valuable than life in the body and in relation to the body, and if gold is more valuable than *electrum* and simples are more valuable than composites, does then not a certain inferiority affect the divinity of the Logos, on entering into union with the human nature, since, when considered on its own unattached, it is superior to a composite which participates in the inferior, namely human nature? (X,44: 43.13-7)

Philoponus concedes that there is a point where all the analogies he employs for the divine-human union in Christ break down. Gold is actually changed when it is mixed with silver in the alloy (note that this was already the reason for Tertullian to reject this analogy). Even the incorporeal and rational soul in its affective conjunction with the body suffers from change, because of its natural link (φυσικὸς δεσμός) with the body and the affection (συμπάθεια) arising from it²⁷⁷. In its λόγος τῆς οὐσίας, however, the soul persists as impassible and immortal, even if it is joined with the passible and changeable body. This is even more true of the Logos of God who in himself is in every respect invariable and unchangeable, “with whom is no variation or shadow due to change” (James 1:17). He remains as he is, even if he comes into union with human nature (ibid.: 43-4).

4.5 *In Two Natures – Out of Two Natures: Towards a Rapprochement*

In the final paragraphs of the *Arbiter* Philoponus inquires into the possibilities of a rapprochement about the disputed matter itself – beyond the verbal battle. Some Chalcedonians say that there are two natures of Christ, or rather that he is seen *in* two natures, as a whole is seen in parts. They conceive of the two natures as the parts of the whole²⁷⁸,

²⁷⁵ Apollinarius, *Syllogismi*, fr. 113: 234 Lietzmann.

²⁷⁶ Leontius of Byzantium, *C. Nest. et Eut.* 2: PG 86,1280B-1284A.

²⁷⁷ On the notion of συμπάθεια see chapter seven, below p. 147f.

²⁷⁸ I propose to follow Vat. Gr. 680 and the Syriac version, which read τὰ τοῦ ὅλου [not: λόγου] μέρη in 44.10 – PG 140,61A. This argument was used in defence of Chalcedon in the polemical context of the sixth century, most prominently by Justinian,

while they acknowledge that the end-product of the union is a single entity. By analogy, a triangle is said to consist “in” three sides, while the shape (σχῆμα) of the triangle is one and is effected of a conjunction of three lines²⁷⁹, and a house is said to be “in” stone and wood, while there is a single form (εἶδος) of the house, effected out of the composition of these elements. The claim of these Chalcedonians is that between the locutions ἐκ δύο φύσεων and ἐν δύο φύσεσιν there is a difference only in expression and not in the concept which is thereby expressed (περὶ μόνην τὴν λέξιν καὶ μὴ περὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς λέξεως νοούμενον, PG 140,61B). Likewise, one could say of a triangle that it is “in” and “out of” three sides. Philoponus considers such an interpretation licit in principle; however, he insists that the whole is not something accidental, which is effected by a mere conjunction of substances, but is itself a nature or substance. If the Chalcedonians assert one composite nature which exists in two simple entities, as a whole is said to exist in parts, Philoponus would be ready to approve of such a terminology, although it is not accurate. Of composites the phrase “of them” is used rather than “in them”, for instance, human beings are composed *of* soul and body and not *in* soul and body, and bodies are composed *of* matter and form and not *in* matter and form. To speak of a whole in parts implies that the parts are spatially distinct, as the parts of a house and the organs of our body are. These are parts in the proper sense. Of elements, however, that are not spatially distinct, the phrase “in” cannot be used properly²⁸⁰.

Edictum de Recta Fide: 74.20-1 Schwartz, συνθέσεως γὰρ ὁμολογουμένης καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν γινώσκεται. See also Leontius of Byzantium, *Triginta Capita* 28: PG 86,1912BC, and Probus, *Solutiones c. Iacobitas*, edited by Uthemann (1981b), 110.

²⁷⁹ Cf. Philoponus, *In De Anima*: 58.1-2: σχῆμα ὑπὸ τριῶν εὐθειῶν περιεχόμενον.

²⁸⁰ Philoponus, *In Phys.*: 7.26-32, and 426.1-3: “for a part differs from an element in this way, that the element pervades the whole of which it is an element, while the part does not”, ET: Edwards (1994), 93. For this use of χωρεῖν, cf. Proclus, *El. Theol.* 152: 134.7-8 Dodds. The Syriac compilation of scholia on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* of miaphysite origin, known as *Anonymus Vaticanus*, has the following comment on the lemma ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον (8.3): “in the parts, i.e. the species is in the hypostases, i.e. subsists in them and they [sc. subsist] in it, in the account of Porphyry, but not at all in the ecclesiastical account. For the ecclesiastical account says that the whole is that which has been constituted out of the parts, but not at all that which is in the parts. Thus it is shown that Christ is out of two natures, but not in two natures”, Baumstark (1900), 240.31-8]. Philoponus’ treatise *What the difference is between parts and elements, and how whole and parts are related to each other*; to the presbyter Sergius was written at a request for clarification on this point: “The request and the recollection of your God-fearing chastity, O presbyter Sergius, excites us again to rational contests, in that you are asking how we conceive of parts being in a whole”, *Ad Sergium* 1: 81.6-8.

This applies to soul and body and in general to all natural forms pervading the underlying matter. If thus the divinity of Christ is not spatially distinct from his soul and body, but pervades the whole without any limitation, having been united to soul and body from the moment of the union, the locution "in two natures" cannot be used properly. None the less, Philoponus may accept it, though not in its proper sense, under the condition that the Chalcedonians confess that there is one composite nature of the whole (μία τοῦ ὅλου τὴν φύσιν σύνθετον)²⁸¹ (X.45: 44-5).

The phrase "in something" can be used not only in the sense of "whole in parts", but in many more senses which are not relevant to our discussion²⁸², since it is then used of separate entities. So we can say that the human species is in individuals, that there is one nature of living being in many species, that there is one substance of the Trinity in three hypostases etc. In none of these cases do we mean "in a single hypostasis" or "in a single individual". Hence those who do not confess one composite nature of Christ, but on the contrary anathematise those who say so, must understand the phrase that Christ is in two natures not as a whole in parts, but as in two hypostases or individuals. If they, however, reject this Nestorian doctrine, the formula "out of two natures" offers them a necessary complement. While there are two entities "out of which" something is composed, the whole which is effected out of them is one, as a triangle is out of three straight lines, but is not itself three straight lines, rather it is a single entity, and likewise of the other things (X.46: 45-6).

For the sake of logical rigour Philoponus puts his point into the form of a syllogism:

If a house is 'in' stones, side-walls and pieces of wood, but the form of the house is one, then the one form of the house consists 'in' stones, side-walls and pieces of wood. Furthermore: If a triangle is one figure 'in' three straight lines, then the one figure of the triangle consists 'in' three straight lines (X.47: 47.8-11).

This is the case with all composites. Therefore one can say that Christ is in two natures; none the less it is not necessary that Christ, being a

²⁸¹ Note that Severus rejects the proposal made by John of Caesarea that the two formulae should be used simultaneously and scorns his adversary as a "new reconciler and mediator of opposites", see *C. Imp. Gr.* II, 12-3: CSCO 111 [112], 111-22 [87-95]; cf. also *Ep. XIV*: PO 12, 209.

²⁸² Porphyry notes that "in something" has nine possible meanings, *In Cat.* 77.18ff. Ammonius, *In Cat.*: 26.33ff. and 29.5ff., Philoponus, *In Cat.*: 32.7ff., and Simplicius, *In Cat.*: 46.3ff. find eleven meanings.

composite out of two natures, has two natures. With an eye to the supporters of the Christology of Chalcedon Philoponus adds:

Christ is in two natures, and Christ is one, hence the two natures are one and not two. But ... we will neither, because Christ is one, deny the constituents of this 'one' (τὸ ἓν τοῦτο), nor, on the other hand, because we recognise two natures which have concurred into the union, will we not confess that 'one' which resulted from them; whether someone prefers to call it one nature or hypostasis or one Christ, makes no difference to us. For the rest will necessarily be implied by each of these (ibid.: 47.14-20 – PG 140,61B).

Although Philoponus thus proposes a formula of compromise between Chalcedonians and miaphysites, it is clear that he insists on a one-nature Christology. This emerges from his emphasis that in each of the terms "one hypostasis", "one nature", or "one Christ" the other ones are included. As he has argued consistently in the *Arbiter*, if Christ is one, his nature and hypostasis is necessarily one as well. And once more Philoponus points out that of which there is one nature – the particular nature of the individual that is – there must also be one hypostasis (ibid.: 46-8).

Philoponus ends his major Christological treatise with a plea for objectivity in the search for truth and generosity with respect to the shortcomings of his work:

So it is, as far as our capacities go. Now we ask those who read this to stand up dispassionately and without favouritism so that they may give an answer to truth itself in accordance with our defence of it. And if they find anything said by us agreeable to it, they should embrace it with welcome understanding, ungrudgingly, as if it were their own offspring. For I consider truth a common benefit in whomsoever it is found. But if anything has slipped from our judgment or examination, may they grant us forgiveness for our slip, but heal what they have forgiven by themselves through clearly proven rebuttals, judging, as we do, that our own private good lies in dissociation from ignorance and in making him who has liberated us from it our true helper (concl. 48: 48.3-12).

5 Philoponus' Defence of the *Arbiter*

After having presented the argument of the *Arbiter* with reference to its theological and philosophical context, I shall now discuss those shorter treatises in which Philoponus gives a defence of his Christology. Notably, the customary titles of the *Opuscula Monophysitica*, estab-

lished by Šanda, do not exactly correspond to the headings found in the manuscripts. The codex Vat. Syr. 144 has the rubrics "*The ten chapters of the Arbiter have ended*" (fol. 30^b) at the end of the treatise which we commonly call *Arbiter*. Then follows the so-called *Epitome of the Arbiter* under the title "*Again a brief epitome of the [sc. argumentative] force of these chapters*" in Vat. Syr. 144 (fol. 30^b), while Brit. Libr. Add. 12,171 reads "*A general treatise which goes beyond these ten chapters*" (fol. 32^b). After this work, Vat. Syr. 144 has the subscription "*The book which is called Arbiter has ended, which is the examiner of the words of the two sides that contend against each other on the Incarnation of God the Logos*" (fol. 38^a), which is not in Add. 12,171. The *Epitome* was apparently considered part of the *Arbiter*. The two apologetic works on behalf of the *Arbiter* are only contained in the Vatican manuscript under the titles "*Again a solution of things in the Arbiter that are doubtful on the part of some*" (fol. 38^a – cf. fol. 45^{va}: "*The first apology*") and "*Again about the fact that some have thought erroneously and have judged that the Arbiter has permitted that Our Lord Christ may be said to be in two natures. Against that I have prepared my whole treatise*" (fol. 45^{va}). At the end of the second apology we read "*The defence concerning some doubts in the Arbiter has ended*", and subsequently "*The book which is called Arbiter, i.e. examiner, has ended*" (fol. 49^{va}). Thus the scribe regarded not only the *Epitome* as a part of the "*Book of the Arbiter*", but also the two apologies. This is certainly justified in that these two short treatises only clarify the argument of the *Arbiter* in response to criticism brought forward against it.

I shall not provide a synopsis of the *Epitome*, since it is just an abbreviated version of the *Arbiter*. Neither shall I treat the *Letter to Justinian*, which may well have been written before the *Arbiter*, as I have attempted to show; it gives the appearance of a first sketch of the argument which was later to be worked out systematically in the *Arbiter*. Both the *Epitome* and the *Letter* add nothing to the content of the *Arbiter*. The treatise with the title "*What the difference is between parts and elements, and how whole and parts are related to each other; to the presbyter Sergius*" touches on Philoponus' defence of his Christology only indirectly. On the basis of an extended philosophical argument Philoponus shows why one cannot properly speak of parts "in" a whole. This is of course an elaboration on the point already made in the *Arbiter*, that "two natures in Christ" cannot be understood as "parts in a whole" in the strict sense. Since the context of the *Treatise to Sergius* is not

theological, I shall not be concerned with it here. The object of my attention in this chapter will be the two apologies on behalf of the *Arbiter* which were conveniently called *Solutio Duplex* by the editor Šanda.

5.1 The First Apology

The *First Apology* begins with an account of the circumstances under which it was written:

Previously someone from the imperial city asked us through a letter, showing himself indignant about two passages written by us in the *Arbiter*, and commanded us to present a solution and defence of them. I immediately brought forth a brief defence for him who was asking such. Now, however, that I have a little leisure, I shall take on these things more at length (*First Apology* 1: 63.4-8).

I take the reference to the “brief defence” for the person who criticised the *Arbiter* to be indicative of the *Epitome* (as I have argued in chapter three, see above p. 30). Philoponus opens his response with a quotation from *Arbiter*, prol. 2: 4.7-22²⁸³. Then he relates the first point of criticism put forward against him:

Now these are our words against which the doubters say: ‘It has not been rightly said that we have the same opinion as those who have troubled the world (οἰκουμένην) and have been such a stumbling-block and cause of division for the Church of God, those I mean who have celebrated the Synod of Chalcedon’ (*First Apology* 2: 64.4-7).

Philoponus replies that he never said anything to that effect, but rather spoke about the *contemporary* controversies on Christology, that is, around the time of the Second Council of Constantinople in 553. For by now, he argues, the participants in these controversies have advanced their understanding of the Incarnation of the Logos, as compared to Chalcedon. It is obvious that Philoponus refers here to those defenders of the Council of 451 who would interpret its Christological definition in the light of the terminology and thought of Cyril of Alexandria. This group is often, though perhaps inexpediently, subsumed under the categories “Neo-Chalcedonians” or “Neo-Cyrellines”²⁸⁴. His estimation of this reading of Chalcedon is epitomised in the following comment:

²⁸³ This quotation is not completely identical with the text of the *Arbiter*, which may be owing to the Syriac translator.

²⁸⁴ The category “Neo-Chalcedonian” was introduced into the history of dogma in analogy to the term “Neo-Nicene” by Lebon (1909) and was developed by his student Moeller (1944/5) and (1951). On its problematic status, see the contributions of Richard

there is a major advance of our contemporaries over those, though even now they maintain communion with them [*sc.* the synodites] as a result of silly habits (*First Apology* 2: 64.12-3).

That Philoponus' favour only extends to those who would see the Chalcedonian formula in terms of Cyril's Christology is corroborated by the subsequent section in which he attacks those "Nestorianising" followers of the Fourth Council. Philoponus insinuates that they would not want to adhere openly to Nestorius' doctrine, but *de facto* do so, when they confess one hypostasis and two natures of Christ, thereby understanding hypostasis as *prosopon* in the sense of Nestorius. The witness for such an interpretation of hypostasis is Theodoret of Cyrus, from whose *Letter to John of Aegea* Philoponus quotes:

'What the communality and the difference is between *prosopon* and hypostasis and, on the other hand, nature, we have shown clearly in that treatise, on behalf of which we are giving an apology, namely that the expression "*prosopon*" is also applied to those which are divided in their natures, and have their union only in conjunction (συνάφεια?), as also Nestorius said: "I am dividing the natures, but I am uniting the adoration"' (*First Apology* 3: 64.21-5).

This is one of the few extant fragments from the letter to John of Aegea, a follower of Nestorius, to whom Theodoret wrote shortly after 451 in defence of the Christology of Chalcedon. Philoponus cites other extracts from this letter in his *Four Tmēmata against Chalcedon*. The authenticity of these fragments was disputed by Chabot on the grounds of Philoponus' insufficient familiarity with the literary work of Theodoret. A testimony in Severus of Antioch, however, shows that Philoponus' account can be trusted, as M. Richard pointed out²⁸⁵. It is obvious from the fragments of the *Letter to John of Aegea* that by advancing a strongly diphysite interpretation of Chalcedon, Theodoret aims at winning the support of his Nestorian addressee. Philoponus takes him to mean by hypostasis (understood as πρόσωπον) "some kind of collective unity of discrete individual entities"²⁸⁶. This is also the sense in which

(1946b). Helmer (1962), Grillmeier (1975b), (1984), (1989), 21-82 (on the controversies between Severus of Antioch and "Neo-Chalcedonians"), and 450-5 (a valuable excursus with further bibliography)

²⁸⁵ Richard (1941/2); see also Gray (1979), 85-8.

²⁸⁶ As put aptly by Gray (1979), 88; however, Gray's claim that this is an adequate understanding of Theodoret has been strongly criticised by Grillmeier (1984), 87-8. The underlying Greek of the quotation in Philoponus' *Tmēmata*. IV, 227 [II, 106] Chabot might have been κατ' ἁλλήλων συνάφεια, as Richard (1941/2), 422 suggested. Abramowski (1979), 47-8, made a case for a less incriminating term such as κατ' ἁλλήλων ἐγγύτης.

he reads the famous phrase from the *Tome of Leo*, that “the unity of the person is recognised in each of the natures”. In Philoponus’ view this does not allow for a true unity of the two natures. His understanding of hypostasis is significantly different from that of Theodoret. As he has argued in the *Arbiter*, hypostasis can be identified with the nature that is particular to a single entity. The “one incarnate nature of God the Logos”, which is distinguished from the (particular) nature of the Father and the (particular) nature of the Holy Spirit, is nothing else than the one hypostasis of the Trinity. If, then, the Council of Chalcedon anathematizes those who speak of “one nature” of Christ, its conception of hypostasis must be a conjunction of two individuals, as set forth in Theodoret’s letter.

Philoponus emphatically rejects the doctrine of Eutyches, since the latter would not acknowledge that the body of Christ is consubstantial with ours. However, there is a correct way of saying that there is one nature of Christ, as demonstrated in the writings of the doctors of the Church, most prominently Cyril and Athanasius of Alexandria²⁸⁷. The fact that this formula was not accepted at Chalcedon shows, according to Philoponus, that in the dogmatic definition of the Council hypostasis should be taken merely as

the affectionate union of the divine Logos and the man, that which Nestorius also styles ‘prosopon’ (*First Apology* 5: 66.9-10).

So much for the Council of 451. Since then, however, there has been an endorsement of Cyrilline Christology among the Chalcedonians which Philoponus appreciates. The following passage bears clear references to the moderately “Neo-Cyrrilline” Christology which was articulated at the Fifth General Council:

When being pressed in many ways, they have permitted that it may be said [sc. as follows]: they profess one incarnate nature of God the Logos and proclaim a hypostatic union of natures, while they anathematise those who say that this has been accomplished only through a conjunction, and not by virtue of the very being of the substantial natures. And for this reason they say that Christ is composite and hold that there is one composite hypostasis of his (*First Apology* 6: 66.16-20).

Yet they shrink from the consequence to be drawn from the equivalence of (particular) nature and hypostasis and refuse to affirm the one

²⁸⁷ Philoponus credits Athanasius with the Apollinarian μία-φύσις formula, cf. *Four Tmēmata*: IV,231 [II,110] Chabot.

composite nature of Christ. Two natures, in turn, require two hypostases, a consequence which they are not willing to accept either.

One could pose the question how it should be possible that there is one nature of divinity and of humanity. This objection does not hold, Philoponus argues, for on *a priori* grounds it is equally impossible that there should be one hypostasis of divinity and humanity:

If we call hypostases the proper forms by which each individual is distinguished from those which are consubstantial with it, God the Logos from his Father and the Holy Spirit, we, however, as individuals of our [sc. species] from the other human beings – for it is not possible that the property of God the Logos and the property of his ensouled flesh, that by which he is distinguished from the other human beings, will be the same – therefore there is neither one hypostasis of the divinity and the humanity of Christ. On the contrary, just as with us the living being composed of soul and body, I mean man, is his one hypostasis and nature, so also in the case of Our Lord Christ who is constituted as a perfect totality of divinity and humanity we must profess that he is one composite hypostasis and likewise nature (*First Apology* 7: 66.28-67.6).

The Council of Chalcedon, in Philoponus' eyes, has effectively introduced a fourth person into the Trinity and so departed from the faith of Nicaea, despite the reference to the Council of 325 in the *Prooemium definitionis* of Chalcedon (whose beginning is cited in *First Apology* 8: 67.9-10):

they give us to understand that as another one apart from the three persons of the divinity, Christ has been born from the virgin (*First Apology* 8: 67.10-1).

Philoponus' point is that to speak of two particular natures of Christ necessarily implies two hypostases or prosopa. Thus the fundamental deficiency of the Christology of Chalcedon is that it introduces *another subject* apart from the second person of the Trinity, and does not affirm the *continuity* of the *one* subject in the Incarnation, the Logos of God. For his contemporaries, however, Philoponus has some appreciation, since they say that the Son of God was born from Mary in the flesh, one of the Trinity. But in the formula of Chalcedon, nothing to this effect is found.

Philoponus sees his interpretation of the Chalcedonian definition confirmed in the *Tome of Leo* from which he quotes²⁸⁸. When Leo speaks of

²⁸⁸ *Quamvis enim in Domino Jesu Christo Dei et hominis una persona sit, aliud tamen est, unde in utroque communis est contumelia, aliud, unde communis est gloria* (Denzinger-Schönmetzer (1965), no. 295), quoted in *First Apology* 9: 67.23-5.

one person, it is that one which is constituted as a result of the conjunction of Logos and the man. This union is communicated through the intimacy between the two. Of each of them a particular nature is affirmed and so, according to Philoponus, a substantial hypostasis and prosopon, so that the union can only be understood as a participation or conjunction of God and man. This is essentially the view of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia.

To substantiate his claim, Philoponus quotes from Theodore's *De Incarnatione*, a treatise which has been transmitted to us only in fragments. The text in question (from book VIII, chapter 63) is notorious since it was often referred to in the Christological controversies of the fifth and sixth centuries²⁸⁹. It has been transmitted in two recensions which differ significantly in their use of the term "hypostasis" for the union in Christ. The first recension is found in the extant part of an ancient Syriac translation of the *De Incarnatione* in the manuscript Brit. Libr. Add. 14,669²⁹⁰. Theodore uses the analogy of man and wife becoming one flesh (Mt 19:6) to argue that in Christ a union of prosopon has been effected, while the difference of the natures is not mitigated. The crucial point of this recension is that Theodore speaks not only of one prosopon but also of one *hypostasis* of Christ. The second recension is attested in the manuscript Brit. Libr. Add. 12,156 (Syriac), in the florilegium appended to the polemical treatise *Deprehensio et Triumphus super Nestorianos* by Leontius of Byzantium and the acts of the Fifth General Council (Greek), and in the *Constitutum* of Pope Vigilius (Latin)²⁹¹. According to these testimonies, Theodore does not speak of "one hypostasis". Instead, he insists that the human nature of Christ has a complete prosopon of its own, since there is no hypostasis without a prosopon. Both versions of the passage affirm a conjunction (συνάφεια) of divinity and humanity, but the second recension leaves little doubt that this is understood as a conjunction of two individual prosopa into one prosopon, not one hypostasis.

²⁸⁹ Such as in the eleventh anathema of Justinian's *Edictum de Recta Fide*: 92.26-94.13 Schwartz, which was endorsed at the Council of 553, canon 12: ACO IV.1,243.1-30. Daley (1978), 172, has a list of references where this passage is cited.

²⁹⁰ For Add. 14,669, see the edition of Sachau (1869), 1, l. 2-13.

²⁹¹ For Add. 12,156, see the edition of de Lagarde (1858), 104.27-105.7; Leontius of Byzantium. *Deprehensio et Triumphus super Nestorianos*, floril., test. 6. *ap.* Swete (1882), II,299.6-20; Second Council of Constantinople, *Actio* VI,9: ACO IV.1,180.23-31; Vigilius, *Constitutum* 123, test. 30 (*Collectio Avellana*, Ep. 83), *ap.* Swete (1882), II,299.6-20.

M. Richard made a strong case that the first recension is an accurate rendering of the genuine text of Theodore. He argued that the second recension originated from a collection that had already been used by Cyril of Alexandria in the late 430s and then in several other florilegia. In Richard's view, this was from the beginning an unfair presentation of Antiochene doctrine and contained passages deliberately altered by hostile, perhaps Apollinarian, circles with which Cyril was in contact²⁹². Richard's position is reflected in the entry no. 3856 of the *Clavis Patrum Graecorum*, where the first recension (with Add. 14,669 and Facundus of Hermiane, whose excerpts do not include the passage in question) is listed as "*traditio genuina*", and the second recension (with Add. 12,156 and the other witnesses) as "*traditio alterata*".

F. A. Sullivan already disputed Richard's hypothesis in the course of a detailed examination of the texts. He aimed at demonstrating that the more "friendly" Syriac translation in Add. 14,669 had been altered apparently in order to "improve" Theodore's conformity with Chalcedonian orthodoxy²⁹³. B. E. Daley, in his critical edition of Leontius of Byzantium, agreed with Richard that Leontius, despite his own assertion of the contrary, drew upon a florilegium with texts by Theodore and Diodore which had already been used by Cyril. However, Daley did not think that the texts were from the beginning tendentiously altered. Regarding the two recensions of Theodore's *De Incarnatione*, Daley sided with Sullivan²⁹⁴. Sullivan's case has been boosted recently by L. Abramowski, who took a fresh look at the manuscript evidence²⁹⁵. A comparison between Add. 12,156 and Add. 14,669 shows that the latter shortened and simplified the text of the *De Incarnatione*. The translator also seems to have had problems with Theodore's Greek and with Greek as such. Moreover, in the case of the notorious passage from chapter 63 of book VIII, the text of Add. 14,669 was redressed so as to eliminate the Antiochene doctrine of two prosopa, which apparently caused embarrassment. Add. 12,156 is a hostile and extremely tendentious selection from Theodore's writings, with fragments being taken out of context, so that sometimes even views which Theodore contested are ascribed to him. None the less, the translation of the passage in question is

²⁹² Richard (1943) and (1946a).

²⁹³ Sullivan (1956), 35-158.

²⁹⁴ Daley (1978), LXXII-LXXIII.

²⁹⁵ See Abramowski (1995) on Add. 12,156, and (1993) on Add. 14,669. Her re-examination of the question was occasioned by the research of the late Fr Köbert of the Pontifical Biblical Institute. Rome, whose conclusions she corroborates.

reliable. As Abramowski notes, in the light of these conclusions the evaluation of the two recensions in the *Clavis Patrum Graecorum* should be reversed²⁹⁶.

The quotation in Philoponus belongs to the second, genuine recension; the wording, however, is different from that in Add. 12,156. It seems that the translator has rendered the passage from Theodore directly into Syriac, as he was working on the *First Apology*. Our text deviates significantly from the other witnesses at two points, which will be noted.

‘What the Lord also says about man and wife, “that they are no longer two, but one flesh” [Mt. 19,6], we also say rightly according to the concept of “union” “that there are no longer two prosopa, but one”, evidently while the natures are distinguished. For as in that case the number of the duality is not impaired by [sc. the fact] that it is called one flesh – for it is evident according to what it is called one – so here the unity of the prosopa²⁹⁷ does not impair the difference of the natures. For when we distinguish the natures, we speak of the perfect nature of God the Logos and of his perfect prosopon, for neither is it possible to say that there is a hypostasis without prosopon, and we speak of the man’s nature and likewise of his prosopon as complete. When, therefore, we look at the unity²⁹⁸ we then call it one prosopon’ (*First Apology* 9: 68.11-8).

After this excursus, let me return to Philoponus’ argument. He again emphasises the difference between the doctrine of Chalcedon which is that of Theodore and of Pope Leo’s *Tome*, and the position held by his (“Neo-Chalcedonian”) contemporaries. These, in turn, proclaim that it is one of the Trinity who is the subject of all that is done and suffered by Jesus in his earthly life. They are in agreement with the faith of Nicaea, where it was affirmed that the only-begotten and consubstantial Son of God, God from God, light from light, descended and became incarnate, suffered death and rose from the dead, and ascended into heaven.

Philoponus is obviously scandalised by the fact that at Chalcedon the formulae δύο φύσεις and ἐν δύο φύσεσιν were preferred to the for-

²⁹⁶ Abramowski (1995), 2. Her studies have been acknowledged in the *Supplementum* to the CPG (1998), 224. However, some confusion has come in here. The Greek fragments from the acts of the Second Council of Constantinople and from Leontius of Byzantium as well as the Latin fragments from the *Constitutum Vigili* should be listed under “*traditio genuina*”, together with the Syriac fragments from Add. 12,156.

²⁹⁷ ܠܥܕܝܢܐ ܠܗܠܝܬܐ (68.15), but τοῦ προσώπου ἡ ἔνωσις – ܠܗܠܝܬܐ ܠܥܕܝܢܐ – *personae unitas*. I am inclined to see in this a corruption of the manuscript. Only a few lines below, with reference to the quotation from Theodore, Philoponus speaks of ܠܥܕܝܢܐ ܠܗܠܝܬܐ ܕܡܢ ܠܥܕܝܢܐ ܕܡܢ ܠܥܕܝܢܐ ܕܡܢ ܠܥܕܝܢܐ (68.19-20).

²⁹⁸ ܠܗܠܝܬܐ (68.18), but ἐπὶ τὴν συνάφειαν – ܠܗܠܝܬܐ ܕܠܝܢ – *ad coniunctionem*.

mula ἐκ δύο φύσεων²⁹⁹. This deficiency has been overcome by the endorsement of the latter at the Second Council of Constantinople. Yet the proclamation of a “composite Christ” and even “one composite hypostasis” does not go far enough; it must be recognised that this necessarily entails “one composite nature”.

In addition to these doctrinal points, the reception of the notorious letter of Ibas and the restitution of Theodoret of Cyrus are brought forward against Chalcedon by Philoponus. This has been corrected at Constantinople in 553, but the position of those who still defend Chalcedon is inconsistent. By condemning Theodore, certain writings of Theodoret, and the letter of Ibas (the “Three Chapters”), they have put the Council of 451 itself under anathema³⁰⁰.

Philoponus clearly regards the development of Chalcedonian Christology from the Council of 451 to the Council of 553 as an advance. But the defenders of Chalcedon have not advanced far enough:

Since they do not recognise the inconsistency of the terminology of those who from the beginning have maliciously spread it in the Church of God, because of long and irrational custom they adhere to it. And for this reason they have put bitter anathemas on those who think differently and do not consent to their opinions in everything (*First Apology* 12: 70.12-5).

Philoponus dismisses the argument that there are two natures of Christ because of the unconfused union between divinity and humanity. He observes that the Chalcedonians also affirm a single hypostasis of Christ, without being afraid of introducing a confusion here. Since Philoponus considers hypostasis equivalent to individual nature, a distinction between the unity of hypostasis and the duality of natures makes no sense to him:

Therefore, if someone speaks of the hypostasis of the one Christ as a composite hypostasis, he is then also obliged to confess a composite nature. But if he calls the nature “composite”, it follows by all means that he should also define the hypostasis as composite (*First Apology* 12: 70.19-21).

The *Arbiter* was written in order to defend miaphysite Christology and to show the inconsistency of Chalcedon – in response to a request,

²⁹⁹ Šanda (1930), [111₁] suggests that *First Apology* 10: 69.3-4 is a reference to the imperial commissioners, who intervened at the fifth session of the Council of Chalcedon on 22nd October 451. In his *Tmēmata*: IV,223 [II,99] Chabot, Philoponus criticises the way in which the Emperor Marcianus influenced the discussions to the favour of Leo’s “Nestorian” doctrine.

³⁰⁰ See *Tmēmata*: IV,237-8 [II,119-21] Chabot.

as Philoponus underlines. This may suffice to refute the first point of criticism brought forth against the treatise, that therein Philoponus made undue concessions to the supporters of the Council of 451.

The second point of criticism concerns the degree to which Philoponus allowed for the formula “in two natures” in the *Arbiter*. Apparently, some Chalcedonians who advocated the use of both “in two natures” and “out of two natures” were happy to take up Philoponus’ recommendation that the Council’s definition could be accepted if the preposition “in” were understood in the sense of parts in a whole. This favourable reception on the Chalcedonian side was met with misgivings in miaphysite circles. The conciliatory attitude of the *Arbiter* provoked criticism from some of Philoponus’ co-religionists, who insisted that the usage of the formula “in two natures” should not be permitted, even if those who used it would read it in a correct way. Philoponus now feels obliged to clarify what he said and to defend his position. His response begins with a paraphrase of *Arbiter* X,46 (*First Apology* 15: 72.13-73.8). As already shown, his argument is that the locution “in” is properly used only of parts that are spatially distinct from another. Since the divinity and the humanity of Christ are by no means parts in this sense, the phrase “in two natures” is inappropriate. Philoponus admits that he considered the formula acceptable, although it is incorrect. This approval, however, entirely depended on an interpretation of the formula which would not jeopardise the oneness of Christ. As he now insists, this condition is not fulfilled as far as the definition of Chalcedon is concerned, since there the formula was understood in a Nestorian sense.

5.2 *The Second Apology*

Philoponus’ suggestion regarding the use of the phrase “in two natures” continued to be controversial in miaphysite circles even after his defence in the *First Apology*. The full title of the *Second Apology* (which is about half the length of the first) reads:

Again about the fact that some have thought erroneously and have judged that the Arbiter has permitted that Our Lord Christ may be said to be in two natures. Against that I have prepared my whole treatise (18: 74.26-75.1 – Vat. Syr. 144, fol. 45^{va})

The tone of this *Second Apology* is remarkably sharper than the first one:

A certain word has come to me that some of those who turn into advocates on behalf the Synod of Chalcedon have brought my *Arbiter* in their midst as an aid for their perfidies, just as if it would permit the locution 'in two'. I have not been occupied with mourning for the shame of those who dare such. For while they do not speak on behalf of the truth, they want by every means to bring to nought those who do so. They should rather look at the meaning [sc. of what has been said in the *Arbiter*]. For which question that is raised by them have I not overthrown throughout the whole treatise? Which doubt that is supposed to have persuasive force have I not shown to be insanity, so that not even one reason – which might be considered congruent – for their perfidy is still left? And conversely: what lines of attack have I not tried, to show that there is one composite nature of Christ? I shall expose the reason why they deceive themselves, and at the same time present the scope of the treatise in brief (*Second Apology* 18: 75.1-11).

Philoponus now appears intransigent towards a reading of the dogmatic definition of Chalcedon along the lines of the Christology of Cyril of Alexandria³⁰¹:

I have seen many of those who receive this Synod turning their faces from the division of Nestorius and confessing that one and the same is the Lord Christ, who was begotten before the ages from the Father in the divinity, and the same in the last time [sc. born] in the flesh from the holy God-bearer and ever-virgin Mary. They hold, however, that this Synod has also said that Christ is in two natures as in parts only for the sake of terminological disagreement, and not [sc. in order to affirm] a division, as it is the case with Nestorius and with a few others of a similar opinion. It has been my intention throughout the whole treatise to uproot this belief of many, and at the same time to show that not only by reason of terminology, but also by reason of the sense [sc. of that terminology] this Synod has erred, when it clandestinely introduced the division of Nestorius (*Second Apology* 19: 75.12-20).

The purpose of the *Arbiter* was twofold: first to introduce some principles common to those who adhere to the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation, and secondly to show how these principles implied a miaphysite Christology and ruled out any duality of natures in Christ. To corroborate this, Philoponus quotes two passages from the *Arbiter*, where he made clear that "in two natures" cannot be applied to a whole which results from a composition of divinity and humanity³⁰². None the less, he allowed for the use of this formula in the sense of parts in a whole, if it is interpreted correctly and not after the manner of a

³⁰¹ The precise meaning of the Syriac in the following passage is not always clear to me. I have tried to make sense of it as best I could.

Nestorian division. Philoponus justifies himself by claiming that he said this “as if by means of a concession rather than for the refutation of their [sc. the Chalcedonians’] absurdity” (*Second Apology* 21: 77.5). It seems that Philoponus has the technical sense of a rhetorical *concessio* in mind³⁰², that is, to make an apparent concession to one’s opponents in order to win them over for one’s own cause eventually.

To those who accused him of compromising miaphysitism, Philoponus replies that they isolated certain parts of the *Arbiter* from their proper context. For this reason, they were oblivious to the scope of the whole treatise. He suggests that these negative reactions on the part of some may have arisen from sheer ignorance about the rhetorical figure of *concessio*. However, the use of this figure is something common among the doctors of the Church:

Severus of blessed memory has shown clearly in one of the letters to the presbyter Thomas what this figure is, when he literally wrote as follows: ‘For this reason this figure of concession has the force that those who speak against each other will think that they agree, and it will turn them away from their own doctrine, opinion and belief and bring them to the truth’ (*Second Apology* 23: 78.5-9).

I have not been able to identify this quotation which is apparently drawn from one of the letters of Severus of Antioch. Perhaps the addressee is Thomas, Bishop of Germanicia, who was exiled from his see in 519 and took part in the conversations between orthodox and Severan bishops, which were held in Constantinople at the initiative of the Em-

³⁰² *Second Apology* 20: 76.6-12 is an abbreviated citation from *Arbiter*, prol. 6: 8.6-10. 18-20; 76.18-21 follows closely *Arbiter* VII,28: 27.4-7.

³⁰³ The Syriac has ܐܡܝ ܕܥܠܐ. According to the *Vita* of John of Beth Aphthonia, originally written in Greek, Severus of Antioch wrote against John the Grammarian who claimed Cyril of Alexandria for Chalcedon: ܐܡܝ ܐܡܝܢܐ ܥܡ ܐܕܡܝܢܐ ܕܡܝܢ ܐܕܡܝܢܐ, PO 2, 250.4-5. The editor Kugener comments: “Littéralement: ‘Toutefois il lui dit qu’il accordera par concession (indulgence) comme par course qu’il a été dit ainsi’; dans ce passage, le traducteur a rendu par ܐܡܝ ‘course’ le terme de rhétorique συνδρομή, qui désigne une concession apparente”. Lausberg (1960), 425, notes: “Die *concessio* ist das Eingeständnis (*confessio*), daß das eine oder andere der gegnerischen Argumente richtig und für die eigene Sache ungünstig ist. Dieses Eingeständnis ist kein totales (da sonst der Prozeß aufhören würde ...), sondern entweder ein partielles, das durch gewichtigere eigene Gesichtspunkte wettgemacht werden kann, oder ein ironisches (Quint. 9,2,51: *simulatio* ...). Die *concessio* kann hinsichtlich des Zeitpunktes des Prozeßgangs als *praeparatio* ... auftreten oder auch nachträglich (nach der Rede des Gegners)”. Greek terms: παρομολογία, ἐπιτροπή, συγχώρησις; for references, see *ibid.*, 425-6. For συνδρομή see Hermogenes, Περί ἰδεῶν B: 313.16-9 and 357.1-4 Rabe.

peror Justinian in 532³⁰⁴. In a letter to this Thomas, which is only extant in part, Severus discusses problems of the right interpretation of Scripture³⁰⁵. The fact that Philoponus introduces Thomas as presbyter might indicate that the letter from which this quotation is taken had been written before Thomas was appointed bishop³⁰⁶.


Be this as it may, Philoponus now unambiguously rejects the Chalcedonian formula which, as its supporters propose, accounts for the oneness of Christ by affirming "one hypostasis" and for the unconfusedness of divinity and humanity by affirming "two natures". Two extracts from *Arbiter* VII,28 and VIII,32 are quoted by Philoponus in order to corroborate his claim that this has always been his stance³⁰⁷. The formula "in two natures" indicates a division of subjects (τὰ ὑποκειμένα) and is thus liable to be understood as a union of two individuals in a Nestorian sense.

6 The Anthropological Paradigm in Christology

Patristic thought on the Incarnation of the Logos found in the union of soul and body a fitting paradigm for conceiving of the union of divinity and humanity in the person of Jesus Christ. In their endeavours to elucidate the ontological implications of the mystery of the divine economy, the Church Fathers recurrently employed this "anthropological paradigm". Its history can be traced from the third century to the watershed of Chalcedon and beyond³⁰⁸. It should be obvious from the preceding two chapters why a considerable part of this study will be devoted to this subject. As has been seen in my analysis of the *Arbiter*, the anthropological paradigm is central to Philoponus' defence of miaphysitism. Moreover, the proper application of this paradigm had become a much disputed point in the controversy between Chalcedonians and miaphysites over the Christology of the Council of 451. Philoponus could rely on an established use of the soul-body relationship for affirming the on-

³⁰⁴ See Honigmann (1951), 73-4.

³⁰⁵ Severus, *Ep. CVIII*: PO 14, 264-72.

³⁰⁶  (78.6) is the word regularly used for "presbyter, priest"; cf. above fn. 110 on p. 32.

³⁰⁷ *Second Apology* 25: 79.15-9 and 79.24-80.1 = *Arbiter* X,45: 44.19-24 and 45.16-8.

³⁰⁸ Extensive material for the age before Chalcedon is collected in the study of Gahbauer (1984). For the post-Chalcedonian period see Uthemann (1982a). Cf. also the sketch by Stockmeier (1976). Still useful is Sellers (1954).

theological unity of Christ. Within the Alexandrian Christological tradition this use was shaped primarily by its champion, Cyril. Philoponus locates himself in this tradition and is greatly indebted to the theological outlook of Cyril; and yet what singles Philoponus out among Patristic theologians is the extent to which he grounds his Christology on this paradigm. For this reason, the questions must be raised whether Philoponus actually uses this paradigm in an appropriate way and whether he can legitimately claim to continue the Alexandrian-Cyrriline line of theological reflection.

In order to provide satisfactory answers, a few terminological and conceptual considerations should precede my analysis. Until now, I have spoken of the “anthropological paradigm”; this, however, requires some clarification. I shall follow the distinction proposed by T. G. Weinandy between two different ways in which the soul-body relationship was used by Patristic theologians as a tool for elucidating the Incarnation. It was employed first as an *analogy* or *comparison* to affirm the ontological unity between the divinity and the humanity, and secondly as a *model* for conceiving of the type of relationship which obtains between the divinity and the humanity³⁰⁹. In other words, in the first case the single ontological reality of a human being, which is composed of two distinct entities, soul and body, is seen as an analogy for the single ontological reality of Christ, the God-man. In the second case, the human constitution is seen as a model of *how* the union between divinity and humanity is achieved in Christ; *as* the soul relates to the body, *so* the Logos relates to his humanity. While the two ways are, of course, not mutually exclusive and can be used simultaneously, Weinandy suggests that theologians of the Patristic age predominantly employ the human constitution as a *model* for the constitution of Christ. This fact is responsible for certain doctrinal misconceptions, usually at the expense of the humanity of Jesus. As Weinandy argues, its proper use as an *analogy* is found in the most pronounced manner in the Christology of Cyril of Alexandria, though he also reverts occasionally to using it as a *model*. None the less Cyril is distinguished by his acute awareness of the essential principle which must be followed when reasoning about God by means of analogies from the created order, expressed very succinctly in the *maior dissimilitudo* of the Fourth Lateran Council³¹⁰. So Weinandy’s

³⁰⁹ This discussion is indebted to Weinandy (2000), 182-90.

³¹⁰ See Denzinger-Schönmetzer (1965), no. 806; on analogy cf. Coreth-Przywara (1957).

distinction between *analogy* and *model* will not only provide us with an analytical tool for our interpretation of Patristic theologians; its systematic implications will also help us to gain a critical appreciation of Philoponus' Christology.

It might be profitable to introduce another distinction in the use of the anthropological paradigm, which is related to the first one. Depending on how one accounts for the union in man and the union in Christ, there seem to be three possibilities of conceiving how the former can be paradigmatic for the latter³¹¹:

- 1) The soul-body union allows for a natural explanation (however difficult it may be to provide that); similarly, the union of divinity and humanity can be explained in natural terms.
- 2) The soul-body union allows for a natural explanation, the union in Christ, however, does not, since it is mysterious.
- 3) Both the anthropological and the Christological unions are not susceptible of a natural explanation, but are essentially mysterious.

In the first case, the soul-body union is likely to be used as a *model* for the Christological union. Historically, such a position has found its most radical expression in Apollinarius of Laodicea. However, it is latent wherever the human constitution is employed to explicate *how* the union between divinity and humanity is achieved in Christ. The second position seems, in a more or less reflected way, a commonplace among many Patristic theologians. Its implications for using the soul-body union as an *analogy* are brought to the fore by Cyril of Alexandria. The third position is advocated, for instance, by Gregory of Nyssa and Leontius of Byzantium³¹², but expressed most prominently in Augustine's insistence on the mysterious character of the human constitution: "the manner in which spirits are joined to bodies and become living beings is thoroughly marvellous"³¹³. The only thing we know is its irreducible fact. Those, then, who demand insistently that a reasonable explanation (*ratio*) should be given as to *how* God and man have been united in the

³¹¹ For the suggestion to make use of this distinction I am indebted to Professor M. Frede.

³¹² Gregory of Nyssa, *Or. Cat.*: 39.11-40.6 Mühlenberg; on Leontius, see below pp. 131ff.

³¹³ Augustine, *Civ. Dei* XXI,10,25-7: CCL 48,776; cf. esp. his *Ep. 137 (ad Volusianum)*. One might compare this with Porphyry, who acknowledges that the "extension" of the soul in relation to the body is ineffable (ἐκτασις ἄρρητος), *Sent.* 28: 17.6-7 Lamberz.

one person of the mediator Jesus Christ display a boldness which is wholly out of place. For they cannot even explain what they know as a fact from their everyday experience, how the human person is constituted out of the two realities of soul and body. It is the merit of this third position to preclude any attempt to interpret the soul-body union as a *model* of the Incarnational union.

Comprehending these aspects of the use of the anthropological paradigm before and after Chalcedon will thus enable us to approach Philoponus from a more systematic perspective. This will also help us to appreciate how important problems of Christology were addressed in the Patristic age³¹⁴. In other words, the first reason to provide an extensive treatment of the soul-body paradigm concerns the doctrinal matter of Christology. There is also another good reason for this investigation, which concerns theological method. Grillmeier has indicated that the anthropological paradigm supplied the momentum for the development of a "scholastic" Christology in the period after Chalcedon³¹⁵. The Council's dogmatic formula incited attempts for its theological clarification both among those who endorsed it as the standard of orthodoxy and among those who staunchly opposed it. While the foundations for this process had already been laid in the preceding centuries, the task of explicating the Church's Christological confession became extremely urgent in the sixth century. The soul-body paradigm provided a useful instrument for this task. In the course of this development, the anthropological models of contemporary Greek philosophy certainly had an important contribution to make. However, one should eschew wholesale conclusions as to how and to what extent such ideas shaped conceptions in Christian theology. The interaction between Christology and anthropology in the Patristic age is complex and needs to be studied with care. The insights offered by historians of doctrine are far from comprehensive³¹⁶. From the limited perspective of this study, I can only elucidate certain aspects of this interaction.

In this chapter, I shall first examine how the union of soul and body in the human composite was used by certain ante- and post-Chalcedonian theologians to explicate the union of divinity and humanity in Christ. I

³¹⁴ Stockmeier (1981), 249, notes that, in contrast to the well-known schemata "Logos-anthropos" and "Logos-sarx", the anthropological paradigm was devised by Patristic theologians themselves, not by modern historians of doctrine.

³¹⁵ See Grillmeier (1975c), 605-6.

³¹⁶ Cf. Grillmeier (1975a), 299-300, Stockmeier (1981), and Gahbauer (1984), 6-9.

shall not endeavour to present within the limits of this chapter an exhaustive treatment of the subject. My aim is to concentrate on a selection of authors who seem to have been decisive for the history of this theologoumenon. Since this paradigm puts a strong emphasis on the *unity* of the two constitutive elements, it is not surprising that it was mainly employed by theologians belonging to the Alexandrian rather than the Antiochene tradition, although it was used by representatives of the latter as well. It will be seen that the soul-body relationship was often used as a *model* for the relationship of divinity and humanity. The first vigorous expression of this tendency can be found in the Christological controversy over Paul of Samosata at the Antiochene Synod of 268/9. Another milestone was the thought of Apollinarius of Laodicea, with its emphasis on the σύνθεσις ἀνθρωποειδής. It was the achievement of Cyril of Alexandria to develop this paradigm as an *analogy*. In the controversies after Chalcedon, however, which often centred on the correct interpretation of his writings, this intuition was partially obscured, especially on the miaphysite side, whose major representative was Severus of Antioch. None the less the principal insight was not totally lost. Leontius of Byzantium, one of the leading theologians of the sixth century, demonstrated how the soul-body analogy could be employed in an original Christological synthesis. My analysis will not go beyond the age in which Philoponus wrote. It would be profitable to take into account the thought of a theologian as authoritative as Maximus Confessor. To do so, however, would reach far beyond the scope of this study³¹⁷. This historical sketch will lead to a critical assessment of Philoponus' use of the anthropological paradigm and thus to a reappraisal of his Christology.

6.1 *From Pre-Nicene Beginnings to the Fourth Century*

6.1.1 The Synod of Antioch in 268/9 and its Christological Controversy

The Synod of Antioch held in the winter of 268/9 condemned Paul of Samosata, bishop of that city, for heresy and deposed him from his see. I

³¹⁷ On Maximus see Uthemann (1982b) and Schönborn (1984), 108-21. It seems, in fact, that the material for Maximus' synthesis was to a large extent provided by the (still little explored) contributions of sixth- and early seventh-century theologians. His terminological and conceptual debts to Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem have been shown by Heinzer (1980), esp. 70-116.

shall not be concerned here with the historical and political circumstances of this important ecclesial assembly³¹⁸; rather, in the context of this chapter, I am interested in what Paul actually taught so as to provoke his condemnation, especially in the properly Christological aspect of the this controversy. In the presentation of the Christology of the Council Fathers by the Antiochene presbyter Malchion³¹⁹ there are two central aspects that are important for my study: first, he conceives of union between divinity and humanity in Christ as a σύνθεσις; secondly, he finds in the composite human constitution a suitable model for this union. More precisely, the relation between the Logos and his flesh is exemplified by means of the relation between soul and body.

Substantial Union

Paul rejects the idea that the Logos should be composed (σύνθετος) with a human body, for this would be equivalent to a kind of mingling which is contrary to his dignity or rank as the Son of God. For Malchion, however, the term σύνθεσις is crucial for expressing the fact that the Son of God is “substantiated (οὐσιῶσθαι)” in his body (fr. S, 22)³²⁰. Elsewhere (fr. S, 23), Malchion appears to say:

On the hypostasis of Our Saviour it should thus be recognised that the Logos alone, while not being incarnate, was not in need of the Holy Spirit, for the Spirit received from him, and he was not under the law. But because he was united substantially with his human body, he was enduring as it

³¹⁸ Cf. Millar (1971), Fischer (1986) and Rist (1997). Perrone (1992) gives a comprehensive overview of two decades of research done on both the historical and the doctrinal aspects of this notorious *affaire*.

³¹⁹ The fragments from the Antiochene Synod are quoted according to the critical edition by de Riedmatten (1952). The authenticity of the fragments from the acts of the Synod, which have come down to us only as quotations in later authors or in florilegia, has been a much disputed problem in Patristic scholarship, especially since Richard (1959) challenged the widely accepted reading of the testimony in Eusebius, *HE* VII,29,2. GCS 9/2,704.15-7, that during Malchion's disputation with Paul stenographers were taking notes which were still extant. Simonetti (1986 and 1988) argued in favour of the fragments' authenticity and was supported by Stead (1993), who made a strong case for the hitherto accepted interpretation of the testimony in Eusebius. Elsewhere I have attempted to enlarge upon the arguments presented by Simonetti and Stead, cf. Lang (2000). For the purpose of this chapter, then, it will be presupposed that the extant sources are in general reliable.

³²⁰ As de Riedmatten (1952), 147₂, points out, the Syriac phrase ܡܕܬܬܐ ܕܠܚܡܐ represents the Greek verb οὐσιῶσθαι. This is borne out by the parallels in two fragments from the acts which are transmitted by Leontius of Byzantium, S. 33 (οὐσίαν οὐσιωμένην ἐν σώματι) and S. 35 (οὐσιῶσθαι ἐν τῷ ὄλῳ σωτήρι τὸν υἱὸν τὸν μονογενῆ).

were that which occurred to it because of the composition and substantial union with him.

That the human body of Christ is united substantially (οὐσιωδῶς or κατ' οὐσίαν) with the Logos rules out the idea of a conjunction (συνάφεια) between the man Jesus and the divine Wisdom (cf. fr. S, 24). This is confirmed by a Latin fragment from the disputation with Paul in the sixth-century *Letter of the Scythian Monks* (fr. S, 25), where Malchion insists that Jesus Christ is one, composed out of two simple elements, God the Logos and the human body, which is from the seed of David (*unus factus est, nequaquam ulterius divisione aliqua sed in unitate subsistens*). The charge laid on Paul is that his rejection of this model of *compositio* implies a denial of the substantial union of the Son of God with the human body. It is insinuated that he conceives of the union in Christ as a participation, presumably of the man Jesus, in the divine Wisdom, who is said to dwell in the latter. According to Malchion, Paul's doctrine of inhabitation of divine Wisdom is motivated by the intention to protect the Son of God from the humiliating consequences of his *kenosis*, i.e. from suffering the cost or loss (*dispendium*) of being united with a human body³²¹.

These fragments found in different sources present us with a consistent idea of the Christology Malchion presented at the Synod against Paul as the measure of orthodoxy. Yet it remains to elucidate what the formulae which he and the Council Fathers apparently considered to be so important actually meant. What did it mean, in particular, to say of the Logos that he was "substantially united with his body" or "substantiated" in it? John Henry Newman thought that Malchion accused Paul

of denying that the divine *usia* in its fulness had simply taken possession of, occupied, and permeated an individual of our race, and that all that was in His human nature, totum quantumcumque, was lived in by, and assumed into, the *usia* of the Word³²².

I should like to suggest that the Christology of Origen can provide us with an interpretative key. The Council Fathers are often believed to have been of "Origenist" provenance³²³. Although this claim is proble-

³²¹ This might also be the meaning of the obscure fr. S, 29, at least if we adopt the supplement suggested by Scheidweiler (1955), 119-20.

³²² Newman (1874), 323.

³²³ Simonetti (1975), 18, names Dionysius of Alexandria, Gregory Thaumaturgus and his brother, Firmilianus of Caesarea in Cappadocia and Theotecnus of Caesarea in Palestine. This point was already made by Loofs (1924), 258, and Bardy (1929), 288-90, 478; cf. de Riedmatten (1952), 67.

matic because of the notorious difficulty of ascertaining what "Origenism" meant in the second half of the third century³²⁴, it will be shown that it is confirmed by the degree to which Malchion's arguments rest on Origen's thought.

Malchion's "substantiation" of the Logos in the human body is pre-figured in Origen's reading of Col. 2:9 (ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς), which he applies to the union of the Logos and the human soul of Christ:

*non gratia spiritus sicut prophetis data est, sed ipsius verbi dei in ea [sc. anima] substantialis inerat plenitudo, sicut et apostolus dicit: In quo inhabitat omnis plenitudo deitatis corporaliter*³²⁵.

In Origen's exegesis, the *kenosis* of the Son (Phil. 2:6) has the purpose of revealing to us that fulness which dwells in him bodily³²⁶. The union between the Logos and the soul of Christ is singular and of a different kind from a purely moral and external relation. Origen can explain the union of the Logos with the human *soul* (not, as one might expect, the body) of Christ with reference to Col. 2:9, since he equates "bodily" with "substantially". That the fulness of the divinity is in Christ *bodily* or *substantially* is his unique characteristic as compared with all the prophets to whom the grace of the Spirit is given³²⁷.

Origen uses the term *substantialiter* (οὐσιωδῶς) as opposed to *accidens* (κατὰ συμβεβηκός). Properties such as goodness or sanctity are found in created beings not by virtue of their nature, but are brought about by the reception or inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Hence these properties belong to creatures only by accident so that they may be lost, as man's fall from his original blessed state shows³²⁸. In Origen, *substantialiter* is also contrasted with *participatione*. Created beings are in the state of bliss (only) when they participate in sanctity and wisdom and thus in the divinity itself³²⁹. Rufinus is notorious for allowing himself certain liberties when rendering the *De Principiis* into Latin, so as to bring Origen's theology of the Trinity in strict terminological conformity with anti-Arian orthodoxy³³⁰. For the purpose of my argument, it is

³²⁴ See Brennecke (1984), 274-5, with reference to Bienert (1978).

³²⁵ *De Princ.* II,6,4,143-6: SC 252,318.

³²⁶ *De Princ.* I,2,8,236-8: SC 252,126; also IV,4,4,155-6: SC 268,410.

³²⁷ This is beautifully illustrated in Origen's *Hom. Is.* III,2: GCS 33,255.1-256.9.

³²⁸ Cf. *De Princ.* I,2,4,92-100: SC 252,116-8; I,2,13,462-5: SC 252,142; I,5,5,282-97: SC 252,192-4; I,8,3,100-14: SC 252,228; IV,4,4,312-20: SC 268,422; *C. Cels.* VI,44: GCS 3,114.18-27; and *Comm. in Joh.* II,18(12): SC 120,288-90.

³²⁹ *De Princ.* I,6,2,57-63: SC 252,198; cf. also I,3,8,276-8: SC 252,162.

³³⁰ Cf. esp. Studer (1972).

irrelevant whether the distinction between *substantialiter* and *accidens viz. participatione* is drawn between the three persons of the Trinity and the created order or whether, in more subordinationist terms, the line should rather be drawn between the Father as the principal source of the godhead and of goodness on the one hand, and on the other hand the Son and the Holy Spirit, together with the whole created order. Evidence from other works by Origen, such as the *Commentary on John*, suggests that, despite legitimate reservations, Rufinus' translation is to be trusted with regard to the point I have analysed. For Origen there is an essential difference between the Trinity and the created order in that whatever is found in the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit pertains to them *substantially*, i.e. in an immutable and irreversible way. Creatures, on the other side, are liable to change, growth or decay, since they possess such qualities as goodness or sanctity only *accidentally*, through the mediation of the Son and the Holy Spirit³³¹.

This idea of the "substantial" presence of God in the God-man Christ that is based on an exegesis of Col. 2:9 is also found in a fragment from Origen's contemporary and correspondent Julius Africanus († after 240):

Λέγεται γὰρ ὁμωνύμως ὁ Θεὸς πᾶσι τοῖς ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἐπειδὴ ἐν πᾶσιν ἔστιν. Ἐν δὲ τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ, ὥς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὄλην οὐσιωθεῖς, ἄνθρωπος λέγεται, κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον· Ἐν ᾧ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τῆς Θεότητος τὸ πλήρωμα σωματικῶς³³².

Julius Africanus seems to say that God is present in all his creatures; in the case of the Incarnation, however, he is even said to be man, insofar as in the fulness of his *ousia* God is present in Christ.

Col. 2:9 is also cited in the *Letter of the Six Bishops* (or *Letter of Hymenaeus*), addressed to Paul of Samosata by six of the bishops who signed the *Synodical Letter*, as we are told in Eusebius of Caesarea³³³. The passage in question is:

³³¹ *Comm. in Joh.* VI,38(22),36-42: SC 157,272; also *Hom. in Num.* XI,8: GCS 30,90.7-92.15. Cf. the editors' note 69 on *De Princ.* I,2,10: SC 253,51-2. This does not, of course, exclude the view that within the Trinity there are different degrees of goodness, as is evident from Origen's *Comm. in Mt.* XV,10: GCS 40,374.6-376.13. Here Origen comments on Mt. 19:17 that goodness in the proper sense (κυρίως) is only attributed to God, that is, the Father. The Son is the image of the Father's goodness (cf. Col. 1:15, Heb. 1:3). A certain degree of subordinationism is obvious from this passage, however, the pre-eminence of Son over the lesser goods is so significant that goodness is not just attributed to him metaphorically (καταχρηστικῶς).

³³² Fr. 4 from the fifth book of the *Chronographiae*: Routh IV (1846), 239.9-13. This parallel was already indicated by Newman (1874), 323-4.

³³³ De Riedmatten (1952), 121-34, has made a good case in favour of the letter's authenticity.

διόπερ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς παρθένου σῶμα χωρῆσαν πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς τῇ θεότητι ἀτρέπτως ἡνῶται καὶ τεθεοποιῆται· οὐ χάριν ὁ αὐτὸς θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος, Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, προεφητεύετο ἐν νόμῳ καὶ προφήταις, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῇ ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν πάσῃ πεπίστευται, θεὸς μὲν κενώσας ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ, ἄνθρωπος δὲ καὶ ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβὶδ τὸ κατὰ σάρκα³³⁴.

By containing the whole fulness of the divinity *bodily*, the body which is from the Virgin has been united unchangeably to the divinity and has been deified. Notably, the letter then cites Phil. 2:6 and so combines the Son's *kenosis* with the bodily presence of the fulness of the divinity in Christ, as Origen does. This text is followed by references to Rom. 1:3 and Heb. 2:14. As we will see, the latter is also adduced by Malchion in his disputation with Paul (fr. S, 36)³³⁵.

Hence Origen's Christology would seem to form the conceptual background to the theology presented by Malchion. By insisting on a "substantial union" the latter emphasises that the union which is constituted by the Logos' being in a human body is unique and of a different degree from the indwelling of grace in the inspired prophets. On this account, the *kenosis* of the Son, which is the revelation of the fulness of the divinity *in the body*, is not adequately expressed by the notion of participation, which not only fails to account for the uniqueness of the divine presence in Christ, but also, from the perspective of Origen's doctrine, appears to suggest that this union of divinity and humanity might be reversible, just as it is in creatures.

Certain elements in Malchion's terminology have been considered reminiscent of Apollinarian Christology. However, although there are similarities between the Christology presented by Malchion and that later developed in Apollinarian writings, the force of these convergences is outweighed by their divergences³³⁶. An important point is Malchion's emphasis on the concept of σύνθεσις both for the human constitution and for the union of divinity and humanity in Christ. It is expedient here

³³⁴ *Epistula Hymenaei* 8: Bardy (1929), 18.

³³⁵ The forger of the spurious *Letter to Paul of Samosata*, attributed to Dionysius of Alexandria and most likely written in the sixth century, also adduces Col. 2:9: Ps.-Dionysius of Alexandria, *Resp. 7 ad Paul. Samos.* 261.3-10: Schwartz. This passage is a good example of how the forger uses the *Letter of the Six Bishops* and adopts its themes. De Riedmatten (1952), 123-6, shows that Ps.-Dionysius of Alexandria develops the thought of the earlier letter in an Apollinarian direction, *pace* Schwartz (1927), 55, who dismisses both documents as spurious.

³³⁶ According to Simonetti (1988), 197, the absence of Apollinarianisms in the fragments is more significant than their presence.

to look for precedents in the theology of Origen³³⁷. In fact, the *Contra Celsum*, written only about twenty years before the synod of Antioch, contains two main themes characteristic of the doctrine expounded by Malchion in the name of the Council Fathers: Christ is conceived of as being composed out of divinity and humanity³³⁸, and man is conceived of as being composed out of soul and body³³⁹. In the *Contra Celsum* there seems to be an implicit parallelism between Christology and anthropology³⁴⁰. At this point Malchion certainly goes beyond Origen in that he explicitly draws upon the union of the human composite as a model for explaining the union of divinity and humanity in Christ. However, he prefers to speak, just as Origen does, of the human composite and of Christ being composed of the Logos and the flesh, rather than use such technical expressions as "composite nature" and "composite hypostasis", which are characteristic of Apollinarian terminology. Notably, Malchion's Christology is not expressed in those terms that would later become so crucial for the Church's doctrine, φύσις and ὑπόστασις (except for the rather unspecific occurrence in fr. S, 23). When the term οὐσία is used, it is never qualified as being "single" or "twofold", as in later controversy. For Apollinarius, on the other hand, it is of paramount concern to refute the doctrine of a duality of φύσεις and to affirm Christ's μία φύσις and μία οὐσία³⁴¹.

The Anthropological Paradigm

In the Christology of the Council Fathers, the union of divinity and humanity is conceived of according to the union of soul and body in the human composite, whereas Paul insists that the constitution of Christ is

³³⁷ Cf. already Loofs (1924), 258-64, and, more cautious, de Riedmatten (1952), 58-67.

³³⁸ *C. Celsum* I,60: GCS 2,111.20-4; I,66: 119.5-121.3; II,9: 136.30-137.3. Cf. Simonetti (1988), 197¹⁰⁰.

³³⁹ *C. Celsum* VI,63: GCS 3,133.6-134.12; VII,24: 176.5-6; VIII,23: 240.15-24. Cf. *De Princ.* I,1,6,188-9: SC 252,102; IV,2,4,122-5: SC 268,312, and already Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* VI,25: GCS 52,321.20-2. Suffice it to say that this anthropology is a commonplace in late ancient thought, both pagan and Christian; see Norris (1963). The question of dichotomy and trichotomy in Origen's anthropology will be discussed below pp. 113f.

³⁴⁰ Chadwick (1953), 94, points to *C. Celsum* IV, 15 and 18, "where Origen is arguing that the soul, whether of Jesus or of any other rational being, undergoes no change of essence by incorporation in a body; *a fortiori* the Logos suffers no change in the Incarnation".

³⁴¹ Cf. de Riedmatten (1952), 53-8.

of a different kind from that of man. This is evident from an important dialogue fragment from the acts of the Synod (fr. S, 36). Unfortunately, this fragment is incomplete and its syntactical structure is sometimes hardly intelligible. This fact cannot be explained only by the vivacity of the recorded dialogue³⁴², but most likely indicates a corruption in the text. Despite these difficulties, the main point of Malchion's attack on Paul seems clear. The learned presbyter sees a parallelism between the constitution of human beings and that of Christ (ὥσπερ ... οὕτως). Man is a composite living being (σύνθετον ζῶον) as a result of the coming together (σύννοδος) of the flesh and that which is in the flesh. On the basis of Heb. 2:14, Malchion maintains that in like manner the subsisting Logos came into the body and took on himself the limitations of human existence. Thus he may conclude that just as man is the end-product of a composition of two elements, so Christ is constituted by the fact that God the Logos and "that which is from the Virgin (τὸ ἐκ τῆς παρθένου)" have come together in one and the same subject. In the further course of the dialogue, Malchion insinuates that, in the case of Christ, Paul only allows for a participation of a man in the divine Logos. In Malchion's terminology, the union in Christ is by substance (οὐσία), not by participation (μετοχή or μετουσία). A substantial union implies that in Christ God and man have been "interwoven (κατὰ συμπλοκήν)". Christ's humanity can thus be understood "as a part of the whole (ὡς μέρος τοῦ ὅλου)". This is essentially different from a union by participation, where the relationship between divinity and humanity remains external.

Paul replies that Malchion's model is flawed, since it presupposes a similarity which does not exist. The constitution (κατασκευή) of human beings is different in kind (ἐτεροία) from that of Christ. Here we have a principal objection brought forward by Paul against the Christology of the Council Fathers: his rejection of the anthropological paradigm. Paul claims that the human constitution is so different that it does not allow for such a comparison. This point is obviously taken up in the Bishops' *Synodical Letter* (fr. S, 30, transmitted by Leontius of Byzantium):

What do you mean by saying that Jesus Christ has a constitution different in kind from ours? We claim that his constitution is different only in one respect, yet of the greatest importance, that in him God the Logos is what the inner man (ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος) is in us.

³⁴² Cf. Chadwick (1953), 93: "The extracts from the Dialogue have an authentic ring; in fr. 36 the dialogue style is prominent. (To read the fragment is to feel the overwhelming weight of this argument.)".

Do the Council Fathers mean the human soul when they use the Pauline expression “inner man”? At face value, this seems to be the case. It will be instructive to compare this fragment from the florilegium appended to the *Deprehensio et Triumphus super Nestorianos* with a passage from the text of the same treatise. Here Leontius emphasises that the Christological “manner of union” is substantial (οὐσιωδῶς), not relational (σχετικῶς), and exemplifies this with the anthropological paradigm:

ὥς εἶναι ἐν τῇ τελείᾳ ἀνθρωπότητι τὸν Λόγον, ὅπερ ἐν ἡμῖν ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τὸν Ἀπόστολος συνυφεστώς, καὶ εἰς τὸν τοῦ ὅλου ὄρον συντελῶν μετὰ τὴν ἔνωσην³⁴³.

This, Leontius continues, is the teaching of the Fathers who condemned Paul of Samosata. Obviously, Leontius is anxious to affirm the *complete* humanity of Christ. This might very well indicate that he perceived a deficiency in the Christology of the *Synodical Letter*, namely that in the composite Christ the Logos was considered a *substitute* of the rational soul as the life-giving principle.

H. de Riedmatten confidently affirmed that “the inner man” stands for the human soul that was missing in the Council Fathers’ portrait of Christ³⁴⁴, while F. Loofs and G. Bardy rejected this identification³⁴⁵. A reason for being hesitant is given by the fact that both in fragment S, 36 from the synodical disputation and in fragment S, 30 from the Bishops’ letter periphrastic expressions are used (τινος ὄντος ἐν τῇ σαρκί and ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος). Again, it might be helpful to ask whether Origen would have interpreted the “inner man” as the human soul. At first sight, this is by no means obvious, for in Origen’s exegesis the “inner man” of Rom. 7:22 is the spiritual man who is converted to the Lord Jesus Christ, finds in himself the law of God and rejoices in it³⁴⁶. The “outer man” (2 Cor. 4:16), on the other hand, represents the sinner³⁴⁷. Origen comments on Luke 12:35-7 that, since our life is a night, we are in need of a lamp which is the νοῦς, the eye of the soul; and if the

³⁴³ Leontius of Byzantium, *Deprehensio et Triumphus super Nestorianos* 41: PG 86,1380C.

³⁴⁴ De Riedmatten (1952), 52-3, cites, as a parallel to this fragment, Ps.-Athanasius, *De Incarnatione contra Apollinarem* I,15: PG 26,1121A. ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔσωθεν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπου νοῦς ἐπουράνιος ἐν Χριστῷ. Similarly Scheidweiler (1955), 121-2, and Wiles (1965), 144.

³⁴⁵ See Loofs (1924), 262, and Bardy (1929), 485-7.

³⁴⁶ *Comm. in Rom.* VI,9,124-7: 513 Hammond Bammel.

³⁴⁷ *Hom. in Lucam* XVI,9: SC 87,246-8; cf. the editors’ note in *Hom. in Lucam*: SC 87,248₁.

“inner man” is to be vigilant, we must indeed be vigilant in all circumstances of this life³⁴⁸. The spiritual combat is the confrontation between the “inner man” and the “outer man”, the spiritual man and the sinner in us. It seems, then, that there is a point of convergence here with Origen’s doctrine of the soul, for ψυχή is precisely that realm of the spiritual combat between πνεῦμα and σῶμα/σάρξ which fight for it. While the higher part of the soul, νοῦς, λόγος or ἡγεμονικόν, tends to the spirit, the lower part, for which Origen has various names, tends to the flesh³⁴⁹. Moreover, in the *Commentary on Romans*, Origen defines the *interior homo* as “*voluntas et propositum, quo initium accipit converti ad Dominum*”³⁵⁰. This is precisely what he says of the soul, when he speaks of the soul of Christ in the *De Principiis*. For the soul is the seat of purpose (*propositum*), affection (*affectus*), love (*dilectio*), and the will (*arbitrium*)³⁵¹. I would therefore suggest that St Paul’s “inner man” in Origen’s exegesis can be equated with the soul, insofar as the higher part of the soul effects the whole soul’s conversion to Christ³⁵². H. Crouzel once found Origen’s dichotomous anthropology (ψυχή – σῶμα) Platonist and his trichotomous anthropology (πνεῦμα – ψυχή – σῶμα) Scriptural³⁵³. Such a neat contrast is not tenable. Exegetes both ancient and modern have argued that Scriptural anthropology is predominantly dichotomous. Trichotomous schemata, on the other hand, are also found in various schools of Greek philosophy (as early as Xenocrates in the fourth century BC). The trichotomy of spirit, soul, and body in 1 Thess. 5:23 does certainly not correspond to the tripartition of the soul in Plato’s *Republic*; it is, however, not typically Pauline either³⁵⁴. Owing to the dynamic character of Origen’s anthropology the two “schemata” are congruent³⁵⁵, which allows us to identify the “inner man” of the spiritual combat with the soul that has turned to God³⁵⁶.

³⁴⁸ *Hom. in Lucam fr.* 80 [= Rauer 195]: SC 87.536.

³⁴⁹ See Crouzel (1956), 130-3.

³⁵⁰ *Comm. in Rom.* VI,9,124-7: 513 Hammond Bammel.

³⁵¹ *De Princ.* II,6,5,170-3: SC 252,318-20; cf. also IV,4,4: SC 268,408-12.

³⁵² Cf. also C. *Celsus* VI,63: GCS 3,134.3-12.

³⁵³ Crouzel (1956), 130; for the trichotomy of 1 Thess. 5:23, cf. *Dial. Heracl.* 6.20-6: SC 67,68-70.

³⁵⁴ Cf. Dobschütz (1909), 230-2; Festugière (1930); Schweizer (1953); Jewett (1971), 175-83. De Lubac (1950), 152-8, to whom Crouzel refers, also gives a much more differentiated picture.

³⁵⁵ As rightly emphasised by Crouzel (1976), 515-21: cf. also the editors’ note 30 on *De Princ.* II,8,4: SC 253,209-10.

³⁵⁶ Arguably, this might be a valid exegesis of St Paul. The parallels between Rom. 7-8 and dualistic motives in the anthropology of Philo of Alexandria have been shown by

This makes it plausible to say that the Antiochene Fathers of 268/9, when they speak of the “inner man in us”, mean the human soul, though I would grant that such an inference cannot readily be made without points of reference in the acts of the Synod. In the texts transmitted to us Malchion seems to employ the terms ἄνθρωπος, σάρξ and σῶμα interchangeably. Malchion’s use of ἄνθρωπος might imply that he takes account of Christ’s human soul, whereas his treatment of the human composite as a model for the composition of divinity and humanity in Christ suggests that the Logos is considered a substitute of the soul as life-giving principle. As is well known, Christology after Origen in the second half of the third century eclipsed the reality of Christ’s human soul. A telling case is the fact that at the turn of the fourth century those who supported the presence of a human soul in Christ found themselves under the accusation of dividing the divine-human unity and reducing Christ to a mere man. Origen had to be defended against this very charge in the *Apology* composed by Pamphilus and Eusebius, a defence which is not free from embarrassment³⁵⁷. It could be argued that the problem with Origen’s thought is his belief in the pre-existence of souls, on which so many of his speculations are based. For those who could not follow Origen here, it might have been sufficient to reject the pre-existence of souls – all the more so if this was nothing more than a privileged hypothesis for him³⁵⁸.

It seems that in Origen’s speculative Christology already the reality of Christ’s human soul is in fact eclipsed, as a consequence of his doctrine that the pre-existent soul of Jesus is united with the Logos so intimately that it receives him completely in itself and thus both become “one spirit” (ἐν πνεύμα, 1 Cor. 6:17). The Incarnation (as treated in *De Principiis* II,6) could – though need not – be perceived as the descent of this single spirit, who takes upon himself flesh. This point was emphasised by R. Lorenz, who saw in Origen’s doctrine of the soul of Christ and its union with the Logos a starting-point for Arius’ view of the

Brandenburger (1968), 48 and 172-3. St Paul’s ἕσω ἄνθρωπος corresponds to Philo’s νοῦς. See also Jervell (1960), 58-60.

³⁵⁷ Pamphilus, *Apologia pro Origene*: PG 17,590AB. Dionysius of Alexandria affirms that Christ possessed a human soul, but does not attribute to this soul an active part in the salvific acts of the life of Jesus, *Fragmenta in Lucam*: 242-3 and 233-4 Feltoe. Cf. Grillmeier (1990a), 295-8.

³⁵⁸ As we are told by Crouzel (1985), 268-72 and Harl (1987), 240-1. Wiles (1965), 143, points out that they did not need to deny that Jesus had a human soul at all. This proposal is criticised by Williams (1985), who insists on the intrinsic bond between these two elements of Origen’s theology.

Logos. Origen would thus provide the nucleus for the notion of Christ's $\sigma\acute{o}\mu\alpha \ \acute{\alpha}\psi\upsilon\chi\omicron\nu$, which is a characteristic feature of both Arian and Apollinarian Christology in the fourth century³⁵⁹. There are no doubt difficulties with this attempt to trace the descendancy of this doctrine from Arius to Origen. None the less, I should like to endorse the judgment of G. C. Stead, who finds Lorenz' thesis "impressive and largely convincing", with "some reservations that need to be made": it had already been pointed out by Lorenz that "Origen expressed a number of sharply divergent views; Arius adapted some and rejected others to form his own synthesis"³⁶⁰.

To conclude, the Christology of the Council Fathers, presented by the presbyter Malchion, favoured the union between the Logos and the flesh, according to the model of the union of soul and body in human beings. This was categorically rejected by Paul of Samosata as inadequate. Similarly, Paul was not willing to accept Malchion's idea of a "substantial union" in Christ, which in his view would jeopardise the divinity of the Logos by mingling it with a corruptible body. Paul rather advocated the idea of a participation of the man in the divine Logos and Wisdom. One can see in this dispute the foreshadowing of the later antagonism between "Alexandrian" and "Antiochene" Christologies. The Council Fathers considered Paul's notion of the relationship between the divinity and the humanity in Christ flawed and aimed at a strong statement on their unity in the Incarnate Logos. The apparent absence of the human soul of Jesus in Malchion's Christology certainly gives some credit to the reservations expressed by Paul of Samosata with regard to the use of the anthropological paradigm. However, it might not be justified to conclude from this lack of an explicit reference to an actual denial of Christ's human soul³⁶¹. Perhaps its status was not perceived to be an issue that needed to be addressed at the Antiochene Synod. As is well known, it would take the radical deficiencies of Arian and Apollinarian

³⁵⁹ Lorenz (1980), 211-24, and (1983); cf. already Lieske (1938), 122₂₆.

³⁶⁰ Stead (1994a), 31 and 33. If my interpretation of the Christological controversy at the Antiochene Synod is correct, Paul of Samosata cannot be regarded as a stage in the development from Origen to Arius, as Lorenz proposed. On the contrary, as Stead already observed, "at a crucial point Arius seems to have agreed with Paul's accusers, rather than with Paul himself", *ibid.*, 34.

³⁶¹ Cf. Bardy (1929), 487. His estimation, however, is criticised by de Riedmatten (1952), 9 and 52-5, who argues for a rather "Apollinarianising" interpretation of fragment S, 30. The Pauline use of the term $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\omega \ \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ allows for a certain vagueness. For modern attempts to solve this aporia, cf. the able discussion of Jewett (1971), 391-401.

Christologies for the Church to become fully aware of this problem in the course of the fourth century and to develop a sufficient theological answer to it.

6.1.2 Arian and Apollinarian Christologies

The model of composition, along with its characteristic terminology, is prominent in the fourth century in an Homoean theological milieu. Obviously, Arian Christology took an interest in conceiving of the union of the Logos and the flesh as closely as possible, so as to make the Logos the subject of human sufferings and denigrate his divinity. For this reason, we are told by Eustathius of Antioch, the Arians insisted that Christ assumed a soulless body (σῶμα ἄψυχον)³⁶². This is confirmed by Gregory of Nazianzus, who reports in his *First Letter to Cledonius* that they attempted to justify their theopaschism by denying a rational soul to the humanity of Jesus and making the Logos the principle of motion in the place of the soul, thus subjecting him to suffering³⁶³. The same account is given by Theodore of Mopsuestia and by Cyril of Alexandria³⁶⁴. Gregory of Nyssa tells us that according to Eunomius not a complete human being was assumed by the Logos, but only the body without a rational soul³⁶⁵. Theodoret of Cyrus associates Apollinarius' doctrine of "one incarnate nature of the Logos" with Eunomius, Asterius and Aetius³⁶⁶. Doctrinal convergences of Apollinarian and Arian Christology are also perceived in Nestorius' *Liber Heraclidis*³⁶⁷. What is remarkable in the witnesses that have come down to us of this "Arian monophysitism" is the highly technical terminology they employ. Thus we read in a credal statement which is attributed to the Homoean Eudoxius (Patriarch of Constantinople 360–369) on the Incarnation of Christ:

³⁶² Eustathius of Antioch, *fr. 15 (De Anima adv. Arian.)*: 100.2-6 Spanneut.

³⁶³ Gregory of Nazianzus, *Ep. 101* 34: SC 208,50.

³⁶⁴ Theodore of Mopsuestia, *Hom. Cat. V*,9: 110-2 Tonneau-Devreesse. Cyril, *Ep. ad Acac. Melit.* 19: 56.2-5 Wickham; Cyril's critique of Arian Christology, which facilitated the development of his own thought, is discussed by Siddals (1987), 350-8.

³⁶⁵ Gregory of Nyssa, *Refutatio Confessionis Eunomii* 172: 384-5 Jaeger. Nemesius of Emesa reports that the Eunomians held that λόγος and σῶμα are not united κατ' οὐσίαν, but κατὰ τὰς ἐκατέρου δυνάμεις, *De Nat. Hom.* 3: 43.17ff. Morani. This is indeed "a possible Plotinian or Porphyrian attitude", as Rist (1988), 411, suggests.

³⁶⁶ Theodoret, *Apologia pro Diodoro et Theodoro*, transmitted in the Syriac acts of the Synod of Ephesus in 449, in the edition of Flemming (1917), 108; see also *Eranistes*, Dial. II: 117-8 Ettlinger.

³⁶⁷ Nestorius, *Liber Heraclidis*: 431 Bedjan [ET: Driver-Hodgson (1925), 313-4]; cf. also 12-3, 50-2 [8-9, 34-5].

not two natures, since he was not a complete man, but God was in the flesh instead of the soul, the whole being one nature according to a composition (κατὰ σύνθεσιν)³⁶⁸.

Eudoxius does not explicitly draw upon the model of the composition of soul and body in man, in contrast to his fellow Homoean Lucius (Patriarch of Alexandria 373–378). Lucius specifically argues from John 1:14 that the Logos has been compounded with the flesh (συνετέθη σαρκί), but not with a human soul. Logos and flesh have become one and are recognised as ἓν πρόσωπον and μία φύσις σύνθετος, just as man is out of soul and body. Since both the Logos and the human soul are αὐτοκίνητα, if Christ had a rational soul, there would be a conflict of operations and no unity of ἐνέργεια³⁶⁹. Notably, this is the first occurrence we know of the formula μία φύσις σύνθετος, which was later given such a central place in Philoponus' Christology.

The fragments from Eudoxius and Lucius fit well into the general portrait of Arian Christology which is given to us by Nazianzen and Theodoret. Inevitably, however, their technical terminology has raised suspicions among scholars to the effect that these texts might be forgeries of Apollinarian provenance³⁷⁰. J. Liébaert has suggested two other possible explanations³⁷¹. Given that Apollinarius' Christology does not fit very well with his Trinitarian theology, he proposes that the heresiarch might have received certain elements in his doctrine of Christ from the Arians, including the notorious technical terminology. On the other hand, the fragment from Lucius is reasonably late so that he on his part might be influenced by Apollinarianism. If we take into account the first possibility, this would give less weight to the Apollinarian and more to the Arian contribution in working out miaphysite Christology. The formula μία φύσις σύνθετος, with σύνθεσις conceived after the model of the human composite, might have originated from Homoean circles. This would explain its remarkable unpopularity among theologians of miaphysite leanings³⁷². As will be seen below, it is not found in Cyril of Al-

³⁶⁸ Eudoxius, *De Incarnatione* (fr.): 65.7-8 Diekamp.

³⁶⁹ Lucius, *Sermo in Pascha* (fr.): 65.15-24 Diekamp. On this fragment see Gahbauer (1984), 56-96, where he gives an overview of the notion of *synthesis* and the anthropological model.

³⁷⁰ See Abramowski (1987), 192. She criticises Gahbauer (1984) for failing to discuss the relation between the fragments attributed to Eudoxius and Lucius and the Apollinarian writings.

³⁷¹ Liébaert (1965), 64-5.

³⁷² As noted by Lebon (1909), 319, and Grillmeier (1989), 134.

exandria, Severus of Antioch is extremely reluctant towards it, and it is only Philoponus who gives it such a prominence in Christology. It seems clear that μία φύσις σύνθετος was inexorably burdened with the rejection of the presence of a human soul in Christ and with monenergism, characteristics not only of Apollinarian, but also of Arian Christology.

Significantly, Athanasius does not refer at all to the anthropological paradigm for illuminating the Christological union. However, it is used exhaustively in the writings of Apollinarius of Laodicea and his disciples. He consistently interprets the unity of divinity and humanity in Christ as being constituted by a union and composition according to the model of the human composite (κατὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν καὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν τὴν ἀνθρωποειδῆ)³⁷³. Apollinarius rejects the idea that of the incarnate Christ there should be a proper nature of the body and a proper nature of the divinity. There is one nature of him, just as there is one nature of man, precisely because Christ has become in the likeness of men³⁷⁴. At the heart of this claim lies Apollinarius' conviction that the Logos is the sole active principle which has a life-giving function in the unity of the God-man. Christ is constituted by a life-giving and a life-receiving part, the mover and the moved. The term φύσις can only be applied to a self-moving living entity (ζῶον αὐτοκίνητον), the Logos. The flesh, on the other hand, is not self-moving and life-giving, but ἑτεροκίνητος, i.e. moved by the ἡγεμονικόν. Both the Logos and the flesh are parts in the composition that constitutes Christ as a single living being. It is important to note that in Apollinarius' thought the constitutive parts of the composite are not in themselves complete and self-contained, and for this reason cannot be described as "natures". Only that single living being which is made up by a moving and a moved part, and not by two complete and self-moving elements (ἐκ δύο τελείων καὶ αὐτοκινήτων), is such a complete entity in itself. This is the case with the human composite as well as with the composite Christ. The Logos and the flesh are incomplete parts of this single nature, in the same way as man is a whole (τὸ ὅλον) out of two incomplete parts, which constitute his single nature³⁷⁵. This is perhaps the most radical consequence Apollinarius

³⁷³ *Ad Dionysium* I 9: 259.23-260.2. The pagination follows the edition of Lietzmann (1904).

³⁷⁴ *Ad Dionysium* I 2: 257.15-9.

³⁷⁵ *Fides Secundum Partem* 18: 173.14-5. This point is brought out clearly by Norris (1963), 95-6 and 109. As noted above (chapter four, p. 84), the underlying idea may be Aristotle's principle that an οὐσία cannot actually be composed of a plurality of οὐσίαι, *Metaph.* Z.12: 1039^a3-4.

draws from his consistent application of the anthropological model to Christology. For Apollinarius, the idea that the one Christ should be composed of the Logos and a perfect humanity (including a rational soul) would jeopardise his unity. There can be only one life-giving principle in the flesh, which becomes the flesh of God, the Logos himself³⁷⁶. The denial of a human soul so becomes a necessary condition for procuring the unity of divinity and humanity in Christ.

A central element in Apollinarius' Christology is the unity of operation in the composite. The flesh is used by the Logos as an instrument (ὄργανον), and it is the single living being, the God-man Christ, who performs both what is divine and what is human. Since there is a single operation (μία ἡ ἐνέργεια), Apollinarius concludes, there is also one substance (μία καὶ ἡ οὐσία) of the Logos and his instrument³⁷⁷. But since only that which is simple (τὸ ἀπλοῦν) can be one, how can the composite (τὸ σύνθετον) be one? On account of the composition of this vital entity out of two incomplete parts a single nature is effected and a single name can be applied to it. Moreover, the whole may be designated by the part, so that the whole man may be called "soul" or "flesh", as well as Christ may be referred to by his divinity or his humanity alone³⁷⁸.

While advocating a vital unity in Christ, Apollinarius at the same time makes the point that this unity does not imply a confusion of the two elements united. Just as in man soul and body remain in the unity, so in Christ the divinity and the body persist unconfounded³⁷⁹. While the invisible divinity is composed with the visible body and can even be contemplated through this body, none the less it remains invisible and indeed non-composite (ἄσύνθετον); it is not circumscribed by the body. Likewise, the body, to which the divine life of the Logos is communicated, does not itself become life-giving³⁸⁰.

Thus Apollinarius emerges as the champion of a σύνθεσις ἀνθρωποειδής in Christ. The concept of composition is crucial both to his anthropology and to his Christology. The force of the Laodicean's speculative mind enables him to exhaust the implications of this model with

³⁷⁶ *Demonstratio*, fr. 107: 232.10-21, cf. also fr. 108: 232.29-32 and Apollinarius' disciple Julian, *Ep. ad Polum*, fr. 180: 277.9-16.

³⁷⁷ *C. Diodorum*, fr. 117: 235.24-236.2.

³⁷⁸ *De Umone* 5: 187.5-14; cf. *Ad Diodorum*, fr. 123: 237.19-23.

³⁷⁹ *Ad Diodorum*, fr. 129: 239.2-4, cf. fr. 134: 239.26-240.3.

³⁸⁰ *Ad Diodorum*, fr. 133: 239.21-5.

unprecedented rigour. Consequently, its deficiencies become perspicuous, most importantly the denial of Christ's rational soul. Among Apollinarius' disciples, Julian relates that his master was the first one to speak of the one composite substance and nature (μία οὐσία καὶ φύσις σύνθετος) of Christ. This single nature is constituted of a moving and a moved part, an active and a passive element, and is moved by a single will only which effects a single operation³⁸¹. Eunomius of Beroea emphasises that from the state of being simple, the Logos has become composite, while not abandoning his own nature³⁸².

6.2 *Cyril of Alexandria and the Post-Chalcedonian Controversy*

6.2.1 The Antiochene Tradition and Cyril

There is a place, though a very restricted one, for the anthropological paradigm in the Antiochene tradition with its strong emphasis on the distinctness of the two natures in Christ. Theodore of Mopsuestia certainly considers the doctrine axiomatic that man is composed of two natures, i.e. soul and body. He may also use the relation of soul and body (just as that of man and wife of Mt. 19:6³⁸³) as an illustration of how the unity of prosopon and at the same time the duality of natures are preserved, yet only "in a subsidiary way", as Norris observes³⁸⁴. In a passage directed against Apollinarius, Theodoret of Cyrus claims that the distinction between νοῦς and ψυχή, on which Apollinarius' rejection of a human mind in Christ is based (for in Christ the place of the νοῦς is filled by the divinity), is an import from pagan philosophy. Instead, Holy Scripture asserts that man is composed of ψυχή and σῶμα (Gen. 2:7 and Mt. 20:28)³⁸⁵. The union of soul and body can be compared with the union of divinity and humanity of Christ, with the crucial difference, however, that the former is a

³⁸¹ Julian, *Ep ad Polum*, fr. 180: 277.9-16; cf. Jobius, *Symbolum*: 286 22: ὑπόστασιν μίαν σύνθετον καὶ πρόσωπον ἓν ἀδιαίρετον.

³⁸² Eunomius of Beroea, *Ep ad Zosimum*, fr. 178: 276.23-30.

³⁸³ In the notorious passage from *De Incarnatione* VIII,63; see above chapter five, pp. 94ff.

³⁸⁴ Norris (1963), 233; cf. Sullivan (1956), 280-3. See Theodore, *C Apollinarem*: II,318.20-319.20 Swete; *In Joh.* 8.16: CSCO 115 [116], 167-8 [119-20]. Abramowski (1968), 360_{11a}, pointed out that Vosté's Latin translation has *unio*, where the Syriac presupposes συνάφεια (soul-body conjunction).

³⁸⁵ Theodoret of Cyrus, *Ep. 146*: SC 111,182.2-13; also *Eranistes*, Dial. II: 112-4 Ettlinger.

natural union of parts that are coæval, created, and fellow slaves, but in the case of the Lord Christ all is of good will (εὐδοκίας), of love to man (φιλανθρωπίας), and of grace (χάριτος)³⁸⁶.

Nestorius' attitude towards the anthropological paradigm seems to have undergone a development in the course of his controversy with Cyril of Alexandria. In one of his earlier sermons he draws an analogy between the union of the immortal soul and the corruptible body and the union of the two natures of Christ. His point is that as one human being results from the union, so in the case of Christ one *prosopon*³⁸⁷. Later, however, Nestorius adopts a very critical attitude towards such reasoning. Apparently, this happened under the impact of his controversy with Cyril³⁸⁸. In the late *Liber Heraclidis* Nestorius straightforwardly rejects the anthropological paradigm. He considers it inevitably tainted with Arian and Apollinarian Christology, with the attendant denial of a union of two complete natures in Christ. The crucial difference for Nestorius can be formulated as follows: man is a single living being, a natural composite out of soul and body,

because the body lives not in its own life but in the union with the soul; and for this reason, if they are divided, the life is not divided but there is [left] only [that] of the soul, since both of them are named after its nature one living being³⁸⁹.

The soul communicates life to the body which is not capable of living of its own, and so the two natures complement each other and form one living entity³⁹⁰. While the soul predominates in this natural composition, it is also in need of the body, namely for sense-perception. With respect to the nature of man which soul and body form, then, they are incom-

³⁸⁶ *Eranistes*, Dial. II: 137-8 Ettlinger; ET: Jackson (1892), 194. For Theodoret's critical appreciation of the anthropological model see also his *Expositio Rectae Fidei* 11: PG 6,1226-7. This work was long attributed to Justin Martyr.

³⁸⁷ Nestorius, *Sermo XXI*: 330.18-331.8 Loofs.

³⁸⁸ If the fragments 358.9-18 Loofs can be attributed to Nestorius' *Sermo VIII*, as the editor suggests, it is likely that Cyril's *Ep. ad Mon. Aegypti* 12: ACO I.1.1,15.12-34, written at an early stage of the Nestorian controversy, is a response to this sermon. Cyril adopts the analogy initially drawn by his opponent, but gives it a different twist so that it serves his own argument; cf. Liébaert (1970), 39-41.

³⁸⁹ Nestorius, *Liber Heraclidis*: 415 Bedjan [ET: Driver-Hodgson (1925), 301-2]. My interpretation of Nestorius is based on those parts of the *Liber Heraclidis* whose authenticity has not been questioned by the analysis of L. Abramowski; for the *status quaestionis* in this matter, cf. Grillmeier (1990a), 708-10.

³⁹⁰ Arnou (1936) argued for an affinity of Antiochene Christology to the anthropology of Nemesius and of the Neo-Platonists; his analysis of Nestorius, however, is questioned by Scipioni (1956).

plete natures. The divinity and humanity of Christ, however, are two complete natures:

For every complete nature has not need of another nature that it may be and live, in that it has in it and has received its definition of being. For in a composition of natures it seems that neither of those natures whereof it is [formed] is complete but they need one another that they may be and subsist. ... How then dost thou predicate one nature of two whole natures, when the humanity is complete, needing not the union of the divinity to become man?³⁹¹

The point is that divinity and humanity do not form a natural composite, that is, they do not result in one nature, but in one prosopon:

For every union which results by a composition of natures in the completion of the nature results from incomplete natures, but that which [results] from complete natures results in one prosopon and subsists therein³⁹².

... there is one prosopon in two prosopa; that cannot be conceived [as] one without the union, but man [is] man and God God. Both of them [are] one Son, one Lord. For when they are distinguished it is not theirs that the latter should be called that which the former is³⁹³.

Nestorius argues that the soul-body union is a composition of natures so as to form a single nature, which implies that the components are incomplete in themselves. The union of divinity and humanity in Christ, on the other hand, is not a natural composition, the two complete natures rather form a single prosopon.

In sum, Nestorius, who knows of Cyril's use of the anthropological paradigm, denies that it can be employed for explicating the union of the two natures in Christ³⁹⁴. It has been suggested that the soul-body analogy is of greater service to Nestorius than to Cyril, since in man the whole composite is the subject, not just the soul, which would correspond to the idea that the subject of all actions is Christ, the prosopon that results from the union of divinity and humanity³⁹⁵. However, the soul's predominance over the body, a commonplace in contemporary anthropology also shared by Nestorius, made the analogy much more conducive to Cyril's Logos-centred Christology. It would thus seem that, under the impact of the controversy with his Alexandrian confrère, the Patriarch of

³⁹¹ *Liber Heraclidis*: 418 [304], ET slightly modified.

³⁹² *Ibid.*: 431-2 [313-4], ET slightly modified.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*: 415 [302], cf. also 425-6 [308-9].

³⁹⁴ See *ibid.*: 236 [161]; cf. also Scipioni (1956), 29.

³⁹⁵ Meunier (1997), 242, following Diepen (1957), 79-82.

Constantinople came to think that the anthropological paradigm could only provide support for his opponent's position.

In Cyril's Christology, the unity of divinity and humanity in Christ is illustrated in a paradigmatic manner by the unity of the human composite. While he developed this paradigm in the course of his controversy with Nestorius, as indicated above, the first vestiges of its use can be found earlier³⁹⁶. Two points are especially worth noticing. First, Cyril employs the soul-body union primarily as an analogy to help affirm the unity of subject in Christ; in a supplementary way, he sees in it a model of how the Incarnational union can be conceived of. Secondly, the appropriation of a human body by the Logos is a paramount motive in Cyril's thought, which is intertwined with his use of the anthropological paradigm.

This insistence on the oneness of Christ, however, is not at the expense of the Saviour's humanity. Although Cyril was indebted to Apollinarian Christology, he overcame its inherent deficiencies by his uncompromising affirmation of the presence of a rational soul in Christ. Cyril's major problem with affirming a "human nature" (and thus "two natures") of Christ is grounded in the idea that every nature entails a hypostasis in which it exists. Consequently he suspected the introduction of another subject in Christ, apart from the Logos. To him, this smacked of a Christological dualism, which endangered the very reason for the Incarnation, namely the salvation of humanity. Salvation is communicated by the life-giving power of the flesh which the Logos has made his own. If our nature, in order to be redeemed from sin, is to be filled with the divine life, the divine Logos must make it his own, in such a way that in him a real unification (εἰς ἓν τι) of Godhead and manhood is effected³⁹⁷.

Cyril was uncompromising in matters of terminology if he saw this supreme soteriological principle endangered, which is obvious from the course of the Nestorian controversy; however, it is equally conspicuous that as soon as he thought his point was secured, he would allow for flexibility in expressing it. This made his usage of key Christological

³⁹⁶ See, e.g., Cyril. *In Ioh.* 15.1: II,543.22-7 Pusey.

³⁹⁷ However, this "physical" conception of redemption should not be overstated. It is balanced (at least to some extent) by Cyril's emphasis that the Incarnation points forward to Christ's obedient suffering and death on the cross. Cyril champions the theme of that *admirabile commercium* by which Christ made himself poor in order to make us rich; cf. Schönborn (1984), 88-99. Cyril's outstanding exegesis of 2 Cor. 8:9 is studied in depth by Angstenberger (1997), 155-89.

terms somewhat ambiguous³⁹⁸. Cyril's wavering terminology, while holding fast to the point he wanted to make, is illustrated by his own explication of the central formula *ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν*, which he coined as one of his watchwords in the controversy with Nestorius. In his answer to Theodoret of Cyrus he is happy to say that this just means that the nature, *that is to say*, the hypostasis (*φύσις ἡγουν ὑπόστασις*) of the Logos, that is, *the Logos himself*, was *truly* (*καθ' ἀλήθειαν*) united with the human nature without change or mixture. The point he insists on is that Christ is one, the same subject (*ὁ αὐτός*) being God and man³⁹⁹. In his controversy with Nestorius, Cyril reiterates that there is only one Lord Christ, composed out of two different realities into a single reality, just as in the case of man, who is recognised as a single reality, composed of soul and body⁴⁰⁰.

On the other hand, Cyril is anxious to emphasise that the union in Christ has been effected without confusion and without alteration, thus anticipating the first two adverbs of the Christological definition of Chalcedon. The ineffable and mysterious union of divinity and humanity has not done away with the difference (*διαφορά*) between the two natures. The flesh remains flesh and is not changed into the divinity, though it becomes the flesh of God, while the Logos remains God and is not changed into flesh, though he makes the flesh his own for the dispensation of salvation⁴⁰¹. This central idea in Cyril's Christology has been aptly called "appropriation", following Cyril's use of the Athanasian term *ἰδιοποιεῖσθαι*. He thereby indicates that the flesh has become the proper flesh of the Logos, whereby *σάρξ* denotes the full human reality of Christ⁴⁰². Cyril rejects a division of Christ into the two natures out of which the union has been effected. Instead, he affirms the notorious formula *μία φύσις τοῦ [θεοῦ] λόγου σεσαρκωμένη*, which he ac-

³⁹⁸ Cf. the assessments of Norris (1975), Simonetti (1982), and McGuckin (1994).

³⁹⁹ *Apol. XII Anathem. c. Theodoretum* 1: ACO I.1.6, 115, italics mine. Similarly, he writes to the Orientals that by *ἕνωσις φυσική* he means nothing else than *ἕνωσις ἀληθής*, for which he adduces the testimony of Eph. 2:3, *Apol. XII Capit. c. Orientales* 31: ACO I.1.7, 40.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ep. 2 ad Nest.* 8: 22.27-31 Wickham.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.* 3: 6.4-9 Wickham; *Ep. 1 ad Succensum* 6: 74.28-32 Wickham.

⁴⁰² See Meunier (1997), 264-75, and McGuckin (1994), *passim*. Siddals (1987), 355-7, reads Cyril's use of *ἴδιον* against the background of Aristotelian-Porphyrian logic. While it seems likely that Cyril was trained in the elements of contemporary logic, references to its technical terminology are at best implicit, as Siddals herself acknowledges. I would rather argue that the *Organon* and the *Isagoge* were common enough in Alexandrian theological discourse for Cyril to use their language without giving it a strictly technical meaning.

cepts as genuinely Athanasian⁴⁰³. To speak of two natures *after* the union, he states, can only be approved if it is interpreted as a conceptual distinction. In order to explain the μία-φύσις formula and the duality of natures ἐν θεωρίᾳ, Cyril adduces the anthropological paradigm⁴⁰⁴. This paradigm primarily serves as an analogy for the unity of subject, but may also be employed to affirm a union κατὰ φύσιν in Christ, in the manner of the union between soul and body⁴⁰⁵.

Notwithstanding this strongly unitive Christology, however, Cyril is aware of the danger that in this way the distinctness of the two elements united might be jeopardised. Thus he can use the same anthropological paradigm to exclude any mingling or confusion of the natures. In his *Second Letter to Succensus*, Cyril puts an emphasis on the difference in kind (ἐτεροειδῆ) between the elements united. Soul and body are not consubstantial with each other; none the less they are united so as to effect the one nature of man, even though this essential difference (κατὰ φύσιν) between them remains in the composite condition when they have been ordered into unity⁴⁰⁶. Accordingly, Cyril asserts in his dialogue *On the Incarnation*⁴⁰⁷ that the “mediator between God and men” (1 Tim. 2:5) has been compounded (συγκεῖσθαι) of the Son of God and a humanity just as ours (καθ’ ἡμᾶς), which is complete in the intelligible content of its being (κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον)⁴⁰⁸. In other words, the Logos, God by nature, has become flesh, that is, man⁴⁰⁹. This is an obvious case where Cyril on the one hand strongly insists on the oneness of Christ, but on the other hand upholds not only the complete reality of Christ’s humanity, but also its fundamental otherness towards the Logos. Keeping the tension between these two poles, Cyril states that a union of unequal and disparate natures has taken place and emphasises

⁴⁰³ See *Apol. XII Capit. c. Orientales* 64-5: ACO I.1.7,48; *Oratio ad Arcadium et Marinam Augustas de Fide* 9-10: ACO I.1.5,65-6.

⁴⁰⁴ *Ep. 1 ad Succensum* 6-7: 74.33-76.14.

⁴⁰⁵ E.g., *Ep. 3 ad Nest.* 4: 18 Wickham; cf. Meunier (1997), 256-64.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ep. 2 ad Succ.* 3: 88.12-8 Wickham. Norris (1975), 262-5, has shown that Cyril’s language of σύνθεσις, συνδρομή, σύμβασις and ἔνωσις serves different ends. De Halleux (1993) has made a case for Cyril’s “diphysitism”.

⁴⁰⁷ *De Incarnatione Unigeniti* 688c26-8: SC 97,220.

⁴⁰⁸ I take it that λόγος is used here in the sense of Aristotle’s “*logos* that says what it is to be so-and-so”, as in the locutions λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι and λόγος τῆς οὐσίας. See also the technical language of *In Ioh.* 20,30-1: III,155.15-6 Pusey, where it is said of Christ: ὁλόκληρον ἔχοντος τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος τὸ ὅρον. On the question of Cyril’s philosophical proficiency see Siddals (1987) and Boulnois (1994).

⁴⁰⁹ *De Incarn. Unigen.* 688e41-2: SC 97,222.

the intrinsically mysterious character of this union, which transcends reason⁴¹⁰.

In the *Scholia on the Incarnation* Cyril draws on the human constitution out of disparate elements, soul and body, in order to explain the oneness of Christ who is constituted out of the hypostasis of God the Logos and a complete humanity (τελείως ἐχούσης κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον). Thus emphasising the distinctness between the two constituents, he conceives of their relation as that of appropriation: the flesh (standing for Christ's complete humanity) has become the Logos' own⁴¹¹. This careful balancing between the oneness of Christ and the completeness of his human nature is one of the striking features of Cyril's Christology outside the polemical context of the Nestorian controversy⁴¹².

Having said this, however, it has to be admitted that Cyril, perhaps predominantly, uses the anthropological paradigm for asserting the inseparability of divinity and humanity, especially in an anti-Nestorian context⁴¹³. Even in his mature dialogue *That Christ is One* he employs the anthropological paradigm to put a strong emphasis on the oneness of Christ, and indeed on his single nature (μία φύσις), just as there is a single nature of man, though he would, of course, reject any confusion or mixture between divinity and humanity in Christ⁴¹⁴. Notably, this same dialogue contains a critical note with regard to the inadequacy of any analogy to be adduced from the created order for the union in Christ. Cyril reflects upon the suffering of Christ in the flesh, but not in the nature of the divinity:

The force of any comparison falters here and falls short of the truth, although I can bring to mind a feeble image of this reality which might lead us from something tangible, as it were, to the very heights and to what is beyond all speech. It is like iron, or other such material, when it is put in contact with a raging fire. It receives the fire into itself, and when it is in the very heart of the fire, if someone should beat it, then the material itself takes the battering but the nature of the fire is in no way injured by the one

⁴¹⁰ Διῷσχυριζόμεθα δὲ σύνοδον μὲν τινα καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ λόγον συνδρομὴν εἰς ἔνωσιν ἀνίστων τε καὶ ἀνομοίων πεπράχθαι φύσεων, *ibid.* 688d30-2: 220. What follows in 688d44-690a6: 222-6, is a refutation of Apollinarian Christology.

⁴¹¹ *Scholia de Incarnatione* 8: ACO I.1.5,220-1.

⁴¹² Cf. *Glaphyra in Lev.*: PG 69,560C, and *Ep. ad Valerianum*: ACO I.1.3,92.9-26. These two passages are analysed by de Halleux (1993), 417 and 421-2.

⁴¹³ Cf. *Apol. XII Capp. c. Orientales* 72: ACO I.1.7,50, and *Expl. XII Capp.* 14: ACO I.1.5,19-20.

⁴¹⁴ *Quod Unus Sit Christus* 736a9-c39: SC 97,374-6.

who strikes. This is how you should understand the way in which the Son is said both to suffer in the flesh and not to suffer in the Godhead. Although, as I said, the force of any comparison is feeble, this brings us somewhere near the truth if we have not deliberately chosen to disbelieve the holy scriptures⁴¹⁵.

Perhaps the first thing to be noted here is Cyril's "diphysite" use of the analogy of glowing iron. Contrast this with Origen who adduces it for the union of the Logos with the soul of Christ and underlines that the fire absorbs the iron⁴¹⁶. Cyril's methodological reflections on the limitations inherent in any comparison for the union in Christ are not explicitly applied to the anthropological paradigm, but it seems legitimate to infer that he would subject it to similar criticism. It is significant that these reflections touch upon a critical point in his use of the soul-body relationship, where he speaks about the way human sufferings can be attributed to the Logos in terms of the soul's appropriation of the sufferings of the body⁴¹⁷. A twofold achievement is procured by Cyril's precautions: first, they provide an implicit correction of any treatment of the soul-body paradigm as a model; secondly, they provide a framework within which its limited explicative value – but value none the less – can be appreciated⁴¹⁸. C. Meunier has aptly said that the soul-body analogy should be considered an "argument of convenience" in the Christology of Cyril, since it is introduced *a posteriori* in order to illustrate the union of divinity and humanity, about which we are told by Scripture, and to make it more acceptable to reason⁴¹⁹.

6.2.2 After Chalcedon: Severus of Antioch and Leontius of Byzantium

The controversy over the Council of Chalcedon in the East was largely concerned with the interpretation of pre-Chalcedonian Christology. These often acrimonious debates centred around the writings of Cyril of Alexandria, which were considered a canonical Patristic author-

⁴¹⁵ Ibid. 776b9-c21: SC 97,506, ET: McGuckin (1995), 130-1.

⁴¹⁶ Origen, *De Principiis* II,6,6,177-201: SC 252,320.

⁴¹⁷ Most importantly in his *Scholia de Incarnatione* 8: ACO I.1.5,220-1; cf. Meunier (1997), 243-53.

⁴¹⁸ A similar caveat is found in Cyril's *Ep. ad Acac. Scythop.*: ACO I.1.4,47, where he applies his typological exegesis of the scape-goat in the O.T. to Christology.

⁴¹⁹ Cf. Meunier (1997), 238-41. Wickham (1982), 45-8, accentuates the limits of this analogy and the importance of the biblical symbols Cyril uses to elucidate the mystery, e.g., the burning coal of Is. 6:6, the sweet-smelling lily of Cant. 2:1, the ark of the covenant.

ity and claimed both by the Chalcedonians and by the miaphysites for their own cause. It is not surprising that Severus of Antioch, the outstanding theologian among the opponents of Chalcedon, would take up the language of σύνθεσις in his Christology and employ it both for the union in Christ and for the union in man. Christ is “wonderfully composed and consisting of two elements, the Godhead and the manhood”, without there being a mixture in the union⁴²⁰. Severus calls this union a “composition out of two elements”, whose end-product Christ, or, as he prefers to say, Emmanuel, is “in one hypostasis ineffably composite; not simple, but composite”. This is conceived in analogy with the human composite of soul and body⁴²¹.

In a letter written during his patriarchate (512–518), Severus speaks of Christ and of his hypostasis as composed, but not of his nature in the same way⁴²². He shows great reluctance towards the phrase “one composite nature”, which he explicitly rejects in his polemical work against John of Caesarea. Here Severus objects to John’s equation of “two united natures” and “one composite nature” that this implies a Nestorian division⁴²³. In his correspondence with Sergius the Grammarian, who uses the phrase “one composite nature” in his *Apology*, Severus bluntly dismisses the idea of an οὐσία σύνθετος⁴²⁴. In general, although the formula μία φύσις σύνθετος has been regarded as the standard of Severan miaphysitism, it is rare among miaphysite theologians. J. Lebon saw in Severus the only witness to this formula. In fact, we find only a few instances where it is used by miaphysites for articulating their own doctrine⁴²⁵. On the other hand, the attacks on it by Chalcedonians can be considered a testimony to its diffusion⁴²⁶. That theologians like Severus were extremely reticent towards the formula μία φύσις σύνθετος was no doubt because of its heretical flavour. Justinian showed in his *Contra*

⁴²⁰ Severus of Antioch, *Ep.* XXV: PO 12,228. For the ancient mixture-theories at the background of this discussion, see Torrance (1988), 59–79.

⁴²¹ *Ep.* XXV: PO 12,230; cf. *Ep.* XV: PO 12,210.

⁴²² See *Ep.* XXXIV: PO 12,273.

⁴²³ *C. Imp. Gr.* II,10: CSCO 111 [112], 104 [81–2].

⁴²⁴ Severus, *Ep. 3 ad Sergium*: CSCO 119 [120], 150 [114–5]; cf. Sergius, *Apologia*: CSCO 119 [120], 182 [140].

⁴²⁵ Lebon (1909), 319, points to a fragment from Severus’ *Ep. 3 ad Ioh. Ducem*, which is extant in the *Doctrina Patrum*: 309.17–310.12 Diekamp. Another witness is a text of unknown authorship edited by Nau: PO 13,191.

⁴²⁶ See, e.g., Leontius of Byzantium, *Triginta Capita* 13: 100.19–23 = PG 86,1904D–1905A; Leontius of Jerusalem, *C. Monoph.* 5: PG 86,1772B, 36: 1792B; Justinian, *Contra Monophysitas* 57–69: 16.13–18.8 Schwartz. Sophronius of Jerusalem, *Ep. Syn.*: ACO ser. II, II.1,480–2; Maximus Confessor, *Ep.* 12: PG 91,489BC, *Ep.* 13: 516–517C, 525D–529A.

Monophysitas that this doctrine had originated from the school of Apollinarius and was spread mainly through forgeries under the name of Julius of Rome and Athanasius. However, neither Athanasius nor Cyril of Alexandria advocated a single composite nature of Christ⁴²⁷.

Lebon has shown that Severus uses the formula μία ὑπόστασις σύνθετος as an equivalent of the Cyrilline μία φύσις τοῦ [θεοῦ] λόγου σεσαρκωμένη, thereby denoting the hypostatic union of the Logos and the flesh⁴²⁸. The meaning of σύνθεσις is never formally defined by Severus; it is clear, however, that it is understood according to the model of the human composite⁴²⁹. As is the case with the composition of body and soul by which a human being is constituted, both divinity and humanity of Christ are preserved in their full reality. While they are united without change and confusion, they do not subsist each in its proper hypostasis (ἰδιοσυστάτως), but rather in the composition (ἐν τῇ συνθέσει). In other words, the composition which results in one hypostasis leaves the two united elements intact.

Ephraem of Amida, Chalcedonian Patriarch of Antioch (526–545), contests the claims of those who see an antagonism between Cyril and Chalcedon. With reference to Cyril's use of the anthropological paradigm in the *Second Letter to Succensus*, he argues that the anti-Chalcedonians do not grasp the dissimilarity in this analogy⁴³⁰. Severus indeed radicalises the thought of Cyril. In the *Philalethes*, he attacks the author of the *Florilegium Cyrillianum* for his Chalcedonian reading of key passages in Cyril. Severus is embarrassed by diphysite language in the writings of the Alexandrian patriarch. Where Cyril speaks of "a single Son, Christ and Lord", Severus insists on "a single nature and hypostasis"; where Cyril is aware of the shortcomings of the anthropological paradigm, Severus seems oblivious of its character as analogy⁴³¹.

⁴²⁷ Justinian, *Contra Monophysitas* 57–86: 16.13–21.22.

⁴²⁸ See Lebon (1909), 319–21, and (1951), 472–7.

⁴²⁹ Severus, *Ep. 2 ad Sergium*: CSCO 119 [120], 105 [78].

⁴³⁰ In the report of Photius, *Bibl. cod.* 229: IV, 127 Henry. Photius has also read other works by Ephraem of Amida (*Bibl. cod.* 228: IV, 114–26) and by Eulogius of Alexandria (*Bibl. cod.* 226: IV, 108–11). Both defend the Christology of Chalcedon and of the *Tomus Leonis* by showing their agreement with Cyril. The key elements of Severus' use of the anthropological paradigm are also found in the doctrinal statement (*Plerophoria*) produced by the Severan bishops for the *Collatio* with the Chalcedonians under the Emperor Justinian in Constantinople in 532. This text is available in the Syriac continuation of Zacharias Rhetor IX, 15: CSCO 84 [88], 119.13–121.8 [82.13–83.22]; for a discussion of this doctrinal statement and the *Collatio* itself, see Brock (1981) and Speigl (1984), as well as the summary in Grillmeier (1989), 244–62.

⁴³¹ Severus, *Philalethes* 42: CSCO 133 [134], 260–1 [213–4]; 99: 319–23 [261–3]; cf. Grillmeier (1989), 47–8.

Among the defenders of Chalcedonian Christology, Leontius of Byzantium, the younger contemporary of Philoponus, endorses the anthropological paradigm, yet is strictly opposed to the Severan model of a composition of two elements⁴³². For Leontius, the fundamental principle of Christology is the “manner of union” (τρόπος τῆς ἐνώσεως). This Christological ἀρχή is elucidated in an exemplary way by means of the twofold human constitution. The Logos in a complete humanity is what the “inner man” is in us. To substantiate his claim, Leontius invokes the authority of the Council Fathers who condemned Paul of Samosata. Note that Leontius discreetly affirms the completeness of Christ’s human nature and so excludes the idea that the Logos could be seen as the substitute of the rational soul in the God-man⁴³³.

In his treatise *Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos* Leontius argues that the Chalcedonian formula of two natures in one hypostasis has to be understood in the same way as the union of soul and body in man, that is, as a union of two things different in kind from another (ἄλλοιός), but not distinct (ἄλλος) as subjects. Thus he defends the applicability of this paradigm, while he is none the less aware of its deficiencies. Leontius admits that every analogy limps⁴³⁴. The point of drawing such an analogy is that the invisible and immortal is united with the visible and mortal – the Logos with the humanity and the soul with the body. The properties of each of them remain without change and without confusion. It might be objected that a human being is composed of incomplete parts, whereas Christ is composed of complete parts, which, for the reason of their completeness, cannot even be properly called “parts”. As we have seen above, a similar objection was put forward by Nestorius in his *Liber Heraclidis*. Leontius argues that completeness is always said either absolutely or in relation to something else⁴³⁵, i.e. when something is seen

⁴³² Another Chalcedonian theologian of the sixth century who employs the anthropological paradigm for Christology, while rejecting a Severan doctrine of μία φύσις σύνθετος, is John of Caesarea, e.g., *Apol. Conc. Chalced.* I,2; CCG 1, 53.134-54.160, and 55.177-81; cf. Uthemann (1982a). 230-6. Leontius of Jerusalem will not be treated separately here, since he adopts a profoundly critical stance towards the anthropological model and makes hardly any use of it – despite his Cyrilline Christology.

⁴³³ *Deprehensio* 42: PG 86.1380C. On the “manner of union” in Leontius, see Daley (1993), 253-60.

⁴³⁴ Οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ ἅν εἴη παράδειγμα, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ ἀπεικός ἔχοι, *C. Nest. et Eut.* 1: 1280D.

⁴³⁵ Ὡς ἐντεῦθεν διττὸν εἶναι τὸν τῆς τελειότητος ὅρον, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς λέγεσθαι, τὸν δὲ ἐν σχέσει θεωρεῖσθαι, κατὰ τὸν μέγαν Γρηγόριον, 1281C. This quotation could not be identified by Daley.

as a part in relation to the whole. Seen in itself, soul, being an incorporeal self-moving substance, and body, being defined by three-dimensional extension, are by no means incomplete. Seen as parts in relation to the whole, however, soul and body are indeed incomplete, but in this respect not even the Logos himself is complete (to say nothing about Christ's humanity), for

the Logos is not the complete Christ, even though he is completely God, if the humanity is not joined to him, nor is the soul a complete man, even though it has a complete substance, unless the body is also understood to be in conjunction with it⁴³⁶.

If one conceives of the union of divinity and humanity in analogy to that of soul and body, does it not follow from the fact that the soul is circumscribed in the body and admits of suffering that the Logos also becomes circumscribed and passible? Such an objection, Leontius responds, rests on a mistaken anthropology, for the human soul suffers not simply because it is in the body, but because it is naturally apt to suffer even if it is separated from the body⁴³⁷. Therefore the soul suffers from passions that are proper to itself (not only from bodily passions), since it is circumscribed by the very conditions of its existence (τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ὑπάρξεως⁴³⁸). The Logos, by contrast, is immutable, impassible and cannot be circumscribed. When he acted as the mediator of the creation of the world, he did not fall from his transcendence into immanence. If he cannot be circumscribed by the macrocosm, he cannot be circumscribed by the microcosm either. For this reason the Logos preserved his impassibility and immutability in the Incarnation⁴³⁹.

In his *Solutio Argumentorum Severi*, Leontius attacks the Severan doctrine of Christ's μία φύσις σύνθετος, on the grounds that it does not account for the significant distinction between the nature of the composite (ἡ φύσις τοῦ συνθέτου) and the nature of the composed elements (ἡ τῶν συντεθειμένων φύσις). Whatever degree of composition one admits, whether it is relational, substantial, by juxtaposition, by mixture etc., the nature of the elements united or composed have another definition, namely that of things (πράγματα), given that they are not confused in the union. If there is one composite nature of Christ, this may refer to the nature (1) of the composition itself, (2) of the elements

⁴³⁶ *C. Nest et Eut* 2: 1281D, ET: Daley (1978), xxx (slightly modified).

⁴³⁷ διὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι πάσχειν καὶ χωρὶς σώματος, *C. Nest et Eut* 3: 1284C.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*: 1285A.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*: 1284BC.

composed, or (3) of the end-product out of both. First, if the champions of the formula μία φύσις σύνθετος argue that the one nature of Christ is the composition itself, they only give an account of the union, not of the elements united. Second, if this formula means the totality of the elements composed in Christ, then there are two natures and not one, given that they are not confused and do not have one single nature and property, but that their difference is preserved in the union. Third, if it is the end-product (ἀποτέλεσμα) of the union that is indicated by the formula, they should rather speak of one hypostasis than of one nature⁴⁴⁰.

Responding to such criticism, the miaphysite interlocutor makes the point that all singular items (πάντα τὰ μοναδικά) have a single nature, as, for instance, the sun. Underlying this objection, Leontius maintains, there is a misconception on the meaning of "nature". If one defines, for instance, that the sun is a star that shines at day or a star that has its place in the middle of the planets, one gives an account of the hypostasis of the sun and not of its nature. For the nature of each hypostasis is said according to what is common to the members of this general class, for example, whether it is fiery or airy, rational or irrational, animate or inanimate. Such are properties constitutive of substance (οὐσιοποιοὶ ἰδιότητες) which are indicative of the nature of the subject. Henceforth it is obvious that the nature of the sun is the same as that of the stars. The notion that each singular item has a "singular nature" (φύσις μοναδική) is rejected as being a misuse of terms. It is rather the case that it has a common nature and a proper hypostasis, the latter being distinguished from the former by defining marks and properties (τοῖς ἀφοριστικοῖς σημείοις τε καὶ ιδιώμασιν)⁴⁴¹. As "Peter" and "Paul" are not names of nature, but of hypostasis, so "sun", "moon" etc. divide and define an individual item of a certain kind from its common substance by its proper hypostasis⁴⁴².

Leontius of Byzantium makes use of the anthropological paradigm in his defence of Chalcedonian Christology, while rejecting a union by nature (φυσικῶς) both for Christ and for the human constitution. As in the union of the Logos with the humanity, so the union of soul and body is worked by the power of God⁴⁴³. Both unions are essentially a

⁴⁴⁰ *Solutio* 4: PG 86,1925C-1928A.

⁴⁴¹ *Solutio* 6: 1928C.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*: 1928CD.

⁴⁴³ *Solutio* 8: PG 86,1940AC. This is very reminiscent of Augustine's comment on this subject: *in talibus rebus tota ratio facti est potentia facientis*, *Ep* 137 8: CSEL 44, 107.12-3

mystery. Perhaps the price Leontius had to pay for his "strictly Chalcedonian" use of the soul-body analogy was an excessively dualist anthropology⁴⁴⁴.

* * *

To recapitulate, the basis for using the human constitution as a paradigm for the union in Christ seems to have been laid already by Origen. The controversy over Paul of Samosata in the second half of the third century put it into the focus of Christological debates. When the soul-body relationship was employed as a model for the relation between the Logos and the flesh, it tended to eclipse the reality of Christ's human soul and thus the completeness of his humanity. This tendency came to the fore in the fourth century with Apollinarius of Laodicea, who impressed his conception of the "composition" in Christ according to the model of the human composite on subsequent Christological reflection. Cyril of Alexandria, in whose theology this legacy could be detected, none the less transcended it in a significant way. He was aware of the limits of any paradigm adduced from the created order for the union in Christ and of its character as analogy. This achievement marked an important advance beyond the third- and fourth-century discussions. Cyril, however, was not wholly consistent in this respect, and together with his well-known terminological ambiguities, this provided momentum for the sixth-century controversy over Chalcedon. Thus Severus of Antioch was confident in grounding his Christology on a reading of Cyril, though it was arguably one-sided. The "strict Chalcedonian" Leontius of Byzantium, on the other hand, rejected the Severan notion of "composition", but showed how the anthropological paradigm could be used in a qualified manner to illustrate the union of divinity and humanity in Christ.

⁴⁴⁴ This is suggested by Grillmeier (1989), 221-2. Similarly Grumel (1926), 394-5, who overstates his point by claiming that Leontius "accomode l'exemple au mystère, plutôt qu'il n'éclaire le mystère par l'exemple". Cf. the estimation of Daley (1993), 260: "The human person, too, when rightly understood, is for Leontius a kind of miracle, a blending and mutual conditioning of two things that remain in their basic reality 'incommunicable' and 'unmixed', by the loving providence of God. Yet both in the human person and in the person of Christ, it is not so much the functioning of the parts as their conjunction in a single, unified subject that is the very heart of the mystery".

7 The Paradigm of the Human Composite in Philoponus

By the middle of the sixth century, when Philoponus entered the Christological controversy over Chalcedon, the anthropological paradigm had undergone considerable refinement. As a commentator on Aristotle, Philoponus was also confronted with the problems of the human constitution and the soul-body relationship which were discussed in the philosophical schools. The question arises whether elements of Philoponus' philosophical anthropology recurred in his theological works and whether the specific context of his Christological treatises transformed his thought. In what follows, I shall first investigate how Philoponus conceived of the soul-body relationship in his commentary on the *De Anima*. This will involve a brief presentation of the *status quaestionis*, as shaped by the single most important treatments of this problem, those of Aristotle, Plotinus, and Porphyry – leaving aside the seminal contribution of Plato, which will be a constant point of reference. Secondly, I shall give a brief synopsis (based upon my analyses in chapter four) and offer some criticism of Philoponus' use of the anthropological paradigm in Christology.

7.1 *Philosophical Background: The Soul-Body Relationship*

7.1.1 Aristotle and Plotinus

The starting-point for my discussion will be Aristotle's definition of the soul as substance in the sense that it is the form of a natural body having life potentially. The soul is the ἐντελέχεια – perhaps best translated as “completion” – which actualises the body such that it is a living body⁴⁴⁵. There are, however, two grades of ἐντελέχεια, illustrated by possession of knowledge and by exercise of knowledge. Obviously, soul is not an entelechy in the second sense, since an ensouled being may be asleep and not exercise its faculties, yet still be in possession of them. So Aristotle arrives at the definition of the soul as the “first entelechy of an organic natural body”, that is, a body furnished with organs for the exercise of its faculties⁴⁴⁶. When he discusses the question whether or not the soul is separable from the body, he raises the curious point that the soul

⁴⁴⁵ Aristotle, *De Anima* B.1: 412^a19-22 The Greek commentators often interpreted ἐντελέχεια as τελειότης, which entered the Medieval tradition as *perfectio*.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 412^b5-6.

might be understood to be the entelechy of the body "as the sailor is of the ship (ὥσπερ πλωτὴρ πλοίου)", but it is clear that he does not affirm this analogy⁴⁴⁷. This "piece of residual Platonism" has troubled both ancient and modern interpreters of the Stagirite, since it does not fit into Aristotle's argument⁴⁴⁸. He certainly holds that the soul, or at least certain parts of it, are not separable from the body, since their relationship is that of form and matter. H. J. Blumenthal has observed that Aristotle's "sailor" evolved into a "steersman". He has detected the earliest reference for this in the *De Anima* by Alexander of Aphrodisias⁴⁴⁹. The lexical change to κυβερνήτης is manifest. Whether this actually implies a change in meaning and thus in the way the analogy works requires careful examination. Πλωτὴρ means "sailor", "seaman", including rowers, navigators, and passengers⁴⁵⁰. This clearly emerges from the following passage in Aristotle's *Politics*:

τῶν δὲ πλωτῆρων καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων τὴν δύναμιν (ὃ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐρέτης, ὃ δὲ κυβερνήτης, ὃ δὲ πρῶρεύς, ὃ δ' ἄλλην τινὰ ἔχων τοιαύτην ἐπωνυμίαν)⁴⁵¹.

The steersman or navigator is one of the πλωτῆρες⁴⁵². This was obvious to Plotinus, who saw the need for more terminological precision in the analogy⁴⁵³. In his *De Anima Commentary* Philoponus faithfully speaks of πλωτὴρ, when he quotes from Aristotle's text. However, that he understands this as steersman is patent, especially from his explanation as to how the analogy works:

ὥστε καὶ εἰ λέγοι πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἐντελέχειαν, οἷδέ τινα καὶ χωριστὴν ἐντελέχειαν ἐξῶθεν τάττουσαν καὶ κοσμοῦσαν καὶ τελειοῦσαν τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ ὁ πλωτὴρ τὸ πλοῖον⁴⁵⁴.

Consequently, when he is not constrained by the text upon which he is commenting, Philoponus speaks of κυβερνήτης⁴⁵⁵. If the point of the

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid. 413^a8-9.

⁴⁴⁸ Blumenthal (1996), 97. Cf. Hicks (1907) and Ross (1961), *ad loc.*

⁴⁴⁹ See Blumenthal (1986b), 382₂₇; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima*: 15.9-10 (Alexander's authorship of this work is now disputed).

⁴⁵⁰ Liddell-Scott (1968), s. v.

⁴⁵¹ Aristotle, *Polit.* Γ.3: 1276^b21-4. On the meaning of κυβερνήτης, cf. Susemihl-Hicks (1894), *ad loc.*: "steersman, or pilot, answers in some respects more to the ship's captain, as he is skilled in navigation ... and responsible for the course of the vessel. Whereas the ναύκληρος or skipper, usually the owner of the ship, although nominally in command, need not be a practical seaman."

⁴⁵² ὁ κυβερνήτης εἷς ἐστιν ἀεὶ τῶν πλωτῆρων, Aristotle, *Polit.* Γ.6: 1279^a3-4.

⁴⁵³ Plotinus, *Enn.* IV.3.21.

⁴⁵⁴ Philoponus, *In De Anima*: 194.2-4.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.: 224.12-225.31; cf. also *index verborum*, s. v.

analogy is the soul's being the entelechy of the body, the only person on the ship who can claim some likeness to the soul is the steersman or navigator. He directs the ship on its course and orders its movement towards the intended end of the journey. Without his direction, the ship would either stray or perhaps not move at all. If the analogy should be applicable to the relationship between soul and body – and thus to the relationship between form and matter – it can only be read in such a way. The analogy which Aristotle introduces, without affirming it, accords with Plato's comparisons of the soul with the steersman of a ship, and the charioteer who drives and directs his equipage⁴⁵⁶. It is likely that the lexical shift to κυβερνήτης occurred under the impression of the *Phaedrus*; none the less it follows the inner logic of the analogy in the *De Anima*. Alexander of Aphrodisias in fact considered the puzzling steersman-analogy inadequate, as did Plotinus. Both of them objected that the soul's presence to the body is not spatial (ὥς ἐν τόπῳ), which would be suggested by the presence of the steersman on a ship. Plotinus, however, concedes that "this is a good comparison as far as the soul's ability to be separate from the body goes"⁴⁵⁷. The same analogy could also be transferred to a cosmological context, that is, for the relationship between God and the world. This is found as early as in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*⁴⁵⁸. Numenius compares the demiurge, the second God, with a steersman who governs a ship⁴⁵⁹.

Aristotle's account of the soul-body relationship is complicated by the fact that he allows for some parts of the soul to be separable, since they are not the entelechy of anything bodily. He holds that the faculty of thinking is not in need of a bodily organ and he does not assign a bodily seat to it in his biological works. While it presupposes other psychical activities which indeed involve the body, notably φαντασία, thinking itself is independent of the body. This statement, however, is qualified in *De Anima* Γ.5, where Aristotle makes his famous distinction between the intellect which can exist apart and the intellect which cannot. The

⁴⁵⁶ Plato, *Phaedrus* 247c and *Critias* 109c; *Phaedrus* 246a.

⁴⁵⁷ Plotinus, *Enn.* IV.3.21.6-8; cf. Clark (1996), 280.

⁴⁵⁸ Aristotle, *Protrepticus*, fr. 13: 48 Ross (= Iamblichus, *Protr.* 10).

⁴⁵⁹ Numenius, fr. 18: 58-9 des Places (= Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* XI,18,24). Eusebius of Caesarea conceives of the Logos as the mediator between the Father and the cosmos. The Logos governs the world as a steersman on a ship, leading the helm, in accordance with the will of his Father, to whom he looks upward, and so attracts the created to the uncreated being; Eusebius, *Theol. Eccl.* I,13: GCS 14,73-4. For an exhaustive list of references in Eusebius, see Ricken (1967), 349.

active intellect has no bodily organ, and so does not perish when the body dies. Notoriously, it has been a matter of great dispute whether Aristotle is speaking about the immortal divine intellect, or about the (individual) human intellect.

Alexander of Aphrodisias argued for the inseparability of the soul, which he did not regard as a substance on its own⁴⁶⁰, but the Neoplatonic commentators were not at ease with this account of Aristotle's psychological theory. They would in general agree that man was defined as a composite entity, made up of rational soul and body, an idea already developed *in nuce* by Plato and then embraced by Plotinus⁴⁶¹; at the same time, however, Neoplatonists considered the transcendent rational soul to be man's true self to such an extent that it could be separated from the body without any loss of identity. Having said this, the question of soul and self in Plotinus needs to be studied with care – since this would go far beyond the limits of this study, it will be treated only in passing here. Characteristic of Plotinus' anthropology is not a simple dualism of body and soul, but a more complex dualism of the living composite (τὸ συνναμφότερον) and the true self (ὁ αὐτός)⁴⁶².

Under the impact of *Alcibiades Maior* 130c, which was very influential in the Neoplatonists' reception of Plato, the true self is identified with the soul (ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτός)⁴⁶³. It belongs to the intellectual realm and is the agent of contemplation of the divine realities. The soul itself does not descend into the body, but gives of itself a kind of light to the body. The true self is thus distinct from the empirical living composite, which is made up of the body and – here Plotinus uses different expressions – the *dynamis*, image, or shadow, of the soul⁴⁶⁴. This is patent in the following passage where Plotinus urges us to

'fly from here' [*Theaetetus* 176ab] and 'separate' [*Phaedo* 67c] ourselves from what has been added to us, and not be the composite thing, the

⁴⁶⁰ οὐκ οὐσία τις αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν, Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima*: 12.8.

⁴⁶¹ Plato, *Phaedo* 70a, 76c, 95c; *Phaedrus* 246c. Plotinus, *Enn.* I.1.3; I.1.10; IV.7.1. Philoponus, *In Cat.*: 49.24-5: ἔστι δὲ σύνθετος μὲν οὐσία ἄνθρωπος. De Vogel (1986), 171-90, argues that Plato's anthropology is not dualist, as often assumed. While Plato certainly thinks that the soul is superior to the body, he regards man as a "both-together" (συνναμφότερον). De Vogel emphasises that the *Timaeus* (esp. 42dff.), not the *Phaedo*, should be considered the locus of Plato's anthropology. Man is defined as "soul" only in the *Alcibiades Maior* 130c, whose authenticity is disputed by de Strycker (1942); cf. de Vogel (1986), 218-9 and 240.

⁴⁶² *Enn.* II.3.9.30-1; see also I.1.2-3; I.1.5.1-2; I.1.6.8-9; I.1.9.7. Cf. Gerson (1994), 127-63, and O'Meara (1985).

⁴⁶³ *Enn.* IV.7.1.25; cf. de Vogel (1986), 184-5 and 246.

⁴⁶⁴ *Enn.* I.1.7.1-6; I.1.8.18 (εἶδωλον); IV.4.19.3 (ἰνδαλμα); IV.4.18.7 (σκιὰ).

ensouled body in which the nature of body (which has some trace of soul) has the greater power, so that the common life belongs more to the body⁴⁶⁵.

To interpret this as an "ascent" from this world in a cosmological sense, to undo, as it were, the "descent" of soul into body, would be a misconception. Such an idea was common among earlier Platonists, such as Numenius, and contemporary Gnostics, but alien to Plotinus. He sees the return to one's ideal self as a becoming aware of one's true identity – it is the recognition that the essence of the soul has always remained in the realm of the intellect. The proper disposition for attaining this different state of awareness is brought about by philosophical discipline⁴⁶⁶. This "waking up" has found its most famous expression in Plotinus' account of his "mystical experience"⁴⁶⁷. Thus, Plotinus "internalizes intelligible reality", but without depriving it of its "cosmic significance"⁴⁶⁸.

He is clear that our empirical condition is composite. However, this composite is not hylomorphic. In particular, Plotinus is critical of Aristotle's view that the soul should be the inseparable entelechy of the body⁴⁶⁹. He compares the relationship of soul to body to that of an artisan to his tool (a metaphor taken from *Alcibiades Maior* 129c-e)⁴⁷⁰. As noted by L. P. Gerson, there is a certain lack of clarity here, since it would seem that the tool is the composite and the user the true self; in other words, the analogy is not with the soul using the body⁴⁷¹. In *Enn.* IV.7.1 Plotinus discusses the question whether soul and body are related as user and tool, or form and matter, but does not resolve it (cf. also I.1.3). A reason why Plotinus does not come to a resolution may be found in his dissatisfaction with Plato's account of this relationship⁴⁷².

⁴⁶⁵ *Enn.* II.3.9.19-24.

⁴⁶⁶ The most one can do is to put oneself into a state of receptivity; the actual union with the divine is given. Cf. *Enn.* V.5.8.3-8, on Intellect's vision of the One: "one must not chase after it, but wait quietly till it appears, preparing oneself to contemplate it, as the eye awaits the rising of the sun; and the sun rising over the horizon ("from Ocean", the poets say [e.g., Homer, *Iliad* 7.421-2]) gives itself to the eyes to see".

⁴⁶⁷ *Enn.* IV.8.1.1-10; ἐγχειρόμενος εἰς ἑμαυτόν, IV.8.1.1; ἔγερσις, III.6.5.23.

⁴⁶⁸ O'Meara (1993), 21. In other words, Plotinus' universe "is no universe where immanence excludes transcendence", *ibid.*, 46.

⁴⁶⁹ *Enn.* IV.7.8⁵.

⁴⁷⁰ *Enn.* I.1.3-4; I.4.16.21-9; IV.7.1.23-4; VI.7.5.23-5.

⁴⁷¹ Gerson (1994), 148, observes: "Just as 'soul' is sometimes used for 'self,' so 'body' is sometimes used for 'composite organism'".

⁴⁷² E.g., the soul wearing the body like clothes which can be thrown off (*Phaedo* 87d-e); the soul being "present" to the body or "woven through the body" (in the case of the world-soul, *Timaeus* 36e); the body being the soul's vehicle (ὄχημα, *Timaeus* 69c).

The problem with it was that it did not provide a defence against the Stoic argument that if the soul is said to be embodied so as to form the single substance of man, it must be corporeal, since a unity of this kind could only be achieved by strictly material entities⁴⁷³. Clearly, this issue was perceived to be important. Porphyry reports that he initiated a three-day-long discussion in the school of Plotinus on how the soul is present to the body (σύνεστι τῷ σώματι)⁴⁷⁴. This question is treated by Plotinus in a few of the *Enneads* that were written both before (IV.7, IV.8, IV.1) and after (IV.3, I.1) Porphyry's arrival at his school⁴⁷⁵. The answer given by Plotinus is original. We should not conceive of the soul as being somehow "in" the body. On the contrary, body is "in" the soul, that is, it completely depends on it for its existence. This idea, Plotinus explains, is also underlying *Timaeus* 36d-e, where Plato says that "the universe lies in soul which sustains it, and nothing is without having some share in soul"⁴⁷⁶.

7.1.2 Porphyry

A pivotal place in the history of Neoplatonic psychology must be given to Porphyry, since he aims at a synthesis into which Aristotle's theory can be incorporated. Psychology is a less known part of Porphyry's comprehensive project to harmonise Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, of which the most familiar part is certainly his reading of the *Categories*⁴⁷⁷. Porphyry follows his master Plotinus in distinguishing between the soul in itself (καθ' ἑαυτήν) and the soul in relation to the body (κατὰ σχέσιν). The soul as an immaterial entity cannot be present to the body ὑποστάσει καὶ οὐσίᾳ. It is not by itself united or "mixed" with the body, but relates to it by virtue of a δύναμις or a set of δυνάμεις, which is derived from its own hypostasis⁴⁷⁸. According to

⁴⁷³ Cf. Nemesius of Emesa, *De Natura Hominis* 2: 22.3-6 Morani (= SVF II, 790).

⁴⁷⁴ Porphyry, *Vita Plotini* 13.11-7.

⁴⁷⁵ According to the chronology of the *Enneads* which is given by Porphyry, *Vita Plotini* 4-6.

⁴⁷⁶ *Enn.* IV.3.9.36-7; also Porphyry, *Sent.* 31: 21.14-6 Lamberz; cf. the lucid discussion by O'Meara (1993), 26-9.

⁴⁷⁷ My discussion of Porphyry's psychology is indebted to G. Karamanolis, who is preparing a doctoral thesis at Oxford University on the Platonists' attitude towards Aristotle. I am grateful to Mr Karamanolis, who kindly let me use the results of his research here. See also Smith (1974), 1-19. In a recent article, Chiaradonna (1998) discusses the juxtaposition of Plato's transcendent form and the Aristotle's immanent form in Porphyry's ontology and argues that Porphyry's "attitude philosophique concordiste" is at odds with Plotinus' uncompromising criticism of Aristotle.

⁴⁷⁸ Porphyry, *Sent.* 3 and 28: 2 and 17 Lamberz.

Porphyry, Aristotle's *De Anima* is not a treatise on the soul in itself, but on the soul κατὰ σῆμα, that is, the embodied soul which operates in the body. On the one hand, then, Aristotle's treatment falls short of the soul's essence. It is only concerned with one aspect of the soul, one of the soul's δυνάμεις by which it descends and effects the animation (ἐμψυχία) of the body. Regarding the soul as a hypostasis, Aristotle has nothing to offer, and our enquiry should be guided by the Platonic tradition. On the other hand, however, Aristotle's theory of the soul as the entelechy of the body is the best available account of how the soul operates within the body. Within this limited domain of the embodied soul, Aristotle can be read with much profit by Neoplatonic philosophers. The term ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἐμψυχία is meant to denote Aristotle's living body, the compound of soul and body, which is distinct not only from the corpse, according to Aristotle, but also from the soul as hypostasis, according to Porphyry. Porphyry seems to have taken this use from passages in Aristotle where the soul is defined as the essence, form, source of movement, or final cause of the living body (τὸ ἐμψυχόν)⁴⁷⁹. Aristotle should be criticised for confusing the soul with the embodied soul. Once, however, we acknowledge that the *De Anima* is concerned with the animation of the body, but does not tell us anything about the soul in itself, we can appreciate the value of Aristotle's theory. As G. Karamanolis points out, Porphyry's limited endorsement of the *De Anima* for the realm of the embodied soul seems to have been received by later commentators on Aristotle, such as Philoponus, although he does not expressly acknowledge his debt to Porphyry⁴⁸⁰.

Under the impact of H. Dörrie's study on the no longer extant *Miscellaneous Questions about the Soul* (*Symmikta Zêtēmata*), one of Porphyry's significant contributions to Neoplatonic anthropology has been seen in the notion of a "union without confusion" (ἀσύγχυτος ἔνωσις) of soul and body. This particular idea is found in Nemesius of Emesa, where it is attributed to "Ammonius, the master of Plotinus". Dörrie claimed that it originated from Porphyry's *Symmikta Zêtēmata*. This reconstruction is based upon the assumption that Porphyry's work was

⁴⁷⁹ Porphyry, fr. 248F.12-3 Smith; cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* Z.10: 1035^b14-21, *De Anima* B.4: 415^b11-2.

⁴⁸⁰ E.g., Philoponus, *In De Anima*: 244.11-3; cf. *Arbiter* X.43: 42.21-26 and esp. X.44: 43.17-27, where he distinguishes between the soul operating with the body as a result of its bond of affection and the soul operating intellectually and apart from its conjunction with the body.

the sole source (with a slight exception) for Nemesius' *De Natura Hominis* and Priscian's *Solutiones ad Chosroem*, as borne out by a comparison of the latter with the third chapter of Nemesius⁴⁸¹. Precisely this point has been challenged by J. M. Rist, who indicates various problems in Dörrie's argument. The idea of a unity without confusion in which the substances that are combined retain their properties unaltered is already encompassed in the Stoic idea of "total blending" (κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων), as of water and wine which can (at least in theory) be separated again⁴⁸². The Stoics allowed for such an unconfused and reversible union in the case of material substances. Since they held that the soul was a material substance, they could interpret the union of soul and body as a "total blending", with the soul pervading the body throughout. In the same way, πνεῦμα, as the active principle, penetrates the matter of the cosmos⁴⁸³. The theory of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων, which Alexander of Aphrodisias attributed to Chrysippus and his followers, was subjected to severe criticism especially by Peripatetics, since it implied the possibility of a mutual co-extension of two or more bodies in their entirety. The principle that two material substances should occupy the same place at the same time (σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν) was considered paradoxical⁴⁸⁴. Plotinus subscribed to Alexander's arguments in his rejection of the Stoic theory of "total blending" for material substances. However, he saw in it an appropriate analogy for the union of soul and body, with the crucial difference, of course, that he insisted on the transcendent, incorporeal nature of the soul⁴⁸⁵. Thus the Neoplatonists could endorse the Stoic terminology of "total blending", but allowed for such an intimate, yet unconfused union only between bodies and incorporeal substances. Now Rist argues that the Neoplatonists reserved the technical term

⁴⁸¹ See Dörrie (1959), 12-103. This hypothesis had been partly anticipated by Arnim (1887).

⁴⁸² Cf. Rist (1988), 405-6.

⁴⁸³ Todd's study of Alexander's *De Mixtione* (1976) is useful in many ways, but should be read with caution. His thesis that for the Stoics κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων was "a purely mental conception which could serve as the illustrative prefigurement of the theory of pneuma's motion through matter" (ibid., 72) and was not understood in its complexity by their ancient critics has been met with some reservation, e.g., by Moraux (1981). Norris (1963), 67-78, gives a good account of the ancient debate.

⁴⁸⁴ Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Mixtione*: 213.2-13, 216.14-31, 220.23-9, and *passim*.

⁴⁸⁵ Plotinus, *Enn.* IV.7.8². This shift is illustrated by the way Plotinus reinterpreted Chrysippus' analogy of the "mixture" of light and air, as seen above in chapter four, pp. 78f.

ἀσύγχυτος ἔνωσις for the relations of incorporeals, such as souls or Platonic forms⁴⁸⁶, while its application to the soul-body relationship only appears in Christian authors⁴⁸⁷. Perhaps we should not make too much of the emergence of this formula for the already existing notion of an unconfused and reversible union of material and immaterial substances. On the other hand, however, Nemesius gives the clear impression that the solution proposed by “Ammonius, the master of Plotinus” marks an advance beyond earlier theories. There are no doubt problems in Rist’s argument, and it has been objected that he unnecessarily disputes the ascription of this idea to Ammonius⁴⁸⁸. Whether or not we subscribe to his reconstruction, the specifically anthropological use of ἀσύγχυτος ἔνωσις in Patristic authors indicates that they shared a genuine interest in the constitution of the human person. In fact, their anthropology was often *Christologically informed*, as in the case of two theologians as divergent in their philosophical abilities as Nemesius and Augustine. Nemesius employs the union of divinity and humanity to shed light on the ἀσύγχυτος ἔνωσις of soul and body, not vice versa. Thereby, Neoplatonic ideas have an illustrative rather than a constitutive role⁴⁸⁹. It goes without saying that this notion played a key role in the dogmatic definition of the Council of Chalcedon.

7.1.3 Philoponus

Philoponus followed the path which Porphyry had opened for Neoplatonic interpreters of Aristotle’s *De Anima*. The soul is considered the cause of union and cohesion for the body⁴⁹⁰. However, it is only in

⁴⁸⁶ As for the possible source for the Neoplatonist use see Plotinus, *Enneads* I.8.2.19.

⁴⁸⁷ See Rist (1988), 409-13. From Rist’s point of view a few corrections should be made to Abramowski’s study on the origin of ἀσύγχυτος ἔνωσις (1981), 105-7. Note that she is critical of attempts to construct a simplistic “dependence” of the Christological formula upon Neoplatonic doctrines, as in Fortin (1962). Abramowski arrives at a conclusion similar to Rist’s (who does not refer to her paper), i.e. that it was the Neoplatonic doctrine of the ἀσύγχυτος ἔνωσις of the νοητά in the νοῦς, not its supposed anthropological meaning, which was employed as an analogy for the Trinity and for the union in Christ.

⁴⁸⁸ Edwards (1993), 177-8.

⁴⁸⁹ This is also the case with Augustine’s *Third Letter to Volusianus* (Ep. 137). The theme of Christology informing anthropology would no doubt be worth pursuing. Since this would go beyond the scope of this book, I should like to point to further literature: Couturier (1954), 549-50; Fortin (1959), 111-28; Telfer (1962); Studer (1979); Hölscher (1986), 213-20; Drobner (1986), esp. 117-22 and 221-5. See also the intriguing essay by Rist (1998).

⁴⁹⁰ ὁρᾶται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐνώσεως καὶ συνοχῆς τῷ σώματι αἰτία οὖσα, Philoponus, *In De Anima*: 197.22-3, cf. 196.29.

appearance that they form a single entity, not in reality⁴⁹¹. Philoponus comments on the lemma 413^a8 that the soul is the entelechy of the body in an analogous way to a steersman who completes the form (εἶδος) of the ship, while he himself is separable from it. He may be considered separable from the ship in his own being, i.e. as man, yet inseparable in his relation to the ship, i.e. as steersman. Thus Philoponus concedes that even the rational soul may be said to be inseparable from the body *insofar* as it is the entelechy of the body. It is evident here that he is concerned to give a faithful interpretation of Aristotle. Philoponus argues that the soul may be considered inseparable from the body insofar as its activities (ἐνέργειαι), by which it perfects the whole living being, are inseparable from the body. These activities belong to the soul as a result of its relationship with the body. The *tertium comparationis* is that the activities of the steersman *qua* steersman are inseparable from the ship, and so he may be said to be inseparable from it, whereas he is not *qua* man⁴⁹². Elsewhere in the same commentary Philoponus makes it clear that in his view Aristotle considers only the vegetative and the irrational soul inseparable from the body, not the rational soul or νοῦς⁴⁹³. As entelechy the soul is inseparable from the body, but it is so neither by virtue of substance (οὐσία), nor by virtue of all of its own activities, but only by virtue of those activities which belong to it as a result of its relation to the body, most of which are practical. However, the mind also has activities which are separable from the body, namely those which concern the intelligibles (νοητά). Given that the body is an obstacle to these activities, it is obvious, Philoponus argues, that the soul has a separate substance, which is called mind⁴⁹⁴. He is anxious to safeguard the separability of the soul (or at least of its higher part) from the body since it is not the entelechy of anything bodily. It seems that Philoponus, following Porphyry, limits the application of Aristotle's theory to the embodied soul. Within these limits, to speak of the soul as the entelechy of the body accounts very well for the operations of the embodied soul; however, Aristotle fails to give an account of the soul in itself. Given this interpretative scheme, Philoponus is one of the more faithful

⁴⁹¹ ἐνωθεῖσα ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι τούτῳ δοκεῖ μὲν ἓν τι πρᾶγμα ποιεῖν, κατὰ ἀλήθειαν δὲ οὐχ ἓν τί ἐστιν, *ibid.*: 8.17-9.

⁴⁹² *Ibid.*: 224.15-37.

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*: 206.19-28 and 246.25-28.

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*: 246.27-247.7. The idea that the body is a hindrance to thought goes back to Plato, *Phaedo* 65a and 66c, and is found in Plotinus, *Enn.* IV.8.2.

exegetes of *De Anima* among the Neoplatonic commentators, more so at least than Ps.-Simplicius⁴⁹⁵.

In his exegetical commentary on the biblical hexaemeron, Philoponus distinguishes between human souls and the souls of the other living beings. Human souls, he argues, have a substance (οὐσία) which is separable from the body, and they enter from outside (ἔξωθεν) into the already formed bodies without any temporal delay. This is substantiated with a quotation from Gen. 2:7 (LXX): "God ... breathed into his face the breath of life (πνοὴν ζωῆς), and man became a living soul (ψυχὴν ζῶσαν)". Thus the genesis of the human soul gives us an indication as to the nature of its substance⁴⁹⁶. Philoponus refers to Aristotle's definition of the soul as the entelechy of a natural body equipped with organs and having life potentially. He understands Aristotle to distinguish between two kinds of entelechies. One of them is inseparable, as the musical activity (ἐνέργεια) of the flute and the lyre, which provides a model for the souls of irrational creatures. The other is separable, as the steersman and the charioteer (the examples taken from Plato's *Phaedrus*). Insofar as their relationship to the ship and the chariot, respectively, is that of form to matter (εἶδοποιούσι), they may be compared to the soul as the form of man⁴⁹⁷.

In his *De Anima Commentary*, Philoponus compares the soul's relation to the body to that of an artisan to his tool: the body is used by the (rational) soul in the manner of an instrument (ὄργανον)⁴⁹⁸. It remains to be discussed how this relationship can be specified in another way. For this purpose, Philoponus begins by differentiating between three sorts of "mixture". First, there is juxtaposition (κατὰ παράθεσιν), as a house is said to consist of stones; secondly, blending (κατὰ κρᾶσιν), as

⁴⁹⁵ For a critique of Philoponus' interpretation of the *De Anima*, see Blumenthal (1986b) and (1996), 94-8.

⁴⁹⁶ Philoponus, *De Opificio Mundi* VI,23: 276.23-277.7 Reichardt.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.: 278.3-13 Reichardt.

⁴⁹⁸ Philoponus, *In De Anima*: 140.11-7. The editor of Moerbecke's Latin translation, Verbeke (1966), XLIII, denies this with reference to 53.31-3, where Philoponus says that the irrational and the vegetative soul do not relate to the body as to an instrument, since they are moved by the appetites of the body. But despite the fact that Philoponus saw the body as an obstacle to the exercise of the proper activity of the rational soul, it does not follow that he denied that the rational soul used the body as an instrument. At any rate, Philoponus says elsewhere that the soul uses the body as a tool, such as when he comments on *De Anima* A.3: 407^b25-6: δεῖ γὰρ τὴν μὲν τέχνην χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι. In the light of the passage adduced by Verbeke, I would suggest the artisan-tool model refers to the rational soul only.

in the case of wine and water; and thirdly, interweaving (κατὰ διαπλοκήν), as ropes are tied together from single strands. This is reminiscent of *Timaeus* 36e, where Plato speaks of the world-soul as being “woven through the body (διαπλοκεῖσα)”. Juxtaposition is characterised by Philoponus as ἀσυμπαθής, that is, there is no *sympatheia* between the elements juxtaposed. Mingling, on the other hand, effects a confusion (σύγχυσις) of the elements. The third model of interweaving is a median between the other two; there is *sympatheia* but no confusion. This is the appropriate model for the union of soul and body, since the soul is not substantially united (συνουσιῶται) with the body, nor is the body wholly alien to the soul⁴⁹⁹. Plotinus already discusses the idea whether soul and body are “interwoven”. Its advantage, he argues, is that the soul would thus not be subject to the πάθη of the body⁵⁰⁰.

The reasons for Philoponus’ rejection of the second model (“blending”) for the soul-body relationship can be set forth if we look at his commentary on Aristotle’s analysis of mixture⁵⁰¹. Aristotle raises the problem whether there is anything like “mixing” at all, for concerning the (at least two) elements to be mixed with another there are three (and no more) possibilities: 1) both are preserved in the mixture; 2) both are destroyed; 3) one is preserved, the other is destroyed. In the first case, there is no difference between the state before and the state after the “mixing”, and so no “mixing” occurs at all. In the second case, there is no “mixing” either, since there is nothing to be mixed. In the third case, there is no “mixing”, since there is nothing to be mixed either; the preserved element still exists, whereas the destroyed element does not. Moreover, the elements to be mixed are not in a similar proportion to each other, which is required for mixing. Aristotle solves this aporia by introducing a distinction between potentiality and actuality. The elements to be mixed exist in the mixture potentially, not actually. In his commentary on this passage, Philoponus distinguishes between three kinds of change (μεταβολή) of elements into one another: ἀφή (junction), ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν (acting and being acted upon), and μῖξις (mixing). Though “mixing” (μῖξις) is a more generic term, Philoponus follows Aristotle and uses it interchangeably with “blending” (κρᾶσις). In order to illustrate Aristotle’s solution to the problem of how a “mix-

⁴⁹⁹ Philoponus, *In De Anima*: 120.35-121.9.

⁵⁰⁰ Plotinus, *Enn.* I.1.4.

⁵⁰¹ Aristotle, *De Generatione et Corruptione* A.10: 327^a30-28^b22; Philoponus, *In De Generatione et Corruptione*: 187.16-203.16; on mixture in Philoponus, see now de Haas (1999).

ing" of elements can occur at all, the example of blended wine is introduced. Here water and wine (τὰ μιγνύμενα) exist potentially, though not according to fittingness or convenience for a purpose (κατὰ τὴν ἐπιτηδείότητα), as, for instance, water is potentially air. Neither do they exist potentially according to mere habit (κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν μόνην), as a sleeping geometer, who can exercise his skills once he has woken up. Sticking to this example, Philoponus explains that it is rather like a drunken geometer who attempts to do geometry, as is his habit, yet is not able to do it "purely" (εἰλικρινῶς). This is indeed the way in which water and wine are blended. Each of the elements is actualised in the mixture in a tempered way (κεκολασμένως)⁵⁰². The elements have thus undergone some alteration. This is the crucial difference between μῖξις or κρᾶσις and σύνθεσις or παράθεσις (in Stoic terminology, as preferred by Philoponus in his *De Anima Commentary*) of physical objects. So Aristotle may call mixing τῶν μικτῶν ἀλλοιωθέντων ἔνωσις, a "union through alteration", as Philoponus explains⁵⁰³. But Philoponus' exposition entails an implicit rejection of the Stoic notion of a "total blending" (κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων) of material substances. The point of the Stoic theory is that with this type of a reversible and unconfused mixture, the properties of the ingredients are preserved unaltered. The example often provided for it is the mixture of water and wine, since it was thought that the two substances could be separated again with the help of a sponge soaked in oil. Philoponus denies that in the case of water and wine we can speak of a confusion (σύγχυσις), but he certainly holds that the elements which are mixed have been altered in some way⁵⁰⁴.

It should have become clear by now from Philoponus' analysis of mingling in his *De Generatione et Corruptione Commentary* that it is precisely this union κατὰ κρᾶσιν which he does not accept as a model for the soul-body relationship. The crucial element in Philoponus' account of the soul-body relationship is that of *sympatheia*. This notion is first found among the Stoics in a cosmological context. Already in the Old Stoa, it denotes the natural concurrence or intercourse of events in the world; this notion plays a central role in Posidonius' cosmology⁵⁰⁵. The physical understanding is transferred by Neoplatonist philosophers

⁵⁰² Literally "chastened". This terminology would enter the scholastic tradition as *formae castigatae* or *qualitates castigatae*; cf. Todd (1980), 167.

⁵⁰³ Aristotle, *De Gen. et Corr.* A.10: 328^b22; Philoponus, *In De Gen. et Corr.*: 203.12.

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.*: 193.16-9.

⁵⁰⁵ Cf. Pohlenz (1964), I, 217, and II, 108.

into the realm of psychology. Nemesius of Emesa reports a refutation of Stoic arguments for the corporeality of the soul, which he found in Platonists⁵⁰⁶. Cleanthes argued that since *sympatheia* is only possible between bodies, and the soul is actually affected by what happens to its body, the soul must be corporeal. The Platonists, in Nemesius' report, challenged precisely this assumption, τὸ μηδὲν ἄσώματον σώματι συμπάσχειν. As for the ensuing question whether the soul is ἀπαθής, or whether it suffers with the body (συναλγεῖ), the more distinguished among the Platonists are said to prefer the first option. Dörrie sees here a clear reference to Porphyry, who even more than his teacher Plotinus insisted on the soul's *apatheia*, but one might also point, as the editor M. Morani does, at Plotinus' *Ennead* III.6.1-4, which is dedicated to this subject⁵⁰⁷.

When Philoponus discusses the passions (πάθη) of the soul, it is obvious that he sees suffering as a bodily sensation, to which incorporeal entities are not subjected, for he raises the question how the incorporeal soul can be punished in the afterlife. In its quest for pleasure in the earthly life, the soul has sinned and needs to have these transgressions expiated in Hades⁵⁰⁸. In order for this to be possible, we have to assume that even in the afterlife the soul is linked with a sort of body, i.e. a pneumatic body. Thus, it suffers by *sympatheia*:

Just as here, when this body suffers, the soul is afflicted because of its natural bond [sc. with the body] and the *sympatheia* which results from this; since on its own the incorporeal could not suffer from anything⁵⁰⁹.

This natural bond (φυσικὸς δεσμός) effects that specific sort of union, according to which we may speak of the passions of the soul. This is reminiscent of Proclus, who argues that the soul, though impassible insofar as it is incorporeal, suffers because of its communion with the body⁵¹⁰. Thus Philoponus comments on *De Anima* 403^a16 (ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ τοῦ σώματος):

[sc. Aristotle] shows that the passions of the soul are not proper to it, but to the composite out of both (τοῦ συναμφοτέρου), from the general fact that

⁵⁰⁶ Nemesius, *De Nat. Hom.* 2: 20.12-22.18 Morani. Cf. Dörrie (1959), 134-6.

⁵⁰⁷ For Porphyry see *De Nat. Hom.* 3: 40.10-2 Morani (= fr. 259F.124-9 Smith); for Plotinus see also *Enn.* I.1.5, where he does not come to a resolution. Cf. Norris (1963), 31-4.

⁵⁰⁸ Philoponus, *In De Anima*: 17.26-18.2.

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid.*: 18.4-6. Philoponus also thinks that there is a luminous body (σῶμα αὐγοειδές) from which the rational soul will never be separated, not even after its complete purification; cf. Verbeke (1966), xxx-xxxvi.

⁵¹⁰ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα κοινωνίαν, Proclus, *El. Theol.* 80: 74.28-9 Dodds.

the body is also moved (συγκινεῖσθαι) by them But if the body is also moved by the passions of the soul, it is obvious that they are not proper to it [*sc.* the soul] alone, but to the composite out of both⁵¹¹.

Philoponus' point is anticipated by earlier Platonists. Porphyry asserts in his *Sententiae* that neither matter on its own (since it is without quality) nor form on its own can be subject to πάθος. It is the "both-together" (συναμφότερον) or compound of matter and form, that is, the body, which is subject to change and suffering. Likewise, living, dying, and suffering is said of the composite of soul and body, neither of the soul on its own, nor of the body on its own⁵¹².

Philoponus goes on to explain that the passions of the soul have their seat in the underlying πνεῦμα. Against the Stoics, however, Philoponus asserts that the mixture of the elements in the body are only the material conditions for the genesis of these passions, just as a harmony needs chords⁵¹³. This musical comparison has already been employed by Plotinus:

Therefore the affective part of the soul will be the cause of affection; the movement will originate from it either as a result of the sensible impression or without it But the affective part remains unchanged after the fashion of an attunement. The causes of movements are like the musician, and what is moved on account of the affection is like the strings. For in music it is not the attunement which is affected, but the string—although the string could not be plucked, however much the musician wanted it, unless the attunement gave its approval⁵¹⁴.

Plotinus, whose treatise "On the Impassivity of the Bodiless" (III.6) is arguably the most important writing on this subject in late antiquity, argues that "irrational reasonings" (λόγοι ἄλογοι) or "unaffected affections" (ἀπαθῆ πάθη) "are additional" to the soul⁵¹⁵. Thus the affective part of the soul (τὸ παθητικόν), which is conceived as some sort of form (εἶδος), is the cause of affection but is itself not affected,

⁵¹¹ Philoponus, *In De Anima*: 50.16-23.

⁵¹² Porphyry, *Sent.* 21: 12-3 Lamberz; cf. already Plotinus, *Enn.* I.1.5-7.

⁵¹³ Philoponus, *In De Anima*: 52.4-13. Cf. the anti-Stoic argument of Plotinus, *Enn.* IV.7.8.

⁵¹⁴ Plotinus, *Enn.* III.6.4.43-52, ET: Fleet (1995); similarly Porphyry, *Sent.* 18: 8-9 Lamberz. In his Christology, Eusebius of Caesarea employs the relationship between a musician and his instrument as a model for the relationship between the Logos and his humanity. Just as the musician himself does not suffer, if his lyre breaks, so Christ's passion does not affect the Logos, see *Dem. Ev.* IV,13,4: GCS 23, 171.25-7; IV,13.6-7: 172.20-6. Cf. Schönborn (1984), 75-9.

⁵¹⁵ ἐπιγίγνεσθαι – Fleet (1995), 86, explains: "The general idea thus seems to be of incidental or extraneous additions that do not affect the essential nature of the subject."

just as the vegetative faculty, when it causes growth, does not itself grow⁵¹⁶.

To conclude this section on Philoponus' anthropology, I should like to note that, even as an exegete of the *De Anima*, he is indebted to the Platonic tradition. Philoponus appears to have endorsed Porphyry's reading of Aristotle, that it is the embodied soul, i.e. the soul-in-relation, which is the entelechy of the body. This accounts very well for how the soul operates within the body. Aristotle's theory, however, does not say anything about the soul in itself. Philoponus illustrates this point with the help of the steersman-paradigm, which serves as a model for the relationship between rational soul and body. The explicative value of this model, however, is limited, as the discussions in Plotinus and Alexander of Aphrodisias have already shown. In his search for a more precise account of this relationship, Philoponus arrives at the conclusion that it cannot be modelled after some kind of "mixing" of physical objects. The natural bond between soul and body which effects that specific sort of union is primarily characterised by the notion of *sympatheia*, through which the soul participates in the *pathê* of the body, whilst not being affected in itself. Philoponus' debts to Plotinus and Porphyry are evident here.

7.2 *The Soul-Body Relationship in Philoponus' Christology*

7.2.1 Synopsis

It has emerged from my analysis of the *Arbiter* that the anthropological paradigm lies at the heart of Philoponus' theological defence of miaphysite Christology. Here the results of this analysis will be presented in brief.

The Human Composite

Philoponus is emphatic that man is a composite of rational soul and body. This anthropology pervades his major treatise, the *Arbiter*, and also his minor treatises, in which he defends his argument against various criticisms. The union (ἔνωσις) of soul and body has effected a single entity (ἓν τι). None the less, in this union soul and body are preserved in their integrity, since they are united without confusion

⁵¹⁶ Cf. Fleet (1995), *ad loc* ; also O'Meara (1985).

(ἀσυνγχύτως). The insistence on this union of two natures precludes the notion that the soul is the human being properly speaking. Philoponus acknowledges the soul's predominance over the body by stating that rationality pertains to the definition of man more than bodily mortality. But he rejects the contention that the soul abstracted from the body is man's true self. A division of this composite means the destruction of the living being. Thus it is aptly called *individual* by the Peripatetics.

Christ the Composite

In the Incarnation the Logos united himself hypostatically with the ensouled flesh, including a rational soul, in such a way that a single entity (ἐν τι) resulted from this composition. Consequently, we speak of his one composite nature (μία φύσις σύνθετος) as a result of this union of two natures (ἐκ δύο φύσεων), the divine and the human. Anything which falls short of these formulae – according to Philoponus – divides the unity of the God-man and makes it meaningless to speak of “Christ” as a single subject. A duality of natures is not acceptable to Philoponus. The Chalcedonian formula “one person/hypostasis in (ἐν) two natures” is also rejected. An interpretation of this formula as “parts in a whole” rests on a misunderstanding, for “parts” in the proper sense are those constituents which are spatially separate from one another (as the parts of a house). Divinity and humanity of Christ (just as soul and body of man) are rather “elements” which mutually pervade one another; they do not allow for the preposition “in”.

Soul and Logos as Moving Principles

The *tertium comparationis* between man and Christ is that the relation of the body to the rational soul, its governing and moving principle, is of the same kind as the relation of Christ's humanity to the divinity. In us, the rational soul uses the body in the manner of an instrument; in Christ, the Logos uses the humanity as a whole in the manner of an instrument. All the rational movements of the soul are subject to the divine operations of the Logos, and, through the mediation of the soul, so are the movements of the body. Consequently, there is a *single operation* in the composite Christ, with the Logos being the ultimate principle of operation. Thus the Logos has that function in Christ which the rational soul has in man (yet without replacing it, as in Apollinarian Christology). There is an important difference, however, in that not all the movements

of the human body are controlled by the rational soul. On the contrary, there are operations proper to the body which the soul cannot govern. In Christ, however, every natural movement is initiated and governed by the Logos, whose will is mediated to the body by the soul. As in man operations of the composite cannot be predicated of the body separately (like walking, speaking, breathing), but are initiated by the soul and accomplished in the body, so in Christ all operations are predicated of the whole composite. Likewise, passions are predicated of the whole human composite because of the union of soul and body. Christ takes upon himself human sufferings – in complete freedom – as a sign of his true Incarnation, and so they can rightly be predicated of him as a whole.

Communicatio Idiomatum

Hence Philoponus' use of the anthropological model provides him with the principle for a Christological *communicatio idiomatum*. None the less, an important rule has to be kept in mind. We may attribute to the whole human being what properly speaking belongs to one of its constituents, rational soul or body. With Christ, it is appropriate to call the whole "God", even if this entails that God is said to be weary, to suffer, even to be crucified and to die. Yet this does not mean that suffering is attributed to the – immutable and impassible – divinity. Neither can the passions that are proper to the human body, for example, being sick or weary, be predicated of the soul in any proper sense. We say of a man that he is prudent or intelligent; likewise, we say of Christ that he works miracles or that he reigns over all things, while we know that these are operations of his divinity. Scripture may also name human beings also from the inferior part, i.e. "flesh", so Christ may be called "man". In any case, however, the principle to be borne in mind with such predications is that whenever something is said of Christ as "God" or as "man", it is the whole composite which is the subject.

Accordingly, the question of the suffering of the soul and the suffering of the Logos presents a significant limit to Philoponus' "monener-gism". Even the incorporeal rational soul is apt to suffer because of its affective conjunction with the body, i.e. the natural link with the body and the *sympatheia* arising from it, as we have seen. In the intelligible content of its substance, however, the soul remains impassible, even if it is joined with the passible body. This is true even to a greater degree of God the Logos who in his divinity is in every respect immutable and un-

changeable. Philoponus seems to be indebted here to Plotinus' doctrine of the soul's ἀπαθὴ πάθη. There is an affinity between this idea and the answers given by fifth-century theologians to the question how the Logos was affected by sufferings of his humanity⁵¹⁷.

The specific way in which Philoponus employs the anthropological paradigm can be located in a tradition which emerged in the third century and was shaped considerably by Apollinarius of Laodicea. Philoponus sees in the composition of man out of rational soul and body a model for the composition of Christ out of divinity and humanity. Almost inevitably, it seems, this carries the burden of the conception of an Apollinarian σύνθεσις ἀνθρωποειδής. This does not mean that Philoponus would deny the presence of a human mind in Christ, as Apollinarius did, for this deficiency had been overcome by Cyril, who is followed in this respect by both Severus and Philoponus. There are, however, difficulties implied in the Alexandrian philosopher's use of this model.

7.2.2 Criticism

The anthropological paradigm certainly has a tendency to support a strongly miaphysite Christology rather than a strongly diphyssite one. Thus the preference for it among Alexandrian theologians, and the reticence about it among Antiochenes. There is no doubt that the idea of the superiority and dominance of the soul over the body, which, in one way or another, was a commonplace in late antiquity, was more congenial to the proponents of a "Logos-sarx" Christology. There are two aspects in particular which seem to have contributed to the widespread popularity of this analogy. First, the rational human soul could be considered the most perfect image of the divine Logos within the realm of creation, with its function in man corresponding to the function of the Logos in Christ. This furthermore entailed the notorious problem that the Logos could be thought to replace the rational soul. Secondly, the body could be seen as the *organon* of the rational soul, just as Christ's humanity as such could be seen as the instrument of the Logos for the achievement of salvation. These elements can be traced back to philosophical theories,

⁵¹⁷ Chadwick (1951), 158-62, has shown that the notion that the Logos "suffered impassibly" (ἀπαθῶς ἔπαθεν), whilst being endorsed by Cyril, is characteristic of the Antiochene position as well. Thereby, Nestorius explicitly adopts the doctrine of the soul's *sympatheia* with the sufferings of the body.

such as the Stoic-Alexandrian analogy between the relationship of Logos and cosmos and that of soul to body⁵¹⁸. Characteristically, the steersman-paradigm was employed both in an anthropological and in a cosmological context⁵¹⁹. It would be misconceived, however, to see a decisive impact of the philosophical schools in the fact that Christian theologians reflected upon the relationship between soul and body and so endeavoured to shed light on the mystery of the Incarnation. Holy Scripture confronted Christian theologians with specific anthropological problems, especially by its accent on the unity of the twofold human constitution, and so gave their thought an emphasis distinct from that of contemporary debates among Greek philosophers. M. Frede has rightly objected to the widespread view that the Christian soul-body problem is essentially that of Platonism, or Greek philosophy in general. He insists that this is not the case, since Platonists would identify the human person with the soul, while it is decisive for Christian doctrine that the human constitution is composite, that is, soul-and-body⁵²⁰. That the Church Fathers were interested in matters anthropological and could make their own contributions to this field can safely be taken for granted.

The obvious place to look for Philoponus' philosophical anthropology is his commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*, which emerged from the practice of the Neoplatonic school of Alexandria. The literary genre of the commentary, however, does not allow for straightforward conclusions as to whether the author subscribes to the content of the text upon which he is commenting. Philoponus' aim in his *De Anima Commentary* is, in the first place, to show himself a cautious exegete, not to write a separate treatise *On the Soul*. What we perceive as tensions in his exposition of Aristotle are owing to his endorsement of Porphyry's synthesis

⁵¹⁸ The notion of the Logos as the life-giving principle perfecting the body of the world (σῶμα μέγα) – the idea of the world as a body is not exclusively Stoic, but goes back to Plato, *Timaeus* 31bff. – supplies Athanasius with a cosmological analogy for the Incarnation. As the Logos relates to the whole cosmos, so he does to the individual human body which he has made his own, see *C. Gentes* 44: 120-2 Thomson, and *De Incarnatione* 41: 234-6 Thomson. On these themes in Athanasius see Grillmeier (1990a), 463-9 and 471-2, with further bibliography.

⁵¹⁹ The idea of God the Father as a steersman, who governs the world by means of the Logos, his helm, is already found in Philo, e.g., *Migr. Abr.* 1,6: LCL 261,134. For further references, cf. Ricken (1967), 356₁₃₀. It is then used by Athanasius to provide an argument against a plurality of rulers and makers of the universe; *C. Gentes* 39,30-5 and 40,11-6: 108 and 110 Thomson, cf. also 36,9-11: 98. Athanasius can say that the Logos is the steersman; in this case, however, the paradigm is not cosmological, but soteriological, as in *De Incarnatione* 43,34-41: 242 Thomson.

⁵²⁰ See Frede (1997), 52-4.

between Plotinian and Aristotelian anthropology. As his third-century predecessor, Philoponus limits the validity of Aristotle's theory of the soul as the entelechy or form of the body to the embodied soul. Regarding the soul in itself, he relies on the Platonic tradition, just as Porphyry did. Platonic motifs come to the fore in Philoponus' Christological treatises, where he unabashedly resorts to the images provided by the *Phaedrus* and the *Alcibiades Maior*: the steersman on a ship, the charioteer on a chariot, and, most prominently, the artisan using an instrument. But it is important to note that the anthropology of the *Arbiter* as a whole neither conforms to the Aristotelian notion that the soul is the form of the body, nor to the Neoplatonic doctrine that the soul is the human person proper and is separable from the body without any loss of identity. Philoponus insists that a corruptible body essentially belongs to the human condition in this world. This is also evident from the remains of his later writings, where he contends that in the resurrection the old bodies will be destroyed and new incorruptible and immortal bodies will be created⁵²¹. I should like to suggest that Philoponus' anthropology is governed by two fundamental propositions of the Christian revelation: first, the unity of the twofold constitution, soul and body, which is of the essence of the human person; and secondly, the asymmetry inherent in this unity. In other words, the rational soul is immortal and so continues to live even when separated from the body (while the body disintegrates). At the same time, however, the soul is not the whole human person, which will only be complete with the resurrection of the body. Philoponus accounts for these two fundamental propositions by giving a specific interpretation of the *organon*-model. The body is related to the soul not as an *instrumentum separatum*, but as an *instrumentum unitum* – if we may borrow the terminology of Thomas Aquinas⁵²². Thus any anthropological dualism is reduced to a minimum. There is only one subject of which all actions and passions are predicated, which itself

⁵²¹ See the fragments from his work on the resurrection, ed. van Roey (1984), 133-8. Cf. also the brief note by Wickham (1990). The origins of Philoponus' views on the resurrection can already be discerned in the *Arbiter*: "For although it is said that our body is dissolved into its constituent elements, those who are not deprived of insight into the things of nature know that [sc. bodies] are not dissolved into numerically [sc. the same elements as] those from which they had been, rather, there will be another generation of elements after the destruction of the body, which are not the same in number, but the same in species", X,37: 34.21-4 Šanda.

⁵²² Aware of the Monothelete and Monoenergist controversies. Aquinas was guarded against the misconceptions which could arise if Christ's humanity was seen as the *instrumentum unitum* of the divinity. See Backes (1931), 155-75 and 270-87.

forms the ontological basis for the *one operation*. This represents – in a modified way – a Christian tradition of anthropological thought that ranges from Apollinarius to Cyril of Alexandria and Severus of Antioch. Philoponus found this conception of the soul-body relationship instrumental for his defence of miaphysitism. Thus the anthropological paradigm had an explicative rather than a constitutive role in his Christology. While it would be misleading to claim that he imported a consistent anthropology from any of the ancient philosophical schools, it is clear that his anthropological concerns stood in continuity with the philosophical debates in late antiquity.

Note, however, that Philoponus did not apply models from the realm of physics to his Christology. We have already seen that in his philosophical commentaries he rejected an account of the soul-body relationship which is conceived in terms of the mingling of objects (for instance, water and wine). Such a model would be all the more inadequate for the Incarnational union. According to the Aristotelian theory of mixing, an equilibrium among the elements to be mixed is a necessary precondition. This does not make any sense in Christology, since divinity and humanity are not in proportion to each other. Mixing presupposes that the elements undergo an alteration, in which they are “chastened”. Again, it is difficult to see how this could apply to the union of divinity and humanity in Christ. In any case, Philoponus did not recur to such physical models⁵²³. The Aristotelian account of “mixing” did not lend itself to his Christological project. The same can be said of Severus of Antioch. He adduced the analogy of a burning coal (taken from Is. 6:6) in order to explain how the humanity of Christ is the operation of his divine nature⁵²⁴. According to Aristotle, however, wood does not “mix” with fire when it is burning; there is φθορά of the wood and γένεσις of the fire⁵²⁵. But this is not what Severus wants to say. On the contrary, while the fire and the wood become inseparably one (a burning coal), the wood does not cease to be wood. Thus the burning coal of Is 6 is a type of Christ in that the Logos and the flesh are united indivisibly, while the flesh is “conserved” by the Logos without having changed it into his own nature, nor being changed himself into its nature. An Aristotelian

⁵²³ That Philoponus’ analysis in his *De Gen. et Corr. Commentary* “lends itself aptly to Christology”, as claimed by MacCoull (1995b), 200, is therefore misconceived.

⁵²⁴ E.g., *Hom. XLVIII*: PO 35, 316-8; cf. Chesnut (1976), 32-4.

⁵²⁵ Aristotle, *De Gen. et Corr.* A.10: 327^b12-3; cf. the commentary of Joachim (1922), *ad loc.*

conception of “mixing”, on the other hand, can be found in the Christology of Sergius the Grammarian, the radically monophysite opponent of Severus, as I. R. Torrance has shown⁵²⁶.

The overview of the history of the anthropological paradigm in Christology given in chapter six has made us aware of its problematic character. One particularly unsatisfactory aspect of Philoponus’ Christology is that he would seem to assume that a natural explanation can be given both for the soul-body union and for the union in Christ. Because of this presupposition, he goes beyond the valuable, but limited, use of the anthropological paradigm as an analogy to affirm the ontological unity between the divinity and the humanity in Christ. This point is made well by Justinian, who concludes his critique of miaphysitism with the following words:

And we say these things without being ignorant of the fact that some of the holy Fathers used the anthropological paradigm [sc. to shed light] on the mystery of Christ. But they did so in order to show that just as man is effected from soul and body as one, and not as two men, in the same manner also Christ, composed of divinity and humanity, is one, and is not divided into two Christs or two sons. These, however, use the anthropological paradigm in order to introduce one nature or substance of the divinity and the humanity of Christ. This we have shown to be alien to piety⁵²⁷.

It would seem defensible to argue that a natural explanation could be given for the soul-body union – however difficult it may actually be to provide such an explanation. To presume, however, that the union of divinity and humanity in Christ allows for such a natural explanation, modelled after the human composite, ignores the ever greater dissimilarity of every analogy that is drawn from the created order for the purpose of elucidating a divine reality.

8 Conclusion: Perspectives on Philoponus’ Christology

8.1 *Christian Theology and Aristotelian-Neoplatonic Philosophy*

Many patterns of argument from Philoponus’ commentaries on Aristotle have been detected in the *Arbiter* during the course of my analysis. But it is not so much the fact that he adduces individual philosophical

⁵²⁶ See Torrance (1988), 59-79.

⁵²⁷ Justinian, *Edictum de Recta Fide*: 82.8-14 Schwartz.

theorems, whether from logic, physics, or metaphysics, which makes his theology “philosophical”. Rather, what sets Philoponus’ anti-Chalcedonian treatise apart from the works of his contemporaries is its theological method. He presupposes the faith of the Church – interpreted from an Alexandrian-miaphysite angle – as a *praeambulum fidei*, but in the course of the argument he completely abstracts from the source of this faith, Scripture and Tradition. Greek-speaking theology in the sixth century can rightly be characterised as “Byzantine scholasticism”⁵²⁸; none the less, the extent to which Philoponus imports philosophical methodology appears extraordinary. In a theology as technical as that of the “scholastic” Leontius of Byzantium, the argument from Tradition is indispensable. For him, the authority of orthodox Christology is grounded on Scripture and on the canonical status of the ecumenical synods, especially Chalcedon, and is only sustained by rational plausibility⁵²⁹. Philoponus is criticised – not unjustifiably – by Grillmeier for reversing the order of Tradition and philosophical argument and using Patristic testimonies in a subsidiary manner⁵³⁰. Philoponus’ intellectual formation certainly contributes to his singularity in this respect. Even in an age when we should not be surprised to find theologians who are familiar with the thought of contemporary philosophers, it is something unheard of in the Greek-speaking part of the Empire – leaving aside here the *Opuscula sacra* of the “last of the Romans, first of the scholastics”, Boethius⁵³¹ – that a famous representative of a pagan philosophical school would dedicate his acumen to a Christian theological controversy. Moreover, Philoponus might feel the need to give a rational defence of miaphysitism all the more urgently since he rejects the canonical status of Chalcedon.

⁵²⁸ Daley (1984), 163–76; cf. Grabmann I (1909), 92–116, and Grillmeier (1975c), 586–610. For a critical endorsement of Grabmann’s approach to comprehend “scholasticism” as a *method*, see Schönberger (1991), 29–33.

⁵²⁹ This has been noted by Daley (1993), 245, who has pointed to the *Prooemium* to Leontius’ collected works: PG 86,1272A, and to *Solutio* 6: PG 86,1929D.

⁵³⁰ Grillmeier (1986), 78.

⁵³¹ This is the title of the chapter on Boethius in Grabmann I (1909), 148–77, echoing the judgment of the Renaissance humanist Laurentius Valla. On Boethius’ theological treatises, cf. Rand (1928), 135–80, Lutz-Bachmann (1983), 61–114, and Daley (1984). Pieper (1960), 50, sees the newness of Boethius in his radical method of articulating the *intellectus fidei* without explicit reference to Scripture. This method is subsequently taken up by the Roman Deacon Rusticus in his *Disputatio contra Acephalos* (c. 560). Among the Latin anti-monophysite literature of this age, Rusticus’ treatise is certainly the most knowledgeable and learned. Cf. Grillmeier (1953), 816–22, and Simonetti (1978) and (1981).

An awareness of the philosophical discussion of his day is necessary for an appreciation of Philoponus' Christological understanding of the terms πρόσωπον/ὑπόστασις and φύσις/οὐσία. Philoponus is not the first one to apply the distinction in Aristotle's *Categories* between first and second substance to the use of ὑπόστασις and οὐσία in Christian doctrine⁵³². It already underlies the Cappadocians' differentiation between what is common and what is particular to the persons of the Trinity, most prominently in Gregory of Nyssa's *Ad Graecos*⁵³³. The originality of Philoponus lies in the consistent application of Aristotle's *Categories*, read in the Porphyrian-Neoplatonic tradition, to his analysis of these key terms in Patristic Christology after Chalcedon. The distinction drawn between *common* and *particular* nature and especially the identification of the latter with hypostasis provide Philoponus with the foundation upon which his miaphysite doctrine rests: one cannot speak of the one without the other, since both are one with regard to their subject. "One hypostasis" necessarily implies "one nature", whereas "two natures" is equivalent to "two hypostases". The Chalcedonian definition of faith, being in itself inconsistent and unintelligible, is therefore nothing but poorly disguised Nestorianism.

It is a stock feature in Chalcedonian polemicists of the sixth and seventh centuries that Severan miaphysitism is deeply entrenched in pagan philosophy and particularly in Aristotelian logic⁵³⁴. The same accusation was brought forth with even more vigour when they attacked the tritheist heresy which rose in the second half of the sixth century. This peculiar Trinitarian theology was a phenomenon very much endemic to miaphysitism and was considered its appropriate offspring by the Chalcedonians⁵³⁵. Surely it is difficult to conceive how this charge could apply to Severus of Antioch, Philoxenus of Mabbug, or Jacob of Sarug. Their Christologies were based on a specific reading of the Alexandrian tradi-

⁵³² Pace Hammerstaedt (1994), 1032-4.

⁵³³ See Zachhuber (1997) and (2000), 71-73. The Cappadocians' use of the technical term λόγος τῆς οὐσίας, e.g., in the famous *Ep.* 38, presupposes some familiarity with the thought-world of Aristotle, though they are, of course, under no obligation to be absolutely faithful to the Stagirite's own usage.

⁵³⁴ For example: Eutychius of Alexandria, *De Differentia Naturae et Hypostaseos* 1-12: [364-78] Ananias; cf. Grillmeier (1989), 512-4, and (1990b), 138-41. Anastasius Sinaita, *Viae Dux* VI.2,9-17: CCG 8,100; IX.2,65-78: 141-2; XXIII,3,20-43: 313.

⁵³⁵ This ancient genealogy of tritheism has been echoed by modern students of this crisis, such as Schönfelder (1862), 286-97; Furlani (1920), 1265, and (1921-22), 104; Maspéro (1923), 207; Martin (1959), 161-83; Weiß (1965), 161-6; and Ebied-Van Roey-Wickham (1981), 25-33.

tion in which the Patristic argument played an all-important role. Severus' *christologie savante* advanced far beyond the early miaphysite literature, which was above all polemical and not speculative. Even so, Severus' own Christological discourse was shaped by the usage of Scripture and of the ante-Chalcedonian Alexandrian tradition, and he would have been astonished by the confidence Philoponus showed in applying philosophical terminology to Christology⁵³⁶. Philoponus, on the other hand, fits very well into this polemical pattern⁵³⁷.

According to the thesis of A.-J. Festugière, a comprehensive reception of Aristotelian philosophy began only in the sixth century when Christian theologians, who at the same time were well-educated philosophers, approached the Stagirite "professionally"⁵³⁸. It should be taken for granted that the Aristotle received in the sixth century had first been adopted and mediated by Neoplatonists. Neoplatonism, which had integrated certain Peripatetic and Stoic doctrines, was the dominant current of thought in late antiquity. In fact, it would be anachronistic to assume that Neoplatonists saw an opposition between Plato and Aristotle, as most moderns do. Since Porphyry the two had been regarded as symphonic.

Before Chalcedon references to Aristotle appeared almost exclusively in writings of an apologetic nature, not in exegetical, homiletic, doctrinal, or historical works⁵³⁹. This is not necessarily indicative of a lack of knowledge on their part, while it is certainly true that until the fourth century the Church Fathers had a very limited access to the Andronican

⁵³⁶ See Lebon (1909), 237-8, and (1951), 454-65; Grillmeier (1989), 156-83. In his correspondence with Sergius, Severus emphasises that neither in Trinitarian theology nor in Christology can terms be used in their strict, philosophical sense; see his *Ep. 2 ad Sergium*: CSCO 119 [120], 135-8 [102-4]. The difference between Severus and Philoponus and the latter's singularity among miaphysites in this respect are noted by Moeller (1951), 640₁₁, and Martin (1959), 172-3.

⁵³⁷ A dramatic portrait of Philoponus as the "heresiarch of the tritheists" is given in the treatise *De Sectis* V,6: PG 86,1233AB. George the Hieromonk (first half of the seventh century) accuses Philoponus of using ἀριστοτελικά τεχνολογία, and subjecting the apostolic teachings of the inspired Fathers to the δόξαι of the Greeks, thus dividing the single and indivisible οὐσία of the Godhead into three οὐσίαι and reducing this common οὐσία to a mere mental abstraction, which has no existence of its own (ἀνύπαρκτον) apart from the three individual οὐσίαι; *De Haeresibus* 13.2: 266-7 Richard.

⁵³⁸ See Festugière (1932), 221-63, and "Festugière Revisited" by Runia (1989).

⁵³⁹ See Runia (1989), 13-6. The same could be said for Plato, as, for instance, the work of Origen shows. Explicit references to Plato occur mostly in the *Contra Celsum*, not in Origen's most systematic work, the *De Principiis*, let alone his Scriptural commentaries and homilies.

corpus and usually drew upon doxographical literature⁵⁴⁰. It should also be borne in mind that even in the debates among pagan philosophical schools Aristotle did not by any means enjoy the prominence that he would later gain under the impact of Porphyry's highly influential *Isagoge* to the *Organon*. There was some resistance to a renaissance of Peripatetic thought, especially among Platonists such as Atticus, whose attacks on the Stagirite are scathing⁵⁴¹. By the late fourth century, however, there was no doubt some direct familiarity with Aristotle among certain Church Fathers, for instance, the Cappadocians and Didymus the Blind⁵⁴². Jerome could even write, regarding a critic of his work against Jovinian, that he would not have expected someone to read this book without knowledge of Aristotle's *Categories*⁵⁴³. None the less, references to Aristotelian ideas remained infrequent in Patristic theology, partly, no doubt, owing to the recurrent association of this philosophy with heretical thought⁵⁴⁴.

The reception of Aristotelian philosophy in Christian theology met with considerable resistance, and was often considered illegitimate. Festugière thought that Aristotle could only be accepted when pagan philosophy was no longer perceived to be a danger. D. T. Runia has pointed out that the reason why this reception started late was not so much fear of the Stagirite, but contempt for the wisdom of this world. The Christian faith was considered the true philosophy. This conviction was summarised in a pointed way in the letter of a Medieval monk: *ipsa philosophia Christus*⁵⁴⁵. The suggestion offered by Runia is an important correction to Festugière's portrait, but still does not provide us with a sufficient answer to the question as to why particular schools of philosophy, notably the Platonic, found a more favourable reception among

⁵⁴⁰ Cf. the admonition of Dorival (1998), 433: "Deux remarques sont ici nécessaires: d'abord un auteur d'apologie peut fort bien citer un écrivain d'après une collection constituée, alors même que, par ailleurs, il l'a lu en tradition directe; ensuite, un auteur peut citer tantôt d'après une collection tantôt d'après l'original".

⁵⁴¹ Edwards (1990) suggests that Atticus is the source (whether directly or through intermediaries) of the polemics against Aristotle in Hippolytus' *Refutatio*. See also Dexipus, *In Cat.*: 5.16ff., who testifies to an earlier tradition; cf. Stead (1963), 54-5.

⁵⁴² See Runia (1989), 16-9, on the sources of the Fathers. Stead (1994b), 32, thinks that serious study of Aristotle by Christians began with Marius Victorinus.

⁵⁴³ Jerome, *Ep.* 50 1: CSEL 54,388.14-389.4.

⁵⁴⁴ See Runia (1989), 23-6.

⁵⁴⁵ The letter was published by Rochais (1951): on the continuity of this Pauline pattern (in Pascal and Kierkegaard, among others) see Tilliette (1990), 33-54. Cf. also the comments of Dorival (1998), 448-9, on the argument of the early Christian apologists that philosophy was useless.

Patristic theologians than Peripatetic thought. Runia himself indicates the reason for this delay when he says: "Before Aristotelianism could be used to lay the foundation of a Christian philosophy it had to be adapted, above all Neoplatonized"⁵⁴⁶. Why should it have to be Neoplatonised in order to become acceptable for Christians? Plato no doubt had something to offer for Christianity, since he believed in the immortality of the soul, its reward and punishment after death, and the demiurgic origin of the universe. Triadic schemes in later Platonists could also be understood as vestiges of the Holy Trinity. Aristotle, on the other hand, whilst being more distinctively theistic than Plato, had a deficient notion of providence, which he believed not to extend to the sublunary sphere. Perhaps more importantly, the Peripatetic school did not have much religious appeal, as Festugière already noted⁵⁴⁷. The possibility of a Christian reception of philosophy seems to depend not so much on the individual doctrines of any school, but on a philosophy's self-understanding of what it is about – which is far from being uniform, whether in antiquity or today. Christian thinkers showed themselves sympathetic to those philosophies which shared their vision of a transcendent human end and at the same time were modest enough not to profess to have accomplished it already⁵⁴⁸. Platonism, especially after Plotinus, had such a congeniality to the Christian kerygma that it appeared to many as a *praeparatio evangelica*. However, to speak of a Neoplatonisation of Aristotle obscures the fact that there was also an Aristotelianisation of Plato from the second century AD onwards. One result of this complex interaction was the genesis of an Alexandrian Neoplatonic school of commentators on Aristotle.

The aporia of defining "Scholasticism" in the Middle Ages generated widespread scepticism towards any essay of this kind. Recently, however, R. Schönberger has capably resumed the question which has troubled the great Medievalists of this century: *Was ist Scholastik?* Without abandoning the impression of the unity of thought which the Middle Ages present to us, he is anxious to account for its historical variety. While he agrees that a univocal understanding of Scholasticism should be discarded, he suggests that Medieval theology is characterised by certain features which enable us to describe it – in the tradition of M. Grabmann – as a method. These characteristics should not be taken as logical

⁵⁴⁶ Runia (1989), 26.

⁵⁴⁷ Festugière (1932), 222-3.

⁵⁴⁸ This thesis is defended in an essay by Jordan (1985), 299-302.

predicates of which it can only be said that they either apply or not; rather, they are valid to a greater or lesser degree. The emerging picture will be complex, and this necessarily so, for otherwise any description of scholastic theology could be contested with the help of a single example which does not agree with it⁵⁴⁹. In this sense, then, we can say that philosopher-theologians like Boethius and Philoponus indeed opened a new era of Christian thought, even though examples of a "scholastic" theology can be adduced from earlier periods. One only needs to point to that treatise by Gregory of Nyssa which is known by the telling (and probably later) title *To the Greeks: From Common Notions*, or to those four works from the fifth century, transmitted under the name of Justin Martyr, which show us a skilled logician and dialectician at work, obviously trained in the school of Aristotle and familiar with the Stagirite's thought⁵⁵⁰. Given these methodological qualifications, the comprehensive reception of Aristotelian-Neoplatonic philosophy appears to be a characteristic of the "scholastic" theology emerging in the sixth century.

What distinguishes the theology of the Latin Middle Ages most significantly from the Patristic approaches towards a *théologie savante* is its institutional place in the monastic or cathedral schools, or, from the thirteenth century onwards, in the newly-established universities. Greek Patristic theology, from the end of the catechetical school of Alexandria in the late fourth century, had no such institutional foundations. It was only in the eleventh century that the patriarchal academy was inaugurated in Constantinople. There was, of course, the famous school of Nisibis in Eastern Syria, modelled after the secular schools, and we

⁵⁴⁹ Schönberger (1991), 45 and *passim*.

⁵⁵⁰ *Quaestiones et Responsiones ad Orthodoxos* (CPG 6285), *Quaestiones ad Graecos* (CPG 1087), *Quaestiones ad Christianos* (CPG 1088), and *Confutatio Dogmatum Quorundam Aristotelicorum* (CPG 1086). They must be acknowledged as the works of a "scholastic" of high standing, according to Hamack (1901), 231-41, and Grabmann I (1909), 94-5. Hamack attributed these writings to Diodore of Tarsus. However, this claim was disputed subsequently by Jülicher (1902) and Funk (1902), who thought of an unknown fifth-century theologian. The Constantinopolitan manuscript of CPG 6285 ascribes it to Theodoret of Cyrus. There still seems to be a crucial difference between the author(s) of these treatises and the philosopher-theologians of the sixth century. In the former case, logical and dialectical skills are used for an apologetic purpose, i.e. to refute objections brought forward against Christian doctrines, while the basic attitude towards the use of philosophy remains negative. Revelation makes all human wisdom superfluous. Thinkers like Boethius and Philoponus, on the other hand, are confident that philosophical reasoning can make a contribution of its own in understanding and explicating the central mysteries of Christianity, Trinity and Incarnation. Recently, Martín (1989) has argued that in the *Confutatio Dogmatum Quorundam Aristotelicorum* some of Philoponus' criticisms of Aristotelian science are anticipated.

know that Iunilius Africanus and Cassiodorus unsuccessfully tried to found similar institutions in the Latin West. The treatise *De Sectis*, composed between 580/1 and 607/8, consists of ten πράξεις, based on the notes (σχόλια) taken by the Byzantine lawyer Leontius from the lectures (ὑπὸ φωνῆς) of Abbot Theodore. This self-description is remarkably similar to the titles of the commentaries on Aristotle from the Neoplatonic school of Alexandria⁵⁵¹, and presupposes some kind of institutionalised teaching of theology. As a rule, however, the subject was pursued as a private study in the Greek-speaking world, often by men who had been educated in the secular schools of grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, or law, such as Severus of Antioch⁵⁵². There certainly existed a forum for theological debates, and questions of doctrine met with a high public interest⁵⁵³. But this was on quite a different scale from the institutionalised teaching of theology at the thirteenth-century European university. The existence of such public institutions for the study of theology may account for the most distinguishing feature of Latin Medieval Scholasticism as compared with the Patristic age, the *quaestio*, with its rigorous structure which left far behind earlier genres in question-and-answer form⁵⁵⁴.

It may be asked what was gained from such an adoption of philosophical method in dogmatic theology. What, after all, does Athens have to do with Jerusalem, Aristotle's *minutiloquium* with the Gospel? The rhetorical flamboyance of Tertullian's apologetic temper must not make us forget that one of the tasks of theology is the articulation of the *intellectus fidei*. In order to articulate the mystery of the Trinity and the Incarnation, theologians are bound to make use of philosophy. The more consciously and critically they do so, the better they fulfil their task. From this perspective, the project of the sixth-century "scholastics" is wholly legitimate. There can be no doubt that philosophical tools are indispensable for the craft of the theologian. The problem which emerges then is whether the conceptual framework chosen by Philoponus was appropriate.

Frede has argued that, especially concerning the problem of individuality, the Church Fathers could hardly have made use of the conceptual

⁵⁵¹ Cf. Richard (1950), esp. 198-202.

⁵⁵² Cf. Daley (1984), 185-8, with further bibliography.

⁵⁵³ This is obvious, for instance, from Agathias, *Historia* II.29.1-5: 78.8-29 Keydell, and Leontius of Byzantium, *Prooemium*: PG 86,1268B-1269A, and is reflected in the common literary genres of the age, such as dialogue and *erôtapokriseis*.

⁵⁵⁴ On the *quaestio* see Schönberger (1991), 52-80. Its singularity, compared with the Greek tradition, is also emphasised by Ebbesen (1982), 102.

schemes developed by ancient philosophers⁵⁵⁵. The doctrine of the Trinity, Christology, and also, to a lesser extent, anthropological questions on the human constitution and the bodily resurrection, required a conception of individuality which is foreign, or even contrary, to our common intuitions. The framework of Aristotle's *Categories* could certainly not provide a sufficient conceptual basis for these Christian doctrines; on the contrary, it could prove misleading. Plotinus had already issued the qualification that Aristotle's ten categories were designed with regard to the physical world and to material objects. They did not apply to the supra-sensible realm⁵⁵⁶. What philosophy had to offer was quite poor, as can be seen in the contributions made by such eminent philosophers as Boethius and Philoponus to the doctrine of the Trinity and Christology. Distinguished Christian theologians who were familiar with the pagan philosophy of their day subscribed to Plotinus' criticism of the ten categories and clearly perceived their limitations in matters of Christian dogma. Augustine applied the category *substantia* to God in his *Confessiones*, but he was clear that it could not properly be predicated of God (or of evil) in the *De Trinitate*⁵⁵⁷. Boethius affirmed that *substantia* was the only one of the Aristotelian categories that could be predicated of God. However, when these categories are applied to God, they change their meaning entirely (*cuncta mutantur quae praedicari possunt*). God is a substance that is beyond substance⁵⁵⁸.

Philoponus, a committed member of the miaphysite communion at Alexandria when writing the *Arbiter*, was not just a hired advocate of a cause he could equally well have opposed, had he set his mind to it. How serious he was about his theological convictions is obvious from his readiness to provoke a schism and endure the anathema for his theology of the Trinity later in his life. Philoponus certainly argued from presuppositions which he shared with other Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle, however, it would seem unwarranted to accuse him of transferring a predetermined philosophical analysis from the created order to the mystery of the Incarnation. As I have argued, anthropological ideas were instrumental for his defence, but not decisive for his endorsement of miaphysite Christology. The main problem lies in

⁵⁵⁵ Frede (1997), 38-40. For a similar judgment cf. Balthasar (1978), 185-210.

⁵⁵⁶ Plotinus, *Enn.* VI.1.1-3; also V.5.10.

⁵⁵⁷ *De Trinitate* VII,4,9-5,10: CCL 50, 259-61; *Confessiones* V,10,20: cf. the commentary of O'Donnell (1992), *ad loc.*

⁵⁵⁸ Boethius, *De Trinitate* IV: LCL 74,16-24.

the conceptual strictures Philoponus imposes on Christological discourse.

8.2 *Philoponus and Chalcedon*

The main purpose of Philoponus' literary endeavour in the *Arbiter* and the subsequent treatises was a defence of miaphysitism and a critique of Chalcedonian Christology. It is appropriate, then, to inquire into his relationship to the dogmatic definition of the Council. There can be no doubt that he understood it *Aristotelice et non piscatorie*, after the manner of Aristotle, not of a fisherman – indeed, there are not too many others to which this applied so accurately. When the *Codex Encyclicus* was compiled between 457 and 459 at the initiative of the Emperor Leo I, the group of Greek bishops led by Euippus characterised their approach to Chalcedon with the following words: *haec ergo breviter piscatorie et non Aristotelice suggestimus*⁵⁵⁹. From the early decades of the sixth century, however, the prevalent attitude towards Chalcedon had shifted from this “pastoral” breadth to a focus on the speculative implications of the Council's dogmatic formula, which seemed so contrary to common intuitions. This debate “after the manner of Aristotle” was all too often marked by sharp polemics about the technical subtleties of the formula, with a tendency to ignore the kerygmatic aspect of the definition of faith. Whether or not the work of Timothy Aelurus proved to be the decisive moment in this shift, as Grillmeier has suggested⁵⁶⁰, may be left unanswered here. The results of this acrimonious controversy were often deplorable. However, this fact does not discredit the attempt to work out the speculative content of the formula. It certainly seems to be a task required for the articulation of the *intellectus fidei*.

I should like to argue that the speculative content of Chalcedonian Christology is not too far from that of Philoponus. This is even more true for the Cyrilline reading of the Council's definition given by such sixth-century theologians as John of Caesarea and Leontius of Jerusalem. Philoponus' antagonism towards the Council was thus mainly owing to the conceptual strictures which he imposed on Christology. Be-

⁵⁵⁹ ACO II.5,84.2-3. This expression is taken from Gregory Nazianzen, who emphasises that he speaks about the Trinity δογματικῶς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀντιλογικῶς, ἀλιευτικῶς. ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀριστοτελικῶς πνευματικῶς, ἀλλ' οὐ κακοπραγμονικῶς ἐκκλησιαστικῶς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀγοραίως· ὀφελίμως, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπιδεικτικῶς, *Or.* 23 12,11-4: SC 270,304-6. On the *Codex Encyclicus* cf. Grillmeier (1975a).

⁵⁶⁰ Grillmeier (1975a), 292.

cause of his identification of particular nature and hypostasis the Chalcedonian distinction between the level of hypostasis, where unity is effected, and the level of nature, where duality is preserved, appeared to him wholly incomprehensible. But is it really more legitimate to speak of one nature or substance with incompatible properties, rather than two natures with their own? Does Philoponus' conception avoid the logical difficulties of Chalcedon, or does he just transfer them onto another level? It was the merit of Chalcedonian orthodoxy, when it affirmed that the two natures of Christ are united καθ' ὑπόστασιν, not κατὰ φύσιν (as in canon VIII of the Second Council of Constantinople), that it secured the full reality of the God-man Christ who is consubstantial with the Father with regard to his divinity and consubstantial with us with regard to his humanity. Evidently, Philoponus' emphasis on the undiminished divinity and the undiminished humanity of Christ prevented him from the extremist position of Eutyches and from any "real-monophysitism". At the point, however, where the divine and the human, the eternal and the temporal, the immaterial and the material meet, the answers Philoponus gave were deficient.

The crucial problems of his approach were already identified by the Emperor Justinian and by Leontius of Jerusalem⁵⁶¹, although their writings preceded Philoponus' *Arbiter* and so did not engage with him directly. While these two sixth-century theologians attempted to form a synthesis of Chalcedonian and Cyrilline Christology, they questioned the miaphysite use of the anthropological paradigm in Christology⁵⁶². Their main argument runs as follows:

To say that there is "one nature" of the divinity and the humanity of Christ according to the paradigm of the "one nature" of man, who is constituted of soul and body, is liable to serious misconceptions. The

⁵⁶¹ Justinian was not the theological dilettante as portrayed by Schwartz. This does of course not exclude the possibility that he relied on the advice of *periti*. The view that Leontius of Byzantium was his theological consultant and had a profound influence on the conciliar decrees of 553 has been discarded; cf. Haacke (1953), 153-4. A better candidate for the role of the Emperor's *peritus* would be his namesake Leontius of Jerusalem. However, the argument of Richard (1944), 81-8, that this Leontius exercised his literary activity in Constantinople has not been unanimously accepted; cf. Gray (1979), 122, and Grillmeier (1989), 289-90.

⁵⁶² Both are in general very reticent towards it; see Leontius of Jerusalem, *Contra Monophysitas* 15: PG 86,1777D; Justinian, *Contra Monophysitas* 27-56: 12-16 Schwartz; *Edictum de Recta Fide*: 82-3 Schwartz. Significantly, the paradigm is absent from canons 7 and 8 of the General Council of 553, where we might have expected it; cf. ACO IV.1,242.1-23 (Greek) and 217.7-29 (Latin). This critique would later be resumed by Maximus Confessor, *Ep. 12* and *Ep. 13*.

“one nature” of man refers to the common species (εἶδος) which comprehends all the individual hypostases or persons in which it is instantiated. Individual members of this class, such as Peter and Paul, are distinguished from one another by certain properties, but not by the nature which they have in common; both are men. What makes this nature “composite” is the fact that neither the soul alone nor the body alone constitutes the human being; rather, man is created from non-being *as* composite. Every creature, even if it is composed of different constituents, can thus be said to have “one nature”. Not so with Christ. The name “Christ” is not indicative of a single nature viz. substance which would be predicated of a plurality of hypostases or persons. If this were the case, it would be at least a logical possibility to find a plurality of “Christs” who would have a single nature in common. In fact, Christ was not created from the beginning (ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς) *as* a composite of divinity and humanity. Therefore there is no “nature of Christ” in the same way as there is a nature of man. While being God from eternity and of the same substance with the Father, the Logos united himself with human nature καθ’ ὑπόστασιν, not ceasing to be God when he became man⁵⁶³. Christ is one hypostasis viz. person that has in himself the perfection of the uncreated divine nature and the perfection of the created human nature, which he has assumed in the Incarnation⁵⁶⁴. This hypostasis is thus truly composite, but without being changed (ἀτρέπτως) or constrained by necessity (ἀνάγκης), as Maximus Confessor would later say⁵⁶⁵.

The name “Christ” is not indicative of a substance (οὐσία), since it is not indicative of a common item (κοινόν); it can neither be said of a plurality of hypostases, nor conceived of in abstraction from its individual properties. To put it concisely, “Christ” is not a ὅρος⁵⁶⁶. “Christ” is not a λόγος τῆς οὐσίας that could be understood in analogy with “man”, “horse”, or “ox”, since it is not a specific term but a *proper name* denoting an individual person. “God” and “man”, on the other

⁵⁶³ Justinian, *Edictum*: 80.18-36; *Contra Monophysitas* 22: 11.30-12.3 and 57: 16.18-30. Maximus Confessor, *Ep.* 13: PG 91,517D, is suspicious of a πλῆθος Χριστῶν.

⁵⁶⁴ Justinian’s statement is carefully wrought: ἔχει τὸ τέλειον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῆς θείας καὶ ἀκτίστου φύσεως καὶ τὸ τέλειον τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ κτιστῆς φύσεως, *Edictum*: 80.37-8.

⁵⁶⁵ Cf. Maximus Confessor, *Ep.* 12: PG 91,489D-492A; *Ep.* 13: 517BC, 528D-529A, 532A.

⁵⁶⁶ Justinian, *Contra Monophysitas* 23: 12.8-9, and Leontius of Jerusalem, *C. Monoph.* 21: 1781D, rely on Cyril, *Scholia de Incarnatione* 1: ACO I.1.5,219.9: Τὸ Χριστός ὄνομα οὔτε ὄρου δύναμιν ἔχει οὔτε μὲν τῆν τινοῦ οὐσίαν, ὃ τι ποτέ ἐστίν, σημαίνει, καθάπερ ἀμέλει ἀνθρῶπος ἢ ἵππος ἢ βούς.

hand, may be said to be indicative of substances, insofar as they stand for the divinity and humanity of Jesus⁵⁶⁷.

It is to Philoponus' credit that he displayed a conciliatory attitude and proposed a compromise between moderate "monophysites" and those Chalcedonians who argued for both ἐκ δύο φύσεων and ἐν δύο φύσεσιν as valid formulae of Christological dogma. As we have seen, he was prepared to accept the latter under certain conditions. It was all the more unfortunate that the heated climate of the mid-sixth-century controversy prevented both parties from coming to a consensus. In the wake of the Council of 553, Philoponus found himself under pressure to defend his previous writings on Christology against the criticism of his partisans. His attitude became rather intransigent and he even drew back from the suggestions he had made in the *Arbiter*. Needless to say, this radicalisation of his thought fits in well with what we know about the last years of his life, when his theology of the Trinity and his views on the resurrection provoked two schisms in the miaphysite community of Alexandria.

Philoponus explicitly aims at bringing order into the mess of the post-Chalcedonian controversies by subduing Christology to a rigorous logical clarification. The categories according to which he judges the validity of different positions are strictly philosophical. However, Philoponus does not succeed in providing a logically coherent alternative to the definition of the Council. Indeed the principal question is whether his project is not inherently flawed. While the divine realities enjoy an innate intelligibility and thus allow for theological investigation, they remain in the half-light of the mystery, which can never be elucidated entirely by rational enquiry. In this respect the *Arbiter* leaves a far too confident impression of what can be achieved at all. Notwithstanding this methodological caveat, the kerygmatic scope of the Chalcedonian definition, the affirmation of the reality of divinity and humanity in the one person of Jesus Christ, calls for an ontological clarification⁵⁶⁸. Hence *Aristotelice* versus *piscatorie* is a false alternative in the understanding of the Council. Chalcedon itself does not provide a developed Christology, but the valid criteria for theological reflection about the person and work of Jesus Christ. It is by these criteria that Philoponus' forceful defence of a μία-φύσις-σύνθετος Christology should be measured.

⁵⁶⁷ Justinian, *Contra Monophysitas* 13-4: 10.5-11, again relying on Cyril (*In Ioh.* II,6: II,324-5 Pusey).

⁵⁶⁸ This is captured well by Balthasar (1978), 185. "Theology" in this sense begins with the New Testament, as pointed out by Grillmeier (1975c), 587-9.

II

JOHN PHILOPONUS, *ARBITER*

9 A Translation of the *Arbiter*

The book of John the Grammarian of Alexandria, called Philoponus or "lover of work". First, the Arbiter or examiner of the words of the two sides that contend against each other on the Incarnation⁵⁶⁹ of God the Logos.

[Prologue]

1. Truth is self-sufficient for its own advocacy with those who ardently regard it with the eye of the soul. But there are many things which obscure reason and pervert right judgment. For personal resentments, empassioned antagonisms, covetousness, ambition, and the fact that one is not expected to turn away from previous misunderstandings by recourse, as it were, to fresh instruction from the truth, will dull the hearing of the soul's tribunal through preference for views once formed. Another point is lack of proper training in logic and lack of skill in reasoning. In addition, sloth and innate sluggishness are impediments for some to departing from previous opinions. We suffer, dear sir, from the following truly lamentable vanity: if somebody propounds to us an enigma from other arts or disciplines in which we happen to be untrained, we are not ashamed very readily to confess ignorance of them. In theology, however, a thing almost incomprehensible [3/4] to men, which not even the holy powers can worthily lay hold of, anybody who has not even tasted these things with his finger tip, as the saying goes, who has not even, maybe, acquired an elementary knowledge of the alphabet, is embarrassed unless he sets himself up as a precise expert, deeming himself not inferior to one who has spent all his life on the study of logic. It is for this very reason that there is only one who can purify our souls from this sort of suffering.

2. Our contemporaries, who contend on the holy⁵⁷⁰ Incarnation of the Logos, the majority of them, as it were, except for a few in number,

⁵⁶⁹ ܐܝܢܐ ܕܡܝܬܐ (Šanda 3.5 and *passim*) was introduced into Syriac only from c. 500 in later works of Philoxenus of Mabbug, in order to render the Greek ἐνανθρώπησις. A literal translation would be "Inhumanation"; for the sake of convenience, the common term "Incarnation" will be used here.

⁵⁷⁰ ܐܝܢܐ ܕܡܝܬܐ (Šanda 4.7 and *passim*), literally: "divine".

monly thought about the Incarnation of our Saviour by the devout, so that the proofs may follow from commonly professed ideas and opinions. Thus it is believed in accordance with the Holy Scriptures that the eternal Son, the only-begotten Word of the Father, he who is true God from true God, he who is consubstantial with his begetter, in the last age became truly incarnate from the holy God-bearer Mary, and became perfect man, without suffering from any change or alteration in substance, but uniting with himself hypostatically a human body ensouled with a rational and intelligent soul. And as is the case with man, who is an assembly from two natures (that is, a rational soul and a body which is made up of elements that have been mingled out of which the rational living being man has been effected), thus also with Christ. The divine nature of the Logos and the human [nature] having been united, a single Christ has resulted from the two: not merely a simple union of natures has resulted. as it may be said that God has been united with a man, or a man with a man, while their natures are divided and no single entity has been constituted by each of them, such as, for example, a single man or a single living being. Rather, the relation which for us the body has with respect to the soul governing it, which moves its own impulses, a relation of such kind, in the case of Our Lord Christ, belongs to the whole human entelechy⁵⁷⁷, which is moved by⁵⁷⁸ the divinity united to it, as [the divinity] wills. The rational soul, because of the union with the divinity, becomes, so to speak, moved by God, and has subjected all its rational movements instrumentally to the divine operations of the Logos united with it, since also the body is naturally the proper instrument of the soul. Hence there is one operation through the whole entelechy⁵⁷⁹, which is principally moved by the divinity of Christ Our Lord but proceeds instrumentally through the rational soul united to him, and is completed in the movement [5/6] of the divine body.

4. Therefore there was also something more in the Lord Christ, more than anything belonging to our entelechy. For with us we find certain movements proper to the body, for which the soul does not provide the causes. For only in the sort of [movements], where the body is moved

⁵⁷⁷ ܠܥܬܠܚܝܬܐ VB Šanda 5.19: ܠܥܬܠܚܝܬܐ ܡܠ ܚܘܕܐ ܕܥܡܠܐ ܝܠܠܐ ܝܡܓ B. "Entelechy" seems an appropriate translation of the Syriac here. The Greek commentators often interpreted ἐντελεχεία (Aristotle, *De Anima* B.1) as τελειότης, which entered the Latin Medieval tradition as *perfectio*.

⁵⁷⁸ ܕܠܥܬܠܚܝܬܐ VB Šanda 5.20: ܕܠܥܬܠܚܝܬܐ ܝܡܓ B

⁵⁷⁹ ܠܥܬܠܚܝܬܐ VB Šanda 5.24: ܠܥܬܠܚܝܬܐ ܝܡܓ B.

principally by the soul, can [the soul] move it. Because it cannot control all the natural faculties of the body – for it cannot make something heavy not-heavy so that it would not incline downwards nor something hot not heat the things put next to it – the body must necessarily also have operations of its own, with no participation of the soul in them, owing to its inability to govern them, as it pleases. Therefore it is true to say that such operations are proper to the body. Concerning Our Lord Christ, however, the omnipotent divinity extended to every effect, and hence no natural movement, either of the soul or of the body, simply occurred merely according to the principle of nature, but it was governed by the divinity united to it, in such a manner as seemed good to [the divinity]: i.e. it transmitted the divine will to the body voluntarily through the mediation of the soul. So, just as in the case of this living being of ours too, one cannot speak of the operations of its double-constituted entelechy (for example, its walking, speaking, breathing, seeing, or hearing) as belonging to the body or to the soul on its own, but we say that they are common to the completed whole, originating from the soul but completed in the body; in the same way, one also has to speak of Our Lord Christ, because every natural faculty, whether psychic or bodily or of the composite from these two, was controlled by the divinity united to it, and responded to its commands; it is therefore impossible to divide in him any of the operations of those [constituents] from which the composite was made up. We do not say e.g. that walking belongs to the body alone, or that fulfilling all righteousness belongs to the soul alone or, loosely, to the human nature of Christ, but each operation must be predicated of the completed whole; originating from the divinity as from the principal cause it is completed through the mediation of the soul in the divine body united to it. [6/7]

5. The passions occurring naturally to soul and body because of natural sickness which Christ voluntarily assumed as a sign of his true Incarnation, again by the principle of unity, while resulting from a part, are rightly predicated of the completed whole, both by custom and again for the reason that they did not happen without the will of the Logos. Hence we say e.g. of Peter or Paul that they are sick or are struck, though these passions occur only in the body. But to be ignorant or weary or anxious or to hate or to love, these passions, on the other hand, appear to pertain to the soul alone and not to the body. None the less, those which occur in a part we predicate of the completed whole, because of the union of soul and body. Furthermore, just as being human belongs to us through

rational soul rather than through organic character of the limbs or using sense-perception or being moved or having a body; and as these things are common to other living beings as well, but we have the impress indeed of something superior in us, on account of which we can be called human beings, because the whole species has come into existence through rational soul, since man is a rational living being, and all the passions, that is of soul and body, are predicated of him: so too in the case of Our Lord Christ, we can rightly name the completed whole⁵⁸⁰ “God”, from the superior of the unified [elements], i.e. the divinity which is of its own kind [and] makes up the completed whole out of those which are fitting, even if he is said to suffer or be weary or be crucified or die. And evidently, while we predicate these [operations] of the whole as derived from the part, we do not lapse from what is the proper [usage]. For we do not associate passion with the divinity, because not even in regard to the rational soul do we say that, when a man is sick in body, it wearies, or that [the rational soul] walks or is divided, or say that anything similar to this occurs to it. Again just as when we say that a man is known to be wise or intelligent from the superior⁵⁸¹ part, which is the soul, we predicate these [operations] of the whole, so also, though we say of Christ that he works miracles or that he governs the universe “by his word of power”⁵⁸², knowing that these are operations of his divinity we attribute them to the whole of him because of the union. But if it is also usual for Scripture to name man from the lesser part, i.e. the flesh, why should it be puzzling, if it also names Christ “man” and “human being”? For unless it called him “God” and “Mighty God”⁵⁸³ and “God over all”⁵⁸⁴ [7/8] and “God warrior of ages”⁵⁸⁵ and “Maker of what is seen and what is unseen”⁵⁸⁶ and “He who has brought everything into being through the word of his power”⁵⁸⁷, as it is also wont to call men “souls”, someone would perhaps be offended, on hearing that Our Lord was called “man” and “human being”. Now, however, just as, on hearing “God”, I understand together with it truly his humanity also, so too with the appellation “man” I understand that the divine nature is meant together with it.

⁵⁸⁰ ܠܚܠܝܬ V Šanda 7.15: ܠܚܠܝܬ B.

⁵⁸¹ ܠܚܠܝܬ VB (*pace* Šanda 7₅).

⁵⁸² Heb. 1:3. ܠܚܠܝܬ V Šanda 7.22: ܠܚܠܝܬ B (Heb. 1:3 Peshitta).

⁵⁸³ Dtn. 10:17.

⁵⁸⁴ Rom. 9:5.

⁵⁸⁵ Is. 9:6 Peshitta.

⁵⁸⁶ *Symbolum Nicaenum*.

⁵⁸⁷ Cf. Ps. 33(32):6 and Heb. 1:3. ܠܚܠܝܬ V Šanda 8.1: ܠܚܠܝܬ B.

6. Having first professed in an orthodox way what is commonly agreed by those who think in a devout manner about the mystery of Christ, we shall go on to examine each point. Do we rightly say that there is one nature of Christ after the union, i.e. a composite and not a simple [nature], or do we necessarily confess that there are two natures after the union viz. that [Christ] is seen in two natures? If we speak of him as “after the union”, this does not mean that the divine flesh of the Logos pre-existed the union, but just as if we said, e.g., “after the garment was whitened” or “after the brass received form”, we do not say that, prior to the whitening of the garment, part of the whiteness which has come into it pre-existed, or that, prior to the forming of the brass, part of the form which has come into it [pre-existed], but that conceptually these are distinguished, though naturally united, so in the case of Christ. Regarding the customary phrase “after the union”, it is evident that the substance of the Logos has existed prior to the ages. The flesh, however, which has been united to him, by assuming existence in relation to him, exists in a way similar to e.g. the partial whiteness in the garment and the part of the form in the brass. “After the union” is to be understood in this way always. It has been examined first, then, since it is natural and follows the understanding of Christians of old to confess “one nature of Christ after the union”, though not simple, but composite; and this is presupposed from now on.

7. *First chapter.* If we profess that the divine and the human natures of Christ have been united not by any visible property, such as e.g. in honour or in power or in operation or in anything else of that kind, but by what they are *qua* natures – for this is to profess a union of natures – there are the alternatives: a single entity has resulted from the union, yes or no? So, if a single entity has not resulted from them, how can we even say that they have been united at all? For what else is “to be united” than becoming one? [8/9] For we do not profess a union by illumination, as in the prophets⁵⁸⁸. Therefore, just as “to be whitened” is nothing else than becoming a participant in whiteness and becoming white, [and] likewise “to be heated” [is nothing else than] becoming a participant in heat and becoming hot, in the same way I therefore think that “to be united” is nothing else than becoming a participant in unity and becoming one. And Holy Scripture has not tired of saying that “the

⁵⁸⁸ Šanda 8.24-9.1 = Nicetas Choniates, *fr* 1. Note that I have in general given preference to the text of the Greek fragments over the ancient Syriac version.

Word became flesh"⁵⁸⁹, because "he was incarnate"⁵⁹⁰. None the less it is acknowledged by those who strive to be devout that [to say] that "the Word was incarnate" is not to be understood in the same way as one might say that a body became white or hot. For as far as becoming hot or white is concerned, it is proper to a substance in itself to admit of predicates of this sort and to be altered by them. But the Logos' being incarnate does not mean anything else than his being united to flesh and a single living being resulting from two [constituents], in the sense which we have previously laid down, and not that the divine substance received the likeness of the flesh in itself and became a body, so to say. Therefore, since what is united to something becomes one with it, and [since] we say "becoming incarnate" for "becoming one", I think it fitting to use two terms, "being united" and "becoming flesh". And I think that Holy Scripture refuted the opinion of heretics very clearly beforehand by using the expression "Incarnation" rather "union", as "union" is by custom predicated homonymously of things which are united in mere affection. This is not unusual for Scripture too, such as in the saying: "As I and you are one, so also they may be one in us"⁵⁹¹. For this reason it says "the Word became flesh", so that none of those who entertain fancies about the power of the divine substance may use this phrase as an evil device and suppose that a union has been effected only by mere affection, while the natures themselves remain particular and separate, and negate these words, as if they were idle. For how can the term "Incarnation", to which change and alteration pertain, allow our intellect to slip into a division of the substances which have been united?

8. If therefore, as I have said, from the union of the two natures a single entity has resulted, what then is this single entity? Only a mere name or a reality? If it is only a mere name, without a reality, there will be no natures that are united, just as the hound of Orion⁵⁹² and a terrestrial dog, being one only in mere name, are not united by nature either [9/10], or a real man and a pictured man. Therefore if the natures *qua* being [natures]⁵⁹³ have been united, and for this reason a single entity has resulted from their union (or composition), it is, then, not a mere name, but a reality. But if it is a reality, it is one of two things: either a nature (or sub-

⁵⁸⁹ John 1:14.

⁵⁹⁰ *Symbolum Nicaenum*.

⁵⁹¹ John 17:21.

⁵⁹² Literally: "astral dog".

⁵⁹³ καθὸ τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσιν Nicetas: ~~καθὸ τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσιν~~ V.B. Šanda 10.1.

stance), or some of the accidents belonging with a substance. If, then, this single entity is an accident or merely some relationship of natures and not a nature (or substance), if it is, as we have said before, an operation or an honour or a power: again it is not the natures which have been united *qua* being [natures]⁵⁹⁴, but their accidents, as it is possible to hear from the partisans of Nestorius: “In as much as the man who is from Mary has participated in the honour (i.e. the operation and power) of the Logos, for this reason one name belongs to the two”. But our argument is not now directed against the [Nestorians], to engage in refutations⁵⁹⁵ of their tenets. Therefore, if the natures have been united *qua* their being [natures], and for this reason the single entity which has been effected out of their union is neither a mere name nor some accident nor an accompaniment of a nature⁵⁹⁶, it must necessarily be a substance or nature (granted that both mean the same, viz. “substance” and “nature”). But if the single entity which has been effected out of the union of the two [natures]⁵⁹⁷ is a nature (or substance), then we do well to profess that there is one nature of Our Lord Christ after the union, even though we recognise it not as a simple but as a composite [nature], as I have often said⁵⁹⁸.

9. But if they say we ought to call him who has been effected out of the union of the two natures not one nature but one Christ, we shall pose the following dilemma before them: this name “Christ” – I mean the [name] which is predicated of the divine Logos who became incarnate, for the name “Christ [i.e. anointed one]” is by custom predicated homonymously of prophets and kings – is it indicative of substance (or nature), or of something accompanying their substance? If, then, it is indicative of accompaniments of a substance of something, such as an operation or a power, this [something] will also be the single end-product resulting from the union. To say this is absurd, as the preceding argument has already shown by way of refutation. For it would have occurred in such a way that we could not say that natures had been united, but [only] what pertains to them accidentally and extrinsically. It is agreed, however, and professed that there is a union of the natures themselves. Thus, therefore, the name “Christ” is not indicative of accompaniments of a substance of something, if the end-product resulting from

⁵⁹⁴ ܡܬܝܢܐ add. B (Šanda 10.7).

⁵⁹⁵ ܡܬܝܢܐܢܐܝܐ VB: ܡܬܝܢܐܝܐܝܐ Šanda 10.10.

⁵⁹⁶ φύσεως Nicetas: ܡܬܝܢܐ B Šanda 10.12: ܡܬܝܢܐ V.

⁵⁹⁷ φύσεων add. Nicetas (Šanda 10.14).

⁵⁹⁸ Šanda 9.24-10.4 and 10.10-16 = Nicetas Choniates, *fr.* 2.

the union is Christ. But if the name "Christ" is indicative of a nature, it is one of two things: it is indicative of one nature or of two [natures]. If one, I have what is sought, namely a truly composite, and not [10/11] a simple [nature]. But if two, there are the alternatives: it is indicative of each of them separately, or of both together. If of each of them separately, so that Christ will be the divine and again the human [nature], will [the name "Christ"] be predicated homonymously of both of them, like "dog of the sea" and "dog of the dry land", or univocally, in the same way that the word "man" [is used] of Peter and Paul? But if homonymously, there will be two Christs and not one, which participate in the name, but are different in the natures understood by the name. For this is homonymy, in the same way that "dog of the sea" and "dog of the dry land" are two dogs, in that "one" belongs only in name and not in reality to what is understood by the name. But if univocally, as in the word "man" [used] of Peter and of Paul, for whom not only the name, but also the nature understood by the name is the same, even so there will again be two Christs, just as Peter and Paul are two men; they are the same in species, but numerically two and not one. Hence, if there are not numerically two Christs, but truly one, i.e. in name and in reality, then the name "Christ" is not indicative of two natures which are understood each on its own, as Nestorius would like to have it.

10. But neither can [the name "Christ"]⁵⁹⁹ be indicative of the two [natures]⁶⁰⁰ together. For if there is no single entity which is the end-product of the union of the two natures, the single name "man" cannot be predicated of soul and body, nor can the name "Christ" be predicated of the two – the divinity and the humanity of Christ – since no single entity has resulted from them⁶⁰¹. For neither is the name "house" predicated of stones and of pieces of wood together, before a single form and likeness of a house has been effected as a result of their composition. Nor is the name "chorus" predicated without qualification⁶⁰² of a plurality together, but is indicative of the relationship between all the singers, that it is one. For a single name too cannot be predicated of a plurality together, without being predicated of them homonymously or univocally, unless one nature results from their composition, or some kind of mutual affection, of which the name will be indicative. But here too they

⁵⁹⁹ τὸ γὰρ Χριστὸς ὄνομα *add.* Nicetas (Šanda 11.15).

⁶⁰⁰ φύσεων *add.* Nicetas (Šanda 11.15).

⁶⁰¹ Šanda 11.15-18 = Nicetas Choniates, *fr.* 3.

⁶⁰² ὁμοῦ V Šanda 11.20: ὁμοῦ B.

say that the name "Christ" is indicative of the end-product of the two natures. They should then say what this end-product of the divine nature and the human nature is. For again this will necessarily be either a mere name or a reality. And if it is a reality, it is either a substance (and nature) or some accident accompanying a substance⁶⁰³. Again, [11/12] it is in denial of its being a mere name or an extrinsic accompaniment of a substance, because of the absurdities which are attendant on such opinions, that it follows that there will be one substance or composite nature, known by the name "Christ". And thus Christ, being numerically one, will be one nature, to be known by that name, but evidently composite and not simple, in the way that the word "man" is indicative of the nature composed of soul and body.

11. Having already encountered the statement that one hypostasis has resulted from two, but not, consequently, one nature as well, we shall examine it, showing its impossibility and inconsistency. For I am not oblivious to the fact that some doctors said that the name "Christ" is not indicative of a substance, but of something effected in relation to a substance, deriving this meaning of the name from ancient uses of the title "anointed". But though these names are mostly not indicative of substance but of some operation or branch of knowledge or possessions or something else of the kind, as e.g. "king", "philosopher", "grammarian", "lord", or "servant", none the less we do not often indicate by such names the kinds of things accompanying a substance. For when we say that a king has come, even though we are not saying a word indicative of a substance, none the less we are saying that the substance of the king has come. In the same manner, when we say that a grammarian walks or is sick or sleeps, we do not say that a branch of knowledge of some kind suffers – for this would indeed be ridiculous – but by this we mean the nature of the man who is referred to by its academic discipline, that is grammar. Thus, then, when Peter said: "You are the Christ, the Son of the living God"⁶⁰⁴, what else did he mean by the name "Christ" but him who is by nature the Son of God? Therefore, though the name "Christ" was not in the first place indicative of substance, when we say that one Christ is the end-product of two natures, his divinity and his humanity, it is evident that we are not saying that some operation is the end-product of substances in composition. For it would show great ignorance to say that an operation is the end-product of substances in compo-

⁶⁰³ *ἡ οὐσία* B: *ἡ φύσις* V Šanda 11.27.

⁶⁰⁴ Mt. 16:16.

sition, or, without qualification, something accidental to a substance. But in designating a composite nature truly, through the economy effected in him, as he whose name designates him as anointed, we do not depart from the fitting. This is our first chapter. [12/13]

12. *Second chapter.* If there are two natures of Christ which have been united – which is the same as saying “substances”, for evidently the divine and the human, to which they also apply the name “dyad of natures”, are substances⁶⁰⁵ – is Christ other than his natures, or is he the same as his natures? If, then, Christ is other than his natures, who is he, being other than them? But nothing which exists is other than its nature (or substance). For if the nature (or substance) of man is rational and mortal living being – for the definitions of things are indicative of their substance – but man is other than his own substance, then man will be other than rational and mortal living being. But man is nothing else than rational and mortal living being. And how should man thus be other than himself? Therefore, if Christ too were other than his own natures (or substances), but the existence of an individual is according to his nature (or substance), as we have shown – Christ will then be other than himself, which is both absurd and ridiculous. Thus Christ is not other than his natures. But if he is not other, then saying “Christ” is the same as saying “his natures”, because they⁶⁰⁶ who claim the contrary say that the name “Christ” is indicative of his two natures. Now if Christ is the same as his natures, just as man is the same as the nature of man, that is, rational mortal living being, and there are two natures of Christ and not one, then there will also be two Christs, as Nestorius thinks, and not one according to the Scriptures. If, then, Christ is truly one in name and in reality and one cannot speak in any way at all of “two Christs” in regard to the Lord’s Incarnation, and if Christ is the same as his nature (or substance), as in the case of each existent, evidently there will of necessity be one nature of Christ⁶⁰⁷, just as saying “the sun” is the same as saying “the nature of the sun” (or its “substance”).

13. The sun, indeed, being one, the nature of the sun must also be one and not two. For, if multiple differences of natural faculties are seen in the sun, such as e.g. its brightness and heat and again its three-dimensional extension and spherical shape, its circular motion and whatever else of the kind, even then there is no need to say that there are multiple

⁶⁰⁵ οὐσίαι Nicetas: ܐܘܨܝܐܝܝܐ VB Šanda 13.2.

⁶⁰⁶ ܐܘܨܝܐܝܝܐ ... ܐܘܨܝܐܝܝܐ VB Šanda 13.15: ὑμεῖς λέγοντες ... φατε Nicetas.

⁶⁰⁷ Šanda 13.1-10. 11-23 = Nicetas Choniates, *fr.* 4.

natures of the sun. For nothing of the kind by itself makes the nature of the sun. Brightness is also in fire, and spherical shape in many others, and again circular motion in the whole sky [13/14], and three-dimensional extension in each body, but the sun is none of those. But what is a joint product of all that has been mentioned, being one and not more⁶⁰⁸, this is the sun's nature (or substance), which is not to be seen in anything else and makes the one sun and its one nature. Likewise then also in the case of the God-man⁶⁰⁹, Christ: though the differences between divinity and humanity are to be seen in him, no sort of competent judge of the nature of things will be content to affirm his two natures. For Christ is neither of these singly, neither his divinity, I mean, nor his humanity. But the fact that he is a joint product of the two, evidently being one and not two, and that he is not to be seen in any other existent, leads us necessarily to confess the one Christ and his single nature, though indeed composite, as we have often said⁶¹⁰.

14. *Third chapter.* If the name "Christ", while we say that it is predicated of our Saviour, is indicative neither of the divinity alone nor of the humanity alone, but of the end-product of the two, it is one of two things: it is indicative of a substance (or nature) or of accidents accompanying the substance of something. If it is indicative of accidents accompanying the substance of something, what is this other than a mutual relationship of natures? If therefore the name "Christ" is not indicative of a substance, but of that which is related to the substance of something, it is indicative of the end-product of the union⁶¹¹ of the two natures, i.e. nothing else but a mutual relationship⁶¹² of the natures. And if the two natures have remained [two] even though they are united⁶¹³, then the mutual union of the natures came about only by a mere relationship, as in the case of a chorus, a house, a city and the like. For those in a chorus are said to have been mutually united, as well as the stones and pieces of wood, of which a house is built⁶¹⁴. But their mutual union is only by a mere relationship, while evidently the natures themselves are separate. The name "chorus", too, is indicative of this single mutual relationship of the singers, every singer being particular and individual in

⁶⁰⁸ 𐌸𐌹𐌸𐌰 𐌲𐌹𐌳𐌰 𐌲𐌹𐌳𐌰 𐌸𐌹𐌸𐌰 VB Šanda 14.2: Ἐν καὶ πλείονα τυγχάνον Nicetas

⁶⁰⁹ θεανθρώπου Nicetas: 𐌲𐌹𐌳𐌰 VB Šanda 14.5.

⁶¹⁰ Šanda 13.26-29. 14.2. 3-9 = Nicetas Choniates, *fr.* 5.

⁶¹¹ τῆς ἐνώσεως *add.* Nicetas (Šanda 14.16).

⁶¹² σχέσις Nicetas: 𐌸𐌹𐌸𐌰 VB Šanda 14.17.

⁶¹³ καὶ ἐνοθεῖσαι (ἐν Χριστῷ *add.*) Nicetas: 𐌸𐌹𐌸𐌰 𐌲𐌹𐌳𐌰 VB Šanda 14.18.

⁶¹⁴ Šanda 14.15-20. 21 = Nicetas Choniates, *fr.* 10.



his hypostasis *qua* his nature and hypostasis. Therefore their number has remained the same, as it was prior to their relationship of union. Likewise of a house there is one relationship of pieces of wood and stones, and on account of it even the very name "house" is used, but each one of them has its own being particularly and hypostatically in relation to the rest. Only a fitting together and juxtaposition of pieces of wood or stone [14/15] happened, and they are said to be united in this respect and not in the intelligible content of their natures. This is likewise in similar cases. Therefore, if we confess that the union of natures in Christ came about not only by a mere relationship, but *qua* natures (or substances), as in the union of soul with body, it is not therefore possible, if the name "Christ" is indicative of him who is from the two, that it should be indicative of any accidents accompanying a substance, lest, by supposing a union only by relationship, we should separate the natures themselves. But if it is not indicative of accidents accompanying a substance, it must be indicative of a substance (or nature). For there is nothing between a substance and [accidents] accompanying a substance.

15. Every name predicated of a plurality must be either homonymous or univocal. But if it is univocal, it is indicative of one and the same nature (or substance) comprehending all those of which it is predicated, as e.g. "horse" is predicated of the horses Xanthos and Balios, and "living being" of a man and a horse. For the nature of a horse is one, even if it is in many individuals (i.e. undivided). Likewise, [the nature] of a living being is one, even if it is in many species. For living being is animate and sensitive substance, in which commonly and to the same degree all living beings participate. But if the name is homonymous, e.g. when "horse" is predicated of a sea horse and a land horse, then "horse" is homonymous and not univocal. But as for these homonyms, when anything under an homonymy is known to be particular, and its intelligible content, being separate, isolates it from the rest of these and, no less even, [isolates] each singly too, *qua* each it signifies, from those, it is indicative of a single nature. I shall clarify what I mean with the help of examples. We have said that the name "horse" is homonymous when predicated of a land horse and a sea horse. For they participate only in name, but are separate through otherness of the substances. So, whenever speech selects the word "horse" which has many meanings, the rider too saying⁶¹⁵ "I shall mean nothing by the word 'horse' except the

⁶¹⁵ 𐌲𐌹𐌸𐌰 VB: 𐌹𐌸𐌰 Šanda 15.24.

land horse", since everybody understands that the title indicates a land horse, it is indicative of one, and only one, nature. Thus too a term applied only to a sea animal, but [15/16] on the other hand indicative of a sea horse, is indicative only of a single nature. This is also the case with univocal names. The name "man" is not indicative of the individuals (i.e. undivided) under the species, such as Peter and Paul and the rest, but of the species itself, just as "living being" [is indicative] of the genus and not of the species that are under the genus, such as horse, ox and the rest. But since each of those under the same appellation is often called by the common name, e.g. when we say "Paul", meaning a "man", the name "man" is also indicative of one individual nature. Otherwise how can we say that there are many or few men in a city, unless the name "man" is here indicative of one individual only? For it is a single man who is signified by the [appellation of the] species, and not many. So, the discussion has shown that any name predicated of any single subject is indicative of only one nature. So with the name "Christ", too: though predicated homonymously of Our Saviour and of the prophets or priests of old, none the less, when we select his predicates and accept only what applies to Our Saviour, which is indicative of the perfect resultant of [the union of] divinity and humanity, since it cannot be indicative of the accidents accompanying any substances, as the previous discussion has proved by refutation, it is necessarily indicative of a single nature, just as any name is, whether homonymous or univocal, as we have discussed above. Therefore if we have acknowledged that the name "Christ" is not indicative of anything else but the perfect resultant of the union of divinity and humanity, and again the discussion has shown that the name "Christ" is indicative of one nature (or substance), since this is also the case with every single name, the perfect resultant of the union of divine and human nature will necessarily be one nature (or substance), as we have also shown.

16. *Fourth chapter.* If a dyad is indicative of a first distinction⁶¹⁶ of a monad, in as much as it is a [certain] division – hence it has its name – and division is opposed to unity, it is therefore impossible that the same should be in the same respect simultaneously [16/17] united and divided; therefore no dyad *qua* dyad may in this respect be said to be united, but rather to be divided⁶¹⁷. I have added "*qua* dyad", since Paul

⁶¹⁶ διακρίσεως *emendavi*: διασκέψεως Nicetas:  V:  B Šanda 16.23.

⁶¹⁷ Šanda 16.23-17.2 = Nicetas Chomates, *fr.* 6.

and Peter, by being two, are in this respect divided and two, but not united. In another respect, indeed, they may be said to be united and one, I mean in the common intelligible content of nature. For each of them is a rational and mortal living being, and so in this respect they are said to be united and one, [namely] in species. But insofar as this one is Peter and that one is Paul – for these are the proper names of the individuals under the species – in this respect they are two and not one, divided that is to say and not united. For the common and universal intelligible content of human nature, albeit it is in itself one, but when realised in many subjects, becomes many, existing in each completely and partially, as the intelligible content of a ship in a ship-builder, being one, becomes many, when it is realised in many subjects. Thus also the doctrine in a teacher, being one in its own intelligible content, when it is realised in those who are taught, is multiplied in them, by becoming inherent as a whole in each one. Moreover, the pattern on a ring, being one, when it is realised as a whole in each of many impressions, both is, then, and may be said to be many, so that the many ships and the many men and the many impressions and the doctrines in the many pupils *qua* individuals are numerically many; and in this respect they are divided and not united, *qua* common species, however, the many men are one, and the many ships are one, and the doctrines likewise, and the impressions by the sameness of the pattern are one. Hence in one respect they are many and divided, in another respect united and one. But though we often apply number to what is continuous, by saying e.g. that a plank is of two cubits, none the less we say that the one [plank] is two [cubits] potentially, not actually, since in actuality it is one and not two: i.e. it is capable of undergoing a cut and becoming two: on this account we say that it is two things⁶¹⁸.

17. This being so, if there are two natures of Christ and not one, and every dyad, *qua* dyad, by being severable, is therein divided and not united, the two natures of Christ then also, *qua* natures, will be two and not one, in this [dyad] divided and not united⁶¹⁹. Perhaps they would be even more divided than divided individuals which belong to the same species, such as Paul and Peter. For these, though divided numerically, are none the less united in the common species, i.e. in the intelligible content of human nature, and again additionally in the common genus, I

⁶¹⁸ Šanda 17.8-24 = *Doctrina Patrum* (= DP) 36, 1: Diekamp, 272.22-273.15; Šanda 17.20-24 = Nicetas Choniates, *fr* 8.

⁶¹⁹ Šanda 18.1-4 = Nicetas Choniates, *fr* 7.

mean in the nature of animate being. Divine and human nature, however, unless they have come to a unity of composite nature, would be divided in every respect, the duality not having been removed by composition; nor would they be united either in common genus or species. For the divine nature in its being transcends all that has been brought into existence by it, even if we often use our various names for it, when we call it "nature" and "substance". If, therefore, we have professed that what Christ results from have been united indivisibly and that the natures themselves have been united – and this is not understood as being effected *qua* some accidents which inhere in them – then it is impossible to say that what is indivisibly united are two, since a dyad is a split undergone in a previous division from the monad.

18. So since division is fuller than duality and of that of which the fulness cannot be predicated, *a fortiori* a part cannot be predicated – for of that of which "colour" is not predicated, "white" is not predicated either, and what is not an animal, *a fortiori* is not a man either – then if a division of natures is not predicated of Christ, *a fortiori* a duality of natures is not predicated of him either. If Christ's natures are not two, *a fortiori* they are not many, but if they are neither two nor many, and everything is either one or two or many, we should necessarily affirm that there is one nature of Christ, composed of divinity and humanity. For though many faculties, i.e. predicates⁶²⁰, are said to be in one and the same [subject], as e.g. in fire there is heat, brightness, redness, lightness and the like, none the less all of them are united, by being in one and the same subject. And what is remarkable about their being in the entire subject, if the many are one? For even the parts of our body, though being many [18/19] in the totality composed of all of them, when united, have effected the single whole. And how can they then not deem the united natures of Christ to come together into one nature? If the two have not become one by virtue of a principle of union, as the many parts of the body which have effected a single totality, nor indeed have come to be in one and the same subject, which is other than they, as even in the body of fire the faculties that constitute it, nor is there any source then of their union, then they are always divided. For if they say that one Christ has been effected out of them, we have already said ourselves what answer we should give to that. Hence it has been shown by what has been said that those who confess an undivided union of natures must

⁶²⁰ ῥαγεὶς ἁπλοῦς (Šanda 18.25) may be a translator's gloss on ἁπλοῦς (δυνάμεις); cf. X,41: 40.13-4.

profess that one composite nature has been effected out of the union of the two natures, because the individual which is composed of them is one, the one whom they also call Christ.

19. *Fifth chapter.* If Christ, composed of divinity and humanity, is one and not two, then there will also be one composite nature of the compound, as there is also one composite nature of man, who is composed of soul and body. If, however, there is not one composite nature of the compound but two, they must be either simple or composite. But if they are simple, since a compound also results from two simple [natures], then there are two simple [natures] from two simple [natures]. The syllogism is as follows: Everything which results from two simple [natures] is composite, and every compound is at least of two simple [natures]. Hence everything which results from two simple natures is two simple natures, which is absurd and also senseless. Or like this: a compound is of two natures, and each of the two natures is after the act of composition simple and not composite. Thus the compound even after the act of composition is simple and not composite. This would be so, if the two natures of the compound are simple. If, on the other hand, [the natures] are composite, it will arise that from two simple [natures] two composite ones have come into being. The syllogism is as follows: Everything which is from two simple [natures] is composite, but every compound is [numerically] less than two composite natures. Therefore two composite natures would result from two simple natures, which is impossible. For every compound is less in number than the simple [natures]. For this reason one cannot say that there are two natures of a compound, be they simple or composite, nor, however, one simple one. It remains that there must be one composite nature of the compound.

20. *Sixth chapter.* If Christ is one in name and reality – for there are not two Christs –[and] if someone wants [19/20] to define him, or simply give the intelligible content of what he is, he must on all accounts give a single formula for the single one, i.e. a single [formula] in signification, even if the wording is different, while indicating one and the same. For every definition of nature is indicative of the subject reality, and therefore the definition of Christ, or the formula of what he is, is indicative of his nature. But every definition by being one – unless it is homonymous – is indicative of one nature. Thus also the definition of Christ, or the formula indicative of what he is, will be indicative of his single nature. And conversely: if there are two natures of Christ⁶²¹, and

⁶²¹ καθ' ἑμᾶς add Nicetas (Šanda 20.8).

one of them being the genus, the other being the species, yet they have existence in the individuals, such as in Peter and in Paul, outside which they do not subsist.

22. We have said what hypostasis is and what nature is according to the ecclesiastical rule. Hence the same common nature, such as that of man, by which no man is distinguished from another, when it exists in each individual, is then proper to this one and not common to anyone else, as we have laid down in the fourth chapter. For the rational and mortal living being in me is not common to anyone else. For instance, when a certain man suffers, or an ox or a horse, it is possible for individuals of the same species to remain without suffering. When Paul dies, it is possible that no other man dies with him. And when Peter came into being and arrived at existence, the men who were to come after him did not yet exist. Therefore each nature is called, what it is, not in a single, but in a twofold manner: in one way, when we look at the common intelligible content of each nature on its own, such as the nature of man or of horse which does not exist in any of the individuals; in another way, when we look at the same common nature which exists in the individuals and assumes a particular existence in each of them, and does not fit with anything else except with this alone. For the rational and mortal living being [21/22] in me is not common to any other man. And the nature of living being which is in this horse is not in any other, as we have now shown.

23. That the teaching of the Church has such conceptions regarding nature and hypostasis⁶²⁴ is evident from the fact that we confess one nature of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, but we teach as doctrine three hypostases (or prosopa) of them, each of which is distinguished from the others by a certain property. For what should the one nature of the divinity be if not the common intelligible content of the divine nature seen on its own and separated in the conception of the property of each hypostasis? But because we understand the term "nature" more particularly, we see that the common intelligible content of nature becomes proper to each individual (or hypostasis) and then cannot fit with any other of those under the same species. And again this is evident from the fact that in Christ we hold a union of two natures, the divine, I mean, and the human. For we do not say that the common nature⁶²⁵ of the divinity which is viewed in the Holy Trinity has become incarnate. If

⁶²⁴ ܡܚܕܐ ܡܚܕܐ VB Šanda 22.3: φύσεων ... καὶ ὑποστάσεων DP.

⁶²⁵ ܡܚܕܐ VB Šanda 22.12: om DP.

this were the case, we would predicate the Incarnation also of the Father and of the Holy Spirit. But we do not hold that the common intelligible content of human nature has been united with God the Logos; for in that case it could be rightly said that God the Logos was united with all men who were before the advent of the Logos and who were to come after it. But it is evident that here we speak of the nature of the divinity as that nature which is particularised in the hypostasis of the Logos from the common divinity. Therefore we also confess the one incarnate nature of God the Logos and by adding “of God the Logos” to it, we clearly distinguish it from the Father or the Holy Spirit. So, here too having conceived of the common intelligible content of the divine nature as being proper to God the Logos, we then say that the nature of the Logos has become incarnate. On the other hand, we say that the nature of the humanity has been united to the Logos as that particular existence which alone out of all the Logos has assumed. So that in this meaning of “nature”, “hypostasis” and “nature” are, as it were⁶²⁶, the same, except that the term “hypostasis” in addition also signifies those properties which, apart from the common nature, belong to each of the individuals, and by which they are separated from each other.

24. Hence one can find many of our party who say indiscriminately⁶²⁷ [22/23] that a union of hypostases or natures has been accomplished. For since hypostasis, as we have shown, denotes the existence which is proper to each individual⁶²⁸ and they often use these terms indifferently, it is evident that they want to denote for us by these terms the proper nature. Because even in familiar discourse and according to the usage of natural scientists it is customary for all to call the common intelligible content of nature “man” (as when they say “man is a species of living being”), since none of the individuals either is a species under a genus or is predicated as such. But we also say that man is different from horse, obviously speaking of these as universal natures. On the other hand, we say that Peter is a man (and Paul and John too), and that a man exists and dies, evidently [meaning] an individual, and likewise when the nature of [each] man has the common intelligible content.

25. Furthermore, we ought to provide the following preliminary qualification: the terms “prosopon” and “hypostasis” often indicate the same

⁶²⁶ σχεδόν DP· om VB Šanda 22.22.

⁶²⁷ ἁδιαφόρως *emendavi*: διαφόρως DP: 𐌁𐌳𐌹𐌳𐌹𐌳𐌹𐌳𐌹 𐌳𐌹 V Šanda 22.25: 𐌳𐌹𐌳𐌹𐌳𐌹𐌳𐌹 B

⁶²⁸ The punctuation in the DP is misleading; better: ... ὑπαρξιν, ἐκ παραλλήλου δὲ

meaning to us, as if one called the same thing “blade” and “sword”. Likewise indeed of the Holy Trinity we speak indiscriminately of three *prosōpa* and three hypostases, in an undifferentiated manner meaning the same by both terms. Often, however, we distinguish⁶²⁹ *prosopon* from hypostasis, when we call a mutual relationship “*prosopon*”. Customary usage is not unaware of this meaning of “*prosopon*” either. For we say that somebody has taken on my part (τὸ ἐμὸν ἀνειληφέναι πρόσωπον) and that someone states his case to someone (εἰς πρόσωπον τοῦδε), and we say that the governor represents the king (πρόσωπον ἔχειν τοῦ βασιλέως). Hence those who are attentive to the doctrines of Nestorius are not inclined to attribute to Christ either a single hypostasis or a single nature, because they do not maintain a union either of natures or hypostases *per se*. Rather, they suppose that the one from Mary is a mere man who contains in himself complete divine illumination and is thereby distinguished from all the other God-clad men, by the fact that in each of them the divine illumination was partial. Therefore they boldly claim⁶³⁰ that the *prosopon* of Christ is one, naming the relationship of God the Logos with the man from Mary, which is one, “one *prosopon*”, because that [man] carried out the complete divine economy in the *prosopon* of the divinity of the Logos. Hence, the insult done to the man will rightly refer to God, as [23/24] also the honour and the insult done by the subjects to the governor will refer to the king himself. They say then that the name “Christ”, in the proper sense, is indicative of this relationship, and for this reason they claim to speak of one Christ, since the relationship, as has been said, is one, even if those who participate in it are many. Therefore I believe it is evident to those who think reverently about the Incarnation of our Saviour that, when we ourselves say that there is one *prosopon* of Christ, we do not, as it seemed fitting to the friends of Nestorius, introduce the term “*prosopon*” for the mere relationship of God with a man. No, we use the terms “hypostasis” and “*prosopon*” indifferently and thus say that there is one *prosopon* of Christ, just as there is one hypostasis of a man, e.g. Peter or Paul.

26. In addition to these other things we should discuss first the following point: though there was not even an ever so short moment when the humanity of Christ subsisted apart from its union with the Logos, but from the beginning of its being it assumed union with the Logos, none the less we do not say that this nature is without a hypostasis, since it

⁶²⁹ ܡܬܝܬܝܢ VB Šanda 23.14: διακρίνουσιν DP.

⁶³⁰ ܕܝܫܚܘܦܝܙܝܢܬܝ DP: ܡܬܝܬܝܢ VB: ܡܬܝܬܝܢ Šanda 23.22.

had a subsistence of its own apart from other men and a circumscribed existence of its own distinct from the common nature of all other men by certain properties. For we have just shown that the term “hypostasis” means that. Therefore, as we profess in respect to the divinity of Christ both its nature and hypostasis, likewise in respect to his humanity we must profess, in the same manner as the nature, its proper hypostasis also, so as not to be compelled, as I have said, to profess this nature without a hypostasis. For evidently the humanity of our Saviour existed as one of the individuals under the common nature.

27. Now that this has been explained clearly and agreed by all, I think, those who suppose that there are two natures of Christ, but one hypostasis – since indeed each of the united [elements] must have had both a nature and a hypostasis, as my argument has shown – should tell us one of two things: whether they confess that the union of natures and hypostases was accomplished to the same degree, or whether they think that the hypostases were more united, since one hypostasis resulted from the two, but the natures less so, since two remained after the union⁶³¹? If someone should suppose the second [my response will be]: first, it appears irrational and impossible for them to attribute intension and remission to a union of natures, when substance does not at all admit of “more” or [24/25] “less”. For why and how can they have a “more” or “less” in that union, as e.g. in the case of white and black which admit of intension and remission, and of more and less, and are capable of being united by mixing? Hence, as for quantity and especially finite quantity, such as two or three, which do not admit of intension and remission, and whose union does not admit of intension and remission even if they are united with each other, five, made up by the addition of three and two, are not more or less [five]. Thus by logical consequence, if substances do not admit of increase and decrease, they cannot be united more and less either. However, if someone should say that what have been united not only as individuals, but also in genera or species are more united, as two individuals under the same species may be united, for example two drops of water or two pieces of wood, of which someone will say that they are united more, namely more than the elements in a compounded body – for those are different in species – and again than soul and body – for those are different in genus: well, here we do not speak about things which are said to be united or divided with respect to

⁶³¹ VII,21-27: 20.14-24.24 Šanda = *DP* 36, II: Diekamp, 273.17-281.17.

another thing, but *qua* themselves. For Peter and Paul, divided *qua* themselves, are united with respect to another thing, I mean in genus and in species. Mixed elements, united *qua* themselves in the composition, are divided with respect to another thing, namely *qua* species, because they are different in species. Likewise also soul and body are united *qua* themselves in a living being, but divided *qua* species and genus. Thus all substances which are said to be united *qua* themselves *eo ipso* do not have increase or decrease, as we have shown. For neither do they bring about the union by something else accompanying them, but by being natures (or substances), as we have often said. Secondly, since we have shown that the hypostasis, along with its accompanying properties, is the same as the more particular nature of individuals, if we assert that it is the same and that there is a union of the particular natures⁶³² of the individuals, then one cannot say that the natures have been united less and the hypostases more. But let us abandon this matter, since it has no basis, because its absurdity is evident. If one cannot say that the natures have been united less and the hypostases more, then we must confess a union of natures and of hypostases to the same degree. But if [25/26] the union regarding both of them is to the same degree, what is the reason that we should assert of the hypostases that one has emerged as a result of the union, but that the two natures have remained two even after the union? Hence they must either speak of one nature or say that, along with the two natures, there are also two hypostases, to be consistent with themselves, accepting the union or the division entirely.

28. But what is their sophism? "By saying one hypostasis we preserve the union and by [saying] two natures, [we preserve] the unconfusedness of the united elements". Let us then say in response to them: it is not the case that an equal union of the two and the unconfusedness of the united elements have been preserved alike. For the natures themselves will not have remained without confusion, and the hypostases of the natures will also have been confused. However⁶³³, even after the union the properties of the hypostasis of God the Logos, by which he is separated from the Father and the Holy Spirit, are preserved. His properties have not been confused with the properties of the human nature which has been united to him, by which [properties] he is separated from the rest of men. If it is therefore ill-considered of us to assert that the hypostases have become one because of the union without shrinking

⁶³² ܡܠܟܐ ܡܠܟܐ *emend* Šanda 25.24: ܡܠܟܐ ܡܠܟܐ VB.

⁶³³ ܡܠܟܐ B ܡܠܟܐ V Šanda 26.9.

from their confusion, and to say that the two natures have remained after the union because of fear of confusion, what would prevent them, by reversing the argument, from professing one nature because of the union, but two hypostases because of their unconfusedness? Though the point is indeed partly false, none the less this argument is more plausible than the other. That one nature can generate many hypostases is I think evident to everyone. Thus we profess one nature of the Godhead⁶³⁴ and assert that there are three hypostases of it. In the case of men, there is one nature of the hypostases under it extending in almost infinite plurality. And similarly with the rest of things. It is impossible, however, that two natures which preserve their numerical duality should make up one hypostasis. This can be proved not only by induction from all the particular instances – for how could there be of stone and wood one hypostasis, i.e. one individual, or of ox and horse, or of God and man?⁶³⁵ – but also from the working of reason itself. For if in the hypostases – which is the same as to say in the individuals – each nature [26/27] assumes existence, given that there are two natures, there must be at least two hypostases in which the natures have assumed existence. For a nature cannot subsist on its own, without being seen in an individual, and we have just shown that individual and hypostasis are the same. Therefore those who say that not only one hypostasis, but also one nature has resulted because of the union are seen to be consistent with themselves and with the truth; those, however, who say that there is one hypostasis, but two natures have been seen to be inconsistent with themselves and with the truth.

29. But they say: “Because the humanity of Christ acquired subsistence in the Logos and did not pre-subsist its union with the Logos, we therefore say that there is one hypostasis of Christ”. Let us ask, then, one of two things: whether nature and hypostasis mean one and the same thing, as if it only was a difference of terms which coincide in one meaning, such as “blade” and “sword”, or whether [they mean] different things. Now if [they mean] the same, given that there is one hypostasis, there must also be one nature, as likewise, if there is one blade, there must also be one sword; or, if there are two natures, there must also be two hypostases. If, however, the term “nature” means one thing and the term “hypostasis” another, and the reason for their holding that there is one hypostasis of Christ is the fact that the hypostasis (or *prosopon*) of

⁶³⁴ τῆς θεότητος DP· ԴԵՈՒԹԵՏՈՒ VB Šanda 26.18.

⁶³⁵ ԵՆԵՆՈՒ ԵՆԵՆՈՒ ԵՆ add VB Šanda 26.23: *om* DP.

the man did not pre-exist prior to its union with the Logos, then the reason for there being two natures of Christ will be the fact that the nature of the man did pre-exist its union with the Logos. But if the particular nature united to the Logos pre-subsisted, its hypostasis must also have pre-subsisted. As far as these things are concerned, it is not possible that one of them should be the case, while the remaining one is not, I mean the particular nature without its⁶³⁶ own hypostasis, or the particular hypostasis without its own nature. For the basic [meaning] of both is one and [the terms] are often used concurrently, as we have shown a little earlier. If, therefore, the hypostasis, like the nature united to the Logos, did not pre-subsist the union with him, for the very reason they assert one hypostasis of Christ, they should also assert that his nature is one; for since they are not different *qua* united with each other, they will not be different in that respect either⁶³⁷.

30. *Eighth chapter.* If they say that because of their unconfusedness there are two natures of Christ after the union, namely the divine and the human, they should not say that there are two but [rather] three, that of the body, that of the soul and that of the divinity. For the natures of the soul and the body also remained without confusion. What kind of reasoning is this, then, for them to acknowledge man, made up of soul and body, as one nature after the union, yet deny that Christ, constituted of divinity and humanity, is one nature after the union, notwithstanding the fact that the union of divinity and humanity is recognised as no whit inferior but rather as superior to [the union] of soul and body? For just as the [elements] from which Christ is united have remained without confusion, so too have those from which man is. If, therefore, man, who is from soul and body, is one nature, Christ, who is from divinity and humanity, must also be one nature. For Christ is nought else but he who is from the two, just as man, who is from soul and body. We shall explain the phrase “unconfused union” as we proceed with our treatise. Therefore, they should either say that there are three natures of Christ because of body and soul and divinity, or that the three have become one because of the union. By affirming two natures and not three, they are *eo ipso* bound to say that there is only one and not two.

31. But what else do they bring up⁶³⁸ besides this? Something insipid and insane: “We do not say that there are three natures of Christ, but

⁶³⁶ ܡܠܝܐ VB: ܡܠܝܐ Šanda 27.22.

⁶³⁷ VII,27-29: 26 17-28.2 Šanda = DP 36,III: Diekamp, 281.21-283.16.

⁶³⁸ ܡܠܝܐ VB (pace Šanda 28₂).

two, the created one and the uncreated one. For soul and body are alike created. Hence *qua* being created, soul and body are one nature; the divine nature, however, is uncreated. Therefore one should speak of two natures of Christ, the created one and the uncreated one, and not of three". Now these people are very ignorant regarding the principles by which sameness and otherness in things is correctly predicated. If we use this argument, what prevents us from reaching the opposite conclusion? For if every nature (or substance), *qua* nature and substance, is not different in any way, as an animal [is not different] from an animal *qua* being animal, and therefore each receives the name and definition of substance (or nature), as every animal [28/29] [receives] that of "animal" – then every substance *qua* [substance] is a single item, as creatures, *qua* being created, are called one nature. If this is so, and substance and nature are called created and uncreated, and *qua* this are not different from one another, then there is one nature of Christ, and their objection will have been thus reversed; but in this way all creatures, e.g. angel and gnat, will be one nature. But I hold it to be evident to everyone that, when we investigate certain things of the same nature and of different substance, it is not right to predicate sameness or difference of their natures according to some accident belonging to the substances externally, but rather according to what belongs to them substantially and constitutes their being. If this were not so, we would say that natures which differ much were one nature, and, on the other hand, those which participate in the same substance would be placed along with those that are other in substance. For example, when we investigate whether, say, a horse and a man are the same in substance, it is not right to consider whether both of them are white, or walk, or are created. For thus we make into one substance those which in their totalities are separate in natures. But neither do we say of the Scythian and the Ethiopian that they are other in substance, because they are very different from each other by blackness and whiteness, or by a long nose or a flat nose, or by the state of being servant and being master, or by obtaining authority over one who is under authority. The reason for this is that these properties are not what are considered constitutive of substance, nor do they form the nature of each subject. Rather, "rational" and "irrational" – which is substantially the difference between man and horse – should be taken [as differentiating properties] and according to this principle of substances man is considered separate from horse, but hence not the Scythian from the Ethiopian, for both of them are rational and mortal. If,

therefore, “created” and “uncreated” are not indicative of substances, but of that which is recognised as belonging to substance, then they should not say that soul and body are one nature because both of them are created, but they are reckoned to be entirely other in genus and do not fall under the [same] intelligible content of nature altogether, insofar as they are such, since the one is a body, the other incorporeal.

32. But even if “created” and “uncreated” were constitutive of the underlying natures, it would not be an act of wisdom to adjudge their consubstantiality from the common [properties] belonging to things. For in all joint participants one sees sameness and otherness [29/30], and what each is, is not by sameness of genus, but by their very own differences, by means of which each is separated from the rest under the same genus. A horse and an ox and a man are likewise an animal, and in this respect are not at all different from one another. However, they are not for this reason from the same substance, but the differences⁶³⁹ applicable to the common genus, such as “rational” and “irrational”, have constituted a different nature, and so “irrational”, having introduced a natural difference, separates a horse from an ox, even though it is difficult to name the difference. For if consubstantiality should be adjudged according to the common features, then it would turn out that sky and earth would be consubstantial, for both of them are body, and [likewise] fire and water, man and stone and again soul and body would be consubstantial, for they are substances, not to mention that God too would be consubstantial with the universe, insofar as we usually call the divinity a substance, too, even though the divinity transcends everything that exists. So, since they are non-consubstantial, even though they participate in the common genera, soul and body should not, owing to the differences in the common genus, be called one nature, even though, *qua* creatures, soul and body have substantial being, in the same way that horse and ox are an animal *qua* common genus.

33. *Ninth chapter.* “Divided” and “divisible” do not mean the same, nor do “undivided” and “indivisible”. For “divided” means what has already undergone parting in actuality, whereas “divisible” means what has not yet been parted, but can undergo parting in actuality. On the other hand, “undivided” means only what has not yet been divided into parts, whereas “indivisible” means what cannot be divided. The opposite of “divided” is “undivided”, [the opposite] of “divisible” is “indi-

⁶³⁹ *ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐκ* (Šanda 30.5) is probably a translator’s gloss.

visible". If, therefore, we profess in common an indivisible union, and the indivisible cannot be divided, for whatever reason this is not possible, then the union, i.e. the end-product of the union cannot be divided. If this is so, and duality, as we have shown in the fourth chapter, is nothing else than a parting and a first division of the monad, then the end-product of the union cannot receive the reality or the name of duality. The end-product of the union, however, is Christ. For this reason, if the union is preserved, we cannot call Christ "two natures", unless someone understands by the word ["union"] a difference between the united [elements].

34. *Tenth chapter.* The tenth discourse will solve the controverted points issuing from our opponents. For it is evident to everyone, as I think, that refutations of opponents' arguments are proofs of the opposite. They say: "If Christ is consubstantial with the Father *qua* divinity and consubstantial with us *qua* humanity, then there are two natures of Christ and not one. For how would one be consubstantial with those that are different in substance?" However, we do not hold that the one nature of Christ is simple. For a simple and single entity cannot be at once consubstantial with two entities that are different in substance. Hence if we say that the nature of Christ is composite, composed of divinity and humanity, what inconceivability or absurdity appears in our reasoning, if we say that the single Christ, being a single individual and a single hypostasis, is *qua* the one and the other (of which he is composed) consubstantial with the one and the other? Because we also say that the single nature of man, by being composed of soul and body, is consubstantial with bodies and with incorporeals, *qua* the common natures of body and of incorporeality, but we do not make⁶⁴⁰ two natures for man *qua* man, for neither a man's body in and of itself nor his soul, viewed in itself, makes human nature, but it is evident that we call the composite "man", even though the Apostle Paul speaks rather metaphorically of the inner man and the outer man⁶⁴¹. We also say of water that it is consubstantial with air *qua* humidity and with earth *qua* coldness. Evidently it admits of a partial communion with each of them, but water itself in the totality of its substance, *qua* water, is not two natures. Hence, though Christ is said to be consubstantial with the Father *qua* divinity and with us *qua* humanity, it is not correct to call his totality as a whole "two natures". For neither his divinity alone nor his humanity

⁶⁴⁰ I propose to follow the manuscript reading *بحاصح*, *pace* Šanda 312.

⁶⁴¹ Cf. Rom. 7:22 and 2 Cor. 4:16.

alone makes up Christ. No, the whole individual we call one nature, is in his totality consubstantial neither with the Father, since God the Father is not human as we are, nor with us, since we are not, by being men, gods in substance as well. Therefore he is [31/32] consubstantial with the Father and with us partially, and not in the totality of the end-product, which as being one individual we say is thereby one nature. While we divide him conceptually into the [elements] from which he has been constituted, we see therein his consubstantiality with the Father and with us. Take another consideration: when we are baptised we profess to believe in one Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God (for “one God, the Father, from whom is everything, and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom is everything”⁶⁴²); and we do not think of the one as two sons. For we are not now producing an argument against Nestorius who said that the Son by nature is from God the Father, but the one from Mary is a man and not the Son of God by nature, but in honour and in affectionate indwelling; though, more shamed by the utterances of the Holy Spirit, he pronounces the two one in honour and in prosopon.

35. “If, therefore, Our Lord Jesus Christ is truly one Son, how do we say that one and the same is Son of God the Father *qua* divinity and again the same is son of man *qua* humanity? For if *qua* the former there exists a Son of God, and *qua* the latter a son of man, there must also be two sons here. For if there be one son, there are the alternatives: either Son of God or son of man; but with both being affirmed, then two sons would necessarily be professed: one of God, the other of man”. If, then, we confess one truly natural Son of God, believing that in one respect he is Son of God, that in another respect the same is son of man – “concerning his Son”, says the Apostle, “who was of the seed of David in flesh”⁶⁴³ – we are not obliged by anyone for this reason to speak of two sons. For he who is from the two through composition is one. Accordingly we must affirm that he is one composite nature, though this [nature] is in one respect consubstantial with God the Father, in another respect with us. For if this is the reason for there being two natures, then it will be the same reason for there being two sons, because Christ is Son of God and son of man. But if this is the reason for there not being two sons, but one through composition, there will not be two natures here either, because the same one is consubstantial with the Father and also with us, yet again a single one because of the composition.

⁶⁴² 1 Cor. 8:6.

⁶⁴³ Rom. 1:3.

36. But they say: "If the natures have remained in the union without confusion and if the property of each of them is preserved, with neither of them suffering from any change or confusion by virtue of the union, why is it not necessary that we should speak of two natures after the union?" What, then, prevents us on our part from answering the opponents' question and saying: if we acknowledge that the natures have been united [32/33] *qua* being natures and that a union makes those that have been united one, as has been shown in the first chapter, how could there be two natures of Christ, after they have been united? For if those that are united become one, it follows necessarily that those that have not become one have not been united. If, therefore, there are two natures of Christ and not one, and a duality, being a parting, is indicative of division, and what are divided are not united, then the natures of Christ are not united. Hence if they are minded to speak of two natures of Christ because of their not being confused, none the less they will be obliged to speak of his one nature because of the union⁶⁴⁴. And so an equivalent argument has emerged. What then do we say on this point, or how are we to mediate in this apparent contradiction? Because if all things which are united in a composition suffer change or variation, bringing the intelligible content of their nature to nought, as occurs in a mingling of the elements out of which our bodies have emerged, or in mixed liquids, it then follows necessarily either that the natures [out] of which Christ exists will never be united or that, being contracted into one nature, they will not, because of the force of the union, escape from suffering variation or confusion. But what has just been said is not only completely erroneous, but also grossly ignorant, and both unscientific and nonsensical⁶⁴⁵. For to contest this opinion, we can produce not just one example or two, but many, indeed an almost unlimited number, and we can refute this kind of opinion not only by examples, but also by a natural principle⁶⁴⁶.

37. First, we shall present a proof from examples. Now the union of the soul with the body is well-known to everyone and [it is] also [well-

⁶⁴⁴ Šanda 33.3-8 = Nicetas Choniates, *fr. 11*.

⁶⁴⁵ ܡܬܬܝܪ ... ܐܪܐ ܐܡ. B (Šanda 33.16).

⁶⁴⁶ ܡܬܬܝܪ ܡܬܬܝܪ (Šanda 33.18). Abramowski (1968), 362, argues that in a late fifth-century dialogue by a Ps.-Nestorius against the Christology of Philoxenus of Mabbug the phrase ἐν λόγῳ φυσικῶ (her retroversion from the Syriac) should be understood with reference to the arguments from Peripatetic physics which the author employs. Thus she translates the phrase as "mit einem Argument aus der Physik". It seems that this is also meant here (see below X,38).

known] that man's single subsistence is constituted from these two. But the composite living being of one man is confessedly one nature with no thought of a confusion in the man's [constituents] having occurred. If someone should call man two natures, we will tell him the same as we have said previously against those who say that Christ is two natures. For although some have said that man is principally the soul, since the rational living being is more [important], none the less we are now conducting a discussion about that composite living being constituted of soul and body. This example, then, which I have mentioned, is in popular use, as it were [33/34]. But also illuminated air is totally mixed with light, and is a single reality from the two, and does not admit of any division either, as long as it is in the light, but is susceptible [of division] only conceptually. This can also be said regarding water which is illuminated and any body which is radiant and shining. For glass vessels too and many stones are transparent and so admit light into them. In all respects, however, the united [elements] are preserved without confusion. For that air illuminated with light is a single entity, is evident from the fact that no part whatsoever of the illuminated air is deprived of light, the light having remained in its entire substance, and with nothing, on the other hand, of the light united with the air being separated from the substance of the air either. Therefore if there is no separation to be seen in the two natures that have been united in the union, then one illuminated air has been created from the two. For just as the humidity or the softness or the lightness of air, by remaining in the whole body, have constituted the single whole, so the light, by remaining in the whole substance, has constituted the single whole, even more so if one takes into account that the light continues without separation from it, as occurs in superlunary bodies. For they enjoy the light of the sun all the time. That united light and air have remained without confusion is evident from the fact that the natural property of each of them has persisted exactly, no whit damaged by the union. For neither has the light in its nature been obscured in any way, when joined with the air, nor, on the other hand, has the air suffered in any way in the intelligible content of its substance, *qua* being air, on receiving the light. Hence when the light is separated, the air persists in its own nature undisturbed. Entities which experience change or variation or confusion in a union never really undergo separation, because the intelligible content of their nature has been destroyed in the union, as with the mingling of wine and honey, or with wine mingled with water, and whatever such cases there may be. For although it

is said that our body is dissolved into its constituent elements, those who are not deprived of insight into the things of nature know that [bodies] are not dissolved into numerically [the same elements as] those from which they had been, rather, there will be another generation of elements after the destruction of the body, which are not the same in number, but the same in species. Here then, the separable light has left the nature of the air or of the water or of the other bright and illuminated things undamaged. And the mixture of light with air and with other bright things has left each of them and whatever is from them, unconfused. We can say that it is the same also with glowing iron [34/35] and many other things. For the brightness which is in the potentiality of air is realised by the penetration of the light and passes into the actuality of light, just as one could say that a man is capable of understanding, when he receives in actuality something belonging to instruction, and brings what is in potentiality to its completion and actuality. None the less the intelligible content of man's substance and that of air persists as what it is in the perfection which [man and air] already have, insofar as anything pertaining to the substance is visible. For air is no "less" air, even when light is not present, and likewise man, even when instruction is not given in actuality; for he is a rational mortal living being; and the body of a living being too, capable of vitality which comes to it from the soul, is completed by receiving it and passing into actuality. In the intelligible content of body's substance, *qua* being a body, it has remained as it is. For a body which enjoys life is animated, but when it is deprived of [life], it is inanimate. It is in no way "more" or "less" body in any of its senses. This is the way we ought to think of the holy Incarnation. For the humanity of God the Logos has been realised through the union with him, or rather, it has been deemed worthy of a supernatural reality. But in the intelligible content of man, soul and body have remained as they are, the intelligible content of their substance having in no way been changed by the effects of the union of God the Logos with soul and body. This will be the end here of examples. For they are sufficient to convince anyone who argues with us that there is no necessity at all for things united to be confused.

38. So much for argument from examples⁶⁴⁷. Now only what are capable of their own dissolution⁶⁴⁸ when they meet at the same point also do not preserve naturally for the intelligible content of their nature the natu-

⁶⁴⁷ ἡμετέραν VB: ἡμετέραν Šanda 35.19.

⁶⁴⁸ ἡμετέραν B Šanda 35.20: ἡμετέραν V.

ral predicates, as when heat is mingled with coldness and white with black. Yet not all of them suffer that sort of [fate], but only those approximating to the same genus which are mutually opposed, such as whiteness and blackness which are contraries and are under one colour, since colour is their nearest genus. Likewise also bitterness [is opposite to] sweetness, for they are contraries, their genus being flavour. The same applies to cold and heat and all similar to them. For those contrary predicates can, whenever acting upon, or being acted upon by one another, duly induce mutual destruction by their intermingling, whereas all those predicates which are not contraries and do not approximate to one genus, even if they concur into one [35/36] species and the generation of one nature and are mutually derived, none the less preserve their properties without confusion, with no damage by another. For example, in the generation of an apple sweetness has concurred with a certain colour and spherical form and a certain scent and heaviness, the product of all which, along with the corporeality which is the subject of the mentioned predicates, has completed⁶⁴⁹ the single nature of the apple, and the apple as an entirety is, e.g., sweet, heavy, spherical, odoriferous and of a certain colour. For none of these predicates has suffered⁶⁵⁰ any disturbance in its nature as a result of the mingling with one another, as if, e.g., sweetness would be disturbed by colour or heaviness or shape. Neither, on the other hand, has the heaviness become less because of the colour or because of the flavour, nor yet form undergone any disturbance because of the colour; but each of these, though persisting in the entire substance of the apple, is none the less without disturbance by others. And for this reason those predicates which are not mutually contrary cannot by nature be disturbed by one another. So why should colour or redness be disturbed by scent, or again heaviness by sweetness? For only contraries which jointly refer to one genus can be disturbed by or in one another. For each of the predicates mentioned refers jointly under its respective different genus, namely redness under colour, sweetness under flavour, spherical shape under form and heaviness under weight. So, since confusion is only seen in predicates when they are united, and not in all of them, but in all referred jointly under one genus, but the remaining ones are not confused because of the otherness of genera, how can all those not be very ridiculous who either in the case of soul and body or in the case of divinity and humanity, out of fear of confusion, shrink

⁶⁴⁹ ⲛⲁⲩⲁ Šanda 36.5: ⲛⲁⲩⲁ VB.

⁶⁵⁰ ⲛⲁⲩⲁ B Šanda 36.7: ⲛⲁⲩⲁ V.

composite: [then] they should consider the absurdity their argument draws them into. For if “without confusion” must introduce a duality in Christ, and duality [must introduce] division, as we have shown, since duality is the first division of the monad, then it is impossible for any things whatever to be joined in an undivided union unless they have experienced confusion. But if the constituent [elements] of Christ have not experienced⁶⁵³ confusion, then they have not concurred⁶⁵⁴ in an undivided union with each other. And if, then, the constituent [elements] of Christ have concurred into an undivided union with each other, then there is no necessity, because they have persisted⁶⁵⁵ without confusion, for Christ to be two natures. This is the basic fact to which the said absurdities attach. [37/38]

40. This having thus been proved, the [question] asked boldly by some: “If he who is from two is one nature, which of the two has perished?” has anyhow also resolved itself. For should those who say that there is one nature from two say that it is simple and not composite, I think perhaps there would be a reason justifying the question. But as it is, there being one composite and the simples being preserved in this composite, the question is completely absurd. For if it were necessary for one of those which have come into union to perish, then the remainder would not be composite but simple. If, however, it is not simple, but composite, it will all be one in virtue of the composition. For every simple is preserved in a composition in virtue of the unconfusedness of the united entities. Neither is it correct to ask in the case of an apple which of the simples of which it is constituted has perished, if the resultant from all of them is one composite nature, nor in the case of illuminated air and all similar things. Perhaps this question is not even very useful in the case of what are united by intermingling (or confusion). For in the intermingling of wine and honey the natures of the wine and of the honey are preserved together, though not without disturbance or alteration. But what shall we say also in the case of man whom we also acknowledge as one nature, neither of the his constituent elements having, we are convinced, perished. Even more therefore in the case of Christ is this question an absurdity. Even if we say that this individual, while being one nature, is composed of divinity and of humanity, they will ask which of the simples has perished. For he, too, as composite is one, and

⁶⁵³ ܡܚܠܐ B: ܡܚܠܐ V Šanda 37.26.

⁶⁵⁴ ܡܚܠܐ B: ܡܚܠܐ V Šanda 37.26.

⁶⁵⁵ ܡܚܠܐ emendavi: ܡܚܠܐ V Šanda 37.27: ܡܚܠܐ B

each of the simples fully preserves in the composite the proper intelligible content of its nature, because it is not necessary for those thus united to be confused. For we have said what entities can be confused, when entering into union.

41. "But if", they say, "we acknowledge that the properties of the natures are preserved after the union and if we recognise their difference and hence that in God the properties⁶⁵⁶ of two or three natures appear, of the body, of the soul, and of the divinity, why then should we not in this way also acknowledge natures of Christ, when we do not negate their properties? Hence if because of the union there was one nature and hypostasis, why did there not also come to be, because of the same union, one property from these many properties? If, however, the union has not contracted the plurality of properties, then it has not contracted the duality of natures either". The answer to this will be obvious to us, if we define what the term "properties" wants to indicate for us. [38/39] Thus we usually call the substantial differences, i.e. the distinctive characteristics of each nature, which appear in them as belonging to them specifically, "properties of natures". For instance, to be three-dimensionally extended and perceptible belongs specifically to the nature of each body. To earth belong dryness, heaviness and resistance⁶⁵⁷, i.e. the encounter of one thing with another, or countercheck of one thing upon another, which belongs to it exclusively; consequently resistance can also pertain to composites. To fire, on the other hand, belong lightness, heat and along with these brightness, which is its more characteristic property. To air, then, belong humidity and brightness, but its more characteristic property is the capacity for conducting sound⁶⁵⁸ and [its] lack of colour; and to water fluidity, humidity and brightness, although they are common to [water] and to air. To our soul, on the other hand, belong self-mastery, being capable of reason and learning etc. We thus call its constancy of being, its omnipotence, its infinity in omnipotence, its immutability, its goodness and the like "properties⁶⁵⁹ of the divinity". Hence we usually call these and the like "properties of the nature" of each. As for

⁶⁵⁶ ܡܠܝܬܐ ... ܡܠܝܬܐ B: ܡܠܝܬܐ ... ܡܠܝܬܐ V Šanda 38.22-3.

⁶⁵⁷ ἀντίρροια; the following phrase (ܡܠܝܬܐ ... ܡܠܝܬܐ, Šanda 39.4-5) is perhaps a translator's gloss.

⁶⁵⁸ ܡܠܝܬܐ VB Šanda 39.8; cf. the similar passage Šanda 39.23 (below fn. 665 on p. 209). See also Philoponus, *In De Anima*: 340.36-7, 357.35-6, and *De Opificio Mundi* V,1: 207, 211, where he states that the capacity for conducting sound is a property both of air and of water.

⁶⁵⁹ ܡܠܝܬܐ B: ܡܠܝܬܐ V Šanda 39.10.

⁶⁶⁰ Cf. above II,13.

⁶⁶² ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ πάντων σύγκριμα τῶν συμπληρούντων τὸ ὑποκείμενον Nicetas:
 ρωι οὐ κλδδδδδδ ιαχδδ κτω γρ ρδδδ ρωι οὐδ κδκ [ϫ B] VB
 Sanda 39.17-8.

⁶⁶³ 𐤀𐤁𐤁𐤁 𐤅𐤁𐤁 VB Šanda 39.18: γὰρ Nicetas.

⁶⁶⁴ ἰδιότητες Nicetas: 𐌺𐌹𐌻𐌹𐌳𐌹 VB Šanda 39.22.

⁶⁶⁵ τὸ διηχὲς Nicetas: 𐌆𐌆𐌆𐌆𐌆 VB Šanda 39.23.

⁶⁶⁶ Cf. Šanda 39.23 (above fn. 665).

Lord Jesus Christ, consisting of divinity and humanity, [we say that] the properties of the natures from which he has been constituted are preserved, of the divinity and of the humanity, I mean, although they are numerically many. None the less we say that his nature as a whole is one and not many, for the reasons I have previously given. For who in his right mind has the audacity to say that air has many natures, or water, or fire, or anything else of that kind, because of the many natural faculties⁶⁶⁷ (or predicates⁶⁶⁸) in each of them, such as in fire heat, lightness, dryness and brightness, and in air lucidity, humidity, fervour, softness, transparency and whatever else naturally belongs to each of them? The argument is the same for bodies composed of each of the [elements]. Hence we do well to say that in Christ also the properties of each of the natures from which he has been constituted are preserved, and that there is one composite nature and hypostasis of the whole.

42. Since some out of ignorance have the audacity to find fault even with the expression “composite”, although it is clearly proclaimed about Christ by all the doctors of the Church, let us quickly resolve the doubts about it: “If the divinity is simple and not composite, but Christ is composed of divinity and humanity, then the non-composite and simple has become composite and has not remained in its own simplicity”. This contention displays great ignorance [40/41] and lack of learning. For the components of the being of a composite do not become composite, but rather, in comparison with what is composed from them, though they may be composite in themselves, they are none the less said to be simple. Thus our body being composite, because a living being is composed of it and of a soul, is said to be simple in comparison [with a living being], and the like [is said] of similar things. If, therefore, even composites are in comparison with their components simple and are called so, how can it not be wholly unreasonable for them to say that simples in the intelligible content of their substance, if their aggregation produces something, will therefore be composite? For in that case even whiteness of which the white body of a subject (e.g. white-lead) has been composed, will not be simple, but composite. For if what have been joined in the composition of something necessarily become composite, the whiteness of the white-lead too will necessarily be composite. So too will every predicate which has produced the body of any subject. Now if the

⁶⁶⁷ Šanda 39.13-22. 40.12-4, 40.8-9 = Nicetas Choniates, *fr.* 12.

⁶⁶⁸ ⲕⲁⲓⲁⲓⲁⲓ ⲁⲓⲁⲓⲁⲓ (Šanda 40 14) may be a translator's gloss on ⲥⲁⲗⲁ (δυνάμεις); cf. IV,18: 18.25.

whiteness of white-lead is composite, and every composite is composed of various others, then whiteness also will have been composed of various others. But if the components of the composite must be composite, in the way the argument has shown, then each of the components of whiteness will also be composite, and therefore these also will be composed of others. And each one of them being composed, they will be [composed] from others and this *ad infinitum*. As the latter is much more absurd than the former, it is false and absurd to say that those which enter into a composition become composite themselves. For how must it not be huge folly to say that, by a quaternity's being composed of four units, each of the units is composite and not simple, because each of them is the fourth part of the composition. For each unit, *qua* unit, is simple and not composite. Thus even our soul would not be a simple but a composite substance, because a living being is composed of it and of the body. Likewise also matter and form, which produce bodies, would be composite. Now it is likely that somebody who says this erroneously holds that the properties of those which somehow have entered into union, have perished [41/42]; this we have frequently shown above to be false. Hence, just as the incorporeality, impassibility, immortality and eternity of God the Logos are truly preserved, though he has been united⁶⁶⁹ to a passible body, which had a beginning of existence: so also have the simplicity and immortality of his substance been preserved without diminution in the composite Christ.

43. Now some also raise the following doubt: "If Christ is composed of divinity and humanity, then the divinity is a part of the composite, but if it is a part, it is not complete. Therefore it is less than the composite, since the part is less than the whole and the incomplete less than the complete". But people who say this err, since "part" belongs to what are "in relation to something". For nothing on its own is a part. "Part" is said with respect to a whole. For a part is part of a whole. If therefore a part is in relation to something, then it is incomplete in relation to something and less in relation to something. Take the example of a moving ship, for a ship it truly is, because each accompaniment of its operation is recognisable. For the pilot is a part of it, the same way as the chariot-eer is of the chariot. For the ship is viewed as a whole along with those who direct it, and a carriage or chariot is a whole along with the chariot-eer who directs it. Hence in this respect the pilot is a part of the whole

⁶⁶⁹ ܡܬܬܝܠܐ B: ܡܬܬܝܠܐ V Šanda 42.3.

ship, and the charioteer of the carriage too, and as a part he is incomplete, but he is not simply a part or simply incomplete. For if we regard each not simply as a man, but as pilot and as charioteer, each is a part of them, the one of the carriage, the other of the ship, and as a part he is incomplete. But if we just view them simply as men⁶⁷⁰, a man is not a part of something or incomplete. For even our soul, in relation to the composite and the use of it, is a part and in this respect incomplete. When seen on its own, however, it is not a part of something, but complete and more valuable than a composite living being, since the intellectual and incorporeal life of the soul is much more valuable than the things of this world which accompany the body and are relative to the body, because pure intellectuality and incorporeality are more valuable than the body. Thus *electrum* which is constituted of gold and silver, has, as a part, [42/43] gold, and in this respect gold is incomplete and inferior to *electrum*, when we look at the usefulness of *electrum*. When viewed on its own, gold is complete and not a part and more valuable than the composite. On behalf of this, innumerable other examples of this sort could be produced. Now we should consider Our Lord Christ too in this way. For in relation to its employment in the divine dispensation, the divinity of the Logos is a part of the composite Christ, since our salvation has not been brought about otherwise than through the Incarnation of God the Logos. In relation to this, therefore, each of the entrants into union is incomplete. As for the divinity in and by itself, which is not akin to anything, it is far beyond perfection and beyond comparison with every existent. But they will certainly not think that [the divinity] is the sort of thing which is a part in relation to something and is inferior in relation to something and is incomplete in relation to something. For that is a sophism and quite alien to an apodeictic discipline.

44. Perhaps someone, disinclined to the examples I have previously given, may raise a doubt: "If the intellectual life of the soul is more valuable than life in the body and in relation to the body, and if gold is more valuable than *electrum* and simples are more valuable than composites, does then not a certain inferiority affect the divinity of the Logos, on entering into union with the human nature, since, when considered on its own unattached, it is superior to a composite which participates in the inferior, namely human nature?" Well, perhaps this contention would have a rationale, if, just as gold is changed when mixed

⁶⁷⁰ ἄνθρωποι VB (*pace* Šanda 42₁).

with silver and [just as] the soul when operating with the body as a result of its bond of affection is inferior to [the soul] when it is operating intellectually and unattached to the body, so the divine nature underwent change and variation in its union with human nature. But as shown above, it has been generally acknowledged by all of us who proclaim the things of Christ that in Christ the divine nature has persisted wholly without change, i.e. the divinity of the Logos will be just as it was both before and after the union with human nature. Since even the rational soul, *qua* being capable of suffering, namely in its operation, suffers in some respects and is changed by its natural link with the body and by the affection [arising] through it, however, *qua* being incapable of suffering in the intelligible content of substance, it remains no less impassible and immortal, even if it is linked with the passible and changeable body. Therefore the wholly invariable and immutable in all his attributes, God the Logos, “in relation to whom is no change, neither shadow of variation”⁶⁷¹, remains as he is, though he was joined in [43/44] union with human nature. How can the effective causes of sufferings affect him who transcends all change and variation? Not to mention that he gives being to all things that are in the way they are.

45. We have hereby shown, then, that, the composite being one, its nature, too, will necessarily be and be called one. But since we should be examiners of arguments and not opponents of those who do not estimate anything more than the truth, we should proceed to examine as best we can the questions which our opponents raise, to see whether they agree with truth and the nature of reality. I say, then: If they say that there are two natures of Christ, or that Christ⁶⁷² is seen⁶⁷³ in two natures, in the same way as we say that a whole is seen⁶⁷⁴ in the parts or that the parts of a whole are such and such, recognising the single effect of the union of all of them (as one might say that a triangle subsists in three straight lines, there being one shape of the triangle which has resulted from the conjunction of three straight lines; and furthermore, that a house exists in stones and pieces of wood, there being again one form of the house, which has resulted from the composition of them): perhaps one might allow such a locution. If, regarding the two [constituents] from which Christ results, saying that Christ is “out of two natures” is the same as

⁶⁷¹ James 1:17.

⁶⁷² ܡܫܝܚܐ VB Šanda 44.9: αὐτὸν Nicetas

⁶⁷³ θεωρεῖσθαι add Nicetas (Šanda 44.9).

⁶⁷⁴ θεωρεῖσθαι λέγομεν Nicetas: ܡܫܝܚܐ ܡܫܝܚܐ VB Šanda 44.9.

saying “in two natures”, just as, in the case of a triangle, “in three straight lines” [is the same as saying] “out of three”, and thus with all the other aforementioned things, as if there were a difference only about the locution and not about the thing understood by⁶⁷⁵ the locution: still, it is necessary that the whole resulting from the two natures should be professed as being something not accidental or a conjunction of substances (as has been shown before), and that it must be a nature and substance. If, therefore, they say that there is a single composite nature which exists in two simples, as we say that there is a single whole in many parts: someone will allow this locution, because of a consensus on things which are [commonly] recognised, even if the locution itself is imprecise. For in the case of composites, all the more if they result in mutual composition, we are accustomed to use [the phrase] “out of them” rather than “in them”. Thus we say that fire is constituted “out of” heat, dryness and lightness, and not that it is “in” them, and, furthermore, we say that man is composed “out of” soul and body and not “in” soul and body, and that all bodies are composed entirely “out of” matter and form and not “in” matter and form. For even though [44/45] we say that a whole is in parts, we are accustomed to use this [phrase] of parts that are spatially distinct, such as of the parts of a house, e.g. walls, roof etc., and likewise of the parts of our body, with mutually resembling parts, bones, nerves, veins and the like, and of the organs, hands, head etc., even though they are united to the whole. For these are parts properly speaking. If, however, the constituents are not spatially distinct, but pervade the whole (in the way that soul and body, and in general all natural forms pervade the whole matter underlying them), no one who has been instructed to use language about such things properly ever used “in two” or “in many” of things like that. Who among the experts in natural things anywhere said that natural things are “in” matter and form, and not rather “out of” matter and form, or, again, that man is “in” soul and body and not rather “out of” soul and body. Hence if the divinity of Christ is not spatially separate from his soul and from his body, but is united to them in their infinite entirety from the moment it entered them, no one uses “in two natures” of it, properly speaking, but rather “out of two natures”. Still, as I have said, if they acknowledge his totality (i.e. [his] one nature) as composite, for Christ is composite, we shall permit them to say that he is “in” those two natures out of which

⁶⁷⁵ ἐκ Nicetas · ص V Šanda 44.17. ب B.

he is, even if they use the locution improperly, as we have shown. But if they are fully proved nowhere at all to call the whole of him “one composite nature” and refrain from affirming it as if it were an absurdity, then we too shall justly blame the locution “in two”⁶⁷⁶.

46. For “in something” is not customarily used [only] in one way, i.e.⁶⁷⁷ “whole in parts”. It is I think acknowledged by everyone that it has many meanings, and I consider it unnecessary to say anything about it since we also use the phrase “in something” of divided things, if e.g. we say that the human species is seen in each individual, in Peter, Paul etc., and there being one nature of living being *qua* living being, it is “in” many species of living being, “in” horses, “in” men, “in” oxen etc. Furthermore, we say that the one substance of the Holy Trinity is “in” three hypostases, and that someone [45/46] is “in” a city and “in” a house and “in” a ship, but also that “in” the superior there are those subject to him, as the Apostle even says regarding God: “In him we live, and are moved, and are”⁶⁷⁸. Likewise [we speak of] wine “in” a vessel, and bodies “in” a place, and everything that is created “in” time, and of many other things of this sort; and none of this kind of things is recognised as in one hypostasis, that is, in one individual. For time is other than the things “in” time, and a place [is other] than the things “in” a place; likewise the superior and those subject him. There are numerically many individuals in which the common species is seen, and, furthermore, three hypostases into which the divine nature is divided. Hence those who do not confess that Christ is one composite nature, but, on the contrary, dare to anathematise those who say so, must then of necessity understand [the phrase] that Christ is “in” two natures not as a whole “in” parts, but, as it pleases the impious Nestorius, as in two hypostases or individuals. If they say that they do not think so, but that they turn their faces away from such thinkers as from impious people, none the less the very formula provides no such opportunity for those who adhere to the evil belief of Nestorius and, even more, dare to call Christ not only “in two” but also “two natures”. For though those from which he is are two, it is not therefore true to say that the whole is two, as we have shown above with the help of many [examples]. For it is not the case either that, since there are three straight lines of a triangle, the

⁶⁷⁶ Šanda 44.8-17. 19-21, 45.16-18 = Nicetas Choniates, *fr* 13.

⁶⁷⁷ ܠܝܬܝܢܝܐ VB: ܠܝܬܝܢܝܐ Šanda 45.20.

⁶⁷⁸ Acts 17:28.

triangle is somehow therefore three straight lines. Nor, on the other hand, is it possible to say that, since there are many things which concur⁶⁷⁹ to make a house, such as stones, bricks and pieces of wood, there are therefore many natures (or forms), of a house, or of fire or of any other composite, since each of them consists of many things. For it is unthinkable that a thing should be reverted by its underlying elements, as it were, into the thing itself. For while there are the above mentioned elements of fire, there is one fire, and the elements, so to speak, of the triangle are three straight lines, but the triangle is one, etc.

47. For what prevents us too, if we change back from the composite to the elements of the composite, from concluding and retorting that its many elements are one and not many, and its nature one and not many? [46/47] This is what I mean: A triangle is in three straight lines. For the triangle itself is one and not many. Therefore the three straight lines are one and not many. Or in another way: For the triangle there are three straight lines. But the triangle is numerically one. So the three straight lines numerically are one. Again: Fire subsists in heat, lightness and dryness. But there is one nature of fire and not many. Thus heat, dryness and lightness are one nature. However, I think it is clear to those who can see logical connexions that a solution is not made in response to all the objections raised but is given in the conclusion itself. For we should conclude the argument as follows: If a house is "in" stones, side-walls and pieces of wood, but the form of the house is one, then the one form of the house consists "in" stones, side-walls and pieces of wood. Furthermore: If a triangle is one figure "in" three straight lines, then the one figure of the triangle consists "in" three straight lines. Likewise also of fire and of all composites⁶⁸⁰.

[Epilogue]

Thus, therefore, even if Christ be spoken of as in two natures, still there will not necessarily be two natures of that same Christ who is the product of the two. Yet again we repeat: Christ is in two natures, and Christ is one, hence the two natures are one and not two. But in assailing people who pride themselves on these things with this sort of solution,

⁶⁷⁹ ἄλλα B· ἄλλα V Šanda 46 17

⁶⁸⁰ The caesura in V (◊ ◊ ◊ in rubrics) indicates that the tenth chapter ends in 47 12 and that what follows is an epilogue, cf. the rubric "From that which is after the tenth [chapter]", in *Eptome* 61.5.

we will neither, because Christ is one, deny the constituents of this “one”, nor, on the other hand, because we recognise two natures which have concurred into the union, will we not confess that “one” which resulted from them; whether someone prefers to call it one nature or hypostasis or one Christ, makes no difference to us⁶⁸¹. For the rest will necessarily be implied by each of these⁶⁸². For Christ being one, his hypostasis and nature must be one, by his being. If that “one” is not going to become many, he must also be one nature and hypostasis. For how can what remain numerically two be numerically one being? For in that way someone might say that there is be one hypostasis of stones and of pieces of wood, even if they [only] touch one another. That the same should be both one and two is impossible. On the other hand, he whose nature is one [47/48] – I mean each one’s particular nature, according to the distinction drawn between them above – must also be one hypostasis.

48. So it is, as far as our capacities go. Now we ask those who read this to stand up dispassionately and without favouritism so that they may give an answer to truth itself in accordance with our defence of it. And if they find anything said by us agreeable to it, they should embrace it with welcome understanding, ungrudgingly, as if it were their own offspring. For I consider truth a common benefit in whomsoever it is found. But if anything has slipped from our judgment or examination, may they grant us forgiveness for our slip, but heal what they have forgiven by themselves through clearly proven rebuttals, judging, as we do, that our own private good lies in dissociation from ignorance and in making him who has liberated us from it our true helper.

The ten chapters of the Arbiter have ended.

10 The Philoponus-Fragments in Nicetas Choniates

10.1 *The Manuscripts*

The manuscripts of Nicetas Choniates’ *Panoplia Dogmatica* have been studied comprehensively for the first time by J. L. van Dieten, after some preliminary work by F. Cavallera⁶⁸³. Four complete (or almost

⁶⁸¹ οὐ διαφερομεθα Nicetas. ܬܠܬܐ ܬܠܬ [Δ add B] ܬܠ ܬ VB Šanda 47 19.

⁶⁸² Šanda 47 16-20 = Nicetas Choniates, *fr* 14.

⁶⁸³ See van Dieten (1966) and (1970), cf. also Cavallera (1913)

complete) manuscripts are known, all of them coming from the thirteenth century and thus being very close to the date of the composition of the *Panoplia*. These four codices contain the text of our extracts, and I shall briefly present them here, following the work done by van Dieten.

Parisinus Graecus 1234

This thirteenth-century codex (= P) is *not* the autograph, as believed by P. Moreau, whose Latin translation of the first five books of Nicetas' *Panoplia* was printed in 1580. Moreau's wrong judgment was endorsed by several modern scholars⁶⁸⁴. The character of the manuscript is very complex; fol. 102^r – 177^v are its oldest part and there are two supplements. This manuscript was once in the library of Theodore Scutariotes, as three entries of his name show (fol. 6^v mg. inf., 7^r mg. sup., 8^r)⁶⁸⁵. The extracts from Philoponus are found on fol. 172^r – 173^v.

Vaticanus Graecus 680

Whereas Cavallera thought that this thirteenth century manuscript (= V) was written by the same scribe as P⁶⁸⁶, van Dieten has pointed out that three scribes were involved in the copying⁶⁸⁷. However, the hand of the second scribe resembles that of P very much, and it might actually be the same. The part which was copied by the first scribe is preserved best (fol. 1 – 78^v und 230 – 250^v), yet occasionally the first two lines are not entirely legible (the pages seem occasionally to have stuck to one another). This is the case on the folios which contain the Philoponus-extracts, 242^r – 244^r. As an old catalogue shows, the codex has been in the collections of the Vatican Library since the pontificate of Sixtus IV (1471–1484)⁶⁸⁸.

Mediceus-Laurentianus IX.24

This thirteenth century manuscript (= M) was in the possession of the Medici Library already in 1495⁶⁸⁹. It contains the Philoponus-extracts on

⁶⁸⁴ For references see van Dieten (1966), 168₆.

⁶⁸⁵ See *ibid.*, 171 and 173.

⁶⁸⁶ Cavallera (1913), 126₂.

⁶⁸⁷ Van Dieten (1970), 6. Earlier, he had suggested that Vat Gr 680 testified precisely to that recension which Paris Gr. 1234 must have shown before the (first) supplement, see van Dieten (1966), 180. Later, however, he did not take up this point anymore.

⁶⁸⁸ See van Dieten (1970), 7.

⁶⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

fol. 147^v – 149^r (155^v – 157^r) – note that this codex has two running page numbers, one on the top and another one on the bottom of the page.

Bodleianus Roe 22

The Bodleian manuscript (= O) can be dated exactly, since the copyist Joannis Rhakendytos noted the day when he had finished his work, Thursday, 15th May 1286. The codex was once in the possession of the Holy Trinity monastery on Chalki (fol. 560^v). Thomas Roe, the English ambassador at the Ottoman Porte from 1621 to 1628, brought the manuscript to the West and gave it as a donation to the Bodleian Library in 1628, together with 27 others (fol. III^v)⁶⁹⁰. The Philoponus-extracts are found on fol. 193^r – 194^v.

The manuscript Vaticanus Regimensis Graecus 67 (1562 AD) also has the extracts from the *Arbiter* on fol. 163^v – 165^r. It is of no value for a critical edition, since it is part of the copy of P made by Moreau for his edition of parts of the *Panoplia* in a Latin translation. Mai's partial edition of the *Panoplia* in the *Spicilegium Romanum* is based on V and on Moreau's copy⁶⁹¹. A few references to Moreau's manuscript have been included in the critical apparatus, since they shed light on certain quibbles in the text.

10.2 *Principles of the Critical Edition*

Since I take into account only a small portion of the text of Nicetas' *Panoplia*, it does not seem appropriate to develop hypotheses about the relationship of the manuscripts to one another, which would eventually lead to a stemma. None the less, a few observations will be noted, which will guide me in establishing a critical edition of the fragments. In fact, where differences between manuscript readings occur, they are quite straightforward and can be explained without great difficulty, so that a decision about which of the readings to accept in the text is not problematic⁶⁹².

Observations on agreements in readings of secondary origin

The pattern of agreements and disagreements between the four manuscripts will help me to make suggestions about their relationship to one

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid., 11.

⁶⁹¹ Mai (1840), 398.

⁶⁹² This critical edition has been guided by the editorial principles set out in Maas (1957) and West (1973)

another. What we are concerned with here are agreements in readings of secondary origin, i.e. corruptions and emendations in the text. It will be ascertained which readings of secondary origin are common to more than one manuscript and which of them occur only in one codex⁶⁹³. Differences in punctuation and accentuation (which often seem to depend on the preferences of the individual scribes) are not considered here.

P is obviously the best of the four codices. It has two readings of secondary origin which are unique to it. Note the omission in fr. 9 (fn. 38): τοῦτο VMO (*add. s. l. M*) Syr: *om.* P. In fr. 8 (fn. 33), the case is more complicated: αὐτὸ VMO: αὐτὸν P. The reading of P here might be an accusative neuter, perhaps owing to the phenomenon which is called "extension of terminal *v* to all accusatives singular" by A. N. Jannaris⁶⁹⁴. Jannaris does not mention αὐτὸ(ν), but has cases like τὸ ἡδύν, γλυκύν, μελίτιν, and the pronouns ἐμέ and σέ, which led to ἐμέν and σέν⁶⁹⁵. In both instances VMO unanimously testify to the preferable reading. In fr. 13 (fn. 49), P reads λόγου, as MO do. This seems to be a *lectio* of secondary origin. The better reading is clearly provided by V (ὅλου), which is supported by the Syriac version. This indicates that at a very early stage of the transmission of the text, ὅλου was misread as λόγου.

V has one reading of secondary origin together with MO, and a few unique ones; otherwise V agrees with P.

M has four readings of secondary origin together with O, and two which are unique to it. Notably, the cases where PV (with the better readings) stand against MO are all either additions or omissions in the latter.

O has a lot of unique secondary readings; it is clearly a maverick, with instances of addition, omission, *lectio faciliior*, itacism, *saut du même au même*, and haplography.

What, then, can we say about the relationship of the four manuscripts to one another? The view of Moreau and others that P is the autograph

⁶⁹³ It seems reasonable, given the small number of manuscripts from the same period, to assume that we are dealing with a "closed recension" here; cf. West (1973), 31-7.

⁶⁹⁴ Jannaris (1897), *Appendix III*, 541. My attention was drawn to this point by Fr Joseph Munitiz.

⁶⁹⁵ Jannaris observes that these forms were very common in Medieval (1000-1450 AD) and Neohellenic (1450-1800 AD) speech; see *ibid.*, 543-4.

has been refuted, yet it is clearly the best codex which brings us closest to the archetype. Similarities have been found between V, M and O, with V being the best witness of these three, while M and O have readings of secondary origin that are unique to the one or the other. It appears defensible to postulate a lost apograph [b] as the common source for V and another lost apograph [c], from which both M and O originated. However, these suggestions are very tentative and should be taken only as a working hypothesis for my edition of the Philoponus-fragments in Nicetas.

In general, the ancient Syriac version has not been taken into account for establishing the text of the fragments, except for a few cases where it supports one of the variants in the Greek manuscript tradition.

Questions of accentuation and punctuation

A word has to be added on accentuation and punctuation, matters for the editor's discretion "which can be a great help or hindrance to following the author's train of ideas", as M. L. West remarks⁶⁹⁶. I have accepted the principles proposed by J. Noret with regard to the accentuation of Greek texts from the Byzantine period⁶⁹⁷. The thirteenth-century codices of Nicetas indeed conform to Noret's rules, though these might seem unusual to modern readers. The strength of Noret's case lies in the fact that the accentuation used in Byzantine manuscripts highlights the meaning of the text and can be clearer than the standardised accentuation used by modern editors. Two examples may be given. Noret's first rule for "enclitics" is:

les indéfinis sont souvent accentués lorsqu'ils sont les premiers mots d'un syntagme, c'est-à-dire lorsque le sens de la phrase ne les lie pas au mot qui les précède mais au mot qui les suit⁶⁹⁸.

The following examples can be found in the Nicetas-manuscripts:

⁶⁹⁶ West (1973), 69.

⁶⁹⁷ Noret (1987), (1989), and (1995).

⁶⁹⁸ Noret (1987), 193. He notes: "Lorsqu'elles sont accentuées, les formes de τίς indéfini sont normalement affectées d'un accent aigu (exactement comme l'interrogatif!) si elles sont monosyllabiques, d'un grave si elles sont dissyllabiques et non suivies d'une ponctuation. Dans les manuscrits de Cantacuzène, on trouve à la fois τίς et τίς, τινές et τινές; nous avons remarqué le même phénomène dans le *Vaticanus gr.* 1660, qui date de 916. Il est possible et l'observation des contextes semble confirmer que, chez les copistes soigneux qui utilisent simultanément les deux orthographes, l'accent aigu marque une prononciation spéciale du mot, mettant celui-ci en évidence" (ibid., 193).

ἡ τῶν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τί συμβεβηκότων (fr. 2)

εἰ γὰρ μὴ εἴη τί [PMO (non legi potest V)] ἐν τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἐνώσεως τῶν
δύο φύσεων ἀποτετελεσμένον (fr. 2; but cf. τι ἐν, fr. 1)

ὅπερ εἴτε φύσιν μίαν καλεῖν τινι [PV: τινὶ MO] φίλον (fr. 14)

Noret's third rule applies to our text once:

les indéfinis sont accentués lorsque, en dehors des cas exposés ci-dessus, le sens de la phrase exige qu'ils soient mis en évidence⁶⁹⁹.

ὥς εἰ καὶ τὸ τρίγωνον ἐν τρισὶν εὐθείαις ὑφεστάναι λέγοι τις [PO: τις VM] (fr. 13).

These are certainly cases where modern editors would consider it appropriate to alter the accentuation. It seems that Noret's rules also apply occasionally to τε:

ταυτὸν ἄρα Χριστὸν [VM: Χριστόν PO] τὲ [PVM: τε O] εἰπεῖν καὶ
τάς αὐτοῦ φύσεις (fr. 4)

ὀνόματί τε [PMO: τέ V] καὶ πράγματι (fr. 4)

As for the punctuation of the text, I did not always reproduce the one found in the manuscripts. Sometimes the signs used in the codices cannot be followed, since they correspond to different signs in our usage. This is especially the case with what is today a question mark (;). Therefore occasional changes seem expedient in order to help the modern reader to follow the author's train of thought.

In my edition, I have added a iota subscript where the modern reader would expect it, for instance, ζῶον, ἀστρῶος.

10.3 Text

The following sigla are used:

P	Parisinus Graecus 1234 (XIII s.)
V	Vaticanus Graecus 680 (XIII s.)
M	Mediceus-Laurentianus IX.24 (XIII s.)
O	Bodleianus Roe 22 (1286 AD)
Moreau	Vaticanus Reginensis Graecus 67 (1562 AD)
Mai	A. Mai (ed.), <i>Spicilegium Romanum</i> IV, Romae 1840, 440-6
Syr	versio Syriaca (ed. A. Šanda)

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid., 195.

add.	addidit
codd.	codices (PVMO)
corr.	correxit
i. mg.	in margine
om.	omisit
s. l.	supra lineam
transp.	transposuit

[PG 140,56A] Ἡ ἀγία δ' οὖν¹ καὶ οἰκουμενικὴ σύνοδος ἡ ἐν χαλκηδόνι συστάσα, διὰ βραχέων ἐμνήσθη τῶν λεγομένων ὑπὸ τῶν μίαν ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ δοξαζόντων φύσιν σύνθετον· εἰσὶ δὲ ὡς ἐκ πολλῶν ὀλίγα εἰπεῖν, τοιαύτης ἐννοίας ἐχόμενα, ἅπερ εἰς συνηγορίαν τοῦ οἰκείου δόγματος ἀσεβῶς προτιθέασιν.

²ἐκθεσις τινῶν κεφαλαίων προβαλλομένων παρὰ³ τῶν μονοφυσιτῶν⁴.

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Fr. 1 Πότερον ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ λεγομένων δύο φύσεων ἐνώσεως, γέγονέ τι ἐν, ἢ οὐ; εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ γέγονέ τι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐν, πῶς καὶ ἡνῶσθαι ὅλως αὐτὰς ἐροῦμεν; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ ἡνῶσθαι· ἢ τὸ ἐν γεγονέναι; οὐδὲ⁵ γὰρ κατ' ἑλλαμψιν ὡς ἐπὶ προφητῶν [56B] ὁμολογοῦμεν τὴν ἐνωσιν·

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Fr. 2 εἰ δ' ἐκ τῆς ἐνώσεως τῶν δύο φύσεων ἐν τι γέγονε, τί ποτε ἄρα τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν; πότερον ὄνομα μόνον⁶ ψιλόν, ἢ πρᾶγμα; εἰ μὲν οὖν ὄνομα μόνον ψιλόν εἶη πράγματος χωρὶς, οὐκ ἂν εἶεν αἱ φύσεις ἡνωμέναι· ὡς οὐδὲ ὁ ἀστρῶς κύων καὶ ὁ χερσαῖος κατὰ ψιλόν μόνον τοῦνομα τὸ ἐν ἔχοντες, ἡνωμένοι κατὰ τὰς φύσεις τυγχάνουσιν· οὐδ' ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ γεγραμμένος· οὐκοῦν εἰ⁷ αἱ φύσεις καθὸ τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσιν ἡνώθησαν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἐνώσεως αὐτῶν ἡγουν συνθέσεως ἐν τι γέγονεν, οὐκ ἄρα ψιλόν ὄνομα τοῦτο ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα· εἰ δὲ πρᾶγμα, πότερον φύσις ἐστὶ⁸ τοῦτο ἡγουν οὐσία, ἢ τῶν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τί συμβεβηκότων; οὐκοῦν εἰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι φύσεις ἡνώθησαν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ⁹ ἐν τὸ ἐκ [56C] τῆς ἐνώσεως αὐτῶν ἀποτελεσθὲν· οὔτε ψιλόν ἐστὶν ὄνομα οὔτε συμβεβηκός τι καὶ παρακολούθημα φύσεως, λείπεται ἐξ

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¹ δ' οὖν PVM: om. O

² PVO: τοῦ αὐτοῦ χωνιάτου add. M

³ παρὰ PM: περὶ O

⁴ P: ἑκθεσις .. μονοφυσιτῶν ante ἡ ἀγία *transp.* MO: om. V

⁵ οὐδὲ PVM: οὐ O

⁶ μόνον PVM: om. O

⁷ οὐκοῦν εἰ PVM: εἰ δὲ O

⁸ ἐστὶ PVM: ἐπὶ O

⁹ τὸ PV· om. MO

ἀνάγκης οὐσίαν εἶναι τοῦτο ἢ φύσιν· κείσθω γὰρ νῦν δι' ἑκατέρου ταυτὸν σημαίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς οὐσίας φημί καὶ τῆς φύσεως. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἐνώσεως τῶν δύο φύσεων ἀποτετελεσμένον φύσις ἐστὶν ἡγουν οὐσία, καλῶς ἄρα μίαν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ δεσπότου Χριστοῦ μετὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν ὁμολογοῦμεν· εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀπλῆν, ἀλλὰ σύνθετον εἶναι¹⁰ ταύτην φαμέν.

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Fr.3

τὸ γὰρ Χριστὸς ὄνομα, τῶν φύσεων ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι δηλωτικὸν¹¹, οὐ δύναται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ εἴη τί ἐν τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἐνώσεως τῶν δύο φύσεων ἀποτετελεσμένον, ἀδύνατον ἢ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἐν τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖσθαι ὄνομα, ἢ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ θεότητός τε καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος [56D] μηδενὸς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐνὸς γενομένου, τὴν Χριστοῦ λέγεσθαι προσηγορίαν ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν.

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Fr. 4

ἕτερον πρόβλημα τῶν μονοφυσιτῶν.
εἴπερ αἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ φύσεις ἐνωθεῖσαι δύο τυγχάνουσι· ταυτὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν οὐσίαι· οὐσίαι γὰρ δήπουθεν ἦτε θεία καὶ ἢ ἀνθρώπειος ἐφ' ὧν¹² ¹³ τὸ τῆς δυάδος τῶν φύσεων φέρουσιν ὄνομα, πότερον ἕτερος τυγχάνει τῶν ἑαυτοῦ φύσεων ὁ Χριστὸς, ἢ ταυτὸν ἐστὶ ταῖς αὐτοῦ φύσεσιν; εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕτερός ἐστι τῶν αὐτοῦ φύσεων ὁ Χριστὸς, τίς ὧν, ἕτερος αὐτῶν τυγχάνει; ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως ἢ¹⁴ οὐσίας¹⁵ ἕτερον ἐστὶν· εἰ γὰρ ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις ἦτοι οὐσία τὸ ζῶον λογικὸν θνητὸν ἐστὶν· οἱ γὰρ ὀρισμοὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς οὐσίας [57A] αὐτῶν εἰσὶ δηλωτικοὶ· ἕτερον δὲ εἴη ὁ¹⁶ ἄνθρωπος τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ, ἕτερος ἂν εἴη τοῦ ζώου λογικοῦ θνητοῦ, ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἀλλὰ μὴν¹⁷ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν, ἢ ζῶον λογικὸν θνητὸν· οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς τῶν αὐτοῦ φύσεων ἡγουν οὐσιῶν ὑπάρχει ἕτερος, τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἐκάστῳ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἦτοι

¹⁰ εἶναι PVM: om. O

¹¹ εἶναι δηλωτικὸν PMO. δηλωτικὸν εἶναι V

¹² ὧν Moreau Mai: ὧν PVM: ὧν O

¹³ PV: καὶ add. MO

¹⁴ ἢ PMO: ἡγουν V

¹⁵ -σίας ἕτερον ἐστὶν ... πραγμάτων τῆς οὐ- om. O

¹⁶ ὁ PV. om. MO

¹⁷ ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἀλλὰ μὴν codd. Moreau: om. Mai

οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ὡς ἐδείξαμεν, αὐτὸς ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ, ὁ Χριστὸς ἕτερος ἔσται· ὅπερ πρὸς τῷ ἀτόπῳ καὶ τὸ γελοῖον ἔχει· οὐκ ἄρα ἕτερος ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστὸς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ φύσεων, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἕτερος, ταυτὸν ἄρα Χριστὸν τὲ εἰπεῖν καὶ τὰς αὐτοῦ φύσεις. ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ τάναντία ὑμεῖς λέγοντες, τῶν δύο φύσεων δηλωτικὸν εἶναι φατὲ τὸ Χριστὸς ὄνομα· εἰ δὲ ταυτὸν ὁ Χριστὸς ταῖς αὐτοῦ φύσεσιν ὡς ἄνθρωπος τῇ ἀνθρώπου¹⁸ φύσει ταυτὸν· τουτέστι τῷ ζῳῳ λογικῷ θνητῷ· δύο δὲ τυγχάνουσιν αἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ φύσεις¹⁹ καὶ οὐ μία, **10** δύο ἄρα καὶ οἱ²⁰ Χριστοὶ [57B] ἔσονται, καθὼς Νεστορίῳ δοκεῖ καὶ οὐχ' εἷς κατὰ τὰς γραφάς. εἰ οὖν εἷς κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ὁ Χριστὸς, ὀνόματί τε καὶ πράγματι καὶ κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ Κυρίου ἐνανθρωπήσεως δύο λέγειν Χριστοὺς ἐνδέχεται, ταυτὸν δὲ ὁ Χριστὸς τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἡγουν οὐσίᾳ, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον, μία δηλονότι καὶ ἡ τοῦ **15** Χριστοῦ φύσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται.

ἕτερον πρόβλημα τῶν αὐτῶν.

Fr. 5 Ὡςπερ εἰ καὶ πλείονες ἐν τῷ ἡλίῳ φυσικῶν δυνάμεων θεωροῦνται διαφοραὶ· οἷον φέρε εἰπεῖν, τὸ φωτιστικὸν **20** αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ²¹ θερμαντικὸν· ἔτι δὲ τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν· καὶ τὸ σφαιρικὸν καὶ²² κυκλοφορικὸν· καὶ εἴ τι²³ τυγχάνει τοιοῦτον ἄλλο, οὐκ ἤδη²⁴ καὶ [57C] πλείονας τὰς τοῦ ἡλίου φύσεις λέγειν ἀνάγκη· οὐδὲν γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτὸ τῶν τοιούτων ἡλίου φύσιν²⁵ ἐργάζεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ πάντων ἅμα τῶν εἰρημένων σύγκριμα ἐν καὶ <οὐ>²⁶ πλείονα τυγχάνον, ἓνα τὸν ἥλιον καὶ μίαν αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἐργάζεται, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ θεανθρώπου Χριστοῦ κἂν αἱ τῆς θεότητος ἐν αὐτῷ²⁷ καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος θεωρῶνται διαφοραὶ, οὐκ ἀνέξονται²⁸ **25** δύο λέγειν αὐτοῦ τὰς φύσεις, οἱ κρίνουν ἡμῇ γέ πη τὴν τῶν

¹⁸ ἀνθρώπου PVM αὐτοῦ O

¹⁹ φύσεις PVM om O

²⁰ οἱ PVM om O

²¹ το PVM om O

²² PVM το add O

²³ τι PVM τοι O

²⁴ ἤδη PM (non legi potest V) εἶδη O

²⁵ φύσιν PVM φύσις O

²⁶ οὐ inserui ex Syr om codd

²⁷ αὐτῷ PVM αὐτοῦ O

²⁸ ἀνέξονται PMO ἀνοξεται V

πραγμάτων ὀρθῶς φύσιν δυνάμενοι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκείνων, καθ' ἑαυτὸ Χριστὸς ἂν εἴη, οὔτε τὸ θεῖον αὐτοῦ φημί οὔτε τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν σύγκριμα ἐν δήπουθεν²⁹ τυγχάνον καὶ οὐ δύο, καὶ ἐν οὐδενὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐνθεωρούμενον ἑτέρῳ, ἓνα τὸν Χριστὸν καὶ μίαν αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν ὁμολογεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης παρασκευάζει.

[57D] ἕτερον πρόβλημα.

Fr.6 Εἰ ἡ δυὰς τῆς ἐκ μονάδος πρώτης διακρίσεως³⁰ ἐστὶ δηλωτικὴ· ἡ δὲ διαίρεσις ἀντικειμένως ἔχει πρὸς τὴν ἑνωσιν· καὶ³¹ διὰ τοῦτο ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἡνώσθαι τε καὶ διηρηῆσθαι ἀμήχανον, οὐδεμία ἄρα δυὰς καθὼς ἐστὶ δυὰς, κατὰ τοῦτο λέγοιτ' ἂν ἡνώσθαι³² διηρηῆσθαι δὲ μάλλον.

Fr.7 καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ τοίνυν εἰ δύο εἰσὶν αἱ τούτου φύσεις καὶ οὐχὶ μία· πᾶσα δὲ δυὰς καθὼς δυὰς ἐστὶ διχᾶς τις οὕσα διήρηται κατ' ἐκεῖνο καὶ οὐχ' ἡνωται, καὶ αἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἄρα δύο φύσεις κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι δύο φύσεις τυγχάνουσai καὶ οὐχὶ μία, κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο διηρημέναι ἂν εἶεν καὶ οὐχ' ἡνωμένοι· καὶ Νεστορίου τὸ δόγμα εἰσάγεται.

[60A] ἕτερον πρόβλημα.

Fr.8 Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συνεχῶν, πολλάκις φέρομεν τὸν ἀριθμὸν· δύο φέρε εἰπεῖν πήχεων τὸ ξύλον λέγοντες· ἀλλὰ δυνάμει δύο φαμέν εἶναι τὸ ἐν οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ τῷ δὲ δύνασθαι τομὴν ὑπομένειν καὶ δύο γενέσθαι, ταύτη φαμέν αὐτὸ³³ δύο τινῶν πήχεων εἶναι

ἕτερον πρόβλημα.

Fr.9 Εἰ ὁ Χριστὸς εἷς ἐστὶν ὀνόματί τε καὶ πράγματι· πᾶς δὲ ὀρισμὸς εἷς ὢν εἰ μὴ ὁμώνυμος εἴη μιᾶς φύσεως δηλωτικός ἐστι, καὶ ὁ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἄρα ὀρισμὸς³⁴, μιᾶς τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως δηλωτικός ἐστὶν· εἰ δὲ καθ' ὑμᾶς³⁵ αἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ

²⁹ δηπουθεν PV δηπου MO

³⁰ correxi ex Syr διασκεψεως codd

³¹ και codd om Mai

³² ἡνώσθαι PVM ἐνώσθαι O

³³ αὐτο VMO αὐτον P

³⁴ ὀρισμος codd corr i mg Moreau ἀριθμός in textu Moreau Mai

³⁵ ὑμᾶς PVM ἡμᾶς O

δύο³⁶ φύσεις δύο ἔχουσιν ὁρισμοὺς οὐ ταυτὸ δηλοῦντας, καὶ ὁ [60B] Χριστὸς ἄρα εἷς ὢν, δύο ὁρισμοὺς ἔξει, οὐ ταυτὸ³⁷ δηλοῦντας; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο³⁸ ἀδύνατον, παντὸς γὰρ πράγματος ἑνὸς ὄντος εἷς ἐστὶ καὶ³⁹ ὁρισμὸς, οὐκ ἄρα δύο
 5 ἔξει καὶ⁴⁰ ὁρισμοὺς ὁ Χριστὸς· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ δύο ἔσσονται αὐτοῦ αἱ φύσεις· ἕκαστος γὰρ ὁρισμὸς, μιᾶς φύσεως ἐστὶ δηλωτικὸς· εἴτε ἀπλοῦς εἴτε σύνθετος.

ἕτερον⁴¹.

10 **Fr.10** Εἰ τὸ Χριστὸς ὄνομα οὐκ οὐσίας δηλωτικὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τινὸς τῶν ἐκ τῆς ἐνώσεως τῶν δύο φύσεων γενομένων δηλωτικὸν ἐστὶ· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστίν, ἢ ἡ τῶν φύσεων πρὸς ἀλλήλας σχέσις· δύο δὲ φύσεις <εἰ⁴²> καὶ ἐνωθεῖσαι μεμενήκασιν ἐν Χριστῷ, κατὰ μόνην ἄρα
 15 σχέσιν [60C] ψιλὴν ἢ τῶν φύσεων πρὸς ἀλλήλας γέγονεν ἐνωσις· ὥς ἐπὶ χοροῦ καὶ οἰκίας καὶ πόλεως καὶ λίθων καὶ ξύλων ἐν οἷς τὸ οἰκοδομούμενον· καθὼς καὶ⁴³ Νεστόριος δογματίζων εὐρίσκεται.

20 ἕτερον⁴⁴.

Fr.11 Εἰ τὰ ἡνωμένα ἐν γίνεται· τὰ μὴ γενόμενα ἐν, οὐχ' ἡνῶται ἐξ ἀνάγκης· εἰ οὖν δύο καὶ οὐ μία τυγχάνουσιν αἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ φύσεις· ἡ δὲ δυὰς διχᾶς τις⁴⁵ οὔσα διαιρέσεως ἐστὶ δηλωτικὴ, τὰ δὲ διηρημένα οὐχ' ἡνῶται, οὐκ ἄρα ἡνωμένοι
 25 εἰσὶν αἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ φύσεις· εἰ τοίνυν διὰ τὸ ἀσύγχυτον δύο εἶναι τὰς τοῦ Χριστοῦ φύσεις ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐνωσιν, μίαν αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν λέγειν ἀναγκασθήσονται.

[60D] ἕτερον⁴⁶.

30 **Fr.12** Οὐχ' ὅσαι πράγματος ἐκάστου ιδιότητες⁴⁷, τοσαῦται καὶ φύσεις τούτου εἰσίν. ἢ γὰρ ἂν οὐδὲν τῶν ἐχόντων ἰδίαν

³⁶ δύο PV. om. MO

³⁷ ταυτὸ PVM. τοῦτο O

³⁸ τοῦτο VMO (add s I M) Syr. om P

³⁹ ἐστὶ καὶ PM· ἐστὶν ὁ O: legi non potest V

⁴⁰ καὶ PVM om O

⁴¹ ἕτερον PVM πρόβλημα add O

⁴² εἰ inserui ex Syr. om codd

⁴³ καὶ PVM om. O

⁴⁴ ἕτερον PVM. πρόβλημα add. O

⁴⁵ τις PVM: τιν O τε Mai

⁴⁶ ἕτερον PVM. πρόβλημα add. O

⁴⁷ ιδιότητες PVM. ιδιοσητος O

ὑπαρξιν, μιᾷς ἔσται φύσεως πλειόνων ιδιοτήτων ἤτοι
 διαφορῶν ἐν ἐκάστω θεωρουμένων· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ πάντων
 σύγκριμα τῶν συμπληρούντων τὸ ὑποκείμενον, φύσις ἐστί.
 5 πυρὸς μὲν γὰρ τὸ φωτιστικὸν καὶ τὸ κοῦφον, ἴδιον· ἀλλ' οὐ
 φύσιν πυρὸς τὸ φωτιστικὸν ἢ τὸ κοῦφον εἶναι φαμέν· ὥσπερ
 καὶ ἄερος ιδιότητες τὸ ἀχρωμάτιστον, τὸ διηχὲς ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων στοιχείων ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν ἐτέρας ιδιότητας· ἀλλ'
 οὐδεὶς τολμήσει διὰ τὸ πολλὰς ἕκαστον τούτων ιδιότητας
 10 ἔχειν, οὕτω καὶ πολλῶν εἰπεῖν⁴⁸ εἶναι φύσεων· οὕτω τοῖνυν
 καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ [61A] συνεστῶτος ἐκ θεότητος καὶ
 ἀνθρωπότητος.

Fr.13

εἰ μὲν λέγοιεν δύο τὰς αὐτοῦ φύσεις ἢ ἐν δύο φύσεσιν αὐτὸν
 θεωρεῖσθαι· ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι θεωρεῖσθαι
 15 λέγομεν· ἢ καὶ τοσάδε εἶναι τὰ τοῦ ὅλου⁴⁹ μέρη· τὸ ἐν τὸ
 ἐκ τῆς πάντων ἐνώσεως ἀποτετελεσμένον γινώσκοντες· ὡς
 εἰ καὶ τὸ τρίγωνον ἐν τρισὶν εὐθείαις ὑφεστάναι λέγοι τίς·
 αὐτοῦ τοῦ τριγώνου σχήματος ἐνὸς ὄντος τοῦ ἐκ⁵⁰ τῆς
 20 συναφῆς τῶν τριῶν εὐθειῶν ἀποτετελεσμένου· καὶ ἔτι⁵¹ τὴν
 οἰκίαν ἐν λίθοις εἶναι καὶ ξύλοις ἐνὸς πάλιν τοῦ τῆς οἰκίας
 εἰδους ὑπάρχοντος· ὅπερ ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνων συνθέσεως
 γέγονεν· ἴσως ἂν τις συγχωρήσειε⁵² τῷ λόγῳ· εἰ γὰρ τὰ ἐξ
 ὧν ὁ Χριστὸς δύο, ἴσον ἂν εἴη τό, τε ἐκ δύο φύσεων τὸν
 25 Χριστὸν εἶναι λέγειν, καὶ τὸ ἐν δύο φύσεσι καὶ τὸ τρίγωνον
 ἐν τρισὶν εὐθείαις καὶ ἐκ τριῶν· καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν⁵³
 εἰρημένων ἕκαστον. [61B] ὡς περὶ μόνην τὴν λέξιν καὶ μὴ
 περὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς λέξεως νοούμενον, τὴν διαφορὰν εἶναι· ὡς
 30 ἐξεῖναι μίαν τὴν τοῦ συνθέτου φύσιν λέγειν, ἐν δύο ταῖς
 ἀπλαῖς τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσαν· ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι πολλοῖς
 οὔσι, μίαν τὴν ὁλότητα εἶναι φαμέν. εἰ δὲ μηδαμοῦ μίαν
 τοῦ ὅλου τὴν φύσιν σύνθετον δηλονότι φασί, καὶ ἡμεῖς τὴν
 ἐν δύο φωνὴν ὑποπτεύσομεν δικαιοτάτα·

Fr.14

καὶ οὔτε διὰ τὸ ἓνα εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν ἀρνησόμεθα⁵⁴ τὰ ἐξ
 ὧν τὸ ἐν τοῦτο συνέστηκεν· οὔτ' αὖ πάλιν διὰ τὸ δύο

⁴⁸ εἰπεῖν P (add. s. l.): om VMO: [εἰπεῖν] Moreau

⁴⁹ ὅλου V Syr: λόγου PMO Mai

⁵⁰ τοῦ ἐκ PM. ἐν O: non legi potest V

⁵¹ ἔτι PVM ἐπὶ O

⁵² συγχωρήσειε PVM: χωρήσειε O

⁵³ τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν PV: τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν M: τῶν λοιπῶν O

⁵⁴ ἀρνησομεθα codd. ἀρνοῦμεθα Moreau Mai

γνωρίζειν τὰς εἰς ἔνωσιν συνελθούσας φύσεις, τὸ ἓν τὸ ἐκ
 τούτων ἀποτελεσθὲν⁵⁵ οὐχ' ὁμολογήσομεν· ὅπερ εἴτε φύσιν
 μίαν καλεῖν τινι φίλον εἴτε ὑπόστασιν εἴτε Χριστὸν ἓνα,
 οὐ διαφερόμεθα· δι' ἑκάστου γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ
 συνεισάγεται.

5

⁵⁵ ἀποτελεσθὲν PVM: ἀποτεσθὲν Q

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